This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

**Usage guidelines**

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

**About Google Book Search**

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

J. Giles
Queen's College
Oxford

27511

XG94.8 MAC

Lucy Kirby

# THE

# WORKS

# OF

# NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.

VOL. IV.

THE

# WORKS

OF

# NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State to the Republic of FLORENCE.

Tranſlated from the ORIGINALS;

ILLUSTRATED WITH

NOTES, ANNOTATIONS, DISSERTATIONS,

And ſeveral New Plans on the ART of WAR,

By ELLIS FARNEWORTH, M. A.

Late Vicar of Roſthern in CHESHIRE,

Tranſlator of the Life of POPE SIXTUS V. and
DAVILLA's Hiſtory of the Civil Wars of FRANCE.

THE SECOND EDITION, CORRECTED.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

---

LONDON,
Printed for T. DAVIES, Ruſſel-Street, Covent-Garden; J. DODSLEY,
Pall-Mall; J. ROBSON, New Bond-Street; G. ROBINSON, Pater-
noſter-Row; T. BECKET, T. CADELL, and T. EVANS, Strand.
MDCCLXXV.

# THE

# ART OF WAR.

IN SEVEN BOOKS.

WRITTEN BY

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State to the Republic of Florence.

## BOOK I.

# THE

# FRENCH TRANSLATOR's

## ADVERTISEMENT to the READER.

ALTHOUGH the manner of making war is very different at preſent from what it was in Machiavel's days, his Treatiſe, or rather Dialogues, upon that ſubject may ſtill be of great uſe. For in the firſt place, they are written by a Genius of the higheſt rank, and founded upon ſome general Principles which will always hold good: and in the next, (beſides the pleaſure of ſeeing what alteration is made in this Science by Time) they may furniſh other men of parts and abilities with ſome uſeful and improveable hints; eſpecially thoſe that follow the profeſſion of arms. There are further many judicious Reflexions in the courſe of this Work, which cannot fail of being very agreeable to Connoiſſeurs: and towards the ſecond Book, the Author launches out into a digreſſion, in which he ſhews with great perſpicuity to what cauſes it is chiefly owing, that the number of eminent Commanders is greater or leſs in different times and places.

* * * * * * * * *

N. B. *The reſt of this Advertiſement is wholly taken up in elucidating ſome military terms and phraſes, which ſhall be explained in their proper places hereafter. But as there was an old Engliſh Tranſlation of Machiavel's* Art of War, *publiſhed in the year* 1588, *by one Peter Whitehorne, who calls himſelf* Student of Gray's Inn, *I ſhall take the liberty of preſenting the Reader with his Dedication of it* *to Queen Elizabeth: for though the language is now grown obſolete and uncouth, yet the Sentiments are juſt and worthy of obſervation. The Tranſlation indeed is a very bad one, and not intelligible at preſent: the Dedication is as follows.*

To the moſt high and excellent Princes ELIZABETH, by the grace of God Queene of England, Fraunce, and Ireland, defender of the Faith, and of the Church of England, and Ireland, on Earth next under God, the ſupreme Governour.

ALTHOUGH commonly every man, moſt worthy and renommed Soueraigne, ſeeketh ſpecially to commende and extoll the thing, whereunto he feeleth himſelfe naturally bent and inclined; yet all ſuch partialitie and private affection laid aſide, it is to be thought (that for the defence, maintenance, and advauncement of a Kingdom, or Common Weale, or for the good and due obſervation of peace, and adminiſtracion of juſtice in the ſame) no one thing can be more profitable, neceſſarie, or more honourable, than the knowledge of Service in warre, and deeds of armes, becauſe conſidering the ambition of the World, it is impoſſible for any Realme or Dominion long to continue free in quietnes and ſavegard, where the defence of the Sword is not alwaies in a readineſſe. For like as the Greekes, being occupied about trifling matters, taking pleaſure in refiting of Comedies, and ſuch other vaine things altogether neglecting Martiall feats, gave occaſion to Philip King of Macedonia, father to Alexander the great, to oppreſſe and to bring them in ſervitude under his ſubjection: even ſo undoubtedly, libertie will not be kept, but men ſhall be troden under foote, and brought to moſt horrible miſerie and calamitie, if they giving themſelves to paſtimes and pleaſure, forſake the juſt regard of their own defence, and ſavegard of their countrie, which in temporall regiment, chiefly conſiſteth in warlike ſkilfulnes. And therefore the auncient Captaines and mightie Conquerours, ſo long as they floriſhed, did deviſe with moſt great diligence, all manner of wayes to bring their men to the perfect knowledge of what ſo ever thing appertained to the warre, as manifeſtly appeareth by the warlike games, which in olde times the Princes of Grecia ordained upon the mount Olimpus, and alſo by the orders and exerciſes, that the auncient Romanes uſed in ſundrie places, and eſpecially in Campo Martio, and in their wonderfull ſumptuous Theaters, which chiefly they builded to that purpoſe. Whereby they not onely made their Souldiours ſo expert, that they obtained with a few, in fighting againſt a great huge multitude of enemies, ſuch marvailous victories, as in many credible hiſtories are mentioned, but alſo by the ſame meanes, their unarmed raſcall people that followed their Campes, got ſuch underſtanding in the feats of warre, that they in the day of battail, being left deſtitute of ſuccour, were able without any other helpe to ſet themſelves in good order, for their defence againſt the enemie, that would ſeeke to hurt them, and in ſuch dangerous times, have done their countrie ſo good ſervice, that verie often by their helpe, the adverſaries have beene put to flight, and fieldes moſt happily wonne. So that the antiquitie eſteemed nothing more happy in a common weale, then to have in the ſame many men ſkilfull in warlike affaires: by meanes whereof their Empire continually inlarged, and moſt wonderfully and triumphantly proſpered. For ſo long as men for their valiauntnes, were then rewarded and had in eſtimacion, glad was he that could finde occaſion to venter, yea and ſpend his life to benefite his countrie: as by the manly actes that Marcus Curtius, Oratius Cocles, and Gaius Mucius did for the ſavegard of Rome, and alſo by other innumerable examples, doth plainly appeare. But when through long and continual peace, they began to be altogether given to pleaſure and delicatenes, litle regarding Martial feats, nor ſuch as were expert in the practiſe thereof, their dominion and eſtates did not ſo much before increaſe and proſper, as then by ſuch meanes and overſight, they ſodainly fell into decay and utter ruine. For ſuch truly is the nature and condicion, both of peace and warre, that where in government there is not had equall conſideracion of them both, the one in fine doth worke and induce the other's oblivion, and utter abbolicion. Wherefore, ſith the neceſſitie of the ſcience of warres is ſo great, and alſo the neceſſarie uſe thereof ſo manifeſt, that even Ladie Peace hir ſelfe, doth in manner from thence crave hir chiefe defence and preſervacion, and the worthineſſe moreover and honour of the ſame ſo great, that as by proofe wee ſee, the perfect glorie thereof, cannot eaſilie finde roote, but in the hearts of moſt noble, courageous, and manlike perſonages. I thought moſt excellent Princes, I could not either to the ſpecial gratefying of your highnes, the univerſal delight of al ſtudious gentlemen, or the common utilitie of the publique wealth, imploy my laboures more profitable in accompliſhing of my dutie and good will, then in ſetting forth ſomething, that might induce to the augmenting and increaſe of the knowledge thereof: and eſpecially the example of your highneſſes moſt politike government over us, giving plaine teſtimonie of the wonderfull prudent deſire that is in you, to have your people inſtructed in this kind of ſervice, as well for the better defence of your Highnes, themſelves, and their countrie, as alſo to diſcourage thereby, and be able to reſiſt the malignitie of the enemie, who otherwiſe would ſeeke paradventure to invade this noble realme or kingdome.

When therefore, about ten yeares paſt, in the

Emperour's warre's againſt the Mores and certain Turkes, being in Barbarie: at the ſiege and winning of Calibbia, Moneſterio, and Affrica, I had as well for my further inſtruction in thoſe affaires, as alſo the better to acquaint mee with the Italian tongue, reduced into Engliſh, the book called The arte of Warre, of the famous and excellent Nicholas Machiavel, which in times paſt, he being a counſailour, and Secretairie of the noble citie of Florence, not without his great laud and praiſe did write: and having lately againe, ſomewhat peruſed the ſame, the which in ſuch continuall broyles, and unquietnes, was by me tranſlated, I determined with my ſelfe, by publiſhing thereof, to beſtow as great a gift (ſince greater I was not able) amongſt my countrie men, not expert in the Italian tongue, as in like works I had ſeene before mee, the Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Spaniardes, and other forreine nacions, moſt lovingly to have beſtowed among theirs: the rather undoubtedly, that as by private reading of the ſame booke, I then felt my ſelfe, in that knowledge marvailouſly holpen and increaſed, ſo by communicating the ſame to many, our Engliſhmen finding out the ordering and diſpoſing of exploites of warre therein contained, the aide and direction of theſe plaine and briefe precepts, might no leſſe in knowledge of warres become incomparable, then in prooves alſo and exerciſe of the ſame altogether invincible: which my tranſlacion, moſt gracious Soveraigne, together with ſuch other thinges, as by mee hath bene gathered, and thought good to adde thereunto, I have preſumed to dedicate unto your highneſs, not onely becauſe the whole charge and furniture of warlike counſailes and preparations, being determined by the arbitremen of Governours and Princes, the treatiſe alſo of like effect ſhould in like manner as of right depend upon the protection of a moſt worthy and noble Patroneſſe, but alſo that the diſcourſe itſelfe, and the worke of a foraine author, under the paſport and ſafe conduite of your highnes moſt noble name, might by ſpeciall authoritie of the ſame, winne amongſt your Majeſties ſubjectes, much better credite and eſtimacion. And if, moſt mighty Queene, in this kinde of Philoſophie, (if I may ſo terme it) grave and ſage counſailes, learned and wittie precepts, or pollitike and prudent admonicions, ought not to be accounted the leaſt and baſeſt jewells of weale publike; then dare I boldly affirme, that of many ſtraungers, which from forreine countries, have heretofore in this your Majeſties realme arrived, there is none in compariſon to be preferred, before this worthy Florentine and Italian, who having freelye without any gaine of exchaunge (as after ſome acquaintaunce and familiaritie will better appear) brought with him moſt ritch, rare and plentifull Treaſure, ſhall deſerve, I truſt of all good Engliſh hearts, moſt lovingly and friendly to bee intertained, imbraced and cheriſhed; whoſe new Engliſh apparel, how ſo ever it ſhall ſeeme by mee, after a groſſe faſhion, more fitly appointed to the Campe, then in nice termes atired to the Carpet, and in courſe clothing rather put foorth to battaile, then in any brave ſhew prepared to the banket; nevertheleſſe my good will I truſt, ſhall of your grace be taken in good part, having faſhioned the phraiſe of my rude ſtile, even according to the purpoſe of my travaile, which was rather to profite the deſirous man of warre, then to delight the ears of the fine Rethorician, or daintie curious ſcholeman. Moſt humbly beſeeching your highnes, ſo to accept my labour herein, as the firſt frutes of a poore Souldiour's ſtudie, who to the uttermoſt of his ſmal power, in the ſervice of your moſt gratious majeſtie, and of his countrie, will at all times, according to his boundent dutie and allegeaunce, promptly yeeld himſelfe to any labour, travaile or daunger, what ſo ever ſhall happen. Praying in the meane ſeaſon the almightie God, to give your highnes in a long proſperous raigne, perfect health, deſired tranquilitie, and againſt all your enemies, lucky and joyful victorie.

Your humble Subject and dayly

Oratour,

PETER WHITEHORNE.

# THE

# AUTHOR's PREFACE,

ADDRESSED TO

## Lorenzo Strozzi, Nobleman of Florence.

MANY are now of opinion, My Dear Lorenzo, that no two things are more diſcordant and incongruous than a civil and a military Life. Hence we ſee daily, that when a man goes into the army, he preſently changes, not only his dreſs, but his behaviour, his company, his air, his manner of ſpeaking, and affects to throw off all appearance of any thing that may look like common life and converſation. For a man that is to be ready equipped for any ſort of violence, deſpiſes the formal garb of a Citizen, and thinks no dreſs fit for his purpoſe but a ſuit of armour: and as to civility and politeneſs, how can we expect to find any ſuch thing in one who imagines it would make him look effeminate, and rather be a hindrance to his preferment than otherwiſe; eſpecially when he thinks it his duty, inſtead of talking and looking like other men, to fright every body he meets with a volley of oaths, and a terrible pair of whiſkers? This indeed gives ſome countenance to ſuch an opinion, and makes people look upon a ſoldier as a different ſort of a creature from all other men.

But if we conſider the nature of government, and the inſtitutions of the Ancients, we ſhall find a very ſtrict and intimate relation betwixt theſe two conditions; and that they are not only compatible and conſiſtent with each other, but neceſſarily connected and united together. For all the arts and ſciences which have been introduced into ſociety for the common benefit of mankind, and all the ordinances that have been eſtabliſhed to make them live in the fear of God, and obedience to human Laws, would be vain and inſignificant, if not ſupported and defended by a military force; which, when properly conducted and applied, will maintain thoſe ordinances and keep up their authority, though perhaps they may not be altogether perfect and without flaw or defect in themſelves. But the beſt ordinances in the world will be deſpiſed and trampled under foot, if not upheld as they ought to be by a military power; like a magnificent Palace that is uncovered at the top, which though full of jewels and coſtly furniture, muſt ſoon moulder into ruin, as it has nothing but its ſplendor and riches to defend it from the injuries of the weather. The ancient Lawgivers and Governors of Kingdoms and Republics took great care therefore to inſpire all their ſubjects, but particularly their ſoldiers, with fidelity, love of peace, and the fear of God. For who ought to be more faithful than a man that is entruſted with the ſafety of his country, and has ſworn to defend it to the laſt drop of his blood? Who ought to be fonder of peace than thoſe that ſuffer by nothing but war? Who is under greater obligations to worſhip God than Soldiers, who are daily expoſed to innumerable dangers, and have moſt occaſion for his protection? Theſe things being well conſidered by thoſe who governed States and modelled armies in former times, and ſtrongly enforced upon others that were under their command, had ſuch an effect upon their conduct and behaviour, that the life of a ſoldier was edifying and ſerved as a pattern for others. But ſince our diſcipline is now depraved to ſuch a degree, that it is totally different from what it anciently was, it is no wonder that men have ſo bad an opinion of a military life, and endeavour, as much as they can, to avoid the company and converſation of all ſuch as follow the profeſſion of arms.

As I am of opinion, therefore, from what I have both ſeen and read, that it is not even yet impoſſible to revive the diſcipline of our anceſtors, and in ſome meaſure to retrieve the reputation of our ſoldiery, I have written the following treatiſe concerning the Art of War, as well for the improvements of others who are deſirous to imitate the Ancients in warlike exploits, as for my own private ſatisfaction, and to avoid the imputation of ſpending my leiſure in idleneſs. Now, though perhaps it may ſeem a preſumptuous undertaking to treat of an Art which I never profeſſed; yet I cannot help thinking myſelf more excuſable than ſome other people, who have taken upon them the actual exerciſe of it: for an error in my writings may eaſily be corrected, without prejudice to any body; but an error in their practice may ruin a whole State. Conſider the nature of this work then, good Lorenzo, and freely beſtow either your cenſure or commendation upon it, as you think it juſtly deſerves. I inſcribe it to you, not only as a teſtimony of my gratitude, (though conſcious to myſelf how ſmall a return it is for the favours I have received from you) but becauſe it is uſual to addreſs things of this nature to perſons who are diſtinguiſhed by their nobility, their riches, their great parts, or munificence; and I know very well that in birth and fortune you have not many equals, ſtill fewer in parts, and in generoſity and liberality, none at all.

# THE

# ART OF WAR.

---

## BOOK I.

### THE CONTENTS.

*Fabrizio Colonna refreſhing himſelf in Coſimo Rucellai's gardens at Florence, enters into a converſation concerning the Art of War. That an honeſt man ought not to make war his only profeſſion. That no Prince or Republic ſhould ſuffer any of their Subjects to make war their only occupation. In what countries the beſt Soldiers are to be raiſed. Whether it is better to take them out of towns, or out of the country. The conveniencies and inconveniencies of trained Bands, or a ſettled Militia. Of what ſort of men an Army ought to be compoſed. How the Romans raiſed their Legions. Whether a Militia ſhould be numerous, or not. How to prevent the inconveniencies to which a Militia is ſubject. Of raiſing and paying Cavalry.*

SINCE it is allowable, I think, to ſpeak well of any man after he is dead, becauſe there can then be no longer any imputation or ſuſpicion of flattery, I willingly take this opportunity of doing juſtice to the memory of my dear deceaſed friend Coſimo Rucellai, whoſe name I never remember without tears; as I knew him to be poſſeſſed of every quality that his friends and country could wiſh for in a worthy man and a good Citizen. For I am very certain he would chearfully have ſacrificed all that he had in the world, and even life itſelf, for his friends; and that there was no enterprize how difficult and dangerous ſoever, which he would not have undertaken for the good of his country. And I muſt acknowledge, that amongſt all the men I ever was acquainted with, I never met with any one whoſe heart was more diſpoſed to great and generous actions. The only thing that he lamented at his death, was, that it ſhould be his fate to die ſo young, and in his own houſe, without honour, or the ſatisfaction of having ſerved any man in ſo effectual a manner as he paſſionately deſired to have done; ſo that he was afraid (as he told his familiar acquaintance) nothing more could be ſaid of him after he was dead, than that they had loſt a good friend. But as his actions are ſunk in oblivion, and ſcarce any of his acquaintance remaining, I think it proper to give this teſtimony of his virtues, and many amiable accompliſhments. Time indeed has ſpared ſome ſmall ſpecimens of the ſprightleſs of his Genius, conſiſting chiefly of love Sonnets, which (though he was not of an amorous turn) he compoſed at vacant hours in his youth, to avoid being altogether idle, and to entertain himſelf as well as others, till he ſhould find it neceſſary to employ his thoughts upon ſubjects of a higher and more ſerious nature. But even from theſe little ſamples, it appears how happy he was in expreſſing his conceptions, and what a figure he might have made in Poetry, if he had thought it worth his while to give himſelf wholly up to it.

Since fortune therefore has deprived us of ſo valuable a friend, the only remedy we have left, is to conſole ourſelves as well as we can with the remembrance of his company, and the recollection of ſuch things, whether of a pleaſant or ſerious caſt, as we have often admired in him whilſt he lived. And becauſe the converſation that happened not long ago in his gardens, betwixt him and Fabrizio

Colonna, concerning the Art of War (at which I and ſome other friends were preſent) is the freſheſt upon my memory, I will endeavour to recollect what I can of it, and commit it to writing: for as Fabrizio laid open the myſteries of that art with great perſpicuity on one ſide, and ſeveral pertinent queſtions were propoſed, many objections ſtarted, and divers arguments ſupported with no leſs ſtrength of reaſon by Coſimo on the other; a ſummary account of that conference may ſerve not only to revive the remembrance of his abilities in the minds of ſuch friends as were then met together, but to make thoſe that were abſent regret they were not there, and to recapitulate to others the ſubſtance of various topics (no leſs uſeful in a civil than a military life) at that time handled in a very maſterly manner, by a great and experienced man. But to our purpoſe.

Fabrizio Colonna returning from the wars in Lombardy, where he had commanded his Catholic Majeſty's forces a conſiderable time with great reputation, took Florence in his way, with a deſign to repoſe himſelf a few days in that City, and to viſit the Duke and ſome other Gentlemen there, with whom he was acquainted. Coſimo Rucellai therefore invited him to ſpend a day with him in his gardens; not merely to gratify his natural turn to hoſpitality and politeneſs, but in hopes likewiſe of being indulged in a long converſation with him concerning ſeveral things he wanted to know, and of which he thought he could not have a better opportunity of informing himſelf, than from the mouth of ſo great a man. The invitation being freely accepted by Fabrizio, he came to the Gardens at the time appointed, where he was received by Coſimo, and ſome of his moſt intimate friends, amongſt whom were Zanobi Buondelmonti, Batiſta dalla Palla, and Luigi Alamanni, (all young men, very dear to him, of the ſame diſpoſition, and engaged in the ſame ſtudies) whoſe virtues and good qualities are ſo well known to every body, that it would be altogether unneceſſary to ſay any thing here in praiſe of them.——To be as brief as I can, Fabrizio was regaled there with all poſſible demonſtrations of honour and reſpect: but after the entertainment and uſual formalities were over (which generally are few and ſhort amongſt men of ſenſe, who are more deſirous of gratifying the rational appetite) the days being long, and the weather intenſely hot, Coſimo, under a pretence of avoiding the heat, took his gueſts into the moſt retired and ſhady part of the Gardens; and being all ſat down, ſome upon the graſs (which was very green and pleaſant) and ſome upon ſeats placed under the trees; Fabrizio ſaid it was a moſt delightful garden, and looking earneſtly at ſome of the trees, ſeemed not to known the names of them; but Coſimo being aware of it, immediately ſaid, perhaps you may not be acquainted with this ſort of trees; and indeed I am not at all ſurpriſed at it, for they are very old ones, and were much more in vogue amongſt our anceſtors than they are at preſent. Having then told him the names of them, and that they were planted by his Grandfather Bernardo, who was fond of ſuch amuſements: I thought ſo, replied Fabrizio; and both the place and the trees put me in mind of ſome Princes in the Kingdom of Naples, who took much delight in planting groves and ſhady arbours, to ſhelter them from the heat.——Here he ſtopped ſhort, and after he had pauſed a little while, proceeded in this manner.——If I was not afraid of giving offence (ſaid he) I would tell you my opinion of theſe things: and yet I think none of you will be affronted at what is ſaid amongſt friends in free converſation; not with any deſign to vilify or depreciate ſuch a taſte, but for the ſake of a little innocent argumentation. How much better then would thoſe Princes have done

(I ſpeak it without intending to reflect upon their memories) if they had endeavoured to imitate the ancients in bearing hardſhips, inſtead of giving themſelves up to eaſe and indolence, in doing ſuch actions as are performed in the ſunſhine, and not in the ſhade; in following their example whilſt they continued hardy and honeſt, and not when they became delicate and corrupt; for after that our country ſoon fell into ruin and diſtraction.—— You have now introduced a ſubject, ſaid Coſimo (but to avoid the frequent and tireſome repetition of "ſuch a one ſaid, ſuch a one anſwered, and ſuch a one replied," I ſhall hereafter only prefix the name of the ſeveral ſpeakers, to what they ſaid in the courſe of this converſation) you have now introduced a ſubject which I have long wiſhed to hear thoroughly diſcuſſed, and therefore ſhould take it as a particular favour, if you would ſpeak your ſentiments of it freely, and without reſerve, or fear of offending any one here: for my own part, I will take the liberty of propoſing ſome queſtions and doubts to you, in which I ſhould be glad to be ſatisfied; but if I ſhall ſeem either to impeach or excuſe any one's conduct in my queſtions or replies, it will not be for the ſake of blaming or defending them, but for better information, if I ſhould miſtake in my judgment.

Fabrizio. It will be a great pleaſure to me, I can aſſure you, on the other hand, to give you all the ſatisfaction I can in ſuch queſtions as you ſhall think fit to propoſe to me; but I will not pretend to obtrude my opinions upon you as deciſive and infallible; when you have heard them, I beg you will judge for yourſelf: perhaps I may now and then aſk you a queſtion too in my turn, and make no doubt but I ſhall receive as much ſatisfaction at leaſt, in your anſwers, as you will do in mine: for it often happens that a pertinent queſtion puts a man upon conſidering ſome things, and gives him light into many others, which otherwiſe he would never have thought of or known.

Cosimo. Let us return then, if you pleaſe, to what you ſaid of my Grandfather and ſome others, who you think would have done better to have imitated the example of the ancients in a hardy and active manner of living, than in making ſuch proviſions for eaſe and luxury. As for my Grandfather, I ſhall make ſome ſort of apology for him; and leave the others to be dealt with as you pleaſe; for I do not believe there was any man of his time, who deteſted a ſoft and delicate way of life more than he did, or was a greater friend to toil and labour. Nevertheleſs, he found it impoſſible either for himſelf or his ſons to practiſe what he moſt approved; for ſuch was the corruption of the age he lived in, that if any one had ſpirit enough to deviate ever ſo little from the common cuſtoms and manner of living in thoſe times, he would have been laughed at and ridiculed by every body. So that if a man ſhould have expoſed himſelf naked upon a ſandy beach to the heat of a noon-day ſun in the middle of ſummer, or rolled himſelf in ſnow in the depth of winter, as Diogenes did, he would have been looked upon as a madman: if any one had brought up his children, like the Spartans in cottages or farm-houſes; if he had accuſtomed them to ſleep in the open air, to go barehead and barefoot, to bathe in the coldeſt ſtreams, in order not only to make them bear hardſhips the better, but to deſpiſe both life and death, he would have been accounted a beaſt rather than a man: if, laſtly, he had lived upon pulſe and roots and ſuch ſort of things, if he had made no account of money, like Frabricius of old, he might perhaps have been admired by ſome few, but he would have been followed by nobody. My Grandfather therefore was diſcouraged from imitating the example of the ancients, in thoſe things, by the general practice of the times, and forced to content himſelf with doing it in others, which did not lay him ſo open to the charge of affecting ſingularity.

FABRIZIO. You have made a very handſome apology for your Grandfather in that particular, Sir; and there is indeed much truth and reaſon in it. But in what I ſaid of imitating the ancients in their manner of living, I did not mean to carry matters to ſuch extremities as you ſeem to think, but to propoſe ſome other things of a gentler and more practicable nature, and ſuch as would be more ſuitable to the preſent times; which I think might very well be eſtabliſhed, if they were introduced and countenanced by ſome man of authority in the State. And if we conſider the practice and inſtitutions obſerved by the old Romans (whoſe example I am always fond of recommending) we ſhall find many things worthy of imitation, which may eaſily be tranſplanted into any other ſtate, if it is not become totally corrupt.

COSIMO. Pray what things are thoſe?

FABRIZIO. To honour and reward virtue; not to deſpiſe poverty; to keep up good order and diſcipline in their armies; to oblige their Fellow-citizens and Subjects to love one another; to decline faction; to prefer the good of the public to any private intereſt; and other ſuch things which would be compatible enough with theſe times, and may eaſily be introduced if due means were taken for that purpoſe: becauſe they appear ſo reaſonable in themſelves, and the expediency of them is ſo obvious to common ſenſe, that nobody could gainſay or oppoſe them; and he that takes this courſe, plants trees under the ſhade of which he may enjoy himſelf with equal pleaſure, and perhaps more ſecurity, than we do here.

COSIMO. What you have ſaid of this matter admits of no contradiction, and therefore I ſhall leave it to the conſideration of thoſe whom it moſt concerns; but ſhould be glad to know, why you, who blame others for not imitating the ancients in weighty and important concerns, have not thought fit in any wiſe to copy them yourſelf in their military diſcipline, and the Art of War, which is your Profeſſion, and in which you have gained ſo much reputation.

Fabrizio. You are now come to the point I expected: for what I ſaid, muſt naturally lead you to aſk ſuch a queſtion; and, for my own part, I ſhall moſt willingly give you what ſatisfaction I can. And though I could make a ſhort and ready excuſe for my conduct in this reſpect, yet ſince we have ſo much leiſure, and ſo convenient a place for it, I ſhall diſcuſs the matter at large; eſpecially as it will give me great pleaſure to inform you thoroughly of what you ſeem ſo deſirous to know.—— Men who have any great deſign in hand muſt firſt make all neceſſary preparations, that their plan, when a proper opportunity offers, may be ready to be put in execution. Now when theſe preparations are made with caution and privacy, they are not known or talked of; ſo that a man cannot be blamed for negligence or omiſſion in that reſpect, except ſome accident happens which ſhews that he has either not made due preparations for the executions of his deſign, or never thought of it at all: and therefore, as I never yet had any ſuch opportunity of ſhewing what preparations I have made to revive the military diſcipline of the ancients amongſt us, nobody can reaſonably blame me for not doing it. This might ſerve for a ſufficient anſwer to your charge.

Cosimo. It might ſo indeed, if I was ſure you never had ſuch an opportunity.

Fabrizio. Since you ſeem to doubt of that, I will ſhew you at large (if you will have patience to hear me) what preparations are neceſſary for that purpoſe; what ſort of opportunity is requiſite;

what impediments may obſtruct the preparations, and prevent thoſe opportunities from happening; and laſtly, (which ſeems a contradiction in terms) that it is at the ſame time the eaſieſt and moſt difficult thing in the word to accompliſh ſuch a purpoſe.

Cosimo. You cannot oblige us more: and if you are not tired with ſpeaking, you may aſſure yourſelf we ſhall never be tired of hearing you. But as the ſubject is copious and much to be ſaid upon it, I muſt beg leave to call in the aſſiſtance of theſe friends now and then: and both they and I hope you will not be offended if we ſhould now and then happen to interrupt you with any queſtion that may ſeem unneceſſary or unreaſonable.

Fabrizio. You are all heartily welcome to aſk what queſtions you think fit; for I ſee the ardour and ingenuity of youth incline you to have a favourable opinion of my Profeſſion, and to liſten to what I have to ſay concerning the duties of it: but when men are grown grey-headed, and their blood is frozen in their veins, they generally either hate the very name of a ſoldier, or become ſo poſitive that they can never be argued out of their opinions. Aſk freely then and without reſerve: for that will give me an opportunity of breathing a little ſometimes, as well as ſatisfaction of anſwering your queſtions in ſuch a manner as may leave no doubt or ſcruple remaining upon your minds. ——To begin then with what you ſaid yourſelf, that in the Art of War (which is my Profeſſion) I have not imitated the ancients in any reſpect whatſoever, I anſwer, that War being an occupation by which a man cannot ſupport himſelf with honour at all times, ought not to be followed as a buſineſs by any but Princes or Governors of Commonwealths; and that if they are wiſe men they will not ſuffer any of their Subjects or Citizens to make that their only Profeſſion. Indeed no good man ever did: for ſurely he cannot be called a good man, who exerciſes an employment that obliges him to be rapacious, fraudulent, and cruel at all times, in order to ſupport himſelf; as all thoſe muſt be of courſe (of what rank ſoever they are) who make a trade of war; becauſe it will not maintain them in time of peace: upon which account, they are under a neceſſity either of endeavouring to prevent a peace, or of taking all means to make ſuch proviſions for themſelves in time of war, that they may not want ſuſtenance when it is over *. But neither of theſe courſes is conſiſtent with common honeſty: for whoever reſolves to heap as much in time of war as will ſupport him for ever after, muſt be guilty of robbery, murder, and many other acts of violence upon his friends as well as his enemies: and in endeavouring to prevent a peace, Commanders muſt have recourſe to many pitiful tricks and artifices to deceive thoſe that employ them. But if they fail in their deſigns, and find they cannot prevent a peace, as ſoon as their pay is ſtopped, and they can live no longer in the licentious manner they uſed to do, they ſet up for Soldiers of fortune, and having got a parcel of their diſbanded men together, make no ſcruple of plundering a whole country without mercy or diſtinction. You muſt have heard that when the late wars were over in Italy and the country full of diſbanded Soldiers, they formed themſelves into ſeveral bands, and went about plundering ſome towns and laying others under contribution. You muſt likewiſe have read how the Carthaginian Soldiers (after the firſt war was ended in which they had been engaged with the Romans) aſſembled together under the banners of Matho and Spendius (two officers whom they had choſen in a tumultuary manner to command them) and made a more dangerous war upon their own country, than that

---

* See the Hiſtory of Florence, paſſim.

which had been juſt concluded *. In the days of our Anceſtors, Franciſco Sforza, in order to ſupport himſelf in ſplendour and magnificence in time of peace, not only betrayed the Milaneſe who had employed him in their ſervice, but deprived them of their liberties and made himſelf their Soverign. All the reſt of our Italian Soldiers, who made war their only occupation, acted the ſame part in thoſe times; and if they did not ſucceed in their villanies like Sforza, they were not leſs blameable; for if we conſider their conduct, we ſhall find their deſigns were altogether as iniquitous as his. Sforza, the father of Franciſco, obliged Jane, Queen of Naples, to throw herſelf into the arms of the King of Arragon, by ſuddenly quitting her ſervice and leaving her diſarmed, as it were, in the midſt of her enemies, with an intention either to deprive her of her Kingdom, or at leaſt to extort a great ſum of money from her. Braccio da Montone endeavoured by the ſame arts to have made himſelf King of Naples; and if he had not been routed and killed at Aquila, he would certainly have accompliſhed his deſign †. Such evils, and others of the like nature, are owing to men who make war their only occupation; according to the proverb, "War makes thieves, and Peace hangs them:" for thoſe that know not how to get their bread any other way, when they are diſbanded, finding nobody that has occaſion for their Service, and diſdaining the thougts of living in poverty and obſcurity, are forced to have recouſe to ſuch ways of ſupporting themſelves as generally bring them to the Gallows.

COSIMO. I confeſs, I thought the Profeſſion of a Soldier the moſt honourable of all others; but you have ſet it in ſuch a light, that I am now ſo much out of conceit with it, that if you have not a great

---

* See Polit. Diſc. book III. chap. xxii.

† See the Hiſtory of Florence, book I. towards the end.

deal more to ſay in favour of it, you will leave a doubt upon my mind: for if what you have ſaid be true, how comes it to paſs that the memories of Julius Cæſar, Pompey, Scipio, Marcellus, and many other Roman Generals are immortalized?

FABRIZIO. I have not yet finiſhed what I propoſed to ſay concerning the two points I mentioned a little while ago, viz. that a good man could not make war his only profeſſion; and that no wiſe Prince or Governor of a Commonwealth ought to ſuffer any of their Subjects or Citizens to do it. As to the firſt, I have done with it; and will now proceed to the diſcuſſion of the ſecond: in which I ſhall take an opportunity of anſwering your laſt queſtion.——I ſay then, that Cæſar and Pompey, and almoſt all the Roman Generals who lived after the ſecond Punic war, owed their reputation to their abilities, rather than their virtue: but thoſe that lived before that time acquired their glory by being virtuous as well as able men: for the former made war their ſole occupation, but the latter did not. Whilſt the Roman Republic continued incorrupt, no Citizen, how powerful ſoever he might be, ever preſumed to avail himſelf of that profeſſion in time of peace, in ſuch a manner as to trample upon the laws, to plunder Provinces, or to turn tyrant, and enſlave his country: nor did any private Soldier dare to violate his oath, to enter into faction and cabals, to throw off his allegiance to the Senate, or to ſupport any tyrannical attempt upon the liberties of the Commonwealth, in order to enable himſelf to live by the profeſſion of arms at all times. The Commanders, on the contrary, contenting themſelves with the honour of a Triumph, returned with eagerneſs to their former manner of living; and the private men laid down their arms when a war was over, with much more pleaſure than they had taken them up, and reſumed the calling by which they had got their bread before,

fore, without any hopes of advancing themſelves by plunder and rapine. Of this we have a remarkable and evident proof in the example of Attilius Regulus, who being Commander in Chief of the Roman Armies in Africa, and having in a manner ſubdued the Carthaginians, ſent to deſire leave of the Senate to return home, that he might put his little farm in order again, which had been neglected by his ſervants: from whence it plainly appears, that if war had been his only occupation, and he had deſigned to have made his fortune by it, he would not have deſired leave to return to the care of his little eſtate, when he had ſo many Provinces at his mercy, and might daily have gained more by plundering them than his whole patrimony was worth*. But as good men who make not war their ſole occupation, expect no other reward but glory and honour for their ſervices; ſo when they have obtained that, they cheerfully return to their former way of life. As for the common Soldiers, we ſee that they likewiſe were of the ſame diſpoſition: for though they entered voluntarily into the ſervice when it was neceſſary, they were not leſs glad to return to their families when they were no longer wanted: the truth of which is manifeſt from many circumſtances; particularly from the privilege which the Roman Citizens enjoyed, of not being forced into the army againſt their inclination. So that whilſt that Republic continued well governed (which was till the time of the Gracchi) there never was any Soldier who made war alone his occupation: from whence it came to paſs that few of them were diſſolute and licentious; and thoſe that were ſo were ſeverely puniſhed. Every well governed Commonwealth therefore ſhould take care that this Art of war ſhould be practiſed in time of peace only as an exerciſe; and in time of war, merely out of neceſſity, and for the acquiſition of glory; referring it (when conſidered as a conſtant buſineſs and employment) to be proſecuted by the Public alone: for if any Citizen has any other end or deſign in following this profeſſion, he is not a good man: and if any Commonwealth acts otherwiſe it is ill governed.

---

* See Politic. Diſc. book III. chap. xxv.

Cosimo. I am thoroughly ſatisfied of the reaſonableneſs of what you have hitherto ſaid concerning this matter, and admit the concluſion you have drawn to be very juſt as far as it relates to a Commonwealth: but I cannot tell whether it will hold good with regard to Princes; for I think a Prince ſhould have ſome ſuch perſons about him as make arms their only profeſſion.

Fabrizio. A Kingdom that is well governed ought to be ſtill more afraid of ſuch perſons than a Commonwealth; becauſe they are the corruptors of Princes, and miniſters of their Tyranny. It is vain to urge any Monarchy that now exiſts, as an inſtance to the contrary; for there is not one that is under good regulations. A Kingdom that is well conſtituted never gives the Sovereign power to its Prince in any thing but the command of its armies; in which caſe alone it is abſolutely neceſſary he ſhould have it; becauſe ſudden reſolutions are often neceſſary, and ſuch as cannot be carried into execution ſo ſpeedily as they ought to be, except the ſupreme command is lodged in the hands of one man: in other matters, nothing ought to be done without his Council; and therefore his Counſellors ſhould take particular care not to let ſuch men be too near his perſon, as would be continually adviſing him to make war, whether it is neceſſary or not, becauſe they cannot tell how to ſupport themſelves in time of peace. But I will enlarge a little further upon this ſubject, and not inſiſt merely upon a Kingdom that is perfectly well governed and conſtituted, but content myſelf (for argument's ſake) with ſuch as we ſee at this time. I ſay then that even in ſuch Governments thoſe perſons are much to be feared who make war their only buſineſs; becauſe the ſtrength of all armies, without doubt, conſiſts in their Infantry: ſo that if a Prince has not power enough over his Infantry to make them diſband and return cheerfully to their former occupations when a war is over, he is in a fair way to be ruined. For no ſort of Infantry can be ſo dangerous as that which is compoſed of people who make war their only calling: becauſe a Prince muſt either keep them continually engaged in war, or in conſtant pay during the time of peace, or run the riſque of being ſtripped of his kingdom: but it is impoſſible for any Prince, either to keep them continually engaged in war, or in conſtant pay when it is over; and therefore he muſt run no ſmall riſque of loſing his Kingdom. Whilſt the Romans continued wiſe and good they never ſuffered any of their Citizens to make war their only employment, (as I ſaid before) though they were able to keep them in conſtant pay, becauſe they were continually at war: but in order to avoid the inconveniencies which might have enſued from the toleration of ſuch a cuſtom, they changed their forces (as they could not alter the times) in ſuch a manner, that at the end of every fifteen years, their Legions were filled with new men that were in the flower of their youth; for they took none but ſuch as were betwixt eighteen and thirty-five years of age, in full health and vigour; and never kept them till they grew old and infirm, as the ſame people afterwards did in more corrupt times. For Auguſtus, and after him Tiberius, more careful to eſtabliſh and increaſe their own power than to promote the public good, began to diſarm the Roman people (in order to make them more paſſive under their tyranny) and kept the ſame armies continually on foot upon the confines of the Empire: but not thinking thoſe ſufficient to keep the Senate and people in due awe, they raiſed other forces, called the *Pretorian Bands*, which were always quartered either in the City or near it, and ſerved not only as Guards to the Emperor's perſon, but to bridle the people. Afterwards, however, when the Emperors ſuffered the men who compoſed thoſe Bands to lay aſide all other occupations, and to make war their ſole Profeſſion, they ſoon became inſolent and formidable, not only to the Senate, but to the Emperors themſelves; many of whom they put to death, and then diſpoſed of the Empire as they pleaſed, taking it from one, and giving it to another: nay it frequently happened that different Emperors were elected by different armies at the ſame time; which ſoon occaſioned the diviſion of that Empire, and at laſt the utter ruin of it. A Prince therefore who would reign in ſecurity, ought to make choice of ſuch men alone for his Infantry, as will cheerfully ſerve him in war when it is neceſſary, and be as glad to come back to their own houſes after it is over; which will always be the caſe with thoſe that have other occupations and employments to live upon: for which purpoſe, when a peace is concluded, he ſhould order his Generals and great officers to return to their reſpective charges and Governments; the Gentlemen to the care of their eſtates; and the private men to their particular callings: that ſo every one may be ready to enter into a war to procure a good peace, and no man preſume to diſturb the peace, in order to ſtir up a war.

Cosimo. Indeed, Sir, I think there is much truth and reaſon in what you have ſaid; but as the ſubſtance of it is ſo very different from the judgment I had formed to myſelf of theſe matters, I cannot ſay that I am altogether ſatisfied in ſome reſpects: for I know ſeveral Lords and Gentlemen who are ſupported by the profeſſion of arms alone in time of peace; as yourſelf for inſtance, and ſome others of your rank and quality, who receive penſions from

Princes and ſtates: I ſee likewiſe many Soldiers, ſtill kept in pay for the ſecurity of fortreſſes and other Cities; ſo that it appears to me that there is ſufficient employment and occaſion for them all in time of peace.

FABRIZIO. Surely you cannot be of that opinion: for if there was no other reaſon to convince you of the contrary, the ſmall number of men that is reſerved to garriſon thoſe places might be a ſufficient anſwer to your objection. What proportion is there betwixt a few regiments of Infantry that are neceſſary to defend ſome ſtrong places in time of peace, and thoſe that are to be kept in pay for the proſecution of a war? Are not many more wanted in time of war to reinforce thoſe garriſons, beſides the numbers that are to be employed in the field, which are always diſbanded as ſoon as a peace is concluded? As to the common ſtanding Guards that are requiſite in any State (which need not be many) Pope Julius II. and your own Republic have ſufficiently ſhewn the world how dangerous they thought thoſe people who made war their only occupation, by diſmiſſing them for their inſolence, and hiring Swiſs Guard in their room, who are not only born and brought up in ſtrict obedience to Laws, but picked and choſen by the State in a proper and regular manner: your objection therefore that Soldiers of every kind are neceſſary, and may find ſufficient employment in time of peace as well as war, muſt naturally fall to the ground. But why Horſe and Gens d'Armes ſhould be kept in pay in times of peace, perhaps may not appear ſo obvious: nevertheleſs, if we conſider the matter thoroughly, it may eaſily be accounted for from the corruption of the times. For it is a bad cuſtom introduced by men who make a trade of war, and would be attended with many dangerous conſequences in a State, if any conſiderable number of them was kept in pay; but as there are ſeldom enow to make up an army of themſelves, they can do no great miſchief at preſent; though they have formerly, as I ſhewed before in the caſes of Franciſco Sforza, his father, and Braccio da Montone. It is a bad cuſtom however, and ſuch as I approve not.

Cosimo. Would you have none at all then? Or if you would have any, in what manner would you raiſe and employ them?

Fabrizio. As a Militia; not like the Gens d'Armes of France (who are as inſolent and dangerous as our own) but after the manner of the Antients, who always raiſed their Cavalry out of their own Subjects; and after a war was over, ſent them home again to ſupport themſelves upon their reſpective occupations, as I ſhall ſhew more at large before I have done with this ſubject. So that if troops of horſe are kept together, and receive pay, and live entirely upon it, even in times of peace, it is owing to corruption and bad government. And though indeed I myſelf and ſome other Commanders, whom I know, receive penſions and ſtipends in time of peace, I muſt confeſs I think it a very corrupt cuſtom: for a wiſe and well governed Republic ought never to keep ſuch Commanders in conſtant pay, but rather to employ its own Citizens in time of war, and afterwards to diſmiſs them to follow their former occupations. So likewiſe a Prince, if he would act wiſely, ſhould not allow a penſion or ſtipend to any one in time of peace, except by way of reward for ſome ſignal piece of ſervice, or in order to avail himſelf of ſome able man in time of peace as well as war. And ſince you have pitched upon me as an example of this kind, I will take the charge to myſelf and make the beſt apology I can. I ſay then, that I never made war my ſole buſineſs and occupation: my profeſſion is to govern my ſubjects well, to defend and protect them: for which purpoſe, I ſtudy the arts both of peace and war; and if I am rewarded ed and eſteemed by the Prince whom I have the honour to ſerve, it is not ſo much for the experience I have in military affairs, as becauſe he is pleaſed to retain me as one of his Counſellors in time of peace. A Prince therefore who would govern wiſely ſhould admit no other ſort of perſons into his Confidence: for if his Counſellors are too fond either of peace or war, they will lead him into errors and inconveniencies. Thus much I thought myſelf obliged to ſay in conſequence of what I propoſed at firſt: and if it is not ſatisfactory, I make no doubt but you will be able to find others who can give you better information in the things you ſeemed ſo deſirous of knowing. You begin however, I dare ſay, to be aware how difficult a matter it muſt be to revive the military diſcipline of the Ancients at preſent, what preparations are neceſſary for that purpoſe, and what occaſions and opportunities are wanting to accompliſh it. But if you are not already tired with what I have ſaid, I could throw a little more light upon this ſubject, by comparing the particulars of our modern practice and inſtitutions with the diſcipline of the Ancients.

**Cosimo.** If we were deſirous at firſt to hear you enter into a diſcuſſion of theſe points, we can aſſure you that what you have already ſaid has redoubled that deſire: we thank you therefore moſt heartily for the ſatisfaction you have given us, and earneſtly deſire the favour of you to proceed.

**Fabrizio.** Since it is your pleaſure then, I will deduce this matter from the fountain-head; that ſo I may be enabled to explain myſelf with more perſpicuity, and you to underſtand me the better. ——Whoever engages in a war muſt endeavour by all means to put himſelf in a condition to face his enemy in the field, and to beat him there if poſſible. For this purpoſe, it is neceſſary to form an army; and to form an army, he muſt not only raiſe men, but arm, diſcipline, and exerciſe them frequently, both in ſmall and large bodies; he muſt teach them to encamp and decamp, and make the enemy familiar to them by degrees, ſometimes by marching near them, and ſometimes by taking poſt in a ſituation where they may have a full view of them. Theſe preparations are abſolutely neceſſary in a field war, which is the moſt effectual and honourable of all others: and a general who knows how to conduct ſuch a war, to form and draw up an army, and to give an enemy battle in a proper and Soldier-like manner, cannot err much in other reſpects: but if he is deficient in this part of his profeſſion (though he be ever ſo able a man in other points) he will never bring a war to a happy concluſion: beſides, if he wins a battle, it cancels all other errors and miſcarriages; but if he loſes one, it effaces the memory of all his former merits and ſervices. To form an army therefore, it is neceſſary in the firſt place to make choice of proper men for that purpoſe, which the Ancients termed *delectus*, but we call *liſting* or *levying*. Thoſe then who have preſcribed rules in the Art of War, are unanimouſly of opinion that ſuch men ſhould be raiſed in temperate climates, that ſo they may be both brave and quick of apprehenſion; for it has been generally obſerved that hot countries produce men that are quick and ſharp witted, but not courageous; and on the other hand, that the inhabitants of cold countries are for the moſt part hardy and brave, but of dull and heavy underſtandings. This rule indeed might be followed by a Prince who had the whole world at command, and could raiſe his men where he pleaſed. But to give a rule which may be obſerved by any State, I ſay that every Prince or Republic ſhould raiſe their men in their own dominions, whether hot, cold, or temperate: for we ſee by ancient examples, that good diſcipline and exerciſe will make good Soldiers in any country, and that the defects of nature may be ſupplied by art and induſtry; which in this caſe are more effectual than nature itſelf. Beſides, the raiſing of men in any other country cannot properly be called *delectus*, or *making a choice*; becauſe that term ſignifies to pick and cull the beſt men in a Province, and implies a power to chuſe ſuch as are unwilling, as well as thoſe that are willing to ſerve; which cannot be done in any country but your own: for in territories that are ſubject to another State, you muſt be content with ſuch as are willing to ſerve you, and not expect to pick and chuſe whom you pleaſe *.

Cosimo. But you may either take or refuſe whom you think fit of thoſe that are willing to ſerve you; and therefore that may be called *delectus*.

Fabrizio. You are right in one reſpect: but conſider the defects to which ſuch a choice is ſubject, and you will find that it is no choice at all. In the firſt place, thoſe that are not your own Subjects, but yet are willing to enter into your pay, are ſo far from being the beſt men, that they are generally the worſt: for if there be any ſcandalous, idle, incorrigible, irreligious wretches, any run-aways from their parents, any blaſphemers, common cheats, or fellows that have been initiated into every kind of villany, thoſe are the people that commonly liſt under your banners; and what ſort of ſoldiers they are likely to make I leave every one to judge for himſelf. Now when they are more of theſe that offer their ſervice than you want, you may indeed pick and chuſe out of them; but you can never make a good choice, becauſe they are all ſo bad. It often happens however, that there are not ſo many, even of theſe, as you have occaſion for to fill up your Regiments: ſo that you muſt be obliged to take them all; and then ſurely you cannot ſo properly be ſaid to make a *delectus*, *a choice*, as to raiſe men at any rate. Of ſuch diſcorderly people our Italian armies and thoſe of moſt other nations are compoſed at preſent, except in Germany; becauſe our Princes have it not in their Power to make any man ſerve in their wars except he is willing. Conſider with yourſelves therefore whether is is poſſible to revive the diſcipline of the Ancients in armies which are raiſed in this manner.

---

* See the Prince, chap. xxii. xxxiii. xiv. and Pol. Diſc. book I. chap. xxi.

Cosimo. What other method would you take then to raiſe them?

Fabrizio. That which I recommended before: a Prince ſhould chuſe them out of his own ſubjects, and exert his authority in ſuch a choice.

Cosimo. Do you think any part of the ancient diſcipline might be revived in an army thus choſen?

Fabrizio. Without doubt it might, if ſuch an army was commanded by the Sovereign of a Principality, or by one of the governing Citizens of a Commonwealth, who is appointed Commander in Chief during the time of his office; otherwiſe it would be a very difficult matter to do it.

Cosimo. Why ſo?

Fabrizio. I will explain that to you more at large hereafter: let it ſuffice at preſent to ſay, that no good can be done any other way.

Cosimo. Well then, ſince theſe Levies are to be made in your own dominions; is it better to draw the men out of the Country or out of Towns?

Fabrizio. All authors who have written upon this ſubject agree, that it is better to take them out of the Country; becauſe ſuch men are inured to hardſhips and fatigues, to endure all ſorts of weather, to handle the mattock and ſpade, to throw up ditches, to carry heavy burdens, and are, generally ſpeaking, more temperate and incorrupt than others. But as Horſe as well as Foot are neceſſary in an army, I would adviſe that the Horſe ſhould be taken out of Towns, and the Foot out of the Country.

Coſimo. Of what age would you have them ?

Fabrizio. If I was to raiſe a new army, I would chuſe them from ſeventeen to forty years of age : but, if I was only to recruit an old one, I would have none above ſeventeen.

Coſimo. I do not well underſtand the reaſon of this diſtinction.

Fabrizio. I will tell you the meaning of it then. If I was to raiſe an Army, or eſtabliſh a Militia, in a State where there was none before, it would be neceſſary to take the beſt and moſt docible men I could find of all ages, (provided they were neither too young nor too old to carry arms) in order to diſcipline them in ſuch a manner as I ſhall inform you of in its proper place : but if I was to raiſe men only to recruit on army that had been long on foot, I would take none above ſeventeen, becauſe there would be men enow of riper age in ſuch an army.

Coſimo. Then you would put your troops upon the ſame footing with thoſe in our Country ?

Fabrizio. Yes ; but I would arm, and officer, and exerciſe, and diſcipline them, in a manner that I fancy is not known amongſt yours.

Coſimo. You would have trained bands, I ſuppoſe ?

Fabrizio. Why not, Sir ?

Coſimo. Becauſe ſeveral wiſe and able men diſapprove of them.

Fabririo. That cannot well be ſurely. Some men perhaps may be accounted wiſe and able, though they really are not ſo.

Coſimo. The bad proof thoſe bands have always made ſeems to countenance that opinion.

Fabrizio. Are you ſure it is not owing to your own fault rather than any defect in them, that they have always made ſo bad proof ? Perhaps I may convince you that it is, before we part.

Coſimo. We ſhall be much obliged to you for ſo doing. But in the firſt place I will tell you upon what accounts theſe troops are diſapproved of, that ſo you may be the better enabled to refute the objections that are made to them. It is ſaid then, that they are either of little or no ſervice, and if a Prince or State confide in them they are ſure to be ruined; or, if they are good Soldiers, the perſon that commands them may ſeize upon the Government himſelf by their aſſiſtance. To confirm this, the example of the Romans is cited, who loſt their liberties by keeping up ſuch forces: the caſe of the Venetians and the King of France is likewiſe inſtanced for the ſame purpoſe; the former of whom make uſe of foreign troops only, to prevent any of their own Citizens from ſeizing upon the Government; and the latter has diſarmed all his ſubjects in order to rule them with more eaſe. But the unſerviceableneſs of theſe troops is further urged for the following reaſons: the firſt is, that they are raw and inexperienced; the ſecond, that they are compelled to ſerve: for when people are grown up to years of maturity, they ſeldom learn any thing perfectly; and ſurely no material ſervice can be expected from men who are forced into the army whether they will or not.

Fabrizio. All theſe objections ſeem to be made by very ſhort-ſighted people, as I ſhall ſhew preſently. For as to the unſerviceableneſs of theſe Bands. I ſay that no troops can be more ſerviceable than ſuch as are choſen out of one's own ſubjects; nor can thoſe ſubjects be raiſed in a better or more proper manner. And ſince this will not admit of diſpute, I ſhall not throw away any more time in endeavouring to prove it; eſpecially as there is ſufficient evidence of it in the hiſtories of all nations. What has been ſaid concerning inexperience and compulſion, I allow to be juſt and reaſonable: for inexperience is the mother of cowardice, and compulſion makes men mutinous and diſcontented: but both experience and courage are to be acquired by arming, exerciſing, and diſciplining them in a proper manner, as I ſhall plainly demonſtrate to you. As to the matter of compulſion, I anſwer, that ſuch men as are to be raiſed by the command of their Prince, ſhould neither be altogether volunteers, nor yet forcibly compelled into the ſervice: for if they were to be altogether volunteers, the miſchiefs would enſue which I juſt now mentioned, it could not properly be called a *delectus*, and few would be willing to ſerve. Compulſion, on the other hand, would be attended with no leſs inconveniencies; and therefore a middle courſe ought to be taken, and without either treating men with downright violence, or depending entirely upon their own voluntary offers, they ſhould be moved by the obedience they think due to their Governors, to expoſe themſelves to a little preſent hardſhip, rather than incur their diſpleaſure: and by theſe means (their own will ſeeming to co-operate with a gentle ſort of compulſion) you will eaſily prevent thoſe evils which might otherwiſe reſult from a ſpirit of licentiouſneſs or diſcontent. I will not venture however to affirm, that an army compoſed of ſuch men is invincible; for even the Roman Legions were often routed, and Hannibal himſelf was at laſt conquered: ſo that it is impoſſible to model any army in ſuch a manner as to prevent it from being ever defeated. The wiſe and able men therefore of whom you ſpeak, ſhould not be ſo peremptory in pronouncing ſuch forces altogether unſerviceable, becauſe they have ſometimes loſt a battle; for though they may happen to be defeated once or twice, they may be victorious afterwards, when they have diſcovered the cauſes that contributed to their defeat, and provided remedies againſt them; eſpecially as their diſgrace (when the cauſes of it come to be looked into) may probably be owing rather to bad conduct in the Commanders than any defect in the inſtitution itſelf: your acquaintance therefore inſtead of condemning one, ſhould endeavour to correct the other; and how that is to be done I will ſhew you as we proceed. In the mean time I ſhall convince you how little foundation there is for the objection which you urge, that ſuch bands, under the command of an aſpiring Subject or Citizen, may deprive a Prince or Republic of their authority and dominions: for it is certain that no Subjects or Citizens, when legally armed and kept in due order by their maſters, ever did the leaſt miſchief to any ſtate: on the contrary, they have always been of the higheſt ſervice to all Governments, and have kept them free and incorrupt longer than they would have been without them. Rome continued free four hundred years, and Sparta eight hundred, though their Citizens were armed all that while; but many other States which have been diſarmed have loſt their liberties in leſs than forty years. No State therefore can ſupport itſelf without an army, and if it has no Soldiers of its own, it muſt be forced to hire foreign troops, which will be much more dangerous; becauſe they are more liable to be corrupted, and become ſubſervient to the ambition of ſome powerful Citizen, who may eaſily avail himſelf of their aſſiſtance to overturn the eſtabliſhed Government, when he was nobody to deal with but an unarmed and defenceleſs multitude. Beſides, every State muſt naturally be more afraid of two enemies than one; and that which takes foreign troops into its pay, will be apprehenſive of them, as well as of its own forces: for which indeed you will ſee there is ſufficient reaſon, if you remember what I ſaid juſt now concerning Franciſco Sforza: whereas a State which employs no troops but ſuch as are compoſed of its own Subjects has only one enemy to fear. But to omit all other proofs which might be adduced to ſupport this point, I ſhall only lay it down as a certain truth, that no man ever yet founded a Monarchy or a Republic but he was well aſſured the Subjects, if armed, would always be ready and willing to defend it: and if the Venetians had acted as wiſely in this reſpect as in others, they might have erected a new Monarchy in the world: for the neglect of which, they are the more inexcuſeable, as they had arms put into their hands by their firſt Legiſlators: but not being poſſeſſed of much territory by land they employed their ſtrength chiefly at ſea, where they carried on their wars with great ſpirit, and made conſiderable acquiſitions. At laſt, however, when they were obliged to engage in a land war for the relief of Vicenza, inſtead of truſting ſome Citizen of their own with the command of their forces, they took the Marquis of Mantua into their pay. Now if this falſe ſtep, which clipped the wings of their ambition, and put a ſtop to their further aggrandizement, was owing to an opinion, that though they knew how to make war at Sea, they did not at land, it was a ſimple and ill-founded diffidence: for a Sea-commander who has been uſed to fight the winds and waves, as well as the enemy, will ſooner make a good Land-officer where he has nothing to deal with but men, than a Land-officer will make a good Sea-commander. The Romans, who were moſt expert in Land-wars, but knew little of naval affairs, being engaged in a quarrel with the Carthaginians, who were very powerful at Sea, did not take either Grecian or Spaniſh forces into their Service, though they were the beſt Seamen in the world at that time; but left the command of that expedition to their own Land-officers, who made a deſcent upon the enemy's coaſt, and ſubdued the whole Country. But if the Venetians acted in the above manner out of apprehenſion that if they did otherwiſe, ſome one of their own Citizens might ſeize upon the Government, it was an unreaſonable jealouſy: for (not to repeat what has been already ſaid) if none of their Sea-commanders ever made themſelves maſters of any town upon their coaſts; much leſs occaſion had they to fear that any of their Citizens who commanded their armies ſhould make uſe of them for ſuch a purpoſe. If they had conſidered this, they would have been convinced that tyranny and uſurpation are not owing to the Citizens being armed, but to a weak Government; and that whilſt a State is well conducted, it has nothing to fear from the arms of its Subjects: the reſolution therefore which they took upon that occaſion was a very imprudent one, and brought great diſgrace and many misfortunes upon them. As to the error which the King of France is guilty of in diſarming his Subjects, inſtead of keeping them well diſciplined and ready for war, (an inſtance which you urge againſt me) every impartial man muſt own that it is a great default in judgment, and has much weakened that Kingdom. But I have made too long a digreſſion, and may ſeem perhaps to have forgot my Subject: yet I was in ſome meaſure obliged to do it, in anſwer to your objections, and to ſhew you that a State ought by no means to depend upon any troops but ſuch as are compoſed of its own Subjects; that thoſe Subjects cannot be raiſed in any manner ſo well as by way of trained bands: and that there can be no better method deviſed to form an army, or militia, or to introduce good order and diſcipline amongſt the Soldiers. If you ever read the inſtitutions eſtabliſhed by the firſt Kings of Rome, particularly by Servius Tullus, you muſt remember that the *Claſſes* which he formed, were a ſort of trained bands, or bodies of men fit to bear arms, out of which, an army might preſently be raiſed upon any ſudden emergency for the defence of the State. ——But to return to your Levies, I ſay again that if I was to recruit an old army, I would take men of about ſeventeen years of age; but if I was to raiſe a new one, and to make it fit for ſervice in a ſhort time, I would take them of all ages betwixt ſeventeen and forty.

COSIMO. Would you have any regard to their reſpective trades or occupations?

FABRIZIO. Some Authors who have written upon this Subject, will not admit of fowlers, fiſhermen, cooks, pimps, or any other ſort of people who make an occupation of pleaſure or ſporting; but prefer plowmen, ſmiths, farriers, carpenters, butchers, hunters, and ſuch like: but, for my own part, I ſhould not ſo much conſider the nature of their profeſſion as the goodneſs of the men, and which of them would be the moſt ſerviceable. For this reaſon I ſhould ſooner make choice of huſbandmen, and ſuch as have been accuſtomed to labour in the fields, as more uſeful in an army than any other kind of people: next to theſe, I would take ſmiths, carpenters, farriers, and ſtone-cutters, of whom it is neceſſary to have many; becauſe they are very often wanted, and it is a good thing to have Soldiers that can turn their hands to more ſervices than one.

COSIMO. But how may one diſtinguiſh thoſe that are fit for war from thoſe that are not?

FABRIZIO. I will firſt inform you of the method I would take for raiſing levies to form a new army; becauſe I ſhall have an opportunity of mentioning ſeveral things at the ſame time, that are neceſſary in the choice of men to recruit an old one. ——I ſay then, we muſt judge whether a man is fit for ſervice, either from the experience we have had of his former behaviour, or from probable conjecture: but in ſuch as are altogether raw men, and never ſerved before, (of whom we muſt ſuppoſe all new levies chiefly, if not wholly, to conſiſt) we can have no experience of their fitneſs: upon which account, we muſt have recourſe to ſuch conjectures as we may be able to form from their age, their occupation, and appearance. Of the two firſt we have already ſpoken; it only remains therefore to ſay ſomething of the laſt. Some, like Pyrrhus, would have their Soldiers tall and large of ſtature; others, like Julius Cæſar, prefer ſuch as are active and vigorous: of which they form a conjecture from the ſymmetry of their limbs, and the vivacity of their aſpect. Some that have treated of this ſubject, accordingly recommend thoſe that have quick and lively eyes, muſcular necks, wide cheſts, brawny arms, long fingers, ſmall bellies, round ſides, ſpare legs, and little feet, which are for the moſt part ſigns of ſtrength and agility; two qualities that are principally neceſſary in a Soldier. But above all, we ought to have ſtrict regard to their morals and behaviour: otherwiſe we ſhall make choice of ſuch as having neither modeſty nor honeſty, will be a ſcandal to an army, and not only become mutinous and ungovernable themſelves, but ſow the ſeeds of corruption amongſt others: for it is not to be expected that any virtue or commendable quality can be found in ſuch men. Here perhaps it may not appear impertinent (nay indeed it ſeems abſolutely neceſſary) to put you in mind of the method taken by the Roman Conſuls, as ſoon as they entered upon their office, to raiſe the forces that were wanted for the ſervice of that year; that ſo you may be more fully convinced of the importance of ſuch a choice. Upon theſe occaſions then, (as their Republic was almoſt continually engaged in war) being obliged to make choice of ſome that had ſerved before, and others that were altogether raw men, they had an opportunity in one caſe of pitching upon ſuch as they knew by experience were fit for their purpoſe, and were forced in the other to make uſe of thoſe that ſeemed to be ſo from probable conjecture. It ſhould likewiſe be obſerved that ſuch Levies are made either for preſent ſervice, or to be diſciplined in order to be employed when occaſion ſhall require. But as I have hitherto ſpoken of thoſe only that are to be raiſed and diſciplined for future ſervice, in countries where there was no army before, and conſequently no proper choice can be made from any experience of ſuch men as are fit for Soldiers, I ſhall continue that ſubject: becauſe it is an eaſy matter either to raiſe good recruits or form armies for immediate ſervice, in places where a military force has been once eſtabliſhed; eſpecially, if the rulers of the State have ſufficient authority to enforce it, as the Romans did of old, and the Swiſs do at this day: for though there muſt of courſe be many new men, yet there will alſo be ſo many veterans, in this ſort of Levies, that both together will ſoon make a very good army. The Roman Emperors, however, when they began to keep up garriſons and ſtanding armies upon the confines of the Empire, thought fit to appoint certain Maſters or Inſtructors to teach and diſcipline their *Tirones* (or new raiſed men) in warlike arts and exerciſes, as we may ſee in the life of the Emperor Maximus: an inſtitution obſerved at home only whilſt Rome continued free; but in ſuch a manner, that the young Romans who had been trained up, and inured to this ſort of diſcipline, made excellent Soldiers when a *delectus* was neceſſary, and they were called out into the ſervice of their Country: but afterwards, when this cuſtom of training up the youth at home was left off by the Emperors, they were forced to make uſe of the method I juſt now mentioned—But to return to the method obſerved by the Romans in making their Levies. As ſoon as the Conſuls (who always conducted their wars) had entered upon their office, they began to raiſe forces, each Conſul having two legions alloted him, which conſiſted of Roman Citizens only, and were the main ſtrength and flower of their armies. For this purpoſe, they firſt appointed twenty-four military Tribunes, ſix to each legion; whoſe office reſembled that of our Lieutenant-Colonels, or Commanders of a battalion. This done, they called all the people together that were able to bear arms, and placed the Tribunes of each legion apart: after which, thoſe Officers caſt lots out of which Tribe or Claſs they ſhould begin their choice; and upon which Tribe ſoever the lot fell, they took four of the beſt men out of it, one of whom was made choice of by the Tribunes of the firſt legion, another by thoſe of the ſecond, another by thoſe of the third, and the laſt fell to the ſhare of the fourth. After this, they picked out four more, out of whom, the firſt was choſen by the Tribunes of the ſecond legion, the ſecond by thoſe of the third, the third by thoſe of the fourth, and the fourth by thoſe of the firſt. When this were thus diſpoſed of, four others were drawn out: the firſt of whom was taken by the third legion, the ſecond by the fourth, the third by the firſt, and the fourth by the ſecond; thus varying the turns of their choice out of all the Tribes, till the four legions were all equal and complete. Now theſe levies might be employed in immediate ſervice, as I ſaid before: and ſince they conſiſted of men, many of whom had been tried, and the reſt well exerciſed and diſciplined at home, ſuch a choice might be made partly from experience, and partly from conjecture: but where the men are altogether raw and untried, and muſt be exerciſed and diſciplined from the beginning to make them fit for future ſervice, the choice muſt be made by conjecture alone, founded upon their age and appearance.

Cosimo. What you have ſaid appears to be very juſt: but before you proceed any further, I could wiſh you would gratify my curioſity in one point, which you have put me in mind of by ſaying, that where the levies that are to be made have not been uſed to military ſervice before, they muſt be choſen by conjecture: for I have heard great fault found with our Militia in many reſpects, eſpecially with regard to their number; ſome being of opinion that if they were fewer, they might be better choſen; that it would not be ſo troubleſome and inconvenient to the country, nor to the men themſelves; and that they might have larger pay, which would make them more content and ready to obey your commands. I ſhould be glad to know therefore, whether you would have a large or ſmall number of ſuch people, and how you would proceed in the choice of them in either caſe.

Fabrizio. Without doubt is it much better to have a large number than a ſmall one; for where there is not a great number, it is impoſſible ever to have a good Militia: as to the objections which you ſay ſome others have made to it, I ſhall preſently ſhew you the futility of them.——I ſay then, in the firſt place, that the ſmallneſs of the number does not make them the better ſoldiers, eſpecially in a country where there is plenty of men, as in Tuſcany; for if you are to chuſe them from experience, you will find very few there that have had any trial, as not many have been in the field; and of thoſe few, there are hardly any that have given the leaſt mark of worth, or deſerve to be preferred to others; ſo that whoever wants to raiſe men in this country can have no aſſiſtance from experience, but muſt depend wholly upon conjecture. Since this is the caſe, I ſhould be glad to know what I am to do, and by what rules I muſt make my choice of a certain number, if twenty well-looking young fellows ſhould be brought before me. Surely every body muſt allow, that it would be the beſt way to arm and exerciſe them all (ſince it will be impoſſible to judge at firſt ſight which of them will make the beſt proof) and defer your choice till they have all had the ſame exerciſe and inſtruction: for then you will eaſily perceive which of them are moſt ſpirited and active, and likely to be the moſt ſerviceable. Upon the whole therefore, the maxim of chuſing but few, that they may be ſo much the better, is ſimple and ill grounded. As to a large number being troubleſome and inconvenient, both to the country and the men themſelves, I anſwer that no number of ſuch men, whether ſmall or great can be troubleſome or inconvenient to any one; for no body is hindered by being a Militia-man from purſuing his uſual occupation, or following his neceſſary affairs; ſince they are only obliged to meet together, and to be exerciſed on holidays, which can be of no prejudice either to the country or themſelves; on the contrary, it would be a great recreation to both: for young men inſtead of being idle at thoſe times, or perhaps ſpending their leiſure in ſomething worſe than idleneſs, would go to theſe exerciſes with pleaſure, and others would not be a little entertained with ſuch a ſpectacle. In anſwer to the objection, that a ſmall number may be better paid, and conſequently will be better ſatisfied and more obedient to command, let it be conſidered that no number of Militia (how ſmall ſoever) can be kept in continual pay in ſuch a manner as to be always ſatisfied with it. Let us ſuppoſe (for example) a Militia to conſiſt of five thouſand men, whoſe pay (if they are to be paid to their ſatisfaction) will amount to at leaſt ten thouſand ducats *per* month. But in the firſt place, five thouſand foot are not ſufficient to make up an army; and in the next, a monthly payment of ten thouſand ducats would be an inſupportable burden upon moſt States, and yet not enough to keep their Soldiers in content and obedience: ſo that though the expence would be extravagant, your army would be ſo inconſiderable that it would not be able to defend your own dominions, much leſs to act offenſively upon occaſion. If you increaſe their pay or their number, it will ſtill be more difficult to pay them: and if you diminiſh either, they will become diſſatisfied and unſerviceable. Thoſe who talk of raiſing a Militia therefore, and of paying them when they have nothing

thing for them to do, talk of things that are either impoſſible, or will anſwer no end: but it is highly neceſſary, I own, to pay them, and well too, when they are called out to ſerve their country. If ſuch an Eſtabliſhment however ſhould happen to occaſion any little inconvenience to the Community in time of peace, (which yet can hardly be) ſurely that muſt be much over-balanced by the conveniencies and advantages which reſult from it: for without a regular and well-ordered Militia there is no living in ſecurity. I conclude then, that thoſe who are for keeping up but a ſmall Militia, that ſo they may be able to pay them the better, or for any other of the reaſons you have alleged, are greatly miſtaken: for (which makes ſtill more for my opinion) any number, be it ever ſo conſiderable, will be continually diminiſhing upon your hands through many unavoidable accidents; and therefore a ſmall one would ſoon dwindle away to nothing. Beſides, when your Militia is numerous, you may employ a conſiderable force at once, if you ſee occaſion; which muſt always have a greater effect than a ſmall one, and be much more for your reputation. I might add, that if you raiſe but a ſmall number of Militia in a large country, and deſign to have them well exerciſed, they muſt of courſe be at ſuch a diſtance from each other, that they cannot all be got together upon the days and at the places appointed for that purpoſe, without great trouble and inconvenience: and if they are not duly exerciſed they will be good for nothing at all, as I ſhall ſhew in its proper place.

Cosimo. You have fully refuted the objections I ſtarted upon this head, I muſt confeſs: but I have another doubt within myſelf which I ſhould be glad to have ſolved. The perſons I mentioned before ſeem to think, that a great number of armed men muſt naturally occaſion much confuſion and diſorder, and frequently tumults in any country.

Fabrizio. This notion is altogether as ill grounded as thoſe which have been already diſcuſſed, as I hope I ſhall be able to convince you. For if a Militia can occaſion any diſorders, it muſt either be amongſt themſelves or others; which may eaſily be prevented, if ſuch an Eſtabliſhment is not ſo badly conſtituted and regulated as to defeat the end of its inſtitution. For if it is properly conducted, it naturally ſuppreſſes all diſturbances amongſt its own conſtituents, inſtead of fomenting them; becauſe they are under the command of ſuperiors: and if the inhabitants of the country where you raiſe a Militia are either ſo little uſed to war that they are in a manner unarmed, or ſo united amongſt themſelves, that they have no factions, it will ſecure them againſt the fear of foreign enemies, but cannot in any wiſe contribute to divide them. For men who are well diſciplined will always be as tender of violating the laws when they have arms in their hands, as when they have not; and will continue ſo if they are not corrupted by their Commanders; which it will be no difficult matter to prevent, as I ſhall ſhew you preſently. But if the people are warlike and yet given to faction, ſuch an eſtabliſhment is moſt likely to re-unite them: becauſe, though they may have arms and Chiefs of their own; yet their arms are ſuch as will be of no ſervice to their country, and their Chiefs only ſerve to foment diviſions and animoſities, inſtead of promoting union and tranquility: whereas this inſtitution furniſhes them with arms that will be ſerviceable to their country, and Chiefs to ſuppreſs their differences. For when any man thinks himſelf injured or offended in a divided country, he immediately applies to the Head of his faction, who, in order to keep up his own intereſt and reputation, is obliged to aſſiſt him in taking revenge, inſtead of diſcouraging violence. But a Chief appointed by public authority acts in a quite different manner: ſo that by eſtabliſhing a good and well ordered Militia, diviſions are extinguiſhed, peace reſtored, thoſe people that were unarmed and diſpirited, but united, continue in union and become warlike and courageous; others that were brave and had arms in their hands, but given to faction and diſcord before, become united, and turn thoſe arms and that courage upon the enemies of their country, which they formerly uſed to exert againſt each other. But to prevent a Militia from injuring others, or overturning the laws and liberties of their country (which yet cannot be effected but by the power and iniquity of the Commanders) it is neceſſary to take care that the Commanders do not acquire too great an authority over the private men. Now authority of this kind is either natural or accidental: to guard againſt the one, it ſhould be provided that an Officer ſhould not have any command over the men that were raiſed in the diſtrict where he was born: but over ſuch only as were drawn out of other places where he has no natural intereſt or connections: as to the other, it may in a great meaſure be prevented by changing the Officers, and ſending them to command in different parts every year: for a long continuation of command over the ſame people is apt to create too ſtrict an union betwixt them, which may eaſily be converted to the prejudice of the Government. How ſerviceable this method has been to thoſe that have followed it, and how fatal the neglect of it to others, plainly appears from the Hiſtories of the Aſſyrian and Roman Empires; where we find that the former continued above a thouſand years without any ſedition or civil war; which was entirely owing to the cuſtom which the Government obſerved of changing the Commanders of their armies every year, and ſending them into different Provinces. On the contrary, the omiſſion of this cuſtom in the Roman Empire, (from the time of Julius Cæſar) was the occaſion of all the civil wars betwixt the Commanders of different armies, and of all the conſpiracies which thoſe Commanders afterwards formed againſt the Emperors. But if any of the firſt Emperors (eſpecially of thoſe that were eſteemed the beſt, as Adrian, Marcus Aurelius, Severus, or ſome others like them) had been provident enough to have changed their Generals at certain times, that Empire would have enjoyed more tranquility and exiſted longer: for then thoſe Commanders could not have had an opportunity of rebelling, the Emperors would have lived in greater ſecurity, and the Senate (when the throne became vacant) would have had more authority, and conſequently have acted with more judgment in the choice of a Succeſſor. But (whether it proceeds from ignorance, or inattention, or indolence in mankind, I know not) it is certain that bad cuſtoms are ſeldom changed, let who will be at the helm; or what example ſoever may be brought either to diſcredit them, or recommend an oppoſite meaſure.

Cosimo. I am afraid I have broke in upon the order you propoſed to yourſelf, and led you away from your ſubject, by aſking impertinent queſtions; for behold from talking of Levies we are got to another topic: ſo that if I had not deſired you would excuſe my freedom when we began this converſation, I ſhould have thought myſelf obliged to aſk your pardon for it.

Fabrizio. You need not make any apology for that, Sir, ſince what has been ſaid is nothing more than was neceſſary to ſhew the nature of a Militia: an inſtitution which (as it is condemned by many) I have taken upon me to defend and explain; and therefore it behoved me to point out the beſt manner of raiſing one. But before I deſcend to other particulars, I ſhould ſay ſomething concerning the choice of Cavalry. Theſe troops were anciently choſen from amongſt the richeſt Citizens (with due regard, however, to their age and other qualifications)

tions) and there were but three hundred of them in a legion: ſo that the Romans never had above ſix hundred horſe in a Conſular army.

Cosimo. Would you have theſe troops likewiſe trained up and diſciplined at home, in order to employ them upon occaſion?

Fabrizio. Moſt certainly; and it is abſolutely neceſſary to do ſo, if you would have Cavalry of your own, and not be obliged to take up with thoſe that make a trade of hiring themſelves out to any body that wants them.

Cosimo. In what manner would you chuſe them?

Fabrizio. As the Romans did. I would take them out of the richeſt of the people; I would officer them as others are officered at preſent: I would have them well-armed, well-exerciſed, and diſciplined.

Cosimo. Would it be proper to allow them any pay?

Fabrizio. To be ſure: but as much only as would be ſufficient to keep their horſes: for if you gave them any more, it would be ſo burdenſome to your Subjects that they would murmur at it.

Cosimo. What number would you have; and how would you arm them?

Fabrizio. That is another matter: but I will anſwer your queſtion after I have told you how the Infantry ought to be armed and prepared for the field.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

# THE
# ART OF WAR.

---

## BOOK II.

### THE CONTENTS.

*What Arms and Armour were chiefly uſed by the Ancients. Concerning the Arms and Armour made uſe of at preſent, and the invention of the Pike. Whether the Ancient or Modern way of arming is the better. How Infantry ought to be armed; and of the neceſſity of Cavalry. Which of the two are moſt to be depended upon. How the Ancients exerciſed their Soldiers: and in what manner they ſhould be exerciſed at preſent. How many men a Regiment ſhould conſiſt of: and how they ſhould be diſciplined and exerciſed in Battalions and Companies. Concerning the three principal ways of drawing up a Battalion in order of Battle. Of rallying Soldiers after they have been diſordered, and making a whole Battalion face about at a time. How to draw up a Battalion in ſuch order as to face an enemy on any ſide. How to draw up a Battalion with two horns, and another in a hollow ſquare. Of the baggage and Carriages belonging to a Battalion: of the neceſſity of many Officers; and the uſefulneſs of Drums and other Military Muſic. A digreſſion concerning Military Virtue; and to what it is owing that it is now become ſo rare. What number of Horſe is neceſſary in a Regiment; and how many Carriages ought to be allowed them for their baggage.*

FABRIZIO. NOW we are provided with men, it is time to arm them; for which purpoſe, let us ſee what arms where chiefly uſed by the Ancients, and chuſe the beſt. The Romans divided their Infantry into heavy and light-armed Companies: the light armed were called *Velites*; under which name were included all thoſe that made uſe of Slings, Bows, and Darts: the greater part of them wore Caſques upon their heads for their defence, and a ſort of Target or Buckler upon their left arm. They fought in no order, and at a diſtance from the heavy armed foot, who had helmets which reached down to their Shoulders, Cuiraſſes, and Brigandines, which covered their bodies and thighs, greaves and gauntlets upon their legs and arms, a ſhield about four feet long and two broad, plated with an iron rim or border at the top to defend it from the edge of ſharp weapons, and another at the bottom to keep it from being damaged by frequent rubbing againſt the ground. Their offenſive weapons conſiſted of a Sword about a yard long on their left ſide, a dagger on the right, and a dart in their hand (called *pilum*) which they threw at the enemy at the firſt charge. Such were the arms with which the Romans conquered the world. Some old writers indeed ſay, that beſides theſe, they had a ſpear like what we call an *Eſpontoon* or *half pike*: but I cannot ſee how ſo troubleſome a weapon could be made uſe of by thoſe that carried Shields; which muſt hinder them from uſing both hands at once; and for one it muſt be too unwieldy. Beſides, ſuch weapons could be of no ſervice, except in the front of an army where there is room to manage them; which would be impoſſible in the other ranks: for thoſe (as I ſhall ſhew hereafter) muſt be drawn up thick and cloſe together, ſince that is the beſt way of forming an army, though perhaps it may be attended with ſome inconveniencies. All ſuch weapons therefore as exceed the length of four feet are of little or no ſervice in cloſe fight: for if you have one of thoſe Spears, and are obliged to take both hands to it (admitting that your Shield was no incumbrance to you) you could not annoy an enemy with it that preſſes hard upon you: but if you make uſe of one hand only, in order to avail yourſelf of your Shield with the other, you muſt take hold of it by the middle of the Staff; and then there will be ſo much of it behind you, that thoſe who are upon your back will prevent you from making any uſe of it. To convince you then that the Romans either never had any ſuch Spears; or that, if they had, they were of little or no ſervice, read the account which Livy gives of their moſt remarkable battles, and you will find that he very ſeldom makes mention of any Spears, but tells us, that as ſoon as they had thrown their darts, they fell upon the enemy with their Swords. I would have nothing at all to do with theſe Spears then, but truſt to the Sword and Buckler, and ſuch other weapons and armour as the Romans made uſe of.——The armour of the Greeks was not ſo heavy as that of the Romans; but for offenſive weapons, they depended more upon the Spear than the Sword; eſpecially the Macedonian Phalanx, which was armed with Spears above twenty feet long, called *Sariſſæ*, with which they broke in upon the enemy, and yet kept good order in their own ranks: and though ſome authors ſay they had ſhields too; yet I cannot ſee (for the reaſons abovementioned) how they could manage them and the Spears at the ſame time. Beſides, in the battle betwixt Paulus Æmilius and Perſeus King of Macedon, I do not remember any mention made of Shields, but of the *Sariſſæ* only, which were very troubleſome to the Romans: ſo that I imagine the Macedonian Phalanx was like the Swiſs Regiments at preſent, whoſe ſtrength lies wholly in their Pikes. The Roman Infantry, beſides their armour, likewiſe had creſts and plumes upon their caſques and helmets, which afforded an agreeable ſpectacle to their friends, and ſerved to ſtrike a terror into their enemies. As to the armour of their Cavalry, it conſiſted at firſt of a round ſhield and a helmet; the reſt of their body was uncovered. Their arms were a Sword and a long thin Javelin or Lance with an iron head, ſo that being incumbered with a Shield and a Lance at the ſame time, they could uſe neither of them properly; and their bodies being in a great meaſure uncovered, were not a little expoſed to the enemy. But afterwards they were armed like the infantry; excepting that they ſtill carried a ſmall ſquare ſhield, and a thicker lance, armed at both ends, that ſo if one ſhould be broken off, they might avail themſelves of the other. With theſe weapons, and this ſort of armour for their horſe and foot, the Romans ſubdued the whole World; and it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe from their ſucceſs that they were the beſt appointed armies that ever exiſted. Livy himſelf indeed, when he is comparing their ſtrength with that of an enemy, often tells us, that in their armour, their weapons, their diſcipline and courage, they were much ſuperior: for which reaſon I have choſen to ſpeak more particularly of the arms and armour of the Conquerors than of the conquered. ——It now remains that I ſay ſomething of thoſe that are in uſe at preſent. The Infantry cover their body with a demi-cuiraſs, or iron breaſt-plate which reaches down to their waiſt; they have a Spear eighteen feet long, called a Pike, and a broad ſword by their ſide: this is their common way of arming themſelves: for very few of them have back plates, greaves, or gauntlets, and none at all any caſques or helmets; and thoſe few inſtead of pikes, carry halberds about ſix feet long with ſharp points, and heads ſomething like a battle-axe: they have likewiſe Muſqueteers amongſt them, inſtead of the Slingers and Bowmen employed by the Ancients. Theſe arms and this ſort of armour were invented, and are ſtill uſed by the Germans, particularly by the Swiſs: for being poor, but deſirous at all times to defend their liberties againſt the ambition of the German Princes, (who are rich and can afford to keep Cavalry, which the poverty of the Swiſs will not allow them to do) they are obliged to engage on foot, and therefore find it neceſſary to continue their ancient manner of fighting, in order to make head againſt the fury of the enemy's Cavalry. Upon this account they ſtill uſe the Pike, a weapon that enables them not only to keep off the horſe, but very often break and defeat them; and without which, men of the greateſt experience in military affairs ſay, that Infantry are good for little or nothing. The Germans accordingly put ſo much confidence in this ſort of Infantry, that with fifteen or twenty thouſand of them they will attack any number of horſe; of which we have had many inſtances of late; and ſuch is the general opinion of their excellence from the many remarkable Services they have done, that ſince the expedition of Charles VIII. into Italy, all other nations in Europe have adopted the ſame weapons and manner of fighting; the Spaniards in particular have got very great reputation by it.

Cosimo. Which method of arming would you recommend, the German, or that of the ancient Romans?

Fabrizio. The Romans without doubt; and I will ſhew you the advantages and diſadvantages of them both. The German Infantry are able not only to ſuſtain the ſhock of Cavalry, but to break them; they are more expeditious upon a march and in forming themſelves; becauſe they are not overloaded with arms. On the other hand, they are much expoſed to wounds, both at a diſtance and when they are cloſe engaged, becauſe they are ſo ſlightly armed; they are of no great Service in ſtorming a town, or even in a field battle where they meet with a vigorous reſiſtance. But the Roman Infantry knew how to deal with Cavalry as well as the German; their armour was ſuch that they were not ſo liable to be wounded either in cloſe fight or at a diſtance; they both attacked, and ſuſtained an attack much better, on account of their targets; they did more execution with their ſwords when they fought an enemy hand to hand, than the Germans can do with their Pikes; and though the latter have Swords, they are not capable of doing any great execution with them, becauſe they have no targets. The Romans were ſo well armed and ſo ſecure under the ſhelter of their targets, that they were very ſerviceable in ſtorming a breach. So that they laboured under no other inconvenience but the weight of their armour; which yet they got the better of by accuſtoming themſelves to carry heavy burdens, and to endure all other ſorts of hardſhip and fatigue, which made that matter eaſy and familiar to them. You muſt conſider likewiſe that Infantry are often obliged to engage other Infantry and Cavalry together: and that if they cannot ſuſtain the ſhock of Cavalry, (or even if they can) and are yet afraid of facing another body of Infantry that is better armed and diſciplined than themſelves, they are of little account. Now if you will compare the German Infantry with the Roman, you will find the former very fit to oppoſe Cavalry. (as I ſaid before), but that they would certainly have the diſadvantage, if they were to engage other Infantry that were no better than themſelves, if they were armed and appointed like the Romans: ſo that one is to be preferred to the other, becauſe the German are only fit to cope with horſe, but the Roman knew how to deal both with horſe and foot.

Cosimo. I ſhould take it as a favour if you would give us ſome particular inſtance of this by way of illuſtration.

FABRIZIO. You will find many in hiſtory, where the Roman Infantry have beat infinite numbers of horſe, and none where they have been worſted by other Infantry, either through any deficiency in their own arms, or advantage of thoſe in an enemy. For if there had been any deficiency in their own, and they had met with other people that armed their Soldiers better than they did, they could not have made ſuch prodigious conqueſts, without laying aſide their own method and arming themſelves in the ſame or a better manner: but as they never did this, we may fairly conclude they never found any other people who excelled them in that reſpect. But this cannot be ſaid of the German Infantry: for they have always made bad proof when they have been engaged by other Infantry as obſtinate and well conducted as themſelves: which muſt be owing to the advantage the enemy had over them in their arms. Philip Viſconti, Duke of Milan, being invaded by an army of eighteen thouſand Swiſs, ſent Count Carmignuola againſt them, who was at that time Commander in chief of his forces. But Carmignuola having no more than ſix thouſand horſe and a ſmall body of foot, and coming to an engagement with them, was preſently defeated with great loſs. As he was an able Soldier however, he ſaw what advantage ſuch an enemy had over Cavalry; and having raiſed another army, he went to look for the Swiſs a ſecond time: but when he came near them, he ordered all his Gens d'Armes to diſmount and fight on foot; which they did with ſuch ſucceſs that they killed fifteen thouſand of the enemy, and the reſt, ſeeing no poſſibility of eſcaping, threw down their arms and ſurrendered.

COSIMO. How is this to be accounted for?

FABRIZIO. I told you a little while ago: but as you ſeem either to have forgot, or not to have underſtood what I ſaid, I will repeat it. When the

German Infantry, who (as I ſaid before) are but indifferently provided with defenſive armour, and make uſe of the Sword and the Pike for their offenſive weapons, come to engage an enemy that is well-armed at all points (as the Gens d'Armes were, whom Carmignuola cauſed to diſmount) they are eaſily defeated: for the enemy has nothing to do but to receive their pikes upon their targets, and to ruſh in upon them Sword in hand; after which, the danger is chiefly over: for the German pikes are ſo long, that they cannot avail themſelves of them in cloſe fight, nor will their ſwords ſtand them in any great ſtead, as they are ſo ſlightly defended, and are engaged with enemies that are completely armed from head to foot. So that whoever conſiders the advantages and diſadvantages on each ſide, will ſee that thoſe who are ſo poorly armed have no remedy againſt an enemy that is completely armed, when he charges home, and has ſuſtained the firſt puſh of the pikes. For when two armies are reſolved to engage, and advance upon each other every moment, they muſt of neceſſity ſoon come cloſe together: and though ſome of the men in the firſt ranks on one ſide, may either be killed or overthrown by the pikes on the other, there will be enow left to carry the day: hence it came to paſs, that Carmignuola made ſuch a ſlaughter amongſt the Swiſs, with little or no loſs on his own ſide.

Cosimo. It muſt be conſidered that Carmignuola's men were Gens d'Armes, though they were on foot, and covered all over with armour, which enabled them to do what they did: I ſhould think it would be a good way therefore, to arm Infantry in the ſame manner.

Fabrizio. If you would recollect what I ſaid concerning the armour which the Roman Infantry made uſe of, you would be of another opinion; for men who have caſques upon their heads, their bodies

dies defended by ſhields and cuiraſſes, their legs and arms covered with greaves and gauntlets, are better able to defend themſelves againſt pikes, and to break in upon them, than Gens d'Armes on foot: of which I will give you a modern example or two. A body of Spaniſh Infantry being tranſported from Sicily into the Kingdom of Naples, to relieve Gonſalvo da Cardova, who was ſhut up in Barletta by the French, Monſieur d'Aubigni was ſent to oppoſe their march with ſome Gens d'Armes and about four thouſand Swiſs foot. When they came to engage, the Swiſs preſſed ſo hard upon the enemy with their pikes, that they ſoon opened their ranks: but the Spaniards, under the cover of their bucklers, nimbly ruſhed in upon them with their ſwords, and laid about them ſo furiouſly, that they made a very great ſlaughter of the Swiſs, and gained a complete victory. Every one knows what numbers of Swiſs Infantry were cut to pieces at the battle of Ravenna in the ſame manner: for the Spaniſh foot having cloſed with the Swiſs, made ſo good a uſe of their ſwords, that not one of the enemy would have been left alive, if a body of French Cavalry had not fortunately come up to reſcue them: after which, the Spaniards, however, drew up cloſe together in good order, and made a handſome retreat with little or no loſs. I conclude therefore, that no Infantry can properly be called good, but ſuch as are able not only to make head againſt Cavalry, but againſt any other ſort of Infantry whatſoever: and this muſt be entirely owing to their diſcipline and manner of arming, as I have often ſaid before.

Cosimo. How then would you have them armed?

Fabrizio. I would take ſome of the Roman arms and armour, and ſome of the German; half of my men ſhould be armed with one, and half with the other; for if in every ſix thouſand foot, three thouſand were provided with ſwords and ſhields like the Romans, two thouſand with pikes, and one thouſand with muſkets, like the Germans, it would be ſufficient for my purpoſe, as I ſhall ſhew you preſently. For I would place my Pikemen either in the front of the battle, or where I thought the enemy's Cavalry were moſt likely to make an impreſſion: and the others I would poſt in ſuch a manner as to ſupport the Pikemen, and puſh forwards when a way was opened for them: which I think would be a better method of arming and drawing up a body of Infantry, than any other that is uſed at preſent.

Cosimo. So much for Infantry. I ſhould now be glad to know whether you would recommend the ancient or modern way of arming Cavalry.

Fabrizio. Conſidering the war ſaddles and ſtirrups which are now in uſe, and were not known to the Ancients, I think men muſt ſit much firmer on horſeback at preſent than they could do formerly. I think likewiſe, our way of arming is more ſecure, and that our Gens d' Armes are capable of making a greater impreſſion than any ſort of Cavalry the Ancients ever had. I am not of opinion however, that we ought to depend any more upon Cavalry in general than they did in former times: for, (as I ſaid before) we have often ſeen them ſhamefully beaten of late by infantry; and indeed they muſt always come off with the worſt when they engage Infantry that are armed and appointed in the manner abovementioned. Tigranes, King of Armenia, brought an army of an hundred and fifty thouſand horſe into the field (many of whom were armed like our Gens d' Armes at preſent, and called *Cataphratti)* againſt Lucullus the Roman General, whoſe army conſiſted only of ſix thouſand horſe and fifteen thouſand foot: upon which Tigranes ſaid, "they were more like the train of an Am-"baſſador than an army." Nevertheleſs, when they came to engage, the King was routed: and the Hiſtorian, who gives us an account of that battle, imputes the defeat entirely to the little ſervice that was done by the Cataphratti, whoſe faces were covered in ſuch a manner that they could hardly ſee, much leſs annoy the enemy, and their limbs ſo overloaded with heavy armour, that when any of them fell from their horſes, they could hardly get up again, or make any uſe of their arms. I will venture to affirm therefore, that ſuch States as depend more upon Cavalry than Infantry, will always be weak and expoſed to ruin; as Italy has been in our times; for we have ſeen it over-run from one end to the other, and plundered by foreigners, merely becauſe its princes have made little or no account at all of Infantry, and truſted ſolely to Cavalry. It is right however to have ſome Cavalry to ſupport and aſſiſt Infantry; but not to look upon them as the main ſtrength of an army; for they are highly neceſſary to reconnoitre, to ſcour the roads, to make incurſions, and lay waſte an enemy's country, to beat up their quarters, to keep them in continual alarm, and to cut off their convoys; but in field battles, which commonly decide the fate of nations, and for which armies are chiefly deſigned, they are fitter to purſue an enemy that is routed and flying than any thing elſe: and conſequently are much inferior to foot *.

COSIMO. Here I could wiſh to have two difficulties reſolved. In the firſt place, every body knows that the Parthians never uſed any other forces but Cavalry in their wars, and yet they ſhared the world with the Romans: in the next, I can neither ſee how Infantry can be able to ſuſtain Cavalry; nor to what the ſtrength of the one, and the weakneſs of the other is owing.

---

* See Pol. Diſc. Book II. Chap. xviii.

Fabrizio. I either told you before, or deſigned to tell you, that what I intended to ſay concerning the Art of War ſhould be limited to Europe; and therefore ſhall think myſelf excuſed from accounting for the conduct of the Aſiatic nations. I cannot help obſerving to you, however, that the diſcipline of the Parthians was quite different from that of the Romans: for the former all fought on horſeback, in a looſe and irregular manner, which is not much to be depended upon: the latter, on the contrary, fought chiefly on foot in cloſe and regular order: and their ſucceſs was various according to the nature of the countries in which they happened to fight. For in encloſed places, the Romans generally got the better; and the Parthians had the advantage in large open plains; and indeed the nature of the country they had to defend was very favourable to their manner of fighting; for it was flat and open, a thouſand miles from any ſea-coaſt, with ſo few rivers, that they might ſometimes march two or three days together without ſeeing one, and was alſo very thin of towns and inhabitants: ſo that the Roman armies which marched but ſlowly on account of the heavineſs of their armour, and the good order they obſerved, were much annoyed by an active and light-armed enemy, who always fought on horſeback, and were at one place over-night, and perhaps fifty or ſixty miles off the next day: in this manner the Parthians availed themſelves of their horſe with ſo much ſucceſs, that they ruined the army conducted by Craſſus, and reduced that under the command of Mark Anthony to the utmoſt diſtreſs. But (as I ſaid before) I ſhall confine myſelf to Europe alone in what I have to ſay of theſe matters, and quote only the examples of the Greeks and Romans in former times, and the Germans at preſent——Let us come now to the other point if you pleaſe, viz. what it is that makes Infantry ſuperior to Cavalry.

valry.——I ſay then, in the firſt place place, that Cavalry cannot march through all roads, as foot can; and they are ſlower in their motions, when it is neceſſary to change their order: for if there ſhould be occaſion to retreat when they are advancing, or to advance when they are retreating; to wheel off to the right or left; to move when they are halting, or to halt when they are in motion, it is certain they cannot do it ſo ſoon as Infantry; and if they are thrown into confuſion by ſome ſudden ſhock, they cannot rally ſo eaſily when the ſhock is over. Beſides, it often happens that a brave and ſpirited fellow is put upon a pitiful horſe, and a coward upon one that is unruly and ungovernable; in either of which caſes, ſome diſorder muſt enſue. Why then ſhould it ſeem wonderful that a firm and compact body of foot ſhould be able to ſuſtain an attack of Cavalry; eſpecially as horſes are ſenſible animals, and when they are apprehenſive of danger, cannot eaſily be brought to ruſh into it? You ſhould likewiſe compare the force that impels them to advance, with that which makes them retreat, and you will then find, that the latter is much more powerful than the former; for in one caſe, they feel nothing but the prick of a ſpur, but in the other, they ſee a rank of pikes, and other ſharp weapons preſented to them; ſo that you may ſee both from ancient and modern proofs, that good Infantry will always be able not only to make head againſt Cavalry, but generally to get the better of them. But if you object, that the fury with which the horſes are driven on to charge an enemy, makes them regard a pike no more than a ſpur; I anſwer, that though a horſe be upon his career, yet he will bate of his ſpeed when he comes near the pikes; and when he begins to feel the points of them, he will either ſtand ſtock ſtill, or wheel off to the right or left. To convince yourſelf of this, try if you can ride a horſe a horſe againſt a wall, and I fancy you will find very few, if any, how ſpirited ſoever they may be, that can be forced to do it. Julius Cæſar, before an engagement which he had with the Swiſs in Gaul, not only diſmounted himſelf, but cauſed all his Cavalry to diſmount, and ſent their horſes away to a place at ſome diſtance from the field of battle, as fitter for flight than to fight upon. Notwithſtanding theſe natural impediments, however, to which Cavalry are ſubject, a General who commands an army, which conſiſts chiefly of Infantry, ſhould always lead them through roads upon his march, where he cannot be attacked by Cavalry without great trouble and inconvenience; and ſuch roads may eaſily be ſound in moſt countries. If he marches over hills, they will protect him from the fury of their career, which you ſeem to think irreſiſtible: if he marches through a flat country, the hedges, and ditches, and woods, will generally ſecure him; every little bank or thicket, how inconſiderable ſoever, every vineyard or plantation, is ſufficient to embarraſs Cavalry, and to prevent their acting with any material effect; and if they come to engage, it is probable they may meet with the ſame impediments in a field of battle as upon a march; for the leaſt obſtruction ſpoils their career, and damps their ardour. The Roman armies, however, I muſt tell you, put ſuch confidence in their armour and manner of fighting, that if it was in their power to chooſe one place, that was rough and confined, in order to ſhelter them from the fury of the enemy's Cavalry, and to prevent them from extending their lines; or another where ſuch Cavalry might act with the greateſt advantage, they always made choice of the latter.——But now we have armed our Infantry, it is time to exerciſe them; let us ſee therefore in what manner the Romans uſed to exerciſe their Infantry before they were ſuffered to engage an enemy; for though ſoldiers may be well-choſen and armed, they will never be good for any thing if they are not diligently exerciſed. Now this exerciſe ought to be of three kinds. In the firſt place, they muſt be taught to endure all ſorts of hardſhip and fatigue, as well as to be dexterous and agile: in the next, to handle their arms well: and laſtly, to obſerve orders, and obey command, and to keep their ranks and ſtations, whether it be upon a march, or in battle, or in encamping; which are the three principal operations of an army, and if they are well executed, a General will come off with reputation even when he loſes a battle. The Ancients therefore had very ſtrict laws and ordinances to enforce the conſtant practice of theſe exerciſes in every particular: their youth were accuſtomed to run races, to leap, to pitch the bar, and to wreſtle; all which are very neceſſary qualifications in Soldiers: for ſwiftneſs of foot will enable them to be before-hand with an enemy in ſeizing an advantageous poſt, to come upon them on a ſudden, and to overtake them when they are flying: if they are nimble and dexterous, they will know how to avoid a blow, and find no difficulty in getting over a foſſe or breaſt-work: and if they are ſtrong, they will be able to carry their arms with more eaſe; to make a greater impreſſion upon the enemy, or to ſuſtain a ſhock the better. But above all, they ſhould be inured to carry heavy burdens, which is very neceſſary: for upon ſome great and preſſing occaſions, they may be obliged to carry proviſions with them for ſeveral days, beſides their arms, which they could not do if they were not accuſtomed to ſuch things: and by theſe means great dangers are often avoided, and ſometimes glorious victories obtained. To accuſtom their young men to their armour, and to teach them how to handle their arms with dexterity, the ancients uſed to clothe them in armour which was twice as heavy as that which they were to wear in battle; and inſtead of a ſword, they put a thick cudgel in their hands which was loaded with lead in the inſide, and much heavier than a ſword: after this, they fixed poſts in the earth about ſix feet high, and ſo firm that no blows could move them; upon which the young men uſed to exerciſe themſelves with their cudgel and buckler, as if they had been real enemies, ſometimes making a ſtroke at the top, as if it had been the head or face of a man, ſometimes at the right or left ſide, ſometimes at the lower part, ſometimes advancing briſkly upon it, and at others retreating a ſtep or two; by which means they became dexterous and expert, not only in defending themſelves, but annoying an enemy, and the weight of their falſe arms made their true ones ſeem light and eaſy to be wielded. The Romans taught their Soldiers rather to thruſt than to cut with their ſwords, becauſe thruſts are more dangerous, harder to be warded off, and he that makes them does not expoſe his own body ſo much, and is ſooner ready to repeat a thurſt than a full ſtroke. Do not think it ſtrange, however, that the Ancients were ſo exact and particular in things, which to you, perhaps, may ſeem trifling and ridiculous: but conſider, that when men come to fight hand to hand, every little advantage is of great importance; and I muſt beg leave to tell you, that ſeveral good Authors have entered into a much more minute and circumſtantial detail of theſe matters than I have done: for the Ancients thought nothing conduced more to the welfare and ſecurity of their country, than to have a great number of men well-diſciplined, exerciſed, and ready for war; knowing, that neither riches nor magnificence, but the reputation of their arms alone, could keep their enemies in awe and ſubjection; and that defects in other things may ſometimes be remedied, but that in war, where the fatal conſequences of them are immediately felt, they admit of no remedy. Beſides, expertneſs in theſe exerciſes makes men bold and courageous in battle; for inſtead of being afraid, every one is eager to diſtinguiſh himſelf in ſuch points as he knows he excels in. The Ancients therefore, took great care to make their youth perfect in all military exerciſes: for they likewiſe accuſtomed them to throw darts, that were much heavier than thoſe they carried in war, at the poſts I mentioned before, which taught them to be very expert in the uſe of that weapon, and made their arms ſtrong and muſcular. They were alſo taught how to uſe the croſs-bow, the long-bow, and the ſling; and in all theſe things there were maſters appointed on purpoſe to inſtruct them: ſo that when they were called out to ſerve in the wars, they were ſo well prepared that they wanted nothing to make them excellent Soldiers, but to be taught how to keep their ranks upon a march or in battle, and to obey orders: which they quickly learnt by being incorporated with others who had ſerved a long time, and were thoroughly experienced in that part of diſcipline.

Cosimo. What exerciſes would you recommend to ſuch as are to compoſe our Infantry at preſent?

Fabrizio. Moſt of thoſe which I have already mentioned, as running, wreſtling, leaping, carrying heavy arms, the uſe of the croſs-bow, the long-bow, and the muſket; which laſt is a new weapon, you know, but a very uſeful one. To theſe exerciſes I would accuſtom all the youth in the country, but thoſe in particular who are deſtined to be Soldiers: and for this purpoſe, I would ſet aſide all holidays and idle times. I would likewiſe have them taught to ſwim, which is very neceſſary; for all rivers have not bridges over them, nor can they expect to find boats always ready to tranſport them: ſo that if your Soldiers cannot ſwim, you will loſe many advantages and opportunities of doing great things *. The reaſon why the Romans exerciſed their youth in the Campus Martius was becauſe the Tiber ran cloſe by it; that ſo when they were fatigued, they might refreſh themſelves in the river, and learn to ſwim.——I ſhould alſo chuſe (like the Ancients) to have thoſe properly exerciſed that are to ſerve in the Cavalry; becauſe it not only teaches them to ride well, but to avail themſelves of their ſtrength in a better manner. For which purpoſe, they had wooden horſes, upon which they exerciſed themſelves, vaulting upon them ſometimes with armour on, and ſometimes with none, without any aſſiſtance, and on either ſide of the horſe: ſo that upon a ſignal or word of command from their inſtructors, they were all either mounted or diſmounted in a moment. Now as theſe exerciſes both for horſe and foot were practiſed without any difficulty or inconvenience in former times, they might eaſily be introduced again amongſt the youth of any ſtate if the Governors of it ſo pleaſed; as in fact they have been in ſome of the weſtern nations, where they divide the inhabitants into Claſſes, which take their reſpective names from the different ſorts of arms they make uſe of in battle: and as theſe

---

* When the ancient Greeks would upbraid any one with extreme inſufficiency, they told them in a proverbial manner, "that he could neither read nor ſwim." Julius Cæſar was alſo of opinion, that ſwimming was of great uſe in war, and he himſelf found it ſo; for chuſing moſt commonly to march on foot, as Alexander the Great alſo did, he always ſwam over the Rivers in his way, when expedition was required. When he was in Egypt, being forced to get into a little boat for his ſafety, and ſo many people leaping in with him, that it was in danger of ſinking, he choſe, though he was of an advanced age, to commit himſelf to the ſea, and ſwam to his fleet, which lay about two hundred paces off, holding his pocket-book above water in his left hand, and drawing his armour in his teeth. Sueton. in J. Cæſare, Sect. 64. Another time, during the war he was engaged in with Petreius and Afranius, he commanded his whole army to paſs a River by ſwimming, without any manner of neceſſity.

——— rapuitque ruens in prælia miles.
Quod fugiens timuiſſet iter, mox uda receptis
Membra fovent armis, gelidoſque a gurgite, curſu
Reſtituunt artus. Lucan. L. iv. v. 151. &c.

conſiſt of pikes, halberds, muſkets, and bows, the man that carry thoſe weapons are called pikemen, halberdeers, muſketeers, bowmen, or archers. Every inhabitant is likewiſe obliged to declare in which of theſe Claſſes he chuſes to be enrolled: and as ſome of them cannot be fit to bear arms, either on account of their age or ſome other impediment, they make a *delectus* or choice out of each Claſs, and call thoſe who are thus choſen *jurati*, becauſe they make them take an oath of fidelity and obedience. Theſe *jurati* then are called together upon holidays, and exerciſed in the uſe of ſuch arms as they take their name from; every Claſs having its particular place aſſigned by the Governors of the State, where it is to rendezvous and be exerciſed; and every man belonging to it, as well as the *jurati*, is to appear and bring his proportion of money with him to defray the expences that are occaſioned by thoſe meetings. What therefore is actually done by others, I ſhould think might be done by our countrymen: but they are grown ſo lazy and degenerate that they will not imitate any thing that is good; though it was intirely owing to ſuch exerciſes that the Ancients had ſuch excellent Infantry, and that the States in the Weſt, abovementioned, have much better at preſent than we have; for the Romans either exerciſed them at home during the time of their Republic, or abroad, under the reign of their Emperors, as I have ſaid before; but the Italian States will not exerciſe them at home, and abroad they cannot, becauſe they are not their own Subjects, and therefore will do nothing but what pleaſes themſelves. Hence it comes to paſs, that theſe military exerciſes are now wholly neglected, and all manner of diſcipline is at an end; which is the true reaſon why many States, eſpecially in this country, are become ſo weak and contemptible.— But to reſume our ſubject. It is not ſufficient to make a good army, that the Soldiers are inured to hardſhips and fatigue, ſtrong, ſwift, and expert in the uſe of their arms: they muſt likewiſe learn to keep their ranks, to obey the word of command, and ſignals by drum or trumpet, and to obſerve good order, whether they halt, advance, retreat, are upon a march, or engaged with an enemy: for without a ſtrict attention to theſe points, an army will never be good for any thing: as it is certain that a parcel of diſorderly and ill-diſciplined men, though ever ſo brave, are not ſo much to be depended upon as others who are not ſo courageous by nature, but orderly and well-diſciplined; for good order makes men bold, and confuſion cowards. But that you may better comprehend what I am going to ſay, it is neceſſary to premiſe, that every nation has had particular corps, or bodies of Soldiers in their Armies and Militias, which though differing in their names, varied but little in the number of men they were compoſed of; as they generally conſiſted of ſix, or at moſt, of eight thouſand. Thus the Romans had their Legions, the Greeks their Phalanxes, the Gauls their Catervæ, and the Swiſs at preſent (who are the only people that have any traces of the ancient military inſtitutions left amongſt them) what we ſhould call Regiments in our country: but they all divided them into Battalions or ſmaller bodies, as beſt ſuited their purpoſes. Let us then call them by the name that is moſt familiar to us, and form them according to the beſt diſpoſitions that have been made, either by the Ancients or Moderns. Now as the Romans divided their Legion, which conſiſted of betwixt five and ſix thouſand men, into ten Cohorts, we will alſo divide our Regiment, which is to conſiſt of ſix thouſand foot, into ten Battalions of four hundred and fifty men a-piece; of whom four hundred ſhould be heavy armed, and the other fifty light armed. Of the heavy-armed, let three hundred have ſwords and targets, and be called Targetmen; another hundred ſhould have pikes, and be called Ordinary Pikemen; the other fifty light-armed men muſt carry muſkets, croſs-bows, halberds, and targets, whom we will call by the old name of Ordinary Velites; ſo that in the ten Battalions there will be three thouſand Targetmen, one thouſand ordinary Pikemen, and five hundred ordinary Velites; that is to ſay, four thouſand five hundred. But as our Regiment is to conſiſt of ſix thouſand men, we muſt add fifteen hundred more; of whom a thouſand muſt have pikes, and be called Pikemen extraordinary; the other five hundred ſhould be light-armed, and called Velites extraordinary; and thus one half of our Infantry would be compoſed of Targetmen, and the other of Pikemen, and others armed in a different manner. Every Battalion ſhould have a Lieutenant Colonel, or particular Commander of its own, four Captains, and forty Corporals, beſides a Captain and five Corporals of the ordinary Velites. Over the thouſand Pikemen extraordinary, there ſhould be three Commanders or Lieutenant Colonels, ten Captains, and an hundred Corporals; in the Velites extraordinary, two Lieutenant Colonels, five Captains, and fifty Corporals. I would then appoint a Colonel or Commander of the whole Regiment, with his Drum and Colours; which every one of the Commanders abovementioned ſhould likewiſe have: ſo that the whole would conſiſt of ten Battalions, compoſed of three thouſand Targetmen, a thouſand ordinary Pikemen, as many extraordinary, five hundred ordinary Velites, five hundred more extraordinary, in all ſix thouſand: amongſt whom, there would be ſix hundred Corporals, fifteen Lieutenant Colonels, fifteen drums and colours, ſixty-five Captains, and the Colonel with his colours and drum.——You ſee I have been guilty of ſome repetition: but it is purely to make you underſtand me the better, and that you may not be puzzled or perplexed when I come to ſpeak of drawing up an army in order of battle.—— I ſay then, that all Princes and Governors of Republics ſhould arm their Militia in this manner, and form them into ſuch Regiments; of which they ought to raiſe as many as their dominions will admit; after which, having divided them into Battalions according to the directions I have juſt now given, in order to make them perfect in their diſcipline, it will be ſufficient to exerciſe them Battalion by Battalion: and though one Battalion has not men enow in it to form a competent army of itſelf, yet by this means, every man may learn to do his own duty. For two things muſt be obſerved in all armies: firſt, that the men be taught what they are to do in their reſpective Battalions; and next, how every Battalion is to act when it is joined with others to form an army: and thoſe that are ready and expert in the firſt, will ſoon learn the ſecond; but ſuch as are not perfect in one, can never be taught the other. Every Battalion then muſt firſt be taught ſeparately to keep good order in its own ranks upon all occaſions, and in all places; and afterwards, how to act in conjunction with the reſt, to attend to the drums and other inſtruments, by which all motions are regulated and directed in time of battle; to underſtand from the difference of ſounds, whether it is to maintain its ground, or to advance, or retreat, or wheel off, or face about. So that when the men know how to keep their ranks in ſuch a manner that no ſort of ground nor any manœuvre can throw them into diſorder; when they underſtand what they have to do by the beat of the drum or ſound of the trumpet, and where to take their ſtation, they will ſoon learn how to act in concert with the other Battalions of their Regiment, when they are aſſembled to form an army. But as it is neceſſary to exerciſe them all together ſometimes, the whole Regiment ſhould be aſſembled once or twice a year in time of peace, to be formed like an army with front, flanks and rear in their proper places, and to be exerciſed for ſome days, as if they were preparing to engage an enemy. Now ſince a Commander draws up his forces for battle, either upon ſight of an enemy, or in apprehenſion of one that is not far off, his army ſhould be exerciſed according to the occaſion, and ſhewn in what order it is not only to march, but to engage, if need ſhould require; with particular inſtructions how to act, if it ſhould be attacked on this or that ſide. But when he would prepare his men to attack an enemy that is in ſight, he ſhould ſhew them how and where to begin the attack, whither they are to retreat if they ſhould be repulſed, who are to take their places, what ſignals, ſounds, and words of command they are to obſerve, and inure them to ſham fights in ſuch a manner, that they may be rather deſirous than afraid to come to a real one. For it is not the natural courage of men that makes an army bold, but order and good diſcipline: becauſe, when the firſt ranks know whither to retreat, and who are to advance in their place if they ſhould be worſted, they will always fight with ſpirit, having relief ſo near at hand: nor will the next ranks be daunted at the misfortune of the firſt, as they are prepared for ſuch an event, and perhaps not ſorry for it, becauſe they may think it will give them the glory of a victory which others could not obtain. Theſe exerciſes are particularly neceſſary in an army newly raiſed, and they ought not to be neglected in one that is compoſed of veterans; for though the Romans were trained up to the uſe of arms from their youth, yet their Generals always exerciſed them in this manner with great aſſiduity for ſome time before they expected to come to an engagement: and Joſephus tells us in his hiſtory, that even the very ſuttlers and rabble that uſed to follow their armies, often did good ſervice in battle by having ſeen the Soldiers frequently exerciſed, and learned to handle their arms, and keep firm in their ranks. But armies compoſed of new men, which have been raiſed either for preſent ſervice, or to be formed into a Militia in order to be employed upon occaſion, will be good for nothing at all, if the Battalions are not firſt exerciſed ſeparately, and afterwards all together: for as good order and diſcipline are abſolutely neceſſary, great care ought to be taken to keep them up amongſt thoſe that know their duty, and greater ſtill to inſtruct ſuch as are entirely ignorant of it: to effect which, a wiſe and able Commander will ſpare no pains.

COSIMO. You ſeem to have deviated a little from your point, I think: for before you have told us how a ſingle Battallion ought to be exerciſed, you talk of exerciſing a whole army, and preparing it for battle.

FABRIZIO. You ſay very true indeed; and I confeſs my zeal for theſe exerciſes and inſtitutions, and my concern at their being now ſo much neglected, have led me a little out of the way, and occaſioned me to break in upon the order I had propoſed to myſelf. But I will return to it.——You may remember that I told you it is of the utmoſt importance in diſciplining a Battalion to make the men keep their ranks well: for which purpoſe, it is neceſſary to exerciſe them in the manner called Snail-faſhion *; and as I ſaid there ſhould be four hundred heavy-armed foot in a Battalion, I will keep to that number. Theſe four hundred men muſt be formed into eighty ranks, of five in each rank, which ſhould learn both how to extend themſelves, and how to reduce themſelves into cloſer order, whether they are moving ſlowly or briſkly: but in what manner this is to be done, is eaſier to comprehend by ſeeing it actually performed than from

---

* That is (I ſuppoſe) to teach them how to contract or extend themſelves upon occaſion, as that animal does.

any deſcription; which is not abſolutely neceſſary here, becauſe every one who has the leaſt experience in military affairs knows the method of it, and that its chief uſe is to accuſtom the men to keep their ranks. But let us now proceed to draw up a Battalion. There are three principal ways then of doing this: the firſt and beſt of which is to draw it up cloſe and compact in the form of an oblong ſquare; the ſecond is to form it in a ſquare with two wings * in front: and the third is to throw it into a ſquare with an area or vacancy in the middle, which is commonly called a hollow ſquare. The firſt may be effected two ways; one, by doubling the ranks, that is, by receiving the ſecond rank into the firſt, the fourth into the third, the ſixth into the fifth, and ſo on; that ſo where there were eighty ranks before with five men in every rank, they may be reduced to forty with ten in a rank, and by doubling them a ſecond time, to twenty with twenty in a rank. This will make an oblong ſquare: for though there will be as many men in the files as in the ranks, yet the men in the ranks muſt ſtand ſo cloſe together as to touch each other, but thoſe in the files muſt be at leaſt four feet diſtant one from another: ſo that the ſquare will be longer from the front to the rear, than from the extremity of the right flank to that of the left; that is, the files will be longer than the ranks. The fifty ordinary Velites belonging to the Battalion muſt not be mixed with the other ranks, but poſted on each flank, and in the rear, when it is formed.——The other way of drawing up a Battalion cloſe and compact in the form of an oblong ſquare is better than this, and therefore I will be more particular in deſcribing it. You remember, I take it for granted, of how many private men and what officers it is to conſiſt, and

---

* The original ſays "con la fronte cornuta, i. e. with a horned front:" the word *corno* in the Italian language, like *cornu* in the Latin, ſignifying a *horn* as well as the *wing of an army*.

p.77. Vol.IV.
Lodge Sa
3F 2P

and how they are to be armed: without further repetition then, I ſay, that the Battalion muſt be formed into twenty ranks, with twenty men in every rank; that is to ſay, five ranks of Pikemen in the front, and fifteen of Targetmen in the rear: there muſt be two Captains in the front, and two in the rear: the Lieutenant Colonel or Commander of the Battalion with his Colours and Drum muſt take poſt in the interval betwixt the five ranks of Pikemen and the fifteen of Targetmen: the Corporals are to be placed upon the two flanks, one at the extremity of each rank in ſuch a manner, that every one of them may have his men by his ſide; thoſe on the right will have them on their left, and thoſe on the left will have them on their right: the fifty ordinary Velites ſhould be poſted upon the flanks and in the rear of the Battalion. Now in order to throw it into this form, you muſt draw it up in eighty ranks, with five men in every rank, and placing the Velites by themſelves either in the front or the rear, every Captain muſt put himſelf at the head of his Company or hundred men, or twenty ranks of five men in each; of which the five front ranks, or thoſe immediately behind him, muſt be Pikemen, and the reſt Targetmen. The Lieutenant Colonel or Commander of the Battalion with his drum and colours, are to be placed in the interval betwixt the pikes and targets of the ſecond Company, and will take up the room of three Targetmen: twenty Corporals muſt be placed upon the left flanks of the ranks commanded by the firſt Captain; and twenty more upon the right flanks of the ranks commanded by the laſt Captain: and it muſt be obſerved that the Corporals of the Pikemen muſt carry pikes themſelves, and thoſe of the Targetmen muſt have Targets and Swords. Your ranks being thus diſpoſed, if you deſire to form them in order of battle to face an enemy, you muſt cauſe the Captain of the firſt twenty ranks to halt with his men, the Captain of the ſecond twenty, to keep advancing, but inclining a little to the right, cloſe along the flank of the firſt twenty, till he comes abreaſt of their Captain, and there to halt himſelf: the third is then to advance with his men in the ſame manner by the right flank of the other two Companies, till he is in a line with the two firſt Captains, and there to halt as they do: after which, the fourth Captain and his Company are to move forward likewiſe by the right flank of thoſe that are already joined, and halt when he has advanced as far as the other three: all which being executed, two of thoſe Captains muſt immediately quit the front rank and take poſt in the rear; and then the Battalion will be formed in an oblong ſquare as it was by the other method. The Velites muſt likewiſe be poſted on each flank as they were before: one of theſe ways is called doubling the ranks in a right line; the other, doubling them by the flanks: the former is the eaſier of the two; the latter more convenient, and may be better adapted to anſwer different occaſions. For in the former you muſt conform to the number, becauſe five doubled makes ten, ten twenty, twenty forty; ſo that if you double your ranks in a right line, you cannot make a front of fifteen, or twenty-five, or thirty, or thirty-five, but muſt be governed in that by the number in your firſt rank; and as it is often neceſſary to form a front of ſix or eight hundred foot, doubling your ranks in a right line would throw the men into confuſion. I therefore like the latter method beſt: and though perhaps there may be more difficulty in it, yet that will ſoon be ſurmounted by frequent practice and exerciſe. I ſay then it is a matter of the utmoſt importance to have Soldiers that know how to take their proper Stations in a moment: for which purpoſe, it is neceſſary to form them into ſuch Battalions, to exerciſe them all together, to teach them to march either quick or ſlow in all directions,

rections, and to keep ſuch order, that no paſs or defile, how rough or difficult ſoever, can oblige them to break their ranks. For if Soldiers can do this, they are good Soldiers, and may be called Veterans, though they have never ſeen the face of an enemy: but if they have been in a thouſand battles, and are ignorant in this point, they are no better than raw men. What has been ſaid, relates only to drawing up a Battalion in cloſer order when it is marching in ſmall ranks: but after that has been done, if it ſhould happen to be thrown into diſorder, either by the nature of the country through which it is obliged to march, or by an enemy, or by any other accident, and you want to reduce it to its former order immediately; there lies the main point and chief difficulty: to ſurmount which, much exerciſe, and practice, and experience are neceſſary; and therefore the Ancients ſpared no pains to make their Soldiers ready and expert in rallying whenever they were thrown into confuſion. For this purpoſe, two things, are neceſſary, viz. that there ſhould be ſeveral peculiar marks of diſtinction in every Battalion; and that the ſame men ſhould always be placed in the ſame ranks. For inſtance, if a man was ſtationed in the ſecond rank at firſt, let him continue in it ever after; and not only in the ſame rank, but in the very ſame place of it: and that he may not be at a loſs how to do that, there muſt be ſeveral peculiar marks to guide and direct him, as I ſaid juſt now. In the firſt place, it is neceſſary the Colours ſhould be ſuch as to be eaſily diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of all other Battalions, when ſeveral are joined together: in the next, that the Lieutenant Colonels, Captains, and other officers ſhould wear different plumes: and laſtly (which is of ſtill more importance) that every Corporal ſhould be diſtinguiſhed by ſome particular mark: in which the Ancients were ſo remarkably careful and exact, that they cauſed their numbers to be marked upon their caſques in great figures, as the firſt, ſecond, third, fourth, and ſo on: but not thinking that ſufficient, every Targetman had the number of his rank and his place in that rank engraved upon his target. When men are thus diſtinguiſhed from each other, and accuſtomed to know and keep their reſpective ſtations, it is an eaſy matter to rally them if they are thrown into confuſion: for when the Standard is once fixed, the Captains and Corporals will preſently know their Stations; and reſume them (whether on the right or left) at a due diſtance from it: the private men likewiſe, being guided by their uſual marks and the difference of Colours, will preſently fall into their proper ranks and places: juſt as when you are to put together the Staves of a barrel, if you have marked them before it was taken to pieces, you may eaſily do it; but if thoſe Staves have not been marked, you will find it exceeding difficult, if not impoſſible. Theſe things may ſoon be learned by frequent practice and exerciſe, and are not eaſily forgotten: and thus the new raw men being inſtructed by the Veterans, a whole Province by ſuch exerciſe may be made good and experienced Soldiers in time.——It is neceſſary alſo to teach your men to move all at a time, when there is occaſion, in ſuch a manner as to make either flank or rear become the front, or the front become either the rear or one of the flanks; which may eaſily be effected by cauſing every man to face at once towards any particular part, which then will become the front. It is true that when they face to either flank, it will make ſome alteration and diſproportion in the ranks, becauſe the diſtance which will then be betwixt the front and the rear, will not be ſo great as that betwixt one extremity of the flanks and the other; which is quite contrary to the form in which a Battalion ought to be drawn up: this however may ſoon be rectified by well-exerciſed and experienced Soldiers, and therefore cannot occaſion any great diſorder. But there is another manœuvre of great importance, in which ſtill more readineſs and expertneſs are requiſite; and that is, when a whole Battalion is to move all at once like one ſolid body; for inſtance, when it is to wheel to the left about in ſuch a manner as to front on that ſide where the left flank was before: for then thoſe that are on the left at the extremity of the front rank muſt ſtand faſt, and thoſe that are neareſt them on the right muſt move ſo ſlow, that the reſt who are farther from them on the right, and thoſe at the other extremity of that rank, may not be obliged to run; otherwiſe, they will be in great confuſion.—— Now as it always happens, when a Battalion is attacked on its march from one place to another, that the Companies which are not poſted in the front are forced to fight either in one of the flanks or the rear, and the Battalion is under a ſudden neceſſity of making a front where that flank, or perhaps the rear, was before; in order to form thoſe Companies in due proportion and order; all the pikes are to be placed in that flank which is to become the front, and the Corporals, Captains, and Lieutenant Colonel muſt take their reſpective poſts as in the method of forming a Battalion above deſcribed. To effect this then, in forming the Battalion into eighty ranks of five men in every rank, you muſt put all the Pikemen into the twenty firſt ranks, with five of their Corporals in the front rank, and five in the laſt of that Company: and then the other ſixty ranks, or three Companies, will wholly conſiſt of Targetmen; in the firſt and laſt rank of which there muſt be five Corporals. The Lieutenant Colonel, with his Standard and Drum, are to take poſt in the center of the firſt Company of Targetmen, and the four Captains at the head of their reſpective Companies. When it is thus formed, if you would have all the Pikemen upon the left flank, you muſt double the Companies one by one by their right flanks:

but if you would have them on the right flank, you muſt double them by the left: and thus the Battalion will have all its Pikemen upon one flank, the Corporals in the front and rear, the Captains in the front, and the Lieutenant Colonel in the center. This is the order it is to obſerve whilſt it is marching: but upon the approach of an enemy, if you would have its front where one of the flanks was before, you have nothing to do but to order your men to face to that flank where the Pikemen are, and then the whole Battalion, with all its ranks and officers, are preſently changed, and in the order I deſcribed before: for every man will be in his proper ſtation, except the Captains, and they will ſoon take their poſts.——But when a Battalion is marching forwards, and apprehenſive of being attacked in the rear, the ranks muſt be ſo diſpoſed that the Pikemen may be poſted there: for which purpoſe, five ranks of them ſhould be placed in the rear of every Company, inſtead of its front where they are uſually ſtationed: in all other reſpects let the ordinary diſpoſition be obſerved *.

Cosimo. If I remember right, you told us that this manner of exerciſe is calculated to reduce all the Battalions of a Regiment into the form of an army; and that it was ſufficient for ſuch a purpoſe. But if it ſhould happen that this Battalion of four hundred and fifty men ſhould be obliged to fight by itſelf, how would you draw it up in that caſe?

Fabrizio. The Lieutenant Colonel ſhould conſider in the firſt place, where it will be moſt neceſſary to place his Pikemen, and to poſt them there accordingly; which may eaſily be done without breaking in upon the above mentioned diſpoſition: for though that is the order which ſhould be obſerved by a Battalion when it acts in conjunction with others againſt an enemy; yet it may ſerve upon all other

---

* The Velites then, we are to ſuppoſe, muſt be ſtationed as before.

occaſions. However, in ſhewing you the two other methods of drawing up a Battalion, which I promiſed you a little while ago, I will anſwer your queſtion more particularly: but they are ſeldom uſed; and if ever, it is when a Battalion is to act alone and independent upon all others.——In order then to form a Battalion with two wings (or two horns) in the front, you are to diſpoſe your eighty ranks of five men in a rank in this manner. In the firſt place, you muſt poſt a Captain at the head of twenty-five ranks, which are to conſiſt of two Pikemen on the left, and three Targetmen on the right. Next to the five firſt ranks, let there be twenty more, with twenty Corporals poſted in them; all of them betwixt the Pikemen and the Targetmen, except the five which carry pikes; for they muſt be placed amongſt the Pikemen. After theſe twenty-five ranks thus drawn up, let there be poſted another Captain at the head of fifteen ranks of Targetmen. In the interval betwixt this Company and the third, the Lieutenant Colonel, with his Colours and Drum, is to poſt himſelf at the head of the third Company, conſiſting of fifteen ranks more of Targetmen. The third Captain is to take poſt at the head of the fourth Company, which is to conſiſt of twenty-five ranks, every one of which is to have three Targetmen on the left, and two Pikemen on the right: and after the five firſt ranks there muſt be twenty more with Corporals in them poſted betwixt the Targetmen and the Pikemen; in the rear of this Company the fourth Captain is to take his Station. If then you would form theſe ranks thus drawn up into a Battalion with two wings, you muſt order the firſt Captain to halt with his twenty-five ranks, and the ſecond to make a motion to the right, and then to advance with his fifteen ranks of Targetmen to double the right flank of the twenty-five ranks that have halted, till he comes a-breaſt of the rank that is the fifteenth from their rear, and there to halt himſelf. After this, the Lieutenant Colonel, with his fifteen ranks of Targetmen, is to do the ſame on the right flank of the two firſt Companies. Laſt of all, the third Captain, with his twenty-five ranks, and the fourth Captain in the rear of them, is to move to the right, and then advance along the right flank of the other three Companies, but not to halt till his rearmoſt rank is in a line with their rearmoſt rank : all which being done, the Captain of the firſt fifteen ranks of Targetmen muſt quit his Station, and repair to the left of the rearmoſt rank, and the fourth Captain to the right of it. In this manner you will have a Battalion of twenty-five ranks, ſome conſiſting of five, and others of twenty men : with two wings (one at each angle of the front) each of which will conſiſt of ten ranks of five men a-piece, and a ſpace betwixt the wings large enough to receive ten men a-breaſt. The Colonel takes poſt in this open, a Captain at the front of each horn, and another at each angle in the rear of the Battalion ; two files of Pikemen and twenty Corporals are placed on each flank. The wings may ſerve to ſecure the carriages and baggage, as well as the artillery, if there be any : the Velites may be ranged along the flanks, on the outſide of the Pikemen.——Now in order to reduce this horned Battalion into a Hollow Square, you need only to take eight of the rearmoſt of thoſe fifteen ranks that have twenty men a-piece in them, and place them immediately in the front of the two wings, which will then become the flanks of the Hollow Square. In the Area left in the middle, the Lieutenant Colonel is to take place with his Colours and Drum : and it may likewiſe receive the carriages and baggage, but not the Artillery, which is to be planted either in the front or on the flanks.——These are the methods that may be taken to form a ſingle Battalion when it is to paſs alone through dangerous and ſuſpected places : but the ſolid Battalion,

talion, without wings or area in the middle of it, is certainly the beſt: nevertheleſs, either one or other of thoſe forms may be neceſſary ſometimes to ſecure the carriages, baggage, &c. The Swiſs have likewiſe ſeveral forms of drawing up their Battalions: one of them is in the ſhape of a Croſs; in the ſpaces betwixt the arms of which, they place their muſketeers to ſhelter them from the firſt ſhock of an enemy; but as ſuch Battalions are only fit to engage ſeparately, and it is my intention to ſhew in what manner ſeveral Battalions united muſt fight, I ſhall not give myſelf the trouble of deſcribing the order they obſerve.

Cosimo. I think I ſufficiently comprehend the method that is to be followed in exerciſing the men of whom your Battalion conſiſts; but if I miſtake not, you ſaid you would add a thouſand Pikemen extraordinary, and five hundred Velites extraordinary, to the ten Battalions of which your Regiment is to be compoſed. Would you not cauſe them alſo to be exerciſed?

Fabrizio. Certainly, and very well too: for I would exerciſe the extraordinary Pikemen, by Companies at leaſt, if not altogether, in the diſcipline of the Battalion; for I ſhould employ them more than the ordinary Pikemen, eſpecially upon particular occaſions, as in convoys, eſcorts, plundering, and the like. As to the Velites, it may ſuffice to exerciſe them ſeparately at home in their particular method of fighting, without bringing them into the field: for as they are to fight in a looſe and detached way, there is no occaſion to call them together when the reſt of the Battalion is aſſembled to be diſciplined in their own manner. You muſt therefore (as I ſaid before, and beg leave to ſay again) take great care to exerciſe your Battalions in ſuch a manner, that the men be taught to keep their ranks, to know their proper ſtations, to rally or alter their diſpoſition in a moment, when they are either got into troubleſome defiles, or are apprehenſive of being attacked, or diſordered by an enemy: for when they are perfect in theſe things, they will eaſily comprehend their duty when joined with others to form an army. So that if any Prince or Republic would be at the trouble of eſtabliſhing this diſcipline and theſe exerciſes, they would always have good Soldiers enow in their dominions to make them ſuperior to their neighbours, and put them in a condition to give law to others, inſtead of receiving it from them. But ſuch is the degeneracy of the times we live in, and theſe things are ſo far from being in any eſteem at preſent, that they are totally neglected and laughed at: which is the reaſon that our armies are now good for nothing; and that if there be yet any officers or private men amongſt us who have the leaſt ſhare of experience, courage, or abilities of any kind, they have no opportunity of ſhewing them.

COSIMO. How many carriages would you aſſign to a Battalion?

FABRIZIO. In the firſt place, no Captain or Corporal ſhould be ſuffered to ride upon a march; and if the Colonel deſired to ride, it ſhould be upon a muſe, and not upon a horſe. I would allow him two baggage horſes, one to every Captain, and two betwixt three Corporals; becauſe I would lodge three of them together when they are in camp, as I ſhall ſhew in its proper place. So that every Battalion ſhould have ſix and thirty horſes to carry its tents, kettles, hatchets, mattocks, ſpades, with other ſuch implements and utenſils as are neceſſary in an encampment, and any thing elſe that may be uſeful or convenient, if there is room for it.

COSIMO. Though I believe all the officers in your Battalion may be neceſſary, yet I ſhould be afraid that ſo many would create confuſion.

FABRIZIO. That might be the caſe if they were not all under the command of one perſon; but as they are, they rather ſerve to preſerve and promote good order; and indeed it would be impoſſible to keep it up without them: for a wall that is weak and tottering in every part, may be better ſupported by many props and buttreſſes, though they are but feeble ones, than by a few, be they ever ſo ſubſtantial; becauſe their ſtrength cannot be of much ſervice at any conſiderable diſtance. For this reaſon, there ought to be a Corporal over every ten Soldiers in all armies, who ſhould be a man of more ſpirit and courage, at leaſt of greater authority, than the reſt, in order to animate them both by his words and example, and exhort them continually to keep firm in their ranks, and behave themſelves like men. How neceſſary theſe things are, may plainly appear from the example even of our own armies, all which have their Corporals, Drums, and Colours, though none of them do their duty. As to Corporals, if they would anſwer the end for which they were firſt appointed, every one of them ſhould have his particular men under him, ſhould lodge with them, ſhould charge with them, and always be in the ſame rank: for then they might keep them ſo regular and compact in their ſeveral ſtations, that it would be almoſt impoſſible for any enemy to break or diſorder them; and if that ſhould ever happen, they might preſently be rallied: but in theſe times they are employed in other purpoſes of a different nature, and do nothing as they ought to do, though their pay is conſiderable. It is the ſame with regard to Colours, which are ſtill continued, rather to make a fine ſhew, than for any other uſe that is made of them. Whereas the Ancients availed themſelves of them as guides and directions in caſe of diſorder: for as ſoon as the Colours were fixed, every man knew his poſt, and immediately returned to it. They likewiſe knew how and when to move, and when to halt, by the motion or halting of the Colours: and thereſore it is neceſſary there ſhould be many different Corps in an army, and that every Corps ſhould have its particular Enſign, and marks of diſtinction: for then it will know what it has to do, and act with ſpirit. The Soldiers then are to obſerve the motion of their Enſigns, and the Enſigns the beat of the Drum; for that, when rightly managed, is a direction to the whole army, which is to act and move in a certain meaſure and pace, according to its different ſounds, that ſo it may know how to keep due time and order. For this purpoſe, the Ancients had their pipes and fifes, and other ſorts of military muſic, perfectly adapted to different occaſions: and as a man that is dancing, and keeps time with the muſic, cannot make a falſe ſtep; ſo an army that properly obſerves the beat of its Drums cannot eaſily be diſordered. The Ancients, therefore, uſed to vary the ſounds and notes of their military muſic according to the occaſion, and as they wanted either to excite, or abate, or confirm the ardour of their Soldiers: and as their tunes and marches were different, they gave them different names: the Doric was calculated to inſpire men with reſolution and firmneſs; the Phrygian excited martial ardour, or rather fury: for Alexander the Great (as it is ſaid) being at dinner one day, and hearing a Phrygian march ſounded, was ſo tranſported with it, that he leaped up from the table and drew his ſword, as if he had been going to charge an enemy. It would be very uſeful then, either to revive theſe meaſures, or invent new ones for ſuch purpoſes; but if that cannot be done, thoſe at leaſt ſhould not be neglected or laid aſide, which teach Soldiers to obey command: and theſe may be varied and adapted in ſuch a manner, that by frequent uſe and exerciſe, they may learn to diſtinguiſh them, and know their ſignification: but at preſent our Drums are chiefly employed to make a noiſe and parade.

Cosmo. I ſhould be very glad to be informed (if you have ever conſidered the matter) how it comes to paſs that we are ſo degenerated, and that not only theſe exerciſes, but all manner of military diſcipline, are now fallen into ſuch neglect and diſuſe amongſt us.

Fabrizio. I will give you my opinion of the matter very freely, Sir. You know then, there have been many renowned Warriors in Europe, but few in Africa, and fewer ſtill in Aſia: the reaſon of which is, that the two laſt mentioned quarters of the world have had but one or two Monarchies, and very few Republics; and that Europe, on the contrary, has had ſeveral Kingdoms, but more Republics. Now men become great and excellent, and ſhew their abilities accordingly as they are employed and encouraged by their Sovereigns, whether they happen to be Kings, Princes, or Republics: ſo that where there are are many States, there will be many great men; but where there are few of the one, there will not be many of the other. In Aſia, there were Ninus, Cyrus, Artaxerxes, Mithridates, and ſome few others like them. In Africa (without having recourſe to the early times of the ancient Egyptians) we read of Maſſiniſſa, Jugurtha, and ſome Carthaginian Commanders of eminent note; the number of whom, however, is very ſmall in compariſon of that which Europe has produced: for in this quarter of the world, there have been numbers of great men that we know of, and many more without doubt, whoſe memories are now extinguiſhed by the malevolence of time: becauſe every State being obliged to cheriſh and encourage men of merit and abilities, either out of neceſſity or for other reaſons, where there are many different States, there muſt of courſe be many great men. Aſia, on the contrary, has not produced many extraordinary men: becauſe that quarter of the globe being ſubject in a great meaſure to one Monarchy, of ſo large an extent that moſt parts of it languiſh in continual inactivity, cannot form any conſiderable number of men for great and glorious enterprizes. The ſame may be ſaid of Africa; though indeed there have been more able Commanders in that Country than in Aſia; which was owing to the Republic of Carthage: for there will always be a greater number of ſuch men in Republics than in Monarchies; becauſe merit is generally honoured in the former, but feared in the latter: from whence it comes to paſs, that able men are cheriſhed and encouraged in one, but diſcountenanced and ſuppreſſed in the other. If we conſider Europe in the next place, we ſhall find that it was always full of Principalities, Kingdoms, and Republics, which lived in perpetual jealouſy of each other, and being obliged to keep up good diſcipline in their armies, were under a neceſſity of honouring and encouraging military merit. For in Greece, beſides the Macedonian Monarchy, there were ſeveral Republics, every one of which produced many great and eminent men. In Italy, there were the Romans, the Samnites, the Tuſcans, and the Ciſalpine Gauls; France, Germany, and Spain abounded with Republics and Principalities: and if we do not read of ſo many great men in any of them as amongſt the Romans, that is owing to the partiality of Hiſtorians, who generally follow the ſtream of fortune, and content themſelves with praiſing the Conqueror. It is But reaſonable however to ſuppoſe, there were a great many illuſtrious men amongſt the Samnites and Tuſcans, as they ſupported themſelves againſt the Romans an hundred and fifty years. The ſame may be ſuppoſed of France and Spain: but the merit which moſt authors are ſo ſhy of allowing to particular men, they are forward enough to celebrate in whole nations, when they tell us, with what bravery and reſolution they exerted themſelves in defence of their liberties. Since it is manifeſt then, that where there are many States there will always be many able men, it is certain, that when the number of thoſe States is diminiſhed, the number of ſuch men will likewiſe decreaſe by degrees, as the effect muſt ceaſe when the cauſe is taken away. Thus, when the Roman Empire had ſwallowed up all the Kingdoms and Republics in Europe and Africa, and moſt of thoſe in Aſia, merit and abilities met with no countenance any where but at Rome: ſo that great men began to grow ſcarcer and ſcarcer in Europe, as well as in Aſia, till at laſt, there were hardly any to be found; for as all manner of ſpirit and worth was extinguiſhed, except amongſt the Romans, ſo when they became corrupt, the whole world in a manner was corrupted, and the Scythians poured by ſwarms into an Empire, which, having extinguiſhed the virtue of moſt other nations, was not able to preſerve its own. And though that Empire was afterwards diſmembered by thoſe Barbarians, yet the ſeveral parts into which it was cantoned never recovered their priſtine vigour; for, in the firſt place, it is a very difficult matter, and requires a long courſe of time, to revive good order and diſcipline when it is once aboliſhed: and in the next, the Chriſtian Religion has wrought ſuch a change in the manners and cuſtoms of mankind, that they are now no longer under a neceſſity of defending themſelves with ſuch a degree of obſtinacy and deſpair as they did in former times. For then, all ſuch as were vanquiſhed in battle, where either put to death, or carried into perpetual ſlavery in the enemy's country, where they ſpent the remainder of their lives in labour and miſery. If a town was taken, it was either demoliſhed, or the inhabitants were ſtripped of their goods, diſperſed all over the world, and reduced to the laſt degree of poverty and wretchedneſs: ſo that the dread of theſe evils obliged them to keep up good diſcipline in their armies, and to honour all thoſe that excelled in the Art of War. But at preſent, theſe terrible apprehenſions are in a great meaſure diſſipated and extinguiſhed: for after an army is defeated, thoſe that fall into the hands of the Conqueror are ſeldom or never put to death; and the terms of their ranſom are made ſo eaſy, that they do not long continue priſoners. If a town has changed ſides an hundred times, it is not demoliſhed, nor are the inhabitants either diſperſed or ſtripped of their poſſeſſions: the worſt they have to fear is being laid under contribution: ſo that men now no longer care to ſubmit to the rigour and continual hardſhips of military diſcipline, to ward off evils which they are but little afraid of. Beſides, the Provinces of Europe are ſubject to few Heads at preſent, in compariſon of what they were formerly: all France is under the dominion of one King; all Spain under that of another; and there are not many Principalities or Republics in Italy; ſo that the petty States find protection under the wings of the ſtrong, and thoſe that are more powerful are not afraid of utter ruin, even if they ſhould be conquered, for the reaſons already given.

Cosimo. But we have ſeen many towns ſacked, and ſome Kingdoms entirely ruined within theſe laſt five and twenty years: examples, which ought to ſerve as warnings to others to provide for their ſecurity by reviving the ancient military diſcipline and inſtitutions.

Fabrizio. You ſay very true: but conſider what towns thoſe were which ſuffered in that manner, and you will find they were not States, but inferior members of States: if Tortona was ſacked, Milan was not; Capua ſuffered, but Naples eſcaped; Breſcia and Ravenna felt the laſh of the Conqueror, but Venice and Rome came off with impunity: ſo that theſe examples are not ſufficient to make a State change its purpoſe; but rather determine it to preſevere in its reſolution, when it ſees it can at any time redeem itſelf from deſtruction by a ranſom; for it will not expoſe itſelf and its ſubjects to the continual fatigues of military diſcipline and exerciſes, when they ſeem not only unneceſſary, but attended with much trouble and inconvenience. As for the dependent members which ought to be moſt affected with theſe examples, it is not in their power to ſave themſelves; and thoſe States which have already been ruined, ſee their error when it is too late to correct it, whilſt others, which have not yet ſhared the ſame fate, take no pains to prevent it; chuſing to live a lazy indolent life, free from trouble and inconvenience, and to rely upon fortune rather than their own virtue: for ſeeing there is ſo ſmall a proportion of virtue now left amongſt mankind, that it has but little influence in the affairs of the world, and that all things ſeem to be governed by fortune, they think it better to follow her train, than contend with her for ſuperiority. To evince the truth of what I have ſaid, if further proof is wanting, let us conſider the ſtate of Germany at preſent, which being full of Principalities and Republics, abounds with great and able Commanders; and indeed, whatſoever is worthy imitation in the military diſcipline of theſe times, is owing to thoſe States, which being jealous of their neighbours, and abhorring the thoughts of ſlavery (a condition which ſeems not much dreaded in ſome other countries) take all proper means to defend their liberties, and therefore continue free and reſpectable.——This, I think, may ſuffice to ſhew the cauſes of our degeneracy, and the preſent neglect of military diſcipline amongſt us; but I cannot tell whether you are of the ſame opinion: perhaps what I have ſaid has either not given you the ſatisfaction you wanted, or not been thoroughly underſtood, and conſequently may have left ſome doubts upon your mind.

COSIMO. None at all, Sir, I aſſure you: on the contrary, I perfectly comprehend what you have ſaid, and am very well ſatisfied with it; but beg the favour of you to reſume our ſubject, and to let us know in what manner you would diſpoſe your Cavalry in theſe Battalions, what number of them you would have, and how they ſhould be armed and officered.

FABRIZIO. You might think, perhaps, I had forgot that, but I have not; though I have but little to ſay of Cavalry, for two reaſons. In the firſt place, becauſe the main ſtrength of an army conſiſts in its Infantry; and in the next, Cavalry, even in theſe times, are much better diſciplined than Infantry; and if they are not ſuperior, they are equal however to the Cavalry of the Ancients. I have already ſhewn how they ought to be exerciſed; and as to their arms, I would arm both the Gens d'Armes and the light horſe as they are armed at preſent: but the light horſe ſhould moſtly conſiſt of Croſsbow men, with ſome muſketeers amongſt them, which, though of little ſervice in other reſpects, are yet very neceſſary to frighten the country people, and drive them from paſſes, which perhaps they may have undertaken to defend: for they are more afraid of one Muſketeer, than of twenty men that are armed in any other manner. With regard to their number (as I propoſed at firſt to take a Roman legion for my model) I ſhould think three hundred good horſe in a Regiment would be ſufficient; of which an hundred and fifty ſhould be Gens d'Armes, and the reſt light horſe; with a Captain, a Cornet, fifteen Corporals, and a Drum to each troop: every ten Gens d'Armes ſhould have five baggage horſes, and every ten light horſemen, two, which (like thoſe belonging to the Infantry) ſhould carry their tents, kettles, horſe-furniture, and other implements and utenſils. Do not think this out of compaſs, for every one of our Gens d'Armes have four horſes allowed them for that purpoſe; but that is an abuſe; for in Germany they have no other horſe than that which they are mounted upon, and only one carriage to every twenty for their baggage. The Roman heavy-armed horſe had no more; but the Triarii indeed were always quartered near their Cavalry, and obliged to aſſiſt them in dreſſing and taking care of their horſes: an example which might eaſily be followed in theſe times, as I ſhall ſhew more particularly, when I come to ſpeak of encampments: for ſurely what was formerly done by the Romans, and is ſtill practiſed by the Germans, may be effected at preſent, and therefore thoſe that omit or neglect theſe things are much to be blamed. Theſe Squadrons being raiſed and enrolled in the ſame manner with the reſt of the Regiment, ſhould ſometimes be reviewed with the other Battalions, when they are aſſembled, and exerciſed in ſkirmiſhes and ſham-fights with them, to make them well acquainted with each other, and perfect in thoſe exerciſes. So much for this head. Let us now proceed to draw up an army in ſuch an order of battle, as is moſt likely to enſure us a victory, when we come to engage an enemy; for this is the end for which all armies are raiſed, and that ſo much care and pains are to be taken in diſciplining them.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

# THE
# ART OF WAR.

---

## BOOK III.

### THE CONTENTS.

*The order of battle obſerved by the Romans. Of the Roman Legion, the Macedonian Phalanx, and the Swiſs Regiments. That it is the beſt way to uſe part of the Roman arms and armour; and part of the Grecian. Of what number of men the Roman armies generally conſiſted. A method of drawing up a Regiment or army recommended. A deſcription of a battle. Reaſons for the ſeveral manœuvres in it. Concerning the general exerciſes of an army.*

COSIMO. SINCE we are going to vary the Subject, I beg leave to reſign my Office of Interrogator in this converſation; for, as I hate preſumption in others, I would not willingly ſeem guilty of it myſelf. I therefore lay down the Dictatorſhip, and give up my authority to any other perſon in company, that will pleaſe to accept of it.

ZANOBI. It would have been very grateful to us all, if you would have continued in that office; but ſince you decline it, be pleaſed at leaſt to ſay, which of us you depute to ſucceed you in it.

COSIMO. I deſire to leave that to Signor Fabrizio.

FABRIZIO. I freely accept it: and think we ſhould follow the example of the Venetians, who always appoint the youngeſt to ſpeak firſt in their Councils and Aſſemblies; eſpecially as the art of ſpeaking well is properly the exerciſe of youth, and therefore we may ſuppoſe young men the beſt qualified to talk of the ſeveral duties and exerciſes of war, as well as the fitteſt to put them in execution.

Cosimo. The lot then falls upon you, Luigi: and as I myſelf am much pleaſed with my Succeſſor, I make no doubt but he will be equally agreeable to you all. Let us loſe no more time however, but return to our Subject.

Fabrizio. I know very well, that in order to ſhew how an army ought to be drawn up in order of battle, it would be neceſſary to deſcribe the method in which the Greeks and Romans formed their troops for that purpoſe: but as this is done at large by ancient Hiſtorians, I refer you to them, and omitting ſeveral other particulars, ſhall ſpeak only of ſuch as are abſolutely neceſſary to be adopted by thoſe that would improve our preſent Syſtem of military diſcipline: for which purpoſe, I will ſhew you at the ſame time, how an army ought to be formed in order of battle at preſent, how it is to be exerciſed in ſham fights, and in what manner to behave in real engagements. The greateſt error then that a General can be guilty of in drawing up an army for battle, is to give it but one front: becauſe in ſo doing, he commits himſelf and his fortune entirely to the event of the firſt conflict: and this is the effect of having loſt the method, obſerved by the Ancients, of receiving one line into another: for without that, thoſe in the front can neither be ſupported nor relieved in the time of action; both which, were effectually performed by the Romans. Now to point out the method by which theſe things were effected, I muſt tell you that they divided their Legion into the Haſtati, the Principes, and Triarii; the firſt were placed in the front or firſt line of the army in thick and cloſe array; the Principes in the ſecond line, but in looſer order; and the Triarii in the third, with ſtill larger intervals betwixt the men in their ranks, into which they could admit both the Principes and Haſtati upon occaſion. Beſides theſe, they had their Slingers, Bow-men, and other light-armed Soldiers, who were not incorporated with theſe ranks, but poſted on the right and left betwixt the Cavalry and Infantry in the front. Theſe light-armed forces uſed to begin the engagment, and if they made any impreſſion upon the enemy (which ſeldom happened) they purſued their advantage: but if they were driven back, they retreated either along the flanks of the army, or through certain intervals of it left open for that purpoſe, to cover the Suttlers and Servants, and other unarmed people that followed the camp. After this, the Haſtati advanced againſt the enemy, and if they were repulſed, they retreated leiſurely into the ſpaces left for them amongſt the Principes, and again advanced with them to renew the battle: but if this line alſo was overpowered, it fell back into the Triarii, and all three, being thus joined together, made their third attack with greater vigour and ſtrength than ever; and if that miſcarried, the day was loſt, becauſe they had no other reſource or means of relief left *. The Cavalry were ſtationed on each ſide of the Infantry, in the form of two wings, and ſometimes engaged the enemy's Cavalry, and ſometimes ſupported their own Infantry, as occaſion required. This method of renewing the attack three ſeveral times, with a continual increaſe of ſtrength and vigour, can hardly be withſtood, except either your fortune be very bad indeed, or the reſolution of the enemy much greater than that of your own forces.——The Greeks were ſtrangers to this method of renewing

---

* See Pol. Diſc. Book II. Chap. xvi.

the front of their Phalanxes; and though they were very well officered, and conſiſted of many ranks, yet they made but one body, or rather one front. To relieve each other, one rank did not retire into another (as the Romans did) but one ſingle man advanced into another's place when it was vacant; which was effected in this manner. When their Phalanx was drawn up in files (which we will ſuppoſe to conſiſt of fifty men a-piece) with its front towards the enemy, all the ſix firſt ranks might engage at once: for their lances (which they called *Sariſſæ*) were ſo long, that thoſe of the ſixth rank reached over the ſhoulders of the men in the firſt. In the time of action therefore, if any man in the firſt rank was either killed or diſabled, the man that was next behind him in the ſecond rank preſently ſtepped into his place; the perſon immediately behind him in the third rank filled the vacancy in the ſecond, and ſo on; the ranks in the rear continually filling up the deficiencies of thoſe in the front: ſo that all the ranks were conſtantly kept full and entire, except the rearmoſt, which was exhauſted at laſt, becauſe there was no other to reinforce it. Theſe Phalanxes therefore might be waſted away and annihilated by degrees, but ſeldom could be broken; as the cloſe order and groſſneſs of their body made them in a manner impenetrable.——The Romans at firſt formed their Legions in this manner, in imitation of the Grecian Phalanx: but growing out of conceit with it at laſt, they divided them into more corps, as Cohorts and Manipuli, or Companies; being convinced that ſuch bodies have moſt life and vigour in them, as have the moſt Officers to animate and inform them, and are divided in ſuch a manner that each diviſion can act ſeparately and ſupport itſelf. The Swiſs Regiments at preſent, are likewiſe formed upon the model of the ancient Phalanxes, and follow their method both in cloſeneſs of order and relieving their ranks: and when they come to engage, they are placed on the flanks of each other, but not in a parallel line. They have no method of receiving the firſt into the ſecond, if it ſhould be repulſed; but in order to relieve each other, they place one Regiment in the front, another a little behind it on the right; ſo that if the firſt is hard preſſed, the ſecond may advance to its aſſiſtance: a third is placed behind both theſe, and on the right too, at the diſtance of a muſket-ſhot; that ſo, if the other two ſhould be driven back, it may advance to relieve them, and all of them have ſufficient room either to retreat or advance without falling foul upon one another; becauſe great bodies cannot be received into each other like little ones; and therefore the little diſtinct corps, of which the Roman Legions were compoſed, are the moſt proper both to receive and relieve each other: and that the method obſerved by the Swiſs is not ſo good as that which was taken by the ancient Romans, appears very plainly from the Succeſs of the Roman Legions, which always got the better of the Grecian Phalanxes whenever they happened to engage them; becauſe both their arms and armour, and their way of receiving one rank into another, were much better than the arms and diſcipline, and cloſe order, of the Phalanx.——Now, in order to form an army upon the model of both, I would make the Grecian Phalanx my pattern in ſome reſpects, and the Roman Legion in others: and therefore, as I told you before, I would have two thouſand Pikemen in my Regiment, armed after the manner of the Macedonian Phalanx, and three thouſand men with Swords and Targets like the Roman Legion. I have divided my Regiment into ten Battalions, as the Romans did their Legion into ten Cohorts: like them too, I have appointed Velites to begin the Battle: and as I have retained the arms of both Nations, I would likewiſe in ſome meaſure imitate the order and diſcipline of each: for which reaſon I have taken care that the five firſt ranks of every Battalion ſhould conſiſt of Pikemen, and the reſt of Targetmen; that ſo it might be enabled not only to ſuſtain the ſhock of the enemy's Cavalry in the front, but to make an impreſſion upon their Infantry, and to open it in ſuch a manner to the right and left that the Targetmen may come in to complete the victory. Now if you conſider this method, and the nature of theſe arms, you will find how well they are calculated for that purpoſe; becauſe the pikes are of admirable ſervice againſt horſe, and amongſt Infantry they do no ſmall execution before they come to fight hand to hand: for after that, they are of no uſe at all; upon which account, the Swiſs place one rank of Halberdiers behind every three ranks of Pikemen, to give them room to make uſe of their pikes; but that room is not ſufficient. Placing our Pikemen then in the front, and the Targetmen behind them, they ſerve both to ſuſtain the enemy's horſe, and open and diſorder their foot: but after the battle is joined, and they become uſeleſs, the Targetmen advance with their Swords, which are weapons that may be managed in the cloſeſt fight.

Luigi. We are impatient to hear how you would draw up an army, thus armed and appointed, in order of battle.

Fabrizio. I was juſt going to do it. You muſt know then, that a Conſular army amongſt the Romans did not exceed two Legions; that is to ſay, about eleven thouſand foot, and ſix hundred horſe; but they were compoſed wholly of their own Citizens. Beſides theſe, they were furniſhed with as many more of both ſorts by their friends and allies, which they divided into two bodies, called the right and left wing, and ſtationed them on each flank of their Main battle; but they never ſuffered the number of theſe auxiliaries to ſurpaſs that of their Legions; though there was generally a larger proportion of Cavalry amongſt them than in their own forces. With ſuch an army, conſiſting of about twenty-two thouſand foot, and two thouſand good horſe, a Conſul went upon moſt expeditions: but when the enemy was very formidable, they ſent out two Conſuls with two ſuch armies united. ——You muſt know likewiſe, that in the three principal operations of an army, viz. upon a March, in an Encampment, and in Battle, they conſtantly poſted their Legions in the center, rightly judging that the forces in which they repoſed the greateſt confidence ſhould always be compact and united; as I ſhall ſhew you when I come to ſpeak more particularly and diſtinctly of theſe three operations. But theſe auxiliary Infantry, by their union and daily converſation with the legionary Infantry, ſoon became as ſerviceable as they were: for they were exerciſed and diſciplined in the ſame manner, and formed in the ſame order before an engagement: ſo that when we know how the Romans drew up one Legion for that purpoſe, we know in what manner they drew up a whole army: and as I ſaid they formed their Legion in three lines, in ſuch a manner that one line might receive another, I have conſequently told you how they drew up their whole army in the day of battle.

To form an army then in order of battle after the manner of the Romans, as they had two Legions, I will take two Regiments; by the arrangement of which, you may ſee how a whole army is to be drawn up: for if you would add any more, there is nothing further to be done but either to multiply or enlarge the ranks. It will be needleſs, I ſuppoſe, to put you in mind of how many foot a Regiment conſiſts, that there are ten Battalions in it, what ſort of arms and armour they have, how many Companies there are, and what Officers in each, what number of Velites and Pikemen both ordinary and extraordinary, how many Targetmen, &c. for when I ſpoke of theſe things a little while ago, I deſired you to take particular notice of them, and to remember them as abſolutely neceſſary to give you a clear idea of the whole arrangement: and therefore, without any repetition of that kind, I ſhall proceed to draw up my army. For this purpoſe, I would place the ten Battalions of one Regiment on the left, and the ten of the other on the right. Thoſe on the left are to be formed in this manner. ——Poſt five Battalions on the flank of each other in the front, with an interval of eight feet betwixt every one of them; and let the ſpace which they occupy be two hundred and eighty-two feet in breadth, and eighty in depth. In the rear of theſe five I would place three others, at the diſtance of eighty feet, one of which ſhould be in a right line with the Battalion that is on the left flank of thoſe in the front; the ſecond with that on the right flank; and the third with that in the center: ſo that theſe three will take up as much ground both in breadth and depth as the other five: but though the ſpace betwixt every one of thoſe five is but eight feet, I would have the ſpace betwixt theſe three to be ſixty-ſix. In the rear of theſe I would poſt the two remaining Battalions at the diſtance of eighty feet, one of them in a right line with that on the left of the three laſt mentioned, and the other with that on the right; with an interval betwixt one and the other of ninety-two feet. The ground therefore which all theſe Battalions, thus formed, take up, will be two hundred and eighty-two feet in breadth, and four hundred in depth. The Pikemen extraordinary I would range along the left flank of theſe Battalions at the diſtance of forty feet, and I would make an hundred and forty ranks of them of ſeven men in every rank: ſo that they would cover the whole left flank of the Battalions draw up in the manner I have deſcribed, and there would be forty ranks remaining to guard the baggage, Suttlers, and other unarmed people who follow the camp in the rear of the army, after poſting the Captains and Corporals in their proper places. Of the three Lieutenant Colonels belonging to them, I would place one at the front, another in the center, and another in the rear. But to return to the front of the army; next to the Pikemen extraordinary, I would place the five hundred Velites extraordinary, and allow them to take up a ſpace of eighty feet. Next to them on the left, I would place my Gens d'Armes, and allow them a ſpace of four hundred and fifty feet: and next to them, my light horſe, whom I would allow the ſame ſpace. The ordinary Velites I would leave with their reſpective Battalions in their proper places, (that is, in the intervals betwixt one Battalion and another) to be attendants as it were upon them; unleſs I ſhould think fit to put them under the cover of the Pikemen extraordinary; which I would do ſometimes, and ſometimes I would not, according as it was moſt for my advantage. The Colonel of the Regiment, with his Colours and Drum, I would place either in the center of that ſpace which is left betwixt the firſt and ſecond lines of the Battalions, or in the front of them, or in the interval betwixt the laſt of the firſt five and the Pikemen extraordinary, as I ſaw moſt convenient; with ſixty, or at leaſt thirty picked men about him, who ſhould not only carry his orders properly and diſtinctly to the different parts of the army, but be able to repel the enemy if he ſhould be attacked.——In this manner I would form the Regiment on the left, which would be juſt one half of the army, and will occupy a ſpace of five hundred and ſeventy-two feet in breadth, and four hundred in depth, excluſive of the ſpace taken up by the forty ranks of Pikemen extraordinary that are to guard the baggage, &c. in the rear, which will be two hundred feet. The other Regiment I would draw up in the ſame manner on the right of this, with an interval betwixt them of ſixty feet: and at the head of this interval I would place ſome pieces of Artillery, behind which, the General of the army ſhould take poſt with his Standard and Drum, and two hundred picked men at leaſt, moſt of them on foot; of whom there ſhould be ten or more fit to carry any orders; and he himſelf ſhould be mounted and armed in ſuch a manner that he might command either on horſeback or on foot, as occaſion required. As for Artillery, ten fifty pounders would be ſufficient for the reduction of a town; and I would make uſe of them rather to defend my Camp than in a field engagement; for my field pieces ſhould be ten or fifteen pounders, and theſe I would place along the front of the whole army, except the ground was ſuch that I could place them conveniently and ſafely in the flanks where the enemy could not come at them. This method of drawing up an army may anſwer the end both of the Grecian Phalanx and the Roman Legion: for you have the Pikemen in the front, and all the reſt of the Infantry are ſo formed in their proper ranks, that either in charging an enemy, or ſuſtaining the charge, they may (like the Phalanx) recruit their front ranks out of thoſe in the rear. On the other hand, if they are ſo hard puſhed that they are obliged to give way, they may retreat into the intervals of the ſecond line, and advance again in conjunction with it to face the enemy: and if they are repulſed the ſecond time, they may retire into the ſpaces betwixt the Battalions in the third line, and renew the battle with ſtill greater vigour: ſo that, according to this method, you may reinforce your ranks either in the Grecian or the Roman manner. As to the ſtrength of ſuch an army, no Body can be more compact: for each wing is perfectly well fortified in every part, both with officers and private men properly armed, and appointed in ſuch a manner, that if there is any apparent weakneſs in it, it muſt be in the rear where the carriages and Sutlers, &c. are ſtationed; and even thoſe are covered by the Pikemen extraordinary. Being ſo well fortified therefore on all ſides, an enemy cannot attack it any where but it will be ready to receive him: for the rear is in no danger; becauſe if the enemy be ſo ſtrong that he is able to attack you on every ſide at once, it muſt be madneſs in you to take the field againſt him. But ſuppoſing he ſhould be ſuperior to you in number by one third, and his army as well armed and drawn up as your own; if he weakens it in order to attack you in ſeveral parts at the ſame time, and you happen to break in upon him in any one, the day is your own. As to Cavalry, you have nothing to apprehend from them; for the Pikemen which environ you on all ſides will ſufficiently ſecure you againſt their fury, even though your own ſhould be repulſed. Your officers are ſo conveniently poſted, that they may do their duty with eaſe; and the ſpaces betwixt one Battalion and another, and betwixt every rank, not only ſerve to receive each other upon occaſion, but give the officers ſufficient room to go backwards and forwards with orders from the General. Now as I told you before, that the Romans had about twenty-four thouſand men in their armies, I would have our army conſiſt of the ſame number: and as their auxiliaries learnt their diſcipline and order from their Legions, I would have our auxiliaries likewiſe formed upon the model of our Regiments. Theſe things may eaſily be effected by a little practice: for in adding two other Regiments to the army, or the ſame number of men that it conſiſts of (let it be what it will) you have nothing to do but to double your ranks by placing twenty Battalions on the left, inſtead of ten, and as many more on the right; or to extend or contract them, according to the nature of the ground, and the poſture of the enemy.

Luigi. I perfectly underſtand you, Sir. Methinks I ſee your army drawn up for battle. I am impatient to have it begin. For Heaven's Sake do not turn Fabius Maximus upon us; if I do, I am afraid I ſhall be tempted to abuſe you as the Romans did that great man.

Fabrizio. I am ready. The ſignal is given. Do not you hear our Artillery? It has fired and done but little execution amongſt the enemy. The Velites extraordinary and light horſe have ſet up a great ſhout and begun the attack with the utmoſt fury. The enemy's Artillery has made one diſcharge; and being ill-pointed, their balls have gone over the heads of our Infantry without doing them any hurt: but to prevent it firing a ſecond time, our Velites and light horſe endeavour to make themſelves maſters of it: a Body of the enemy poſt themſelves before it; ſo that the Artillery on both ſides is become uſeleſs. See with what courage and dexterity our men charge them: the expertneſs they have acquired by long exerciſe and diſcipline, inſpires them with confidence: the Battalions move forward in regular pace and good order, with the Gens d'Armes on their flanks to attack the enemy: our Artillery draws off through the ſpace that was left vacant by the Velites to make room for it. See how the General encourages his men, and aſſures them of victory. Obſerve our Velites and light horſe returning, and extending themſelves along the flanks of our army, to ſee if they can meet with any of the enemy's light-armed forces there.—— The two armies are now engaged: ſee with what firmneſs and ſilence our men receive the charge: do not you hear the General giving his orders to the Gens d'Armes to maintain their ground, and not to advance upon the enemy, nor deſert the Infantry upon any account whatſoever? You ſee a party of our light horſe have now detached themſelves to charge a Body of the enemy's Muſketeers that were coming to take us in flank; and how the enemy's Cavalry are advancing to ſupport them: but the Muſketeers, to avoid being entangled betwixt them, are retiring to their own army. See with what reſolution and dexterity our ordinary Pikemen handle their weapons; but the Infantry on each ſide are now come ſo cloſe together that our Pikemen can no longer make any uſe of their pikes; and therefore, according to their uſual diſcipline, they retreat by degrees till they are received by the Targetmen. You ſee how a large Body of the enemy's Gens d'Armes have in the mean time diſordered our Gens d'Armes on the left, who retire (as they had learnt before) into the Pikemen extraordinary, and being ſupported by them, not only make head againſt the enemy again, but repulſe them with great ſlaughter. Now the ordinary Pikemen of the firſt Battalions have retreated amongſt the Targetmen; they leave them to maintain the battle, and behold what havock they make amongſt the enemy; with what confidence and ſecurity they preſs upon them; ſee how cloſe they are engaged with them, they hardly have room to manage their Swords. The enemy are embarraſſed and falling into confuſion: their pikes are too long to do any further execution, and their ſwords are of no ſervice againſt men that are ſo well ſecured by their armour. What a carnage! what a number of wounded men! They begin to run away. See, they are flying on the right and on the left. The battle is over; we have gained a glorious victory.——It might have been more complete however, if we had exerted our whole ſtrength. But you ſee we were under no neceſſity of employing either our ſecond or third line, as the firſt was ſufficient to do the buſineſs: ſo that I have nothing more to add upon this occaſion; except it be to anſwer any objection or doubt you may have to propoſe.

Luigi. You have carried every thing before you with ſuch amazing rapidity, that I cannot well tell whether I ought to ſtart any objection or not. With ſubmiſſion however to your ſuperior judgment, I will make bold to aſk you a queſtion or two. Be ſo good therefore to tell me, in the firſt place, why you would ſuffer your Artillery to fire no more than once: and why you ordered it to be drawn off ſo ſoon, without making any ſort of uſe of it afterwards. In the next place, you managed that of the enemy juſt as you pleaſed, and had it pointed ſo ill, that it could do no execution: which indeed I ſuppoſe may be the caſe ſometimes; but if it ſhould happen (as I believe it often does) that the ſhot ſhould take place, what remedy would you preſcribe? And ſince I have mentioned artillery, I will here propoſe all that I have to ſay upon that ſubject, that ſo we may have no occaſion to return to it hereafter. I have heard many people laugh at the arms and armour, and military diſcipline, of the Ancients, and ſay they would be of little or no ſervice at all now, ſince the invenſion of Artillery, which would break all their ranks, and beat their armour to pieces: ſo that it would be folly to draw up a body of forces in ſuch order as cannot be maintained, and undergo the fatigue of carrying armour, which can be no means ſecure them.

Fabrizio. Your objections are of ſeveral kinds; and therefore you muſt have patience if you expect a particular anſwer to them all. It is true our artillery made but one diſcharge, and I was in ſome doubt whether I ſhould ſuffer even that; becauſe it is of more importance to keep one's ſelf from being hurt, than to annoy the enemy. Now in order to ſecure yourſelf from Artillery, you muſt either keep out of the reach of its ſhot, or place yourſelf behind a wall, or a bank, or ſome fence of that kind; there is no other cover that I know of, and that muſt be very ſtrong. But when an army is drawn up in order to engage, it cannot ſkulk behind a wall or a bank, nor yet keep at ſuch a diſtance as not to be annoyed by the enemy's Artillery. Since there is no method then to ſhelter one's ſelf from it, the General muſt have recourſe to ſuch means as will expoſe him and his men to the leaſt danger; for which purpoſe, the beſt, and indeed the only way, is to make themſelves maſters of it, if poſſible, and as ſoon as they can. To do this, it is neceſſary that a body of your men ſhould march up, and ruſh ſuddenly upon it; but not in cloſe order: becauſe the ſuddenneſs of the attack will prevent it from firing more than once; and when your men are thinly drawn up, it cannot do much execution amongſt them. Now a compact body of regular forces is not at all proper for this ſervice: for if it moves faſt, it muſt naturally fall into diſorder of itſelf; and if it extend and weakens its ranks, it will preſently be broken by the enemy: upon which conſiderations, I drew up my army in a manner that was moſt proper for ſuch an attempt; for having placed a thouſand Velites in the wings of it, I ordered them to advance, together with the light horſe, as ſoon as our Artillery had fired, to ſeize upon that of the enemy. This is the reaſon why I would not ſuffer our own to make a ſecond diſcharge, leſt the enemy ſhould have time to do the ſame, as they eaſily might have done, and perhaps before our Artillery was loaded again, if I had not taken theſe means to prevent it. So that the only way to make the enemy's Artillery of no ſervice, is to attack it as ſoon as poſſible: for if they deſert it, it falls into your hands of courſe; but if they defend it, they muſt place a body of forces before it, and then they will not dare to fire it again, becauſe their own men muſt be the chief ſufferers by it.—— Theſe reaſons, I think, might be ſufficient of themſelves,

ſelves, without quoting any examples to ſupport them: but as antiquity furniſhes us with many, I will give you one or two.——When Ventidius had reſolved to come to an engagement with the Parthians (whoſe ſtrength conſiſted chiefly in their bows and arrows) he ſuffered them to advance almoſt to the very entrenchements of his camp before he drew out his army: and this he did, that he might fall ſuddenly upon them, and before they could make uſe of their arrows. Cæſar tell us, that in a battle with the Gauls, they made ſo ſudden and furious an attack upon him, that his men had not time to throw their darts at the enemy, as the Romans always uſed to do. Now from theſe inſtances, we ſee, that in order to ſecure an army in the field from the effects of any weapons or engines that annoy them at a diſtance, there is no other way, but to march up to them as faſt as poſſible, and get poſſeſſion of them, if you can, or at leaſt to prevent their effects. Beſides all theſe, I had ſtill another reaſon which determined me to fire my Artillery no more than once: perhaps it may ſeem trifling to you; but with me it has much weight. There is nothing that occaſions greater confuſion and embarraſſment amongſt a body of men, than to have their ſight dazzled or obſtructed: a circumſtance which has been the ruin of many gallant armies that have been blinded either by the ſun or clouds of duſt: and what can contribute more to that than the ſmoke of Artillery? It would be more prudent therefore to let the enemy blind themſelves, than to go blindfold yourſelf to ſeek them: for which reaſon, I would either not make any uſe of Artillery at all, or if I did (to avoid cenſure now great guns are in ſuch credit) I would plant it in the flanks of my army; that ſo when it was fired, the ſmoke might not blind the men in my front, where I would have the flower of my army. The effects of that may be ſeen from the conduct of Epaminondas, who going to engage the enemy, cauſed all his light horſe to trot backwards and forwards a great pace in the front of their army, which raiſed ſuch a duſt that it threw them into diſorder, and gave him an eaſy victory over them.——As for my ſeeming to have pointed the enemy's Artillery as I pleaſed, and made the ſhot fly over the heads of our Infantry; I anſwer, that it much oftener happens ſo than otherwiſe: for Infantry ſtands ſo low, and it is ſo nice a matter to manage heavy pieces of cannon well, that if you either elevate or lower them ever ſo little too much, in one caſe the balls will fly quite over their heads, and in the other, they ſtrike into the earth, and never come near them: the leaſt inequality of ground likewiſe is a great preſervation to them; for any little bank or brake betwixt them and the Artillery, ſerves either to intercept the ſhot, or divert their direction. And as to Cavalry, eſpecially Gens d'Armes (becauſe they are drawn up in a cloſer order, and ſtand ſo much higher than light horſe, that they are more expoſed to danger) they may continue in the rear of the army till the Artillery has fired. It is certain that ſmall pieces of Cannon and muſket-ſhot, do more execution than heavy Artillery; againſt which, the beſt remedy is to make a reſolute attack upon it as ſoon as poſſible: and if you loſe ſome of your men in it, (which muſt always be the caſe) ſurely a partial loſs is not ſo bad as a total defeat. The Swiſs are worthy of imitation in this reſpect: for they never decline an engagement out of fear of Artillery; but always puniſh thoſe with death who offer to ſtir out of their ranks, or ſhew the leaſt ſign of being frighted at it. I cauſed my Artillery therefore to be drawn off as ſoon as it had been diſcharged, in order to make room for the Battalions to advance; and made no further mention of it, as a thing of no conſequence after the two armies had joined battle.——You ſay likewiſe, that many people laugh at the arms and armour,

mour, and military diſcipline of the Ancients, as good for nothing ſince the Invention of Artillery: from whence one would be apt to imagine the Moderns had made effectual proviſion againſt it. If ſo, I ſhould be glad to hear what that proviſion is; for I confeſs I know of none, nor do I think it poſſible to make any, but what I have already mentioned. Why do our Infantry at preſent wear corſlets? and why are our Gens d'Armes covered with armour from head to foot? If they deſpiſe this manner of arming among the Ancients, as of no ſervice againſt Artillery, whey do they continue to uſe it themſelves? I could likewiſe wiſh to be informed, why the Swiſs, (like the ancients) form their Regiments of ſix or eight thouſand foot, drawn up in cloſe order; and for what reaſon all other nations have began to imitate them; ſince that method expoſes their armies to no leſs danger, (with regard to Artillery) than many other inſtitutions that were in vogue amongſt the Ancients, but are neglected and laid aſide at preſent? Theſe are queſtions, which I fancy the people whom you mention cannot eaſily anſwer: but if you would propoſe them to Soldiers of judgment and experience, they would tell you, that they arm themſelves in that manner, not becauſe they think ſuch armour will effectually ſecure them againſt Cannon balls, but becauſe it will defend them againſt croſs-bows, pikes, ſwords, and many other offenſive weapons, which an enemy may make uſe of. They will tell you further, that the cloſe order obſerved by the Swiſs, is neceſſary to make an impreſſion upon the enemy's Infantry, to ſuſtain their Cavalry, and to prevent themſelves from being eaſily broken: ſo that we ſee Soldiers have many other things to dread beſides Artillery, againſt which this order, and this ſort of arms and armour, ſerve to ſecure them. Hence it follows, that the better an army is armed, and the cloſer and ſtronger it is drawn up, the leſs it has to fear:

and therefore the perſons whoſe opinion you alledged not long ago, muſt either have had very little experience, or not have conſidered the matter in the light they ought to have done. For ſince we find that only the pikes and cloſe order of the Ancients, (ſtill in uſe amongſt the Swiſs) have done ſuch wonderful ſervice, and contribute ſo much to the ſtrength of our armies at preſent; why may we not conclude, that the reſt of the military Inſtitutions obſerved by the Ancients (but now entirely laid aſide and neglected) might be equally ſerviceable? Beſides, as the fury of Artillery does not make us afraid of drawing up our Battalions in cloſe order, like the Swiſs; certainly there can be no other diſpoſition contrived that can make us more apprehenſive of its effects. Further, if we are not terrified at the enemy's Artillery in laying ſiege to a town, when it may annoy us with the greateſt ſecurity, and we can neither come at it, nor prevent its effects, becauſe it is covered by walls; but muſt endeavour to diſmount it with our own Cannon, which perhaps may require much time, and expoſe us to a continual fire all the while; why ſhould we ſo much fear it in the field, where we may preſently either make ourſelves maſters of it, or put a ſtop to its firing? The invention of Artillery therefore, is no reaſon, in my opinion, why we ſhould not imitate the Ancients in their military diſcipline and Inſtitutions, as well as their courage: and if this matter had not been thoroughly diſcuſſed in a piece lately publiſhed, I would have dwelt longer upon it at preſent: but for brevity's ſake I refer you to that diſcourſe*.

Luigi. I have read it, and am of opinion upon the whole, that you have ſufficiently ſhewn, that the beſt remedy againſt Artillery, is to ſeize upon it as ſoon as you can; that is, in a field battle. But ſuppoſe the enemy ſhould place it in the flanks of their army; where it would ſtill gall you, and yet be ſo well ſecured, that you could not make yourſelf maſter of it. For in drawing up your army, you may remember that you left an interval of eight feet betwixt every Battalion, and of forty betwixt the Battalions and the Pikemen extraordinary: now if the enemy ſhould form their army in the ſame order, and place their Artillery deep in thoſe intervals, I ſhould think it would annoy you very much, without any riſque of being taken, becauſe you could not come at it there.

---

* See Politic. Diſc. book II. chap. xvii.

FABRIZIO. Your objection carries much weight with it; and therefore I will endeavour either to take it off, or to find ſome remedy in that caſe. I told you before, that the Battalions, when engaged with an enemy, are in conſtant motion, and of conſequence muſt draw cloſer and cloſer to each other; ſo that if you leave but ſmall intervals betwixt them for the Artillery, they will ſoon be filled up in ſuch a manner, that it cannot be of any ſervice: but if you make them large, in order to avoid that inconvenience, you muſt naturally run into a much greater; becauſe you then leave room enough for the enemy to ruſh into them, and not only ſeize upon your Artillery, but throw your whole army into confuſion. But to make ſhort of the matter, I beg leave to tell you once for all, that it is impoſſible to place your Cannon betwixt your Battalions, eſpecially ſuch as are fixed upon carriages: for as they are drawn one way, and point another, they muſt all be turned into a different direction before they can be fired; and to do that, will require ſo large a ſpace, that fifty pieces would diſorder any army: ſo that they muſt of neceſſity be placed ſomewhere out of the Battalions; and then they may be come at in the manner I have already preſcribed. Let us ſuppoſe however, that they could be placed within the Battalions, and that we could hit upon ſome medium, which on one hand would prevent the Battalions from fruſtrating the effects of the Artillery when they drew cloſer together; and on the other, not leave the intervals betwixt them ſo large, that the enemy might puſh into them: I ſay, that even then a method might be found to elude its force, by opening counter-intervals in the enemy's army, to let your ſhot paſs through without doing any execution. For to ſecure your Artillery effectually, perhaps you would place it at the very bottom of the intervals betwixt your Battalions; in which caſe, (to avoid killing your own men) it muſt be pointed in ſuch a manner, as to throw its ſhot directly and continually through the interval it is planted in; and therefore, by opening ſuch another interval right over-againſt it in the enemy's army, they will paſs through it without doing them any damage at all: for it is a general rule, always to give way to ſuch things as cannot be oppoſed; as the Ancients uſed to do when they were attacked by Elephants and armed Chariots.——You ſee I gained a victory with an army formed and appointed in the manner I recommended; and I muſt beg leave to repeat (if what I have already ſaid be not ſufficient) that ſuch an army muſt of neceſſity defeat any other, at the very firſt onſet, that is armed and drawn up like ours at preſent, which, for the moſt part can make but one front, is entirely unprovided with Targets, and not only armed in ſuch a manner, that they cannot defend themſelves againſt an enemy that cloſes with them, but ſo formed, that if they poſt their Battalions flank to flank, they make their lines too thin and feeble; and if they place them in the rear of each other, not having any method of receiving one another, they ſoon fall into confuſion, and are eaſily broken. And though indeed they are divided into three bodies, called the Van-guard, the Main-battle, and the Rear-guard; yet this diviſion is of no uſe, except upon a March, or to diſtinguiſh them in an encampment:

ment: for in engagement they are combined, and therefore all liable to be defeated at once by the firſt ſhock.

Luigi. I further obſerved in your late Battle, that your Cavalry were repulſed, and forced to take cover under the Pikemen extraordinary, by whoſe aſſiſtance, they not only made head againſt the enemy a ſecond time, but repulſed them in their turn. Now I am perſuaded that Pikemen may ſupport Cavalry in a thick and cloſe drawn-up body like the Swiſs Regiments: but in your army there are but five ranks of Pikemen in the front, and ſeven on the flanks; ſo that I cannot ſee how they can keep off a body of horſe.

Fabrizio. Though I told you before, that ſix ranks of Pikemen might charge at a time in the Macedonian Phalanx, yet I muſt now add, that if a Swiſs Regiment conſiſted of a thouſand ranks, no more than four or five of them at moſt could charge at one: for their Pikes being eighteen feet long, three feet we may imagine muſt be taken up betwixt one hand and the other: ſo that the firſt rank would have but fifteen feet to make uſe of: in the ſecond, beſides the three feet betwixt the mens hands, as much more muſt be taken up by the diſtance betwixt one rank and another, and then there would be but twelve feet of the pike that could be of any ſervice: the third, for the ſame reaſons, would have but nine feet; the fourth but ſix; and the fifth but three: the other ranks behind could make no uſe at all of their pikes, but ſerve to recruit and ſupport the firſt five ranks, as we have ſhewn before. If then five of their ranks could keep off the enemy's Cavalry, why cannot our five do the ſame, as they likewiſe have other ranks in their rear to ſupport them, though they have not pikes like the others? And if the ranks of Pikemen extraordinary, which are placed upon the flanks of our army, may ſeem to you too thin, they may be reduced into a ſquare, and poſted on the flanks of the two Battalions in the rear; from which place they may ſuccour either the front or rear, and aſſiſt the horſe upon occaſion.

Luigi. Would you always then make uſe of this form and order of battle, whenever you are to engage an enemy?

Fabrizio. No. I would always ſuit my order of battle to the nature of my ground, the quality and number of the enemy, as I ſhall ſhew you before we part. But I recommended this order not only as the beſt, (as it certainly is) but as a rule to direct and aſſiſt you in forming others: for every art has its general rules and principles upon which it is founded. One thing however, I would have you remember, and that is, never to draw up an army upon any occaſion in ſuch a manner, that the front cannot be relieved by the rear: for whoever is guilty of that error, prevents the greateſt part of his army from doing him any ſervice at all, and will never gain a victory over an enemy that has the leaſt degree either of courage or conduct.

Luigi. I confeſs I have ſtill another ojection to the order in which you diſpoſed your army. You made your front conſiſt of five Battalions, poſted on the flank of each other: your ſecond line of three: and your third of two. Now I ſhould think it would be better to invert that order: for ſurely it muſt be more difficult to break that army which is ſtronger and ſtronger the farther you penetrate into it, than another that is weaker and weaker.

Fabrizio. If you will pleaſe to recollect that the third line in the Roman Legions was compoſed of ſix hundred Triarii only, and that they were placed in the rear, you would drop your objection: for you ſee that, according to that model, I have placed but two Battalions in the rear, which yet conſiſts of nine hundred men: ſo that if I have been guilty of any error in following the example of the Romans in that reſpect, it is by making my rear ſtronger than they did. Now though the authority alone of ſuch an example might ſerve for a ſufficient anſwer to your objection, yet I will give you my reaſons for what I have done.——The front ranks of an army ought always to be thick and compact, becauſe they are ſo ſuſtain the firſt ſhock of the enemy, and have no friends to receive into them: for which reaſon, they ſhould be cloſe and full of men; otherwiſe they will be looſe and feeble. But as the ſecond line is to receive the firſt into it upon occaſion before it is to engage, there ſhould be large intervals left in it for that purpoſe; and therefore it muſt not conſiſt of ſo many men, as the firſt: for if the number of them was either larger, or but barely equal, you muſt either leave no intervals in it, (which would occaſion confuſion) or if you do, it will be longer than the firſt, which would be out of proportion, and make a ſtrange appearance. As to what you ſay of the enemy finding our army weaker and weaker the farther they penetrate into it, it is a manifeſt error: for they cannot come to engage the ſecond line, till it has received the firſt into it: ſo that they will find the ſecond line much ſtronger than the firſt was, when they are both united, and the third line ſtill ſtronger than either of the other two, becauſe they will then have the ſtrength of the whole army to cope with at once: and as the third line is to receive more men than the ſecond, it is neceſſary it ſhould have larger intervals in it, and conſequently conſiſt of fewer men of its own.

Luigi. I am thoroughly ſatisfied in this point. But if the five Battalions in the front retire into the three that are in the ſecond line; and afterwards thoſe eight into the two that are in the rear, it does not ſeem poſſible that the eight Battalions in the ſecond line, much leſs the ten in the third, can be contained in the ſame ſpace of ground that the firſt five were.

Fabrizio. To this I anſwer in the firſt place, that the ſpace of ground is not the ſame in that caſe: for there were intervals betwixt the firſt five, which are filled up when they retire into the ſecond line, and the ſecond into the third: there was likewiſe an interval betwixt the two Regiments, and betwixt them and the Pikemen extraordinary, which all together afford them room enough. Beſides, the Battalions take up different ſpaces of ground whilſt they keep their ranks, and when they are diſordered: for in the latter caſe, the men either get cloſer together, or extend themſelves. They extend themſelves when they are ſo hard preſſed, that they are going to run away; and they keep cloſer together when they are determined to make an obſtinate reſiſtance. I might add, that when the five ranks of Pikemen in the front have done their buſineſs, they retire through the intervals betwixt the Battalions, into the rear, to make way for the Targetmen to advance upon the enemy; where they will be ready for any ſervice, in which the General ſhall think fit to employ them: for in the front they could be of no further uſe after the two armies were cloſe engaged: and thus the ſpace allotted will be ſufficient to contain the whole army. But if it ſhould not, the flanks being compoſed of men, and not ſtone walls, can eaſily open and extend themſelves in ſuch a manner as to make room enough.

Luigi. When the five firſt Battalions retire into the three in the ſecond line, would you have the Pikemen extraordinary, whom you place in the flanks of your army, ſtand faſt in their ranks, and form two horns as it were to the army? or would you have them likewiſe retire with the Battalions? In the latter caſe, I cannot imagine whither they are to retire, as they have no Battalions in their rear with proper intervals to receive them.

FABRIZIO. If the enemy does not attack them at the ſame time that the Battalions are forced to retire, thoſe Pikemen may continue firm in their ſtation, and take the enemy in the flanks, as they are preſſing upon the Battalions in their retreat: but if they are attacked at the ſame time (as moſt likely they will be.) they alſo muſt retire; which they may do very well, though they have no battalions in their rear to receive them, by doubling their ranks in a right line to the center, and receiving one rank into another, in the manner I ſhewed you a while ago. But to double them in order to retreat, you muſt obſerve a different method from that which I then ſpoke of: for in that caſe, I told you the firſt rank muſt receive the ſecond, the thirth the fourth, and ſo on: but in this you muſt begin in the rear inſtead of the front, that ſo the ranks may retreat, and not advance in doubling each other.. But to anſwer the whole of what may be objected to the manner in which I conducted the late battle, I muſt beg leave to tell you again, that I drew it up and cauſed it to engage, in the firſt place, to ſhew you how an army ought to be formed in order of battle; and in the next, how it ſhould be exerciſed. The order, I make no doubt, you now perfectly comprehend; and as to the exerciſe, I ſay that the Regiments ought to be joined together, and exerciſed in this manner as often as poſſible; that ſo the officers may learn to poſt their Battalions in their proper places: for as every private man ſhould know his own rank, and place in that rank, ſo every Lieutenant Colonel ſhould know where to ſtation his Battalion in the army, and all of them learn to obey their General. They ſhould likewiſe know how to join one Battalion with another, and to take their reſpective poſts in an inſtant: for which purpoſe, the Colours of every Battalion ſhould have their number marked upon them in ſuch a manner as to be viſible to every one, not only to diſtinguiſh the Battalions from one another, but that the Lieutenant Colonel of every Battalion, and his men, may the more eaſily know where to find each other. The Regiments ought likewiſe to be numbered, and their numbers marked upon the Colonel's Colours, in order to know which Regiment is poſted on the right, and which on the left; what Battalions are placed in the firſt, ſecond, or third line, &c. There ſhould likewiſe be regular ſteps and gradations to preferment in our army: for inſtance, the loweſt officer ſhould be a Corporal, the next above him, a Captain of fifty ordinary Velites, the next, a Captain of a Company in the Battalions, the next, the Lieutenant Colonel of the tenth Battalion, the next, the Lieutenant Colonel of the ninth, the next, the Lieutenant Colonel of the eighth, and ſo on in ſucceſſion, till you come to the Lieutenant Colonel of the firſt Battalion, who ſhould be next in command to the Colonel of the Regiment; to which poſt no-body ſhould be advanced, till he had paſſed through all the ſubordinate degrees juſt now mentioned. But as there are alſo three Lieutenant Colonels of the Pikemen extraordinary, and two of the extraordinary Velites, I would have them rank with the Lieutenant Colonel of the tenth Battalion: for I ſee no abſurdity in having ſix officers of equal rank in the ſame Regiment, as it may ſerve to create an emulation amongſt them, and excite every one of them to behave himſelf in ſuch a manner, as to be thought worthy of being preferred to the command of the ninth Battalion. Every one of theſe officers then knowing where his Corps is to be poſted, the whole army will preſently be in proper order, as ſoon as the General's ſtandard is erected. This is the firſt exerciſe an army ſhould be accuſtomed to; that is, to range itſelf immediately in order of battle upon occaſion: for which purpoſe, it ſhould be drawn up and ſeparated again, not only every day, but ſeveral times in the day.

Luigi. What other marks of diſtinction would you have upon the Colours beſides their particular number?

Fabrizio. The General's Standard ſhould have the arms of his Prince upon it: the others may have the ſame, with ſome variation of the field or colours, as the Prince ſhall think fit: for that is a matter of no great moment, provided they are ſufficient to diſtinguiſh one Corps from another. But let us now paſs on to another ſort of exerciſe, in which an army ought to be very ready and expert; and that is, the learning to move in due pace and diſtance, and to keep its ranks when it is in motion. The third kind of exerciſe is to teach the men to act as they ſhould do, when they are actually engaged with an enemy; to diſcharge the Artillery, to draw it off; to cauſe the Velites extraordinary to begin the attack, and then to retire; to make the firſt line fall back into the ſecond, as if it was hard preſſed, and then the ſecond into the third; and afterwards to reſume their firſt Stations; and to uſe them ſo frequently to theſe and other ſuch things, that every man may know every part of his duty, which will ſoon become eaſy and familiar to him by practice. The next exerciſe is to inſtruct your men in the nature of ſignals, and how to act by beat of drum, ſound of trumpet, or particular motion of the Colours: for ſuch orders as are given by word of mouth, they will eaſily underſtand. And as different notes and ſounds are of great importance, and have various effects, I will tell you what ſorts of military muſic were uſed by the Ancients. The Lacedæmonians, as Thucydides informs us, made uſe of Flutes in their armies, as the moſt proper inſtrument to make them move regularly and reſolutely, but not with precipitation. The Carthaginians, for the ſame reaſon, uſed harps in their firſt attack: Halyattes, King of Lydia, made uſe of both: but Alexander the Great, and the Romans, uſed horns and trumpets, which they thought the fitteſt inſtruments to rouſe the courage of their men, and inſpire them with martial ardour. But as we have imitated both the Greeks and Romans in arming our men, we will alſo borrow our military muſic from each of those nations The General then ſhould have its trumpets about him, as the propereſt inſtruments to animate his army, and ſuch as may be heard farther than any other. The Lieutenant Colonels and other officers of the Battalions ſhould have ſmall drums and flutes, not to be played upon as they commonly are, but in the ſame manner that they are ſounded at great banquets and other feſtivities. With theſe trumpets the General may preſently make his army underſtand when he would have it either halt, or advance, or retreat; when he would have the Artillery diſcharged, and the Velites extraordinary move forwards; and by various notes and ſounds acquaint them with all the different manœuvres he thinks neceſſary to be made: which Signals ſhould afterwards be repeated by the drums: and in this the whole army ſhould frequently be exerciſed, becauſe it is of the utmoſt conſequence. As to the Cavalry, they may have trumpets too, but of a ſmaller ſize and different ſound, This is all that occurs to my memory at preſent, as neceſſary for the forming and exerciſing an army.

Luigi. I have but one queſtion more to propoſe, and hope it will not tire your patience if I aſk why the Velites extraordinary and light horſe in the late battle began the attack with a great ſhout? whereas there was a dead ſilence when the reſt of the army began to engage. I confeſs I am at a loſs to account for this, and therefore beg the favour of you to explain it to us.

Fabrizio. Various are the opinions of ancient authors concerning this matter; that is, whether thoſe that begin the battle ſhould ruſh on with furious ſhouts and outcries, or march up to the attack with ſilence and compoſure. The latter way is certainly the moſt proper to preſerve good order, and for hearing words of Command more diſtinctly; the former, to animate your own men, and diſmay the enemy: and as I think ſome regard ought to be had to all theſe circumſtances, I made one part of my army begin with a great ſhout; the other with profound ſilence. But I do not think a continual ſhout can be of any ſervice, but quite the contrary; becauſe it will prevent the General's orders from being heard, which muſt be attended with terrible conſequences; nor it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe the Romans uſed any ſuch ſhouts after the firſt onſet; as we read in many parts of their Hiſtory, that when their armies were beginning to give way, it was often prevented by the exhortations and reproaches of their Commanders; and that their order of battle was ſometimes changed even in the heat of action; which things could not have been done, if the Voice of the officers had been drowned in the ſhouts of the Soldiers.

THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

# THE
# ART OF WAR.

---

## BOOK IV.

### THE CONTENTS.

*Of ſeveral precautions and artifices that are to be made uſe of both in drawing up an army for battle, and in the action, and after it is over. Two other ways of forming an Army. That a General ought never to hazard an engagement, except he either has an advantage over the enemy, or is compelled to it. Some rules to be obſerved by a General. How to avoid a Battle when the enemy is determined to engage at all events. In what manner Soldiers are to be animated to fight: and how their ardour is to be abated when it runs to high. That a General ought to be an Orator as well as a Soldier, and to harangue his men ſometimes, in order to mould them to his particular purpoſes. That Religion animates Soldiers, and keeps them in their duty. That it is proper to inſpire them with a contempt of the enemy; and ſometimes to lay them under a neceſſity of fighting bravely.*

LUIGI. SINCE we have gained one glorious victory under my auſpices, I do not care to tempt ſo fickle and inconſtant a Deity as Fortune any further: upon which account I deſire to give up my poſt to Zanobi Buondelmonti (the youngeſt man in company who has not yet filled it) according to the order agreed upon; and dare ſay he will accept that honour, (or rather trouble) both out of complaiſance to me, and becauſe he has naturally more courage and ſpirit than falls to my ſhare, and will not be afraid of riſquing another battle, in which he has a chance to be beaten as well as to conquer.

Zanobi. Sir, I ſhall willingly accept whatever you think fit to confer upon me; though I confeſs I had much rather have continued an Auditor: for the queſtions you propoſed, and the objections you ſtarted, whilſt you was in the poſt you now deſire to reſign, were much more pertinent and neceſſary than any that occurred to me. But not to throw away any more time in ceremonies, which perhaps may be diſagreeable to Signor Fabrizio, let us intreat him to proceed, if we have not already treſpaſſed too much upon his patience.

Fabrizio. That I will do with great pleaſure, eſpecially as this change of perſons will give me an opportunity of ſeeing the difference of your reſpective judgments and diſpoſitions. But I ſhould be glad to know whether you have any more queſtions to aſk relating to the matter we were laſt engaged in.

Zanobi. I could which to be informed of three things before we quit it: in the firſt place, whether there be any other way of forming an army in order of battle that you can think of at preſent? in the next, what precautions are neceſſary before a General leads his army on to engage the enemy; and if any accident or diſorder ſhould happen during the battle, in what manner it is to be remedied?

Fabrizio. I will endeavour to give you what ſatisfaction I can in theſe points. But I ſhall not anſwer your queſtions ſeparately and diſtinctly: becauſe what I ſhall ſay in anſwer to one queſtion may ſometimes poſſibly ſerve likewiſe as an anſwer to another.——I told you before, that I gave you a general order of battle, which you might eaſily change into any other, as the number and quality of the enemy, and the nature of your ground, ſhall require: for you muſt always act according to thoſe circumſtances. But let me deſire you to remember that you cannot be guilty of a greater or more fatal error than in making a large extenſive front, exept your army be very numerous: for if it is not, you ought by all means to form it in ſuch a manner that it may be deeper than it is wide. For when your army is not ſo large as that of the enemy, you muſt have recourſe to other expedients, ſuch as drawing it up ſo that it may be flanked by ſome river or moraſs, or ſecuring it in that part by ditches and entrenchments to prevent it being ſurrounded, as Julius Cæſar uſed to do in his wars with the Gauls. But you muſt make it a general rule in ſuch caſes to contract or extend your front according to the number of your own men and thoſe of the enemy; and when you are ſuperior to them in that reſpect, you ſhould endeavour to draw them into plains and open places, eſpecially if your army is well diſciplined, that ſo you may extend your front and ſurround them: for in rough and narrow places your ſuperiority of number will not be of any great advantage to you, becauſe you cannot give your ranks their due extent: upon which account, the Romans always made choice of clear open ground, and avoided ſuch a field of battle as was rough and confined. On the contrary, if you have but a ſmall army and ill-diſciplined, you muſt ſeek out for an advantageous ſituation to ſhelter your men, and where their inexperience cannot be of much prejudice to you: it will be better ſtill if it be upon an eminence, from whence you may fall down upon the enemy with greater weight. You ſhould take care however not to draw up your army either upon the declivity of a hill, or any place near the ſkirts of it, where an enemy may get above you: for in that caſe you will be much annoyed by their Artillery, and your men ſo embarraſſed that you cannot annoy the enemy again with your own Cannon. Great regard is likewiſe to be had to the wind and ſun in forming an army for battle: for if you have them in your face, one will dazzle your ſight with its rays, the other will blind you with duſt. Beſides, when the wind is againſt you, it will diminiſh the force of your blows: and as to the ſun, you muſt not only take care that it is not in your face when the battle begins, but that it may not afterwards be troubleſome to you. For which purpoſe, you ſhould contrive to have it full upon your back at firſt, if poſſible; that ſo it may be a great while before it comes upon your face: as Hannibal did at Cannæ, and Marius when he defeated the Cimbrians. If you are inferior to the enemy in horſe, poſt your army amongſt vineyards and hedges, and other ſuch impediments, when you have an opportunity; as the Spaniards did not long ago, when they beat the French at Cirignuola in the Kingdom of Naples. It has likewiſe often happened that the ſame armies which have been beaten by others, have beat them again in their turn, only by changing their order and their ground: the Carthaginians, for inſtance, having been ſeveral times defeated by Marcus Regulus, in rough and narrow defiles, were at laſt victorious by the conduct of Xantippus the Lacedæmonian, who adviſed them to come down into the plains, where they availed themſelves of their Elephants and Cavalry in ſuch a manner, that they fairly beat the Romans. I have obſerved from the conduct of many great Generals amongſt the Ancients, that when they knew where the enemy placed the main ſtrength of their army, inſtead of employing the flower of their own forces, they appointed the worſt they had to oppoſe them in that quarter, and the beſt of their troops to oppoſe the worſt of the enemy: but afterwards, when the battle was begun, they ordered their choiceſt troops not to preſs upon the enemy, but only to ſuſtain the charge, and the weakeſt to retire by degrees into the rear of the army: for by theſe means the beſt part of the enemy's army is inſenſibly ſurrounded, and whilſt they think themſelves ſure of a victory, they are preſently thrown into confuſion and routed. Thus, when Cornelius Scipio was ſent into Spain againſt Aſdrubal the Carthaginian, being aware that Aſdrubal thought he would place the Legions (which were his beſt troops) in the center of his army, and that Aſdrubal would therefore do the ſame; when they came to an engagement, he changed his uſual order of battle, placing the Legions in the two wings, and the worſt of his forces in the center of his army. But juſt before the battle began, he ordered the center to move forwards very ſlowly, and the two wings to advance briſkly: ſo that the wings only of both armies were engaged, whilſt the center of each was at ſuch a diſtance from one another, that they could not come together in due time; and the ſtrongeſt part of Scipio's army being engaged with the weakeſt of Aſdrubal's, the latter was entirely defeated. This method might be practiſed in thoſe times, but it cannot at preſent, now Artillery is in uſe: for the diſtance which muſt be left betwixt the center of each army would give the Artillery time to fire again and again, which would do as much miſchief as if they were cloſe engaged. It is time therefore lay it aſide, and to have recourſe to the method I preſcribed a little while ago; that is, to let the whole army engage, and the weakeſt part of it give way.——If your army is larger than that of the enemy, and you want to ſurround them without diſcovering your deſign, let your own be drawn up with a front equal to their's; and afterwards, when the battle is begun, let your main body retire by little and little, and the wings extend themſelves: by which the enemy will find themſelves ſurrounded and entangled before they were aware of it. When a General would ſecure his army in ſuch a manner that he may be almoſt certain of not being routed if he comes to an engagement, he ſhould poſt it in ſome place from whence he may eaſily and preſently retreat into a ſafe and defenſible ſituation, as behind a moraſs, or amongſt mountains, or into ſome ſtrong fortreſs, whither the enemy cannot purſue him, though he may purſue them upon occaſion: as Hannibal uſed to do in the ebb of his fortune, when he began to be afraid of Marcus Marcellus. Some Generals, in order to diſturb and diſconcert the enemy, have ordered their light-armed troops to begin the battle, and then to retire into their proper ſtation again; and after both armies were warmly engaged, to ſally out from the flanks again and make a ſecond attack, which has ſometimes ſucceeded ſo well, that the enemy has been thrown into diſorder and routed by it. If you are inferior to the enemy in Horſe (beſides the methods already recommended) you ſhould place a body of Pikemen in their rear; and in the heat of action, let the Horſe open to the right and left to make way for the Pikemen to advance upon the enemy, which will certainly give you the advantage over them: ſome have accuſtomed part of their light-armed Infantry to mingle with their Horſe, and to fight in conjunction with them, which has been of very great ſervice to them. But of all thoſe that have excelled in drawing up armies in order of battle, without doubt Hannibal and Scipio ſhewed the moſt conſummate ſkill and abilities in the African wars: for as Hannibal's army conſiſted not only of Carthaginians, but Auxiliaries of various nations, he placed eighty Elephants in his front; next to them his Auxiliaries; behind them, his Carthaginians; and laſt of all, his Italians,

lians, in whom he put but little confidence. His deſign in this diſpoſition was, that his Auxiliaries having the enemy in their front, and the Carthaginians in their rear, ſhould not have an opportunity of running away if they were ſo inclined; but being under a neceſſity of fighting, he hoped they might either break or diſconcert the Romans in ſuch a manner, that when he advanced with a freſh body of his beſt troops, he might entirely defeat them. Scipio, on the other hand, drew up his three lines of Haſtati, Principes, and Triarii (after the uſual manner of the Romans) in ſuch order that they might eaſily ſupport or receive each other. In the front of his army, he left ſeveral intervals over againſt Hannibal's Elephants: but to make it appear cloſe and united, he filled them up with Velites, whom he ordered to give way as ſoon as the Elephants advanced upon them, and retire through the ordinary ſpaces into the Legions, in order to leave a free paſſage for the Elephants: by which means he evaded the fury of thoſe beaſts, and coming to a cloſe engagement with the enemy, entirely defeated them.

ZANOBI. Now you mention that battle, I remember to have read in ſome account of it, that Scipio did not ſuffer the Haſtati to retire into the line of the Principes, but cauſed them to file off to the right and left, and take poſt in the flanks of his army, to make room for the Principes to advance. Now I ſhould be glad to know for what reaſon he deviated from the uſual order and diſcipline of the Romans upon this occaſion.

FABRIZIO. I will tell you. Hannibal had placed the ſtrength of his army in the ſecond line: Scipio therefore, in order to oppoſe him with equal force, joined his Principes and Triarii together, ſo that the intervals amongſt the Principes being taken up by the Triarii, there was no room left to receive the Haſtati: upon which account, he cauſed them to open to the right and left, and wheel off to the flanks. But remember that this method of opening the firſt line to make room for the ſecond to advance, cannot be made uſe of but when you have the advantage over the enemy; for then it may eaſily be put in practice, as it was by Scipio: but if you have the worſt of the battle, and are repulſed, you cannot do it without expoſing yourſelf to the danger of a total defeat: and therefore it is neceſſary to have intervals in the ſecond and third lines, to receive your men upon ſuch occaſions.——But to return to our ſubject. The ancient Aſiatics, amongſt other inventions to annoy the enemy, had chariots with ſcythes fixed to their axletrees, which ſerved not only to open the enemy's ranks, but to mow them down as they drove through them. Now there were three ways of guarding againſt theſe dangerous machines: for the enemy either drew up in ſuch cloſe order, that they could make no impreſſion upon them; or received them in the intervals betwixt the Battalions, as Scipio did the Elephants; or made ſome ſtrong fence againſt them, as Sylla did in the battle he fought with Archelaus, who had a great number of theſe armed chariots; for he fixed ſeveral rows of ſharp-pointed ſtakes or paliſadoes in the ground before his firſt line, which ſtopped the career of the chariots, and prevented the execution they muſt otherwiſe have done. The new method which Sylla uſed in drawing up his army at that time, is likewiſe worthy of notice: for he placed his Velites and light horſe in the rear, and all his heavy-armed men in the front, leaving ſeveral intervals in it, through which thoſe in the rear might advance when occaſion required; by which means he gained a complete victory.——In order to throw the enemy into confuſion after the battle is begun, it is neceſſary to have recouſe to ſome invention that may ſtrike a terror into them: which may be done either by ſpreading a report that you have ſuccours coming up, or making a falſe ſhew of ſuch ſupplies at a diſtance; which has often occaſioned ſuch a conſternation in an army, that it has been preſently defeated. This ſtratagem was put in a practice by the Roman Conſuls, Minucius Ruffus and Accilius Glabrio: Caius Sulpicius likewiſe mounted a great number of ſuttlers and ſervants that followed his camp, upon mules, and other beaſts that were of no ſervice in battle; and having drawn them up and accoutred them like a body of horſe, he ordered them to make their appearance upon a neighbouring hill, as ſoon as he was engaged with the Gauls; which had ſuch an effect, that he ſoon routed them. The ſame was done by Marius, in a battle which he fought with the Germans.——If then theſe falſe alarms have ſuch conſequences in the heat of an action, what may not be expected from a real one; eſpecially if the enemy is ſuddenly and unexpectedly attacked either in the flank or in the rear, when they are engaged in the front? But this is no eaſy matter to effect, except you are favoured in it by the nature of the country: for if it be plain and open, you cannot conceal ſuch a body of your forces as is neceſſary upon ſuch occaſions*; but if it abound with woods or mountains, you may lie in ambuſh and fall ſuddenly upon an enemy, when he leaſt expects it, and be aſſured of ſucceſs.——It is ſometimes likewiſe of great ſervice in time of battle, to raiſe a report that the enemy's General is killed, or that one part of their army is giving way: and it has been no unuſual thing to throw Cavalry into diſorder by ſtrange noiſes, and uncommon appearances: thus Cræſus brought a great number of Camels againſt the enemy's horſe: and Pyrrhus made uſe of Elephants againſt that of the Romans, which occaſioned great confuſion and diſturbance amongſt them. The grand Signor, not long ago, routed the Sophi of Perſia and the Sultan of Syria, merely by the uſe of muſkets; the exploſion of which ſtruck ſuch a terror into their Cavalry, that they ran away. The Spaniards, in their battles with Hamilcar, uſed to place carriages full of flax, and drawn by oxen, in the front of their armies; and ſetting fire to the flax as ſoon as the battle begun, the oxen were ſo frighted at it, that they ruſhed in amongſt the enemy, and opened their ranks.——Where the nature of the country is ſuch, that you cannot well draw the enemy into an ambuſh, you may however dig ditches and pit-falls in the plains, and cover them lightly over with bruſh wood and clods, leaving intervals of ſolid ground, through which you may retire yourſelf in the heat of the battle; and if the enemy purſues you, he is undone. If you are aware of any accident that happens during the action, which you think may diſpirit your men, it is the beſt way either to conceal it, if you can, or to give it ſuch a turn as may ſerve to produce a quite different effect, as Tullus Hoſtilius did, and after him Lucius Sylla, who ſeeing a body of his forces go over to the enemy he was engaged with, and that it had greatly diſcouraged his own men, immediately ſpread a report through his army, that it was done for a ſecret purpoſe, and by his own order: ſo that, inſtead of being daunted, they fought with more courage, and beat the enemy. The ſame Commander having ſent a party of Soldiers upon ſome attack, in which they were all killed, and being afraid it might diſcourage the reſt of his army, ſaid in public, that he had ſent them upon that errand on purpoſe to be cut off, becauſe he knew they were a parcel of raſcals and traitors. Sertorius, in a battle with the Spaniards, killed one of his own men who brought him word that one of his Generals was ſlain; imagining that if he publiſhed it, it would ſtrike a damp into his army.——It is a very difficult matter to ſtop an army that is beginning to run away, and to make it charge again: but here we muſt make a diſtinction betwixt one that is actually running, and another that is only inclining; for in the firſt caſe, it is almoſt impoſſible; in the ſecond, there may be ſome remedy found. Some of the Roman Generals have done it by reproaching their Soldiers, and upbraiding them with cowardice, as we may inſtance in the conduct of Sylla, who ſeeing part of his Legions begin to fly before the army of Mithridates, rode up to the head of them with a drawn Sword in his hand, and cried out, "If any "body ſhould enquire after your General, tell "them you left him fighting in the plains of Bœo- "tia." Attilius the Roman Conſul detached a body of his beſt troops to ſtop the flight of ſome others that were running away, and told them that if they did not turn back, they ſhould be attacked by their own friends, as well as by the enemy. Philip of Macedon finding ſome of his troops were afraid of the Scythians, poſted a body of Cavalry, in which he moſt confided, in the rear of his army, with orders to kill any man that offered to quit his rank: upon which, the reſt chuſing rather to hazard their lives in battle, than to be killed without mercy, if they fled, exerted their courage, and fought ſo manfully that they beat the Scythians [*].

---

* And yet Hannibal found means to draw the Romans into a ſort of an ambuſh in the middle of a plain, at the famous battle of Cannæ. See the account of that battle by Sir W. Raleigh, in his Hiſtory of the World, book V. chap. 3.

---

[*] Memorable was the behaviour of two Lacedæmonian Matrons to their Sons, when they had fled from battle, as it is recorded in two Greek Epigrams, of which the following are literal tranſlations.

Fugiebat Lacon olim pugnam; obviam vero facta mater
Dixit, in pectus enſe ſublato,
Vivus quidem tuæ matri uſque dedecus injungis,
Et Strenuæ Spartæ patrias leges ſolvis.
Si vero occideris meis manibus, mater quidem audiam
Infelix, ſed in meâ patriâ conſervatâ.

——Several of the Roman Generals have taken a pair of Colours out of the hands of an Enſign, in the heat of battle, and thrown it into the midſt of the enemy, with a promiſe of a reward to thoſe that ſhould retake it: but this was done not ſo much to prevent their running away, as to create an emulation amongſt their Soldiers, and encourage them to fight with great ardour. Having now ſpoken of ſuch things as are neceſſary to be done, not only before a battle, but in the time of action, it may not be amiſs perhaps to ſay ſometing of what ought to be done after it is over; eſpecially as I ſhall be very brief in this point, which yet ſhould not be omitted, becauſe it is a part of our Syſtem.——I ſay then, that when you have gained a victory, you ought by all means to purſue it, and to imitate Julius Cæſar rather than Hannibal in that reſpect; the latter of whom loſt the Empire of the World, by trifling away his time at Capua, after he had routed the Romans at the battle of Cannæ. Cæſar, on the other hand, never reſted after a victory, but always purſued and harraſſed the enemy after they were broken and flying, with greater vigour and fury than he attacked them at firſt.——But when a General happens to loſe a battle, he is to conſider in the firſt place, how to make the beſt of his loſs; particularly if he has any conſiderable force left. Perhaps he may reap ſome advantage, either from the neglect, or tardineſs, or inadvertency of the enemy: for after a victory, Soldiers often grow too remiſs and ſecure, and give the army they have beaten an opportunity of beating them in their turn; as L. Marcius did the Carthaginians, who having ſlain the two Scipio's in battle, and defeated their armies, made little account of the forces that were

> Mater filium deſertorem pugnæ poſt mortem Sociorum
> Occidit, partus dolorum recordationem aſpernata:
> Legitimum etenim Sanguinem diſcernit Lacedæmon
> Virtute præliantium, non genere infantium.

left under the command of Marcius, till they were attacked and routed by him. Hence we ſee, that nothing is ſo eaſy to effect, as what the enemy imagines you will never attempt; and that men are frequently in the greateſt danger, when they think themſelves moſt ſecure. But if a General can reap no ſort of advantage from his firſt loſs, he ſhould by all means endeavour at leaſt to make it as light and ſupportable as he can, and to prevent any further damage: for which purpoſe, he ought to uſe every method either to divide or retard the enemy, if they purſue him. In the firſt caſe, ſome, when they were aware they could ſtand their ground no longer, have ordered their inferior Commanders to ſeparate and retreat with their forces by different ways to ſome appointed rendezvous; which has made the enemy afraid of dividing his forces, and ſuffer all or moſt of them to eſcape: in the ſecond, many have ſuffered the beſt of their baggage and effects to fall into the enemy's hands upon the road, that ſo whilſt they were buſy in plundering and ranſacking that, they might have time to ſave themſelves. The artifice made uſe of by Titus Dimius, to conceal the loſs he had ſuſtained in battle, is not unworthy of notice: for after he had fought from morning till night, and had a great number of his men killed, he cauſed moſt of them to be buried in the night: ſo that the next day, when the enemy ſaw ſo many of their own men, and ſo few of the Romans killed, they looked upon themſelves as worſted, and immediately began to retreat.——And now I think I have in a great meaſure anſwered your queſtions; though not ſo diſtinctly and particularly perhaps, as you expected. It is true, I have ſomething yet to add concerning the method of forming armies in order of battle: as ſome Generals have drawn up their forces in the ſhape of a wedge, with its edge in the front; imagining that form to be the beſt adapted to penetrate and open the ranks of an enemy. To provide againſt this, the other ſide commonly drew up their army in the form of a pair of open ſhears, to receive the wedge in the vacuity, and ſo to ſurround and attack it on every ſide. Upon this occaſion, let me recommend a general rule to you: which is, that in order to fruſtrate any of your enemy's deſigns, it is the beſt way to do that of yourſelf, which he endeavours to force you to: for then you may proceed in a cool and orderly manner, and turn that to your advantage, which he intended as the means of your ruin: but if you are compelled to it, you will ſurely be undone. To confirm the truth of this, it is needleſs to repeat what I have ſaid before: for when the enemy advances in a wedge, with a deſign to open, and as it were to cleave your army aſunder, if you open it yourſelf in the form abovementioned, it is certain you muſt cut him to pieces, and he cannot much hurt you. Hannibal placed Elephants in the front of his army, to break in upon that of Scipio: but Scipio having opened a way for them himſelf, gained a complete victory by it. Aſdrubal likewiſe poſted the flower of his army in the center of his front, for the ſame purpoſe: but Scidio ordering his front to open and file off, diſappointed his intention, and defeated him: ſo that when ſuch deſigns are known, they are generally fruſtrated, and prove the ruin of the contrivers.

I think I have likewiſe ſomething left to ſay, relating to the precautions which a General ſhould make uſe of before he leads on his army to battle: for, in the firſt place, I am of opinion, that he ſhould never come to engagement, except he either has an advantage over the enemy, or is compelled to it. Now the advantage may ariſe from the nature of the ground, the order, ſuperiority, or bravery of his army: and he may be compelled to engage, by a conviction, that if he does not, he muſt inevitably be ruined: which may happen, either when he has no money to pay his troops, and they begin to mutiny and talk of diſbanding; or when he has no proviſions left, and muſt otherwiſe be ſtarved; or when he knows the enemy daily expects to be reinforced: for without doubt, in ſuch circumſtances, he ought always to engage; becauſe it is better to try your fortune whilſt there is any chance of victory (though ever ſo ſmall) than to ſit ſtill and be ſure to be undone. It is therefore as great a fault in a General not to hazard an engagement upon ſuch occaſions, as if he had a fair opportunity of gaining a victory, and neglected it, either out of ignorance or cowardice. Some advantages may reſult from the negligence and miſconduct of the enemy; and others from your own vigilance and good conduct: many armies have been routed in paſſing rivers, by an enemy, who has waited till one half of them has been tranſported, and then fallen upon them; as Cæſar did upon the Swiſs, when he cut off a fourth part of their army, which was ſeparated from the reſt by a river they had paſſed. Sometimes an enemy is ſo jaded and fatigued by too raſh and haſty a purſuit, that if your men have had a little time to reſt and refreſh themſelves, you have nothing to do but to face about and gain a victory. If an enemy offers you battle early in the morning, you ought not to draw out your army to fight him immediately; but rather to let his men wait under arms for ſome hours, till their ardour is abated, and then to come out of your entrenchements and engage him, as Scipio and Metellus did in Spain; the former, when he had Aſdrubal upon his hands, and the latter, Sertorius. If the enemy has diminiſhed his ſtrength, either by dividing his army (as the Scipios did in Spain) or upon any other occaſion, you ought by no means to omit that opportunity of fighting him. Moſt prudent Generals have choſen rather to receive the enemy, than to attack them: becauſe the fury of the firſt ſhock is eaſily ſuſtained by men that ſtand firm and reſolute, and ready prepared in their ranks: and when that is over, their fury commonly ſubſides into languor and deſpair.

By proceeding in this manner, Fabius routed both the Samnites and the Gauls: but Decius, his Collegue, taking the other courſe, was defeated and ſlain*. Some Generals, who have thought the enemy ſuperior to them, have choſen to defer a battle till the evening; that ſo if they ſhould be worſted, they might ſave themſelves under ſhelter of the night: others who have known that the enemy would not fight at particular times, out of reverence to the laws of their Religion, have taken that opportunity to attack and defeat them: of which advantage Julius Cæſar availed himſelf againſt Arioviſtus in Gaul, and Veſpaſian againſt the Jews in Syria. But above all things, a General ſhoud take care to have men of approved fidelity, wiſdom, and long experience in military affairs, near his perſon, as a ſort of Council; from whom he may learn, not only the ſtate of his own army, but that of the enemy's; as which of them is ſuperior to the other in number; which of them is the better armed and diſciplined; which of them is the ſtronger in Cavalry; which of his own troops are fitteſt to undergo hard ſervice and fatigue; and whether his Infantry or Cavalry are likely to be of moſt ſervice. Let them well conſider the nature of the country where they are; whether it be more advantageous to the enemy or themſelves; which of the two can be moſt conveniently furniſhed with proviſions and other ſupplies; whether it be better to come to an engagement directly, or to defer it; and what advantage or diſadvantage may accrue from time: for it ſometimes happens, that when Soldiers ſee a war protracted, and a battle put off from time to time, they loſe their ardour, and become ſo weary of hardſhips, that they grow mutinous and deſert their Colours. It is likewiſe of great importance to know the qualities and diſpoſition of the Enemy's General, and of thoſe that are about him; for inſtance, whether he is bold and enterprizing, or cautious and timid. He ſhould next conſider how far he can confide in his Auxiliaries; and be particularly careful not to bring his army to an engagement, if he perceives his men are in the leaſt diſpirited or diffident of victory: for it is a bad omen indeed, when they think an enemy invincible. In ſuch circumſtances, you muſt either endeavour to avoid a battle, by following the example of Fabius Maximus (who always took the advantage of ſituations where Hannibal durſt not attack him) or, if you think the enemy will attack you, how advantageous ſoever your ſituation may be, you muſt entirely quit the field, and canton your forces in different towns and fortreſſes, to tire him out with ſieges and blockades.

---

* See Pol. Diſc. Book III. Chap. xlv.

ZANOBI. Is there no other way of avoiding an engagement?

FABRIZIO. I think I told ſome of you in a converſation we once had before upon this very point, that an army in the field cannot poſſibly avoid an engagement, if the enemy is determined to fight it at all events; except it ſuddenly decamps, and removes to the diſtance of fifty and ſixty miles, and always keeps retreating as they advance *. Fabius Maximus never refuſed to fight Hannibal: but did no chuſe to do it without an advantage; and Hannibal, conſidering the manner in which he always took care to fortify himſelf, was too wiſe to force him to it: but if Fabius had been attacked, he muſt either have fought him at all events, or run away.

Philip of Macedon, the father of Perſeus, being at war with the Romans, encamped upon the top of

---

* See Pol. Diſc. book III. chap. x.

of a very high hill, to avoid coming to an engagement with them: but they attacked and routed him there. Cingetorex *, General of the Gauls, retreated to a conſiderable diſtance, that he might not be obliged to fight the Roman army, commanded by Julius Cæſar, who had ſuddenly paſſed a river that was betwixt them, contrary to his expectation. The Venetians in the late wars, might have avoided a battle with the French, if they had marched away from them (as Cingetorex did from Cæſar) inſtead of waiting till they paſſed the Adda: but they neither took the opportunity of attacking them whilſt they were paſſing that river, nor could they afterwards retreat; for the French were then ſo cloſe at their heels, that as ſoon as the Venetians began to decamp, the French fell upon them and defeated them. In ſhort, there is no other way of avoiding a battle, if the enemy is fully determined to bring you to one: and therefore it is to no purpoſe to alledge the example of Fabius Maximus; for in that caſe, Hannibal avoided an engagement as much as Fabius.——It often happens, that Soldiers are eager to engage, when (conſidering the ſuperiority of the enemy, the nature of the ground, or ſome other circumſtances) you are convinced you cannot do it without diſadvantage, and therefore would willingly decline a battle: it may likewiſe happen, that either neceſſity may oblige, or opportunity invite you, to engage when you find your Soldiers diſpirited and adverſe to it; in one of which caſes, it is neceſſary to repreſs their ardour, and in the other to excite it. In the firſt, when perſuaſion and exhortations have no effect, it is the beſt way to let ſome part of them be roughly handled by the enemy; that ſo, both thoſe who have ſuffered, and thoſe who have not, may learn to be more tractable and conformable to your

---

* The Author is guilty of a little miſtake here; it was not Cingetorex, but Vercingetorex. See Cæſ. Com. de Bello Gallico. lib. VII. cap. xxxv.

your will another time: for what was the effect of chance in the army of Fabius Maximus, may be done on purpoſe by any other Commander, upon a like occaſion. It happened, that not only the General of his Cavalry, but all the reſt of his army, were very impatient to fight Hannibal; though Fabius himſelf was utterly againſt it: which diſſenſion grew to ſuch a height, that at laſt they divided the army betwixt them. Fabius, with his troops, kept cloſe in his entrenchments; the other went out and engaged the enemy, but would have been entirely defeated, if Fabius had not at laſt marched out to his ſuccour: from which example, both the General of his Cavalry, and all the reſt of the army, were convinced, that it would have been wiſer to have ſubmitted to the opinion of Fabius.——As to the means of animating your men, and inflaming them with a deſire to engage, it would be a good way, in the firſt place, to exaſperate them againſt the enemy, to tell them they are deſpiſed, to inſinuate that you have corrupted ſome of their officers, and hold a private correſpondence with them, to encamp in a ſituation where you may daily ſee what they are doing, and now and then take an opportunity of ſkirmiſhing with them: for things that are often ſeen, at laſt become familiar, and are but little regarded [*]. If theſe meaſures fail, you ſhould treat them with diſdain, and harangue them in a weighty and pathetic manner, upbraiding them with cowardice, and endeavouring to make them aſhamed of themſelves, by telling them, that if the reſt have not courage enough to follow you, you will take ſuch or ſuch a Regiment, which you know you can depend upon, and fight the enemy with that alone [†]. But to make your men the bolder and more courageous and reſolute, you ought above all things, to take care that they may neither ſend any of their money or plunder away to their own houſes, or depoſite it in any other place of ſafety, till the war is over: that ſo they may be aſſured, that if they run away, they may ſave their lives perhaps, but muſt certainly loſe their treaſure; the love of which moſt commonly operates as ſtrongly upon men as that of their life.

---

[*] See Pol. Diſc. book III. chap. xxxvii.

[†] As Cæſar and Alexander did.

ZANOBI. You ſay that Soldiers ſhould be animated to fight by haranguing them: would you harangue the whole army then, or the officers only?

FABRIZIO. It is an eaſy matter to induce a few people either to do a thing or to let it alone; for if arguments are not ſufficient, you make uſe of force and authority: but the great difficulty is to make a whole army change their reſolution, when the execution of it muſt either be of prejudice to the public, or thwart your own private ſchemes and deſigns; becauſe in that caſe, you can avail yourſelf of nothing but words, which muſt be heard and conſidered by the whole army, if you would have the whole army affected by them. For this reaſon, it is neceſſary that a General ſhould be an Orator as well as a Soldier: for if he does not know how to addreſs himſelf to the whole army, he will ſometimes find it no eaſy taſk to mould it to his purpoſes. But there is not the leaſt attention ſhewn to this point at preſent. Read the Life of Alexander the Great, and you will ſee how often he was obliged to harangue his troops; which otherwiſe he ſhould never have conducted (rich and loaded with ſpoil) through the deſarts of India and Arabia, where they underwent every ſort of hardſhip and fatigue. Many things may prove the ruin of an army, if the General does not frequently harangue his men: for by that, he may diſpel their fears, enflame their courage, confirm their reſolution, point out the ſnares that are laid for them, promiſe them rewards, inform them of danger, and the way to eſcape it, rebuke, entreat, threaten, praiſe, reproach, or encourage, and avail himſelf of all other arts that can either excite or allay the paſſions and appetites of mankind. If any Prince or Republic, therefore, would make their armies reſpectable, they ſhould accuſtom their Generals to harangue the men, and the men to liſten to their Generals.——Religion likewiſe, and the oath which Soldiers took when they were enliſted, very much contributed to make them do their duty in former times: for upon any default, they were threatened not only with human puniſhments, but the vengeance of the Gods *. They had alſo ſeveral other religious ceremonies, which had a very good effect in all their enterprizes; and would have ſtill in any place where Religion is held in due reverence. Sertorius well knew this, and uſed to have conferences with a Hind, which he ſaid was ſent by the Gods to aſſure him of victory. Sylla pretended to converſe with an image he had taken out of the temple of Apollo; and ſeveral have given out that ſome God or other has appeared to them in dreams and viſions, and commanded them to fight the enemy. In the days of our Anceſtors, when Charles VII. of France was at war with the Engliſh, he pretended to be adviſed in every thing by a Virgin ſent from Heaven, commonly called *the Virgin of France* †; which gained him many a victory.——It is proper alſo to teach your men to hold the enemy in contempt, as Ageſilaus the Spartan did: who having taken ſome of the Perſians, cauſed them to be ſtripped naked and ſhewn to his Soldiers, that ſo when they had ſeen the delicacy of their bodies, they might deſpiſe them. Some Commanders have laid their men under a neceſſity of fighting, by depriving them of all means of ſaving themſelves, except by victory, which is certainly ly the beſt method of making them fight deſperately: and this reſolution is heightened, either by the confidence they have in themſelves, their arms and armour, their diſcipline, good order, and the victories they have lately gained, or by the eſteem they have for their General, which ariſes rather from the opinion they have of his valour and conduct, than from any particular favour they have received of him *; or by the love of their country, which is natural to all men. There are various other methods of laying them under the neceſſity of fighting, but that is the ſtrongeſt and moſt powerful, which leaves men no other alternative but either to conquer or die.

---

* See Politic. Diſc. book I. chap. xi. xii. xiii. xiv. xv.

† Or the Maid of Orleans.

---

* See Pol. Diſc. book III. chap. xii. xxxiii. xxxviii.

THE END OF THE FOURTH BOOK.

# THE ART OF WAR.

## BOOK V.

### THE CONTENTS.

*In what order the Romans uſed to march through an enemy's country; and how an army ought to be drawn up for that purpoſe. How to reduce an army into order of battle immediately: and to form it in ſuch a manner that it may be able to defend itſelf on any ſide, in caſe of a ſudden attack. Concerning orders that are to be given by word of mouth, beat of drum, or ſound of trumpet. Of Pioneers, and the Proviſions that are neceſſary for an army. In what manner the Antients divided the ſpoil taken from the enemy amongſt their Soldiers. How to diſcover Ambuſcades upon a march. That a General ought to be well acquainted with the country through which he is to paſs; and to keep his deſign ſecret. What means are to be taken for that purpoſe. Some other precautions that are neceſſary upon a march. How to avoid an angagement, if the enemy preſſes hard upon you, as you are going to paſs a river; and in what manner rivers may be paſſed with ſafety. How ſome Generals have eſcaped when they have been ſhut up in a paſs, or ſurrounded by the enemy.*

**Fabrizio.** I Have ſhewn you how an army ought to be formed that is going to engage, how an enemy may be defeated, and many other circumſtances on this ſubject which may happen through various accidents and occurrences. It is now time therefore, I think, to inform you in what manner I would have an army drawn up, which has not an enemy actually in ſight, but expects to be attacked on a ſudden; particularly when it is marching either through an enemy's country, or one that is ſuſpected of favouring the enemy.—— You muſt know then, in the firſt place, that the Roman Generals uſually ſent ſome troops of horſe before their armies to reconnoitre the country, and ſcour the roads: after them came the right wing, with the carriages and baggage belonging to it in its rear: then followed one of the legions with its carriages; and next to that, the other in the ſame manner: laſt of all, came the left wing with its baggage, and the reſt of the horſe in the rear of all. This was the order which they commonly obſerved upon a march; and if they were attacked either in the front or rear, they immediately cauſed all the carriages to be drawn off to the right or left, as beſt ſuited their convenience, and the nature of the ground would admit; after which, the whole army, being freed from that incumbrance, faced about to the enemy. If they were attacked on the right flank, they drew off the carriages to the left, and vice verſâ, converting the flank that was attacked into a front. This being a very good method, in my opinion, I think it is worthy of imitation; and therefore, upon the like occaſions, I would always ſend my light horſe before they army to reconnoitre the country, and ſcour the roads: the four Regiments of which it conſiſts ſhould march next, one after another; every one of them having its own baggage in its rear. And as there are two ſorts of baggage, viz. that which belongs to individuals, and that which is for the uſe of the army in general, I would divide the latter into four parts, and aſſign one fourth of it to the care of every Regiment: the

Artillery, Suttlers, and others who attended the camp, ſhould alſo be diſtributed amongſt them in the ſame manner; that ſo every Regiment might have an equal ſhare of theſe impediments. But as it ſometimes happens, that you march through a country, which inſtead of being ſuſpected, is profeſſedly your enemy, and where you hourly expect to be attacked, you will then be obliged to change the form and order of your march for greater ſecurity; and to draw up your men in ſuch a manner that neither the peaſants nor the enemy's army may find you unprepared to receive them on any ſide, if they ſhould make a ſudden attack upon you. In ſuch caſes, the Roman Generals uſed to form their armies into an oblong ſquare, ſo that they might defend themſelves on every ſide, and be ready to fight as well as to march: and I confeſs I like that diſpoſition ſo well, that I would follow their example in drawing up the two Regiments I have taken for the model of an army, in the ſame manner upon the like occaſions: that is, in an oblong ſquare with a hollow in the middle of it, or four hundred and twenty-four feet on every ſide. My flanks then would be that diſtance from one another; in each of which, I would place five Battalions in the rear of each other, with an interval of ſix feet betwixt every one of them: ſo that theſe Battalions would take up the ſpace of four hundred and twenty-four feet in depth, including the intervals betwixt them; every Battalion being ſuppoſed to take up eighty feet. In the front and rear of the hollow ſquare, I would place the other ten Battalions; that is, five of them in the front of it, and five in the rear; in ſuch a manner that four of them abreaſt of each other ſhould be next to the front of the right flank, and four drawn up in the ſame manner next to the rear of the left, with an interval of eight feet betwixt every one of them: another I would poſt next to the front of the left flank, in a line with the four firſt, and another next to the rear of the right, in a line alſo with the four others there. Now as the diſtance from one flank to another is four hundred and twenty-four feet, and the Battalions poſted in front of the ſquare (including the intervals betwixt them) will take up no more than two hundred and ſeventy-four feet, there will remain a vacant ſpace of one hundred and fifty feet betwixt the four Battalions on the right, and the ſingle one on the left. There will alſo be the ſame room left betwixt the Battalions in the rear without any difference; except that the ſpace in the front will be near the left flank, and that in the rear near the right. In the former of theſe, I would place my ordinary Velites, and my extraordinary in the latter, which would not amount to quite a thouſand in each ſpace.——But to order it ſo that the hollow ſquare in the middle of the army ſhould be completely four hundred and twenty-four feet on every ſide, care muſt be taken that neither the five Battalions that are poſted in the front, nor the other five in the rear may take up any part of the ſpace that is included betwixt the flanks: for which purpoſe, the laſt men on the right and left of the firſt rank of the Battalions in the rear ſhould be cloſe (not in a right line, but rather obliquely) with the innermoſt man in the laſt rank of each flank; and the laſt man on the right and left of the laſt rank of the Battalions in the front, ſhould be cloſe (in the ſame manner) with the innermoſt man in the firſt rank of each flank; and then there will be a ſpace left at every angle of the army large enough to receive a body of three hundred and thirty-three Pikemen extraordinary; but as there would ſtill be two more corps of Pikemen extraordinary left, each conſiſting of three hundred and thirty-four men, I would draw them up in a ſquare form in the middle of the area within the army; at the head of which, the General himſelf, with his proper Officers and attendants, ſhould take poſt. Now though theſe Battalions thus drawn up march all in one direction, but may be obliged to fight on any ſide, you muſt take care to qualify them properly for that purpoſe: and therefore the five firſt Battalions being ſecured on all ſides but in their front, muſt be formed with their Pikemen in their foremoſt ranks. The five laſt Battalions are likewiſe covered on every ſide, except their rear; and therefore they muſt be formed with their Pikemen in their rearmoſt ranks. For the ſame reaſon each flank ſhould alſo have its Pikemen in the outermoſt ranks. The Corporals and other Officers ſhould take their proper poſts at the ſame time; that ſo when the enemy comes to engage, every corps, and every member of that corps, may be in its due place, according to the order and method I deſcribed before, when I was ſpeaking of ranging an army in order of battle. The Artillery I would diſtribute along each flank; the light horſe ſhould be ſent before to reconnoitre the country and ſcour the roads: and the Gens d'Armes I would poſt in the rear of each flank, at the diſtance of eighty feet from the Battalions. For it ſhould be a general rule in drawing up an army, always to poſt your horſe either on the flanks or in the rear; becauſe, if you poſt them in the front, you muſt either do it at ſuch a diſtance from the army, that if they ſhould be repulſed by the enemy, they may have time and room enough to wheel off without falling foul upon your Infantry, or you muſt leave proper intervals in the front to receive them in ſuch a manner as not to diſorder the reſt of your forces. This is a matter that deſerves to be well remembered; for many who have neglected theſe precautions have been thrown into diſorder, and routed by their own men. The carriages, ſuttlers, and other unarmed people who follow the camp, ſhould be placed in the hollow ſquare, and ſo ranged that any perſon upon occaſion may have a free paſſage through them, either from the front to the rear, or from one flank to another. The depth of the whole army, when the Battalions are thus diſpoſed, will be five hundred and eighty-four feet from front to rear, excluſive of the horſe and artillery: and as it is compoſed of two Regiments, it muſt be conſidered how each of them is to be poſted. Now ſince the Regiments are diſtinguiſhed by their reſpective marks and numbers, and each of them conſiſts of ten Battalions and a Colonel, the five firſt Battalions of the firſt Regiment ſhould be poſted in the front of the army, and the other five in the left flank; in the angle of which, on the inſide, the Colonel of it ſhould take his ſtation: after which, the five firſt Battalions of the ſecond Regiment ſhould be placed in the right flank, and the other five in the rear, with their Colonel in the angle which they make there. When the army is thus formed, you are to put it in motion, and to obſerve this order during your whole march; which will effectually ſecure you againſt any tumultuary attack from the people of the country. All other proviſions for that purpoſe are unneceſſary, except you ſhall think fit now and then to ſend a troop or two of light horſe, or a party of Velites to drive them away: for ſuch ſort of diſorderly people are ſo afraid of regular forces, that they will never come within reach of their pikes, much leſs of their ſwords; but may ſet up a great ſhout perhaps, and make a feint of attacking you, like a parcel of curs barking at a maſtif which they dare not venture to come near. Thus Hannibal all the while he was traverſing Gaul to invade Italy, made little or no account of the country people.——For the ſake of convenience and expedition upon a march, you ſhould ſend Pioneers before the army to make a clear paſſage for it: and theſe Pioneers ſhould be covered by the light horſe that are ſent forwards to reconnoitre the country. In this order an army will march ten miles in a day with great eaſe, and have time enough to encamp and refreſh itſelf before it is dark: for the uſual march of an army is about twenty miles a day.——If you ſhould happen to be attacked by a regular army, it cannot be ſo ſuddenly but you will have ſufficient time to put yourſelf in a proper poſture of defence: becauſe ſuch an army muſt move in an orderly manner, and therefore you will be able to draw up your forces, either in the form I have been deſcribing, or in ſome other of the like nature. For if you are attacked in the front, you have nothing to do but to draw your Artillery from the flanks, and your horſe out of the rear, and to poſt them in the places and at the diſtances I juſt now recommended. The thouſand Velites in the front may advance; and having divided themſelves into two bodies of five hundred in each, let them take place betwixt the horſe and each wing of the army. The void which they leave may be filled with the two Corps of Pikemen extraordinary, which were poſted in the middle of the hollow ſquare. The Velites extraordinary, which were in the rear, may divide into two bodies, and range themſelves along each flank of the Battalions to ſtrengthen them; and all the carriages, ſuttlers, &c. may draw off through the open ſpace, which will then be left into the rear of the Battalions. The hollow ſquare being thus left empty, let the five Battalions, which were in the rear, march up through the vacancy betwixt each flank towards the front; three of them advancing till they come within eighty feet of thoſe in the front, and the other two halting at the ſame diſtance in their rear, with proper intervals betwixt them all. All this may be done in a very little time; and then your order of battle will much reſemble the firſt and principal of thoſe which I recommended ſome time ago: and if it be cloſer in the front, it is likewiſe groſſer in the flanks, which will make it ſo much the ſtronger. But as the five Battalions in the rear had poſted their Pikemen in their laſt ranks for the reaſons abovementioned, it will be neceſſary upon this occaſion to place them in their foremoſt ranks, in order to ſupport the front of the army: for which purpoſe, they muſt either wheel to the right or left about (Battalion by Battalion) all at once, and like one ſolid body, or the Pikemen muſt paſs through the ranks of the Targetmen, and place themſelves in the front of them, which is a much more expeditious way than the other, and ſubject to leſs diſorder. The ſame muſt be done upon any attack, in all parts of the army where the Pikemen are in the rear of the Targets, as I ſhall ſhew you. If the enemy preſents himſelf in the rear, you have nothing more to do than to make your whole army face about to that part, and then your rear immediately becomes the front, and your front the rear: after which, you muſt obſerve all the directions in forming that front, which I gave you before. If the enemy is likely to fall upon your right flank, the whole army muſt turn its face that way, and make the front there, as I have already ſaid; taking care to place your Cavalry, Velites, and Artillery according to that diſpoſition; in which alterations there is but little difference, excepting in the diſtance betwixt each flank, and that which there is betwixt the front and the rear. It is true, that in converting the right flank into the front, the Velites which are to fill the ſpace betwixt the horſe and the wings of the army, ſhould be thoſe that are neareſt the left flank; and the two corps of Pikemen in the area ſhould advance to fill their places: but before they do that, the carriages, &c. ſhould quit the area, and retire through the open left by the Velites behind the left flank, which will then become the rear of the army. The other Velites, which were poſted in the rear, ſhould keep their place, that ſo no opening may be left, becauſe that which was the rear before, will now become the right flank: all the other neceſſary manœuvres in this caſe muſt be conducted in the manner already preſcribed. What has been ſaid of making a front of the right flank may be applied to the left; as the like manœuvres and diſpoſition are to be made upon that occaſion. If the enemy be ſo numerous, and drawn up in ſuch a manner that he may attack you on two ſides at once, you muſt ſtrengthen them from thoſe quarters which are not attacked, by doubling their ranks, and dividing all the Artillery, Velites, and Cavalry betwixt them. But if he attacks you on three or four ſides at the ſame time, either he or you muſt be very imprudent; for ſurely no wiſe General would ever expoſe himſelf to be attacked on ſo many ſides at once by a powerful and well-ordered army; and on the other hand, the enemy cannot do it with ſucceſs, except his army is ſo numerous that he can ſpare almoſt as many men as your whole army conſiſts of to attack you on every ſide. If then you are ſo indiſcreet as to venture yourſelf in an enemy's country, or any other place where you may be attacked by an army three times as ſtrong, and as well-diſciplined as your own, you have nobody to blame but yourſelf, if any miſfortune happens to you: but if the misfortune is not owing to your own imprudence, but to ſome ſtrange and unexpected accident, you may ſave your reputation, though you are totally ruined by it, which was the caſe of Scipio in Spain, and Aſdrubal in Italy. But if the enemy is not much ſtronger than you are, and attacks you on two or three ſides at once, in hopes of throwing you into diſorder, that is his error and your advantage: becauſe in that caſe, he muſt weaken himſelf ſo much, that you may eaſily ſuſtain the charge in one place, and attack him vigorouſly yourſelf in another; by which he muſt of conſequence be defeated.—This method of drawing up an army therefore, againſt an enemy who is not actually in ſight, but may yet attack you on a ſudden, is very neceſſary; and it is of great importance to accuſtom your Soldiers not only to be formed and to march in this order, but to prepare themſelves for battle, as if they were going to be attacked in the front, and then to fall into their former order again, and move forwards: after which, they ſhould be ſhewn how the rear or either of the flanks may be converted into the front, and then reduced into their firſt arrangement: all which muſt be often practiſed, if you would have your army ready and expert in theſe exerciſes. This is a point which all Princes and Commanders ſhould carefully attend to: for military diſcipline conſiſts chiefly in knowing how to command and execute theſe things; and that only can be called a good and well-diſciplined army, which is perfect in the practice of them: and if ſuch a one was now in being, I think it would not be poſſible to find another that could beat it. If it be ſaid that the forming an army in theſe ſquares is attended with a good deal of trouble and difficulty, I allow it; but as it is very neceſſary, the difficulty muſt be got over by frequent exerciſe; and when that is one done, all other parts of military diſcipline will ſeem light and eaſy.

Zanobi. I agree with you that theſe things are highly neceſſary, and think you have explained them ſo well, that nothing material has either been omitted, or can be added. There are two other points however, in which I ſhould be glad to be ſatisfied: in the firſt place, when you would convert either the rear or one of the flanks into the front of your army, and the men are to face about to that part, are they to do it by word of command, or by beat of drum, or ſome other ſignal? In the next, whether thoſe whom you ſent before your army to clear the roads and make a free paſſage for it, ſhould be Soldiers belonging to your Battalions, or other ſort of people appointed on purpoſe for that ſervice?

FABRIZIO. Your firſt queſtion is very pertinent: for many armies have been thrown into great confuſion, when the General's orders have either not been heard, or miſtaken: ſuch orders therefore ſhould be very clear and intelligible, eſpecially upon important occaſions: and if they are ſignified either by beat of drum or ſound of trumpet, it ſhould be done in ſo diſtinct a manner, that one note or ſound cannot be miſtaken for another: but if they are delivered by word of mouth, you ſhould take great care not only to avoid general terms, and to make uſe of particular ones, but even in thoſe, not to hazard any that may admit of a double interpretation. Some armies have been ruined by their Officers crying out, Give way, give way, inſtead of Retreat; which ſhould be a ſufficient warning never to make uſe of that expreſſion again. If you want to convert either the rear or one of the flanks into the front, and would have your men turn their face that way, do not ſay Turn ye, but Face about to the right, the left, or the rear, as the occaſion requires. In like manner all other words of Command ſhould be plain and ſimple, as, Charge home, Stand faſt, Advance, Retreat, &c. and if orders can be delivered clearly and diſtinctly by word of mouth, let them be given that way; if not, make uſe of a drum or a tumpet.——As to Pioneers, I would depute ſome of my own Soldiers for that ſervice; not merely becauſe the Ancients uſed to do ſo, but that I might have the fewer unarmed people, and conſequently the fewer incumbrances in my army: for which reaſon, I would take as many as I wanted out of every Battalion, who ſhould leave their arms and accoutrements to be taken care of by the men in the next ranks to them, and be furniſhed with axes, mattocks, ſpades, and other neceſſary implements of that kind: ſo that when the enemy approached they might preſently return to their reſpective ranks in the army, and take up their arms again.

Zanobi. But who muſt carry their pioneering implements?

Fabrizio. The carriages appointed for that purpoſe.

Zanobi. I doubt you would not be able to make your Soldiers do that ſort of work.

Fabrizio. Very eaſily, as I will convince you before we part: but let us wave that matter at preſent, if you pleaſe, becauſe I will tell you in the firſt place, how I would ſupply them with proviſions: for as we have pretty well fatigued them I ſuppoſe with ſo much exerciſe, it is now high time to give them a little refreſhment.——All Princes and Commanders ſhould take particular care that their armies may be as light and little encumbered as poſſible; that ſo they may be at all times fit and ready for any enterprize or expedition. Now the difficulties occaſioned either by the want or too great plenty of proviſions, may be reckoned amongſt the moſt conſiderable that are incident to an army.

The Ancients did not give themſelves much trouble about furniſhing their troops with wine: for when they came into countries where there was none to be had, they drank water with a little vinegar in it to give it a taſte: ſo that inſtead of wine, they always carried vinegar along with them. They did not bake their bread in ovens, as is uſual in towns: for every Soldier had a certain allowance of meal or flour, and lard, which being kneaded together, made a very good and nouriſhing bread. They uſed likewiſe to carry a ſufficient quantity of oats and barley for their horſes and other cattle: for they had herds of oxen, and flocks of ſheep and goats, which were driven after the army, and therefore did not occaſion any great embarraſſment. To theſe precautions it was owing that their armies would ſometimes march for many days together, through deſart countries and rugged defiles, without diſtreſs or difficulty. On the contrary, our modern armies, which can neither live without wine, nor eat any bread but was is baked and made as it is in towns (of which they cannot carry a quantity ſufficient for any long time) muſt often either be reduced to great diſtreſs, or obliged to provide themſelves with thoſe neceſſaries in a manner that muſt be very troubleſome and expenſive. I would therefore re-eſtabliſh this method in my army, and not ſuffer any ſort of bread to be eaten by the Soldiers but what they made themſelves: as to wine, I ſhould not prohibit the uſe of it, if any was brought into the camp; but I would not take the leaſt pains to procure it for them: in all other things likewiſe relating to proviſions, I would follow the example of the Ancients, by which many difficulties and inconveniencies might be avoided, and many great advantages gained in an expedition.

ZANOBI. We have beat the enemy in a field battle, and afterwards marched our army into his territories, it is but reaſonable now that we ſhould make our advantage of it by plundering his country, laying the towns under contribution, and taking priſoners. But firſt I ſhould be glad to know how the Ancients proceeded upon ſuch occaſions.

FABRIZIO. I take it for granted (as we had ſome converſation upon this matter once before) that you will allow that wars, as they are conducted at preſent, impoveriſh not only thoſe that are beaten, but thoſe alſo that are conquerors; for if one ſide loſes its territories, the other is at an immenſe expence in gaining them: which was not the caſe in former times, when the Conqueror was always enriched by the victory. The reaſon of this is, that the plunder is not now brought to account, as it uſed to be formerly, but left wholly to the diſcretion of the Soldiers, which occaſions two very great diſorders, one of which I have already mentioned;

the other is, that it makes the Soldiers ſo greedy of ſpoil, that they lay aſide all regard to order and military diſcipline: from which it has often happened, that the Conqueror has had the victory ſnatched out of his hands. The Romans, however, who were very attentive to this point, provided againſt both theſe inconveniencies, by ordering that all the plunder ſhould belong to the public, who ſhould afterwards diſpoſe of it as they thought fit. For this purpoſe, they had public officers attending their armies, whom they called Queſtors or Treaſurers, in whoſe hands all the booty taken in war was depoſited; out of which, the Conſul paid the Soldiers, defrayed the expences of the ſick and wounded, and all other neceſſary charges of the army. The Conſul indeed had a power of diſtributing ſome part of the plunder amongſt the Soldiers, and he often did; but this was not attended with any ill conſequence: for when the enemy was conquered, all the ſpoil that had been taken from them was placed in the middle of the army, and a certain proportion of it given to the Soldiers, according to their rank and merit. This cuſtom made them more intent upon victory than plunder: for after the legionary Soldiers had defeated the enemy, they never purſued them, nor even ſo much as ſtirred out of their ranks, the Cavalry, and other light-armed forces, being employed for that purpoſe: for if the plunder was to have been the property of the firſt men that laid hold of it, it would neither have been reaſonable or poſſible to have kept the Legions firm and quiet in their ranks; and therefore ſuch a meaſure muſt have been of very bad conſequence. Hence it came to paſs that the public was enriched by a victory, as every Conſul, when he entered Rome in triumph at his return from the wars, always brought with him the greateſt part of the treaſure which he had amaſſed by contributions and plundering the enemy, into the common Stock. ——The Ancients acted very wiſely in another point relating to this matter: for they ordered the third part of every man's pay to be lodged in the hands of the Standard-bearer of his Corps, who was not to be accountable for it till the end of the war. This ſeems to have been done for two reaſons: in the firſt place to ſave their money, which they otherwiſe might have ſquandered away in idle and unneceſſary expences, as moſt young men are apt to do when they have too much in their pockets: and in the next, to make them more reſolute and obſtinate in defending their Colours, as they muſt know that if the Standard was taken, they ſhould loſe all their arrears.——A due obſervation of theſe Inſtitutions, I think, would very much contribute to revive the ancient military diſcipline amongſt us.

ZANOBI. When an army is upon a march, it muſt certainly be expoſed to many dangerous accidents, to obviate and avert which, the utmoſt ſagacity and abilities of the General, as well as the moſt determined bravery of the Soldiers, are neceſſary to be exerted. You would much oblige us, Sir, if you would point out thoſe occaſions.

FABRIZIO. I ſhall very willingly comply with your requeſt, ſince theſe things are abſolutely neceſſary to be known by one that is deſirous of being perfectly inſtructed in the Art of War. A General then ought above all things to beware of Ambuſhes whilſt his army is upon a march; into which he may either happen to fall, or be cunningly drawn by the enemy before he is aware. To prevent the firſt, he ſhould ſend out ſtrong parties to reconnoitre the country, and be particularly circumſpect if it abounds with woods and mountains, becauſe thoſe are the fitteſt places for Ambuſcades, which ſometimes prove the deſtruction of a whole army, when the General is not aware of them; but can do him no harm when he is. Flights of birds, and clouds of duſt, have frequently diſcovered an enemy: for whenever the enemy approaches they muſt of courſe raiſa a great duſt, which ſhould ſerve you therefore as a ſufficient warning to prepare for an attack. It has often happened likewiſe, that when Generals have obſerved a great number of pigeons or other birds, that uſually fly together in flocks, ſuddenly take wing, and hover about in the air a great while without lighting again, they have ſuſpected there was an Ambuſcade thereabout; in which caſe, by ſending out parties to diſcover it, they have ſometimes eſcaped the enemy, and ſometimes defeated them.——To avoid being drawn into an Ambuſcade by the enemy, you muſt be very cautious of truſting to flattering appearances: for inſtance, if the enemy ſhould leave a conſiderable booty in your way, you ſhould ſuſpect there is a hook in the bait; or if a ſtrong party of the enemy ſhould fly before a few of your men, or a few of their men ſhould attack a ſtrong party of your army; or if the enemy runs away on a ſudden, without any apparent cauſe, it is to reaſonable to imagine there is ſome artifice in it, and that they know very well what they are about: ſo that the weaker and more remiſs they ſeem to be, the more it behoves you to be upon your guard, if you would avoid falling into their Snares. For this purpoſe, you are to act a double part; and though you ought not to be without your private apprehenſions, yet you ſhould ſeem outwardly to undervalue and deſpiſe them: the one will make you more vigilant, and leſs apt to be ſurprized; and the other, inſpire your Soldiers with courage and aſſurance of victory. You ſhould always remember likewiſe, that an army is expoſed to more and greater dangers in marching through an enemy's country, than in a field battle: upon which account, it concerns a general to be doubly circumſpect at ſuch times. The firſt thing he ought to do is, to get an exact map of the whole country through which he is to march; that ſo they may have a perfect knowledge of all the towns, their diſtance from each other, the roads, mountains, rivers, woods, moraſſes, and the particular ſituation and nature of them. For this purpoſe, it is neceſſary to procure ſeveral perſons by different means, and from different parts, who are well acquainted with thoſe places, whom he ſhould examine ſeparately, and compare their accounts, that ſo he may be able to form a true judgment of them: beſides which, he ſhould ſend out parties of horſe under experienced Commanders, not only to diſcover the enemy, but to obſerve the quality of the country, and to ſee whether it agrees with his map, and the information he has received. He muſt likewiſe keep a ſtrict eye over his guides, whom he ſhould encourage to ſerve him faithfully, with promiſes of great rewards, if they did their duty, and threaten them with the ſevereſt puniſhment, if they deceived him. But above all things, he ought to keep his deſigns very ſecret; which is a matter of the utmoſt importance in all military enterprizes: and to prevent his army from being thrown into diſorder by any ſudden attack, he ſhould order his men to be conſtantly prepared for it: for if a thing of that kind is foreſeen and expected, it is neither ſo terrible nor prejudicial when it happens, as it otherwiſe might have been. Many, in order to prevent confuſion upon a march, have placed their carriages and unarmed people near the ſtandard, and ordered them to follow it as cloſe as poſſible; that ſo if there ſhould be occaſion either to halt or retreat, they might do it with greater eaſe and readineſs; which, I think, is a cuſtom not unworthy of imitation. A General ſhould alſo be very careful neither to ſuffer one part of his forces to detach itſelf from the other whilſt they are upon a march, nor to let any of the Corps move faſter or ſlower than the reſt: for then his army would become weak and unconnected, and conſequently expoſed to greater danger. It is neceſſary, therefore, to poſt officers along the flanks, to keep an uniform pace amongſt them, by reſtraining thoſe that march too faſt, and quickening others that move too ſlow; which cannot be done more properly than by beat of drum, or ſound of ſome muſical inſtrument. The roads ſhould alſo be laid open, and cleared in ſuch a manner, that one Battalion at leaſt may march through them at a time, in order of battle. The quality and cuſtoms of the enemy are to be conſidered in the next place, and whether they uſually make their attack in the morning, or at noon, or in the evening, and whether they are more powerful in horſe or foot: according to which circumſtances, you are to regulate your own proceedings and preparations. But let us ſuppoſe ſome particular caſe. It happens ſometimes that a General is obliged to decamp before the enemy, becauſe he is not able to cope with them, and endeavours to avoid an engagement: but as ſoon as the enemy are aware of it, they likewiſe decamp, and preſs ſo hard upon his rear, that they muſt probably come up with him, and force him to an engagement before he can paſs a river that lies in his way. Now, ſome who have been in this dangerous ſituation have thrown up a deep ditch in the rear of their army, and filled it with fagots, and other combuſtible matter, which they have ſet fire to, and thereby gained time to paſs the river in ſafety, before the enemy could get over the ditch.

Zanobi. I can hardly think ſuch an expedient as this could be of much ſervice, becauſe I remember to have read, that Hanno the Carthaginian being ſurrounded by the enemy, ſet fire to a parcel of fagots on that ſide where he deſigned to make his puſh; which had ſuch an effect, that the enemy thinking him ſufficiently ſecured from eſcaping in that quarter, drew off their guards to another; but as ſoon has he was aware of that, he ordered his men to throw their targets before their faces, to defend them from the flames and ſmoke, and to puſh through the fire; by which means, he got clear with his whole army.

Fabrizio. Very true; but recollect what I ſaid, and compare it with what Hanno did: I told you that the others cauſed a deep ditch to be thrown up, and filled with combuſtibles, which they ſet on fire: ſo that the enemy had not only the fire but the dicth to paſs before they could come at them. Now Hanno had no ditch, and therefore as he deſigned to paſs through the fire, he took care it ſhould not be a very fierce one: otherwiſe, that alone would have ſtopped him, without any ditch. Do not you remember that when Nabis was beſieged in Sparta by the Romans, he ſet fire to that part of the town in which he was himſelf, to prevent the enemy, who had already got poſſeſſion of ſome ſtreets, from advancing any farther? by which, he not only ſtopped them where they were, but drove them entirely out of the town again. But to return. Quintus Luctatius, the Roman, having the Cimbrians cloſe at his rear, and coming to a river which he wanted to paſs, ſeemed determined to halt there and fight them; for which purpoſe, he fixed his ſtandard, threw up entrenchments, erected tents, and ſent out parties of horſe to forage: in ſhort, he acted in ſuch a manner, that the Cimbrians being fully perſuaded he deſigned to encamp there, entrenched themſelves, and ſent out ſeveral parties into the country as he had done; which Luctatius being aware of, immediately ſtruck his tents, and paſſed the river without any moleſtation. Some have diverted the courſe of a river, when they had no other means of paſſing it, and drawn off one part of the ſtream other way, till the other has become fordable. When the current is very rapid, the ſtrongeſt and heavieſt horſe ſhould be placed higher up the ſtream than the foot, to break the force of it, and facilitate their paſſage; and the light horſe rather lower than the foot, to pick up any of them that may happen to be carried away by it: but rivers that are not fordable muſt be paſſed by the help of bridges, pontoons, and other ſuch conveniencies; and therefore it is neceſſary to carry proper materials and implements for the conſtruction of them along with an army. It happens ſometimes that you find the enemy poſted on the other ſide to oppoſe your paſſage: in which caſe, I would recommend an expedient made uſe of by Julius Cæſar in Gaul, who coming to a river, and finding Vercingetorex poſted with an army on the oppoſite bank, marched down one ſide of it for ſeveral days, whilſt Vercingetorex marched down the other. At laſt, Cæſar having encamped in a woody part of the country, where he could conceal part of his men, drew three cohorts out of every Legion, and left them there, with orders to throw a bridge over the river, and to fortify it as ſoon as he could when he was gone: after which, he purſued his march. Vercingetorex, in the mean time, obſerving the number of his legions was the ſame, and not ſuſpecting that any part of them were left behind, attended his motions as he had done before, on the other ſide; but when Cæſar thought the bridge was finiſhed, he made a ſudden counter-march, and finding every thing executed according to his orders, immediately paſſed the river without any oppoſition.

**Zanobi.** What rule or mark is there by which one may diſcover a ford with any certainty?

Fabrizio. A river is always the ſhalloweſt and moſt fordable where you ſee a ſort of a ridge or ſtreak acroſs it, betwixt the tail of a pool and the head of a ſtream; becauſe there is more gravel and ſand left there than in any other place: the truth of which obſervation has been confirmed by long experience, and therefore it may be depended upon.

Zanobi. But ſuppoſe the bottom ſhould either be ſo rough and broken, or ſo ſoft and full of holes, that Cavalry cannot paſs with ſafety; what remedy is there in that caſe?

Fabrizio. I would make hurdles and ſink them; over which they might paſs with eaſe.——But to proceed. If a General and his army happen to be incloſed in a paſs betwixt two mountains, out of which there are but two ways of extricating himſelf, one in his front, the other in his rear, and they are both occupied by the enemy, there is ſtill a method left to get clear of them, which has been practiſed by others with ſucceſs in ſuch circumſtances; and that is, to throw up a very deep and large ditch in his rear, with an intent, as it may ſeem, to ſecure himſelf effectually on that ſide, and to take all other methods to make the enemy believe he deſigns to exert his whole ſtrength in the front, in order to force his way out on that ſide, if poſſible, without apprehending any danger in his rear. The enemy, therefore, in the like caſes, having been deceived by theſe appearances, have naturally turned their whole force from the rear where they thought they had him ſafe, to block him up more ſecurely in the front: upon which, he has taken an opportunity of ſuddenly throwing a draw-bridge over the ditch, and eſcaped that way out of the hands of the enemy. Lucius Minucius, the Roman Conſul, and his army, being ſhut up by the enemy in the mountains of Liguria, and ſeeing to other means to get clear of them, ſent a body of Numidians which he had with him, very badly armed, and mounted upon poor lean horſes, towards the paſs that was blocked up by the enemy, who immediately doubled their guards, and took all neceſſary meaſures to defend it with vigour upon their firſt appearance: but perceiving, as they came nearer, what a pitiful figure they made, they drew off part of their guards. The Numidians being aware of this, preſently ſet ſpurs to their horſes, and made ſo furious an attack upon thoſe that were left, that they broke through them, and afterwards made ſuch havock and devaſtation in the adjacent country, that the enemy were forced to quit their poſts, and leave the paſs open for Minucius and his whole army to come out of the mountains where they had been ſhut up. Some Generals, when they have been attacked by a much ſuperior force, have drawn up their men very cloſe together, and ſuffered themſelves to be ſurrounded by the enemy; in order to make their way by one reſolute puſh through that part of their army which they ſaw was the thinneſt and weakeſt; and this method has ſometimes ſucceeded very well. Mark Anthony, in his retreat out of Parthia, obſerving the enemy attacked him early every morning when he was decamping, and harraſſed his rear all day long, reſolved afterwards not to decamp till noon; upon which, the Parthians concluding he would not move at all that day, returned to their own Camp, and left him to continue his march all the reſt of the day, without any diſturbance. The ſame Commander, to guard againſt the arrows of the Parthians, ordered all his men to kneel down when the enemy drew near, and the ſecond rank to cover the heads of the firſt with their targets, the third of the ſecond, the fourth of the third, and ſo on: by which means the whole army was under a roof as it were, and ſafe from their arrows.——

This is all that occurs to my memory at preſent concerning the accidents that may happen to an army upon a march: if you have no other queſtions to aſk relating to this matter, I will paſs on to another part of our Subject.

THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

# THE ART OF WAR.

---

## BOOK VI.

### THE CONTENTS.

*What ſort of Situations the Romans and Greeks made choice of for their encampments. The form of an Encampment. Concerning the Centinels and Guards that are poſted about a Camp: and the neceſſity of obſerving who goes out and comes into it. Of Military Juſtice, and the method taken by the Ancients in puniſhing offenders. That the Ancients allowed neither Women nor Gaming in their Armies. Their method of decamping. That they uſed to encamp in healthful ſituations, and where they could neither be ſurrounded by an enemy, nor cut off from Proviſion. Directions concerning Proviſions. How to encamp more or leſs than four Regiments or Legions; and what number of men is ſufficient to fight an Enemy. What means ſome Generals have uſed to get clear of any Enemy. How to make a Prince become ſuſpicious of his Counſellors and Confidants, and to divide his forces. How to ſuppreſs Mutiny and Diſcord in an army. In what manner the Ancients interpreted bad Omens and other ſiniſter events. That an enemy ſhould not be reduced to deſpair: and of ſeveral artifices that may be uſed to decoy and over-reach them. In what manner a ſuſpected town or country is to be ſecured; and how to gain the affections of a people. That a War ſhould not be carried on in Winter.*

ZANOBI. SINCE we are going to vary our Subject, I beg leave to lay down my office, and hope Battiſta della Palla will take it up: in ſome doing, we ſhall in ſome meaſure imitate the example of experienced Commanders, who in time of battle (as Signor Fabrizio has informed us) generally place the beſt of their men in the front and rear of their armies; that the former may begin the attack with vigour, and the latter ſupport it with reſolution: Coſimo Rucellai therefore was wiſely pitched upon to lead the van (if I may uſe the expreſſion) in this converſation, and Battiſta della Palla to bring up the rear: Luigi Alamanni, and I, took upon us to conduct the ſecond line: and as we all readily ſubmitted to the charge aſſigned us, I dare ſay Battiſta will do the ſame.

BATTISTA. I have hitherto ſuffered myſelf to be governed entirely by the company, and ſhall do ſo for the future. Let us intreat you then, Signor Fabrizio, to proceed in your diſcourſe, and to excuſe this interruption.

FABRIZIO. If it is any interruption, it is an agreeable one I aſſure you; for this change of officers, as I told you before, rather refreſhes my recollection than otherwiſe.——But to reſume our Subject. It is now time to encamp and repoſe our army in ſecurity: for all creatures, you know, naturally require due intervals of reſt from their labour, and nobody can properly be ſaid to reſt, that does not enjoy ſecurity at the ſame time. You might except perhaps that I ſhould have firſt encamped my army, and then ſhewn the order of a march, and laſt of all, how it ſhould be formed to engage an enemy. But I have done quite the contrary; and indeed I was obliged to it: for as I was to ſhew what an army upon a march had to do, when it was forced on a ſudden to prepare for action, it was neceſſary to tell you firſt in what order of battle it ſhould be drawn up.——Now to lodge your men in ſecurity, your camp ought to be ſtrong and well governed: the former of which points depends either upon art, or the nature of its ſituation; the latter, upon care and good diſcipline in the Commander. The Greeks uſed to look out for a ſituation that was ſtrong by nature; and never would encamp in any place that was not fortified either by a mountain or a river, or wood, or ſome other defence of that kind: the Romans, on the contrary, not depending ſo much upon nature as art and good diſcipline in their encampments, conſtantly made choice of ſituations where they could range their forces in their uſual order, and exert their whole ſtrength upon occaſion. Hence it came to paſs that the form of their encampments was always the ſame; becauſe they never ſwerved from their eſtabliſhed diſcipline, but pitched upon a ſituation which they could make conformable to it: whereas the Greeks were often obliged to vary the form and manner of their encampments, becauſe they made their diſcipline give way to the ſituation of the place, which could not always be the ſame, or ſimilar.——When the ſituation therefore was but indifferent, the Romans uſed to ſupply that defect by art and induſtry: and ſince I have hitherto propoſed the conduct of that people as a model in moſt caſes, I would likewiſe recommend their method in the encampment of their armies: not that I would follow it exactly in every particular, but in ſuch only as may beſt ſuit the circumſtances of the preſent times. I have told you more than once already, that they had two Legions of their own Citizens in their Conſular armies, amounting to about eleven thouſand foot and ſix hundred horſe; beſides which, they had eleven thouſand more foot compoſed of the auxiliaries furniſhed by their friends and confederates: but they never had a greater number of auxiliaries than of their own Citizens in thoſe armies; except in their horſe, in which they were not ſo ſcrupulous. I told you likewiſe, that they always poſted their Legions in the center, and their auxiliaries in each wing, whenever they came to an engagement; which cuſtom they alſo obſerved in their encampments, as you muſt have read, I dare ſay, in ancient Hiſtory; and therefore I ſhall not trouble you now with a circumſtantial detail of the method they followed upon ſuch occaſions, but content myſelf with informing you in what manner I would chuſe to encamp an army at preſent; from whence you will eaſily perceive what I have borrowed from the Romans.—— You know that as they had two Legions in a Conſular army, I have likewiſe compoſed mine of two Regiments, each conſiſting of ſix thouſand foot and three hundred horſe: you remember into how many Battalions I divided them, in what manner they are armed, and by what names the different forces of which they conſiſt are diſtinguiſhed: you know, laſtly, that in drawing them up either for battle or a march, I have made mention of no other troops, but only ſhewn that when their number is to be doubled, there is nothing more to be done than to double the ranks.——But now I am to ſhew you the method of encamping, I ſhall not confine myſelf to two Regiments only, but inform you how a whole army ſhould be diſpoſed of, conſiſting (like thoſe of the Romans) of two Regiments of our own forces, and the ſame number of Auxiliaries: and this I do to give you a clear idea of a complete encampment; for in the exerciſes and operations which I have hitherto deſcribed and recommended, there was no occaſion to bring a whole army into the field at once.

In order then to encamp an army of twenty-four thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, divided into four Regiments, two of our own Subjects and two of Auxiliaries, I would obſerve this method. After I had pitched upon a convenient ſituation, I would erect my Standard in the middle of a Square, two hundred feet deep on every ſide; one of which ſides ſhould face the eaſt, another the weſt, another the north, and another the ſouth: and in this ſquare the General ſhould fix his quarters. In the next place, (as it was generally the practice of the Romans, and ſeems worthy of imitation) I would ſeparate my Soldiers from the people who do not carry arms, and ſuch as ought to be ready and fit for action from thoſe that are loaded and encumbered in another manner: for which purpoſe, I would quarter either all or the greater part of my Soldiers on the eaſt ſide of the camp, and the others on the weſt; making the eaſt ſide the front, the weſt the rear, and the north and ſouth the flanks of my camp. To diſtinguiſh the quarters of my Soldiery I would draw two parallel lines thirteen hundred and ſixty feet in length, and at the diſtance of ſixty from each other, from the General's Standard towards the eaſt; at the extremity of which, I would have the eaſtern gate of my camp. By theſe means, a paſſage would formed directly from that gate to the General's quarters of twelve hundred and ſixty feet in length, (for the diſtance from the Standard to the extremity of his quarters on every ſide is an hundred feet) and this interval ſhould be called the Main Paſſage. In the next place, let another paſſage be drawn from the ſouth to the north gate acroſs the Main Paſſage, and cloſe by the eaſt ſide of the General's quarters, which ſhould be two thouſand five hundred feet in length (as it is to reach from one flank of the camp to the other) and ſixty in breadth: and let this be called the Croſs-way. Having thus marked out the General's quarters, and drawn theſe two paſſages, I would proceed to provide quarters for the two Regiments of my own Subjects: one of which I would lodge on the right hand, and the other on the left of the Main Paſſage. For this purpoſe, I would place thirty-two lodgments on the left, and as many more on the right of that paſſage, leaving a ſpace betwixt the Sixteenth and Seventeenth lodgment of Sixty feet in breadth for a Traverſe-way to paſs through the midſt of the quarters of theſe two Regiments, as you may ſee it marked out in the plan of an encampment which I luckily happen to have in my pocket. In the front of theſe two lodgments, on each ſide of the Main Paſſage where they border upon the Croſs-way, I would quarter the Commanders of my Gens d'Armes, and their private men in the fifteen lodgments next adjoining to them: for as I have allowed an hundred and fifty Gens d'Armes to each Regiment, there would be ten private men in every one of theſe compartments. The tents of the Commanders ſhould be eighty feet broad and twenty deep; and thoſe of their private men thirty in depth and ſixty in breadth. But I muſt here deſire you to remember once for all, that whenever I make uſe of the word breadth, I mean the ſpace that is extended from north to ſouth; and when I ſpeak of depth, I would be underſtood to deſign that which ranges from eaſt to weſt.——In the next fifteen compartments which are to be on each ſide of the Main Paſſage, and on the eaſt of the Traverſe-way (and to take up the ſame ſpace with that occupied by the Gens d'Armes) I would quarter my light horſe; which being an hundred and fifty in each Regiment, would likewiſe amount to ten in every tent: and in the remaining ſixteenth I would lodge their Commanders, aſſigning them the ſame room with that taken up by the Commanders of the Gens d'Armes. The Cavalry then of both Regiments being thus provided with quarters of each ſide of the Main Paſſage, will direct us how to diſpoſe of our Infantry, as I ſhall ſhew you in the next place.

You have obſerved how I have quartered the three hundred horſe belonging to each Regiment, and their officers, in thirty-two lodgments on each ſide of the Main Paſſage, beginning from the croſs-way; and that I have left a void ſpace, ſixty feet in breadth, betwixt the ſixteenth and ſeventeenth lodgment for a traverſe-way. I order then to quarter the twenty Battalions, of which the two Regiments conſiſt, I would appoint lodgments for two Battalions behind the Cavalry on both ſides of the Main Paſſage; each of which ſhould be thirty feet in length and ſixty in breadth, like the others, and ſo cloſe to thoſe of the horſe that they ſhould join together. In every firſt lodgment, beginning from the Croſs-way, I would quarter the Lieutenant Colonel of the Battalion, who would then be in a line with the Commander of the Gens d'Armes: and this lodgment only ſhould be forty feet in breadth, and twenty in depth. In the next fifteen lodgments reaching to the traverſe-way, I would quarter a Battalion of foot on each ſide of the Main Paſſage; the number of which amounting to four hundred and fifty, there would be thirty in every lodgment. The other fifteen lodgments I would place contiguous to the light horſe on each ſide of the Main Paſſage, and on the eaſt of the traverſe-way, allowing them the ſame dimenſions with thoſe on the weſt: and in each range of theſe I would quarter one Battalion, aſſigning the ſixteenth, which ſhould be twenty feet in length, and forty in breadth, for the Lieutenant Colonel of the two Battalions, who would then be cloſe a-breaſt with the Commanders of the light horſe. The two firſt ranges of lodgments being thus occupied, would conſiſt partly of Cavalry, and partly of Infantry: but as the Cavalry ſhould always be clean and ready for action, and the horſemen have no Servants allowed to aſſiſt them in dreſſing and taking care of their horſes, the foot of the two Battalions that are quartered next to them ſhould be obliged to wait upon them for that purpoſe: in conſideration of which, they ſhould be excuſed from all other duty in the camp, according to the practice of the Romans.

Leaving a void ſpace then of ſixty feet wide, on the back of the lodgments on each ſide of the Main Paſſage, one of which may be called the firſt way on the right, the other, the firſt way on the left, I would mark out another range of thirty-two double lodgments parallel to the others, and with their back parts cloſe together; allowing the ſame dimenſions with an interval likewiſe betwixt the ſixteenth and ſeventeenth for the traverſe-way: and in each of theſe I would quarter four Battalions, with their Commanders in the firſt and laſt of them. In the next place, I would leave another ſpace of ſixty feet wide on the back of theſe two lodgments, for a way which ſhould be called the ſecond way on the right, on one ſide the Main Paſſage; and the ſecond way on the left, on the other: cloſe to which, I would have another range of double lodgments on each ſide of the Main Paſſage, in every reſpect like the other two; in which I would quarter the four remaining Battalions, and their Lieutenant Colonels: ſo that all the Cavalry and Infantry of our own two Regiments would be diſpoſed of in ſix ranges, or lines of double lodgments, with the Main Paſſage betwixt them.——As to the two auxiliary Battalions (ſuppoſing them to conſiſt of the ſame number and ſort of forces) I would place them on each ſide of our own, in the like order and number of double lodgments: the two firſt lines of which ſhould be partly horſe, and partly foot, and at the diſtance of ſixty feet from the two third lines of our own on each ſide the Main Paſſage, to make room for a way betwixt them, which ſhould be called on one ſide, the third way on the right; and on the other, the third way on the left. After this, I would mark out two other lines of lodgments, parallel to the firſt on each ſide of the Main Paſſage, and divided like thoſe of our own Battalions, with ſpaces of ſixty feet betwixt them for other ways, which ſhould be numbered and denominated from their ſituation and diſtance from the Main Paſſage: and then all this part of the army would be quartered in twelve ranges or lines of double lodgments, with thirteen ways or paſſages betwixt the ſeveral diviſions of it, including the Main Paſſage, Traverſe, and Croſs-ways.—Beſides this, I would have a void ſpace left of two hundred feet in width, betwixt the lodgments and the foſſe which ſhould encompaſs them: ſo that computing the whole diſtance from the center of the General's quarters to the eaſtern gate, you will find that it amounts to thirteen hundred and ſixty feet.——There are ſtill remaining two vacant intervals, one from the General's quarters to the South, an the other from thence to the North gate of the Camp; each of which (reckoning from the center) is twelve hundred and fifty feet in length. Deducting then from each of theſe ſpaces an hundred feet, which are taken up by the General's quarters on each ſide, and ninety feet on each ſide for an Area or Piazza, and ſixty for a way to divide the two above mentioned ſpaces in the middle, and two hundred more for the interval betwixt the lodgments and the foſſe, there will be a ſpace left of eight hundred feet in breadth, and two hundred in depth, for a line of lodgments on each ſide; the depth being the ſame with that of the General's quarters. Theſe ſpaces being properly divided, will make forty lodgments on both ſides of the General's quarters, each of which will be an hundred feet long, and forty broad: and in theſe I would quarter the Colonels of the ſeveral Regiments, the Paymaſters, the Quartermaſter-General, and in ſhort, all thoſe that had any particular charge or buſineſs in the army; leaving ſome of them vacant for the reception of ſtrangers or volunteers, and attendants upon the General. On the backſide of the General's quarters I would make a paſſage from north to ſouth ſixty-two feet wide, and call it the HEAD-WAY, which ſhould run along the weſt ſide of the eighty lodgments juſt mentioned: and then thoſe lodgments, and the General's quarters, would be included betwixt that paſſage and the croſs-way. From the head-way I would draw another paſſage directly from the General's quarters to the weſtern gate of the camp, which ſhould be ſixty feet wide, and of the ſame length with the Main Paſſage; and this ſhould be called the Market-way. Theſe two paſſages being drawn, I would make a market-place, or ſquare, at the beginning of the market-way, over againſt the General's quarters, and joining to the head-way, which ſhould be two hundred and forty feet on every ſide. On the right and left of the market place, I would have a row of quarters, each of which ſhould contain eight double lodgments, which ſhould be thirty feet in depth, and ſixty in breadth; that is, ſixteen on each hand of the market-place. In theſe I would lodge the ſupernumerary horſe belonging to the auxiliary Regiments: and if there ſhould not be room enough for all of them there, I would quarter thoſe that were excluded in ſome of the eighty lodgments next to the General's quarters, but chiefly in thoſe that lie neareſt the foſſe.

It now remains that we ſhould quarter our Pikemen and Velites extraordinary; for you know there are a thouſand of the former, and five hundred of the latter in every Regiment: ſo that our own two Regiments having two thouſand Pikemen, and one thouſand Velites extraordinary, and thoſe of the Auxiliaries as many more, we have ſtill ſix thouſand foot to diſpoſe of; all of whom I would quarter on the three ſides of the foſſe, in the weſtern part of the camp. For this purpoſe, I would have a row of five double lodgments, an hundred and fifty feet long, and an hundred and twenty wide, on the weſt ſide, of the north end of the head-way, leaving a vacant ſpace of two hundred feet betwixt them and the foſſe: which row conſiſting of ten ſingle lodgments, and every lodgment being thirty feet deep, and ſixty wide, would contain three hundred foot; that is, thirty in every one of them. Next to theſe (but with an interval of ſixty-two feet betwixt them) I would place another row of five double lodgments of the ſame dimenſions; and after that, another; and ſo on till there were five rows of five double lodgments of the ſame ſize, and with the ſame intervals betwixt them, all in a right line one with another, at the diſtance of two hundred feet from the foſſe on the weſt of the head-way, and on the north ſide of the camp: ſo that there would be fifty lodgments in all, which would contain fifteen hundred men. Turning then from the left towards the weſtern gate, I would mark out five other rows of double lodgments in the ſpace betwixt the laſt of the other five and that gate, of the ſame contents and proportion, but with intervals of only thirty feet betwixt one row and the other; in which I would likewiſe quarter fifteen hundred men: and in this manner, all the Pikemen and Velites extraordinary belonging to our own two Regiments would be diſpoſed of in ten rows of double lodgments, that is, an hundred ſingle ones, (reckoning ten in a row) along the range of the foſſe from the north to the weſt gate. In the like manner I would provide for the Pikemen and Velites extraordinary belonging to the auxiliary Regiments; quartering them all in ten rows of double lodgments of the ſame dimenſions, and with the ſame intervals betwixt them, along the range of the foſſe, from the weſt to the ſouth gate; allowing their Colonels and other officers to take up ſuch quarters there as ſhould be moſt convenient for them.

My Artillery I would plant all along the banks on the inſide of the foſſe: and in the vacant ſpace, which would be ſtill left on the weſt ſide of the Head-way, I would lodge all the unarmed people, and impediments belonging to the camp. Now you muſt know by the word Impediments, the Ancients meant all the baggage, and people, and ſtores that are neceſſary in an army, except the Soldiers; as Carpenters, Joiners, Smiths, Stone-cutters, Maſons, Engineers, Cannoneers (though indeed theſe laſt may properly be reckoned Soldiers) Herdſmen, Oxen and Sheep for the ſuſtenance of the army, Cooks, Butchers; in ſhort, all manner of Artificers and implements, together with proper vehicles and beaſts of burden to carry the ammunition, proviſions, and other requiſites. However, I would not aſſign ſeparate and diſtinct lodgments for all theſe things; but content myſelf with ordering that ſome paſſages ſhould be left entirely clear and unoccupied by them. Of the four void ſpaces which would be left betwixt theſe paſſages, I would appropriate one to the Herdſmen and their cattle; another to the Artificers of every kind; another to make room for the carriages that contain the proviſions; and the laſt to receive thoſe that are loaded with arms and ammunition. The paſſages which I would have left quite open, ſhould be the market-way, the head-way, and another called the Middle-way, to be drawn acroſs the camp from north to ſouth, which ſhould cut the market-way at right angles, and anſwer the ſame purpoſes on the weſtern ſide of the camp, as the traverſe-way does in the eaſtern. Beſides this, I would have ſtill another paſſage drawn behind the lodgments of the Pikemen and Velites extraordinary; which are ranged on three ſides of the foſſe; and every one of theſe paſſages ſhould be ſixty feet wide.

Battista. I confeſs my ignorance in theſe matters, and think I have no reaſon to be aſhamed of it, as the Art of War is not my profeſſion. The diſpoſition however, which you have made, pleaſes me very much; and I have but two queſtions to aſk relating to it, which I beg the favour of you to reſolve: the firſt is, why you make the ways and paſſages about the lodgments ſo broad? The ſecond (which perplexes me the moſt) is, in what manner the ſpaces you allow for the lodgments are to be occupied?

FABRIZIO. The reaſon why I have made all the paſſages ſixty feet wide, is that a whole Battalion at a time, drawn up in order of battle, may paſs through them: for I told you before, if you remember, that every Battalion takes up a ſpace of fifty or ſixty feet in width. It is neceſſary alſo, that the interval betwixt the lodgments and the foſſe ſhould be two hundred feet wide, in order to draw up the Battalions there in a proper manner upon occaſion, to manage the Artillery, to make room for booty or priſoners taken from the enemy, and for throwing up new banks and ditches, if it ſhould be requiſite. It is likewiſe proper to have the lodgments at a good diſtance from the foſſe, that they may be more out of the reach of fireworks, and other offenſive things, which an enemy might otherwiſe throw in amongſt them.——In anſwer to your ſecond queſtion, I muſt tell you, it is not my intention that every ſpace which I have laid out for lodgments ſhould be wholly covered by one great tent only, but that it ſhould be divided and occupied in ſuch a manner as may beſt ſuit the convenience of thoſe for whoſe uſe it is deſigned, and have more or fewer tents in it as they pleaſe, provided they did not exceed the limits preſcribed them.

But in order to lay out theſe lodgments, there ſhould always be able and experienced Engineers, Quarter-maſters, and Builders, ready to mark out a camp, and diſtinguiſh the ſeveral paſſages and diviſions of it with ſtakes and cordage, as ſoon as the General has fixed upon a proper ſituation for it: and to prevent confuſion, the front of the camp ſhould always look the ſame way; that ſo every man may know near what paſſage, and in which quarter, he may find his tent. This rule being conſtantly obſerved, the Camp will be a ſort of a moving

Town, which carries the ſame ſtreets, the ſame houſes, and the ſame aſpect with it wherever it goes; a convenience which thoſe muſt not expect, who make choice of ſuch ſituations only as are naturally ſtrong and advantageous; becauſe they muſt always change the form of their camp according to the nature of the ground. The Romans (as I ſaid before) made their Camps ſtrong in any ſituation, by throwing up a ditch and rampart about them, and leaving a vacant ſpace betwixt their lodgments and the ditch, which was generally twelve feet wide, and ſix deep; though they ſometimes made it both wider and deeper, eſpecially if they either deſigned to continue long in the ſame place, or expected to be attacked. For my own part, I would not fortify a Camp with a Paliſade, except I intended to winter in it; but content myſelf with a rampart and a ditch, not of leſs width or depth than what has been juſt now mentioned, but greater, if occaſion required: beſides which, I would have an half moon at every angle of the Camp, with ſome pieces of artillery in it, to take the enemy in flank, if the trenches ſhould be attacked. In this exerciſe of encamping and decamping, the army ſhould frequently be employed, in order to make the ſeveral officers ready and expert in laying out the diſtinct lodgments in a proper manner, and to teach the Soldiers to know their reſpective quarters: nor is there any great difficulty in it, as I ſhall ſhew elſewhere; for I will now proceed to ſay ſomething concerning the guards that are neceſſary in a Camp; becauſe if that point is not duly attended to, all the reſt of our labour and care will be to no purpoſe.

Battista. Before you do that, I wiſh you would imform me what is to be done when you would encamp near an enemy; for ſurely there cannot be time enough, upon ſuch an occaſion, to diſpoſe things in this regular order, without expoſing yourſelf to great danger.

FABRIZIO. No General will ever encamp very near an enemy, except he is in a condition to give them battle whenever they pleaſe: and if the enemy be likewiſe diſpoſed to engage, the danger cannot be more than ordinary; becauſe he may draw out two thirds of his army, and leave the other to form his Camp. The Romans, in ſuch caſes, committed the care of throwing up entrenchments, and laying out their Camp, to the Triarii, and cauſed the Principes and Haſtati only to ſtand to their arms; for as the Triarii, were the laſt line of their army that was to engage, they might leave their work if the enemy advanced, and draw up under arms in their proper ſtation. So that if you would imitate the Romans in the like caſe, you ſhould leave the care of laying out and fortifying your Camp to the Battalions in the rear of your army, which reſemble the Triarii in thoſe of the Romans.

But to return to what I was going to ſay concerning the Guards of a Camp. I do not remember to have read that the Ancients uſed to keep any Guards or Centinels on the outſide of their entrenchments in the night-time, as we do at preſent. The reaſon of which I take to be, that they thought their armies were expoſed to much danger by making uſe of them; as perhaps they might either betray or deſert them of their own accord, or be ſurpriſed or corrupted by the enemy: and therefore they did not think fit to put any confidence in them. Upon theſe conſiderations, they truſted wholly to the Guards and Centinels that were ſtationed within their entrenchments; which were keep with ſuch order and exactneſs, that the leaſt failure in that duty was puniſhed with death. I ſhall not trouble you however, with a long and circumſtantial detail of the order and method which they obſerved in this matter, becauſe you very likely have read it in their hiſtories, or if you have not, you may meet with it there whenever you pleaſe. For the ſake of brevity then, I will only tell you what I would do myſelf upon ſuch occaſions. I would cauſe one third of my army to continue under arms every night: and one fourth of this to be upon guard along the entrenchments and other proper places of the camp, allowing a double guard at every angle of it; one part of which ſhould conſtantly remain there, and the other be patrolling all night from that angle to the next, and back again: and this method ſhould be obſerved in the day-time alſo, if the enemy lay near me. As for giving out a Parole, or Watch-word, and changing it every night, and other ſuch circumſtances belonging to Guards and Centinels, I ſhall ſay nothing of them, becauſe they are known by every one. But there is one thing of the utmoſt importance, the practice of which will be attended with much advantage, and the neglect of it with great prejudice; and that is, to obſerve ſtrictly who lies out of the Camp at night, and what ſtrangers come into it: which is a very eaſy matter to be done by ſuch as obſerve the manner and order of encamping I have recommended; becauſe every lodgment having a certain number of men belonging to it, you may preſently ſee if there be more or fewer in it than there ſhould be: if any are abſent without leave, they ſhould be puniſhed as deſerters; and if there are more than there ought to be, you ſhould diligently enquire who they are? what buſineſs they have there? and of other circumſtances relating to them. This precaution will make it very difficult, if not impoſſible, for the enemy to hold any ſecret correſpondence with your Officers, or to penetrate into your deſigns: and if the Romans had not carefully attended to this point, Claudius Nero could not have left his camp in Lucania, and gone privately into the territories of Picenum, and returned from thence to his former quarters, whilſt Hannibal knew nothing of the matter all the while, though the two Camps lay very near each other *.

But it is not ſufficient barely to give out good and wholeſome orders for this purpoſe, if the obſervance of them is not enforced with the utmoſt ſeverity: for there is no caſe whatſoever in which the moſt exact and implicit obedience is ſo neceſſary as in the government of an army: and therefore the laws that are eſtabliſhed for the maintenance of it ought to be rigorous and ſevere, and the General a man of inflexible reſolution in ſupporting them. The Romans puniſhed with death, not only thoſe that failed in their duty when they were upon guard, but all ſuch as either abandoned their poſt in time of battle, or carried any thing by ſtealth out of the Camp, or pretended they had performed ſome exploit in action which they had not done, or engaged without the orders of their General, or threw away their arms out of fear: and when it appened that a Cohort or a whole Legion had behaved ill, they made them caſt lots, and put every tenth man to death, which was called Decimation: this was done to avoid ſhedding too much blood, and that though they did not all ſuffer, every man might be under an apprehenſion that the lot might fall upon him. But where there are ſevere puniſhments, there ſhould likewiſe be proportionable rewards, to excite men to behave themſelves well by motives both of hope and fear; and therefore they always rewarded thoſe that had diſtinguiſhed themſelves by any meritorious action; eſpecially ſuch as had either ſaved the life of a Fellow-citizen in battle, or been the firſt in ſcaling the walls of an enemy's town, or ſtorming their Camp, or had wounded, or killed, or diſmounted an enemy. In this manner every man's deſert was properly taken notice of, and recompenſed by the Conſuls, and publicly ho-

---

* See Livy, Lib. xxvii. chap. 44.

poured: and thoſe that obtained any reward for ſervices of this kind (beſides the reputation and glory which they acquired amongſt their brother Soldiers) were received by their friends and relations with all manner of rejoicings and congratulations, when they returned from the wars.——It is no wonder then that a people, who are ſo exact in rewarding merit, and puniſhing offenders, ſhould extend their Empire to ſuch a degree as they did: and certainly they are highly worthy of imitation in theſe reſpects. Give me leave therefore to be a little more explicit in deſcribing one of their puniſhments.——When a delinquent ſtood convicted before his General, the latter gave him a ſlight ſtroke with a rod; after which, he might run away if he could: but as every Soldier in the army had liberty to kill him, he no ſooner began to run but they all fell upon him with their ſwords, or darts, or other weapons; ſo that he ſeldom eſcaped: and if he did, he was not allowed to return home, except under heavy penalties, and ſuch a load of infamy, that it would have been much better for him to have died. This cuſtom is in ſome meaſure ſtill kept up by the Swiſs in their armies, who always cauſe a convicted offender to be killed by the reſt of the Soldiers: and I think it is a very good one; for in order to prevent others from ſupporting or protecting an offender, it is certainly the beſt way to leave the puniſhment of him to themſelves; becauſe they will always look upon him with a different eye in that caſe, from what they would if he is to be puniſhed by any body elſe. This rule will alſo hold good in popular Governments, as we may learn from the example of Manlius Capitolinus, who being accuſed by the Senate, was ſtrenuouſly defended by the People, till they were left to judge him themſelves: after which, they preſently condemned him to die. This then is a good method of puniſhing deliquents, and of cauſing juſtice to be executed upon them in ſecurity, without fear of exciting mutiny or ſedition. But as neither the fear of laws, nor reverence to man alone, are ſufficient to bridle an armed multitude, the Ancients uſed to call in the aid of Religion, and made their Soldiers take a very ſtrict oath to pay due obedience to military diſcipline with many awful ceremonies and great ſolemnity: beſides which, they uſed all other methods to inſpire them with a fear of the Gods; that ſo if they violated their oaths, they might have not only the aſperity of human laws, but the vengeance of Heaven to apprehend.

BATTISTA. Did the Romans ever ſuffer women or gaming in their Camp, as we do at preſent?

FABRIZIO. They prohibited both: nor was the reſtraint very grievous; for their Soldiers were ſo conſtantly employed either in one ſort of duty or other, that they had no time to think either of women or gaming, or any other of thoſe vile avocations which commonly make Soldiers idle and ſeditious.

BATTISTA. They were in the right of it.—— But pray tell me what order they obſerved when they were going to decamp.

FABRIZIO. The General's trumpet was ſounded three times: at the firſt ſounding, they ſtruck their tents and packed them up; at the ſecond, they loaded their carriages; and at the third, they began their march in the order I have deſcribed before, with their Legions in the middle of the army, and their baggage in the rear of every particular corps. For which purpoſe, it is neceſſary that one of the Auxiliary Regiments ſhould move firſt with its own baggage, and a fourth part of the public impediments in its rear, which was placed in one or other of the four diviſions in the weſtern part of the camp that I ſpoke of not long ago: and therefore every Legion ſhould have its particular diviſion aſſigned to its charge; that ſo when they are about to march, every one of them may know where to take its place.

**Battista.** Did the Romans uſe to make any other proviſions in laying out their Camps beſides thoſe which you have already mentioned?

**Fabrizio.** I muſt tell you again that they always kept to the ſame form in their encampments, which was their firſt and principal conſideration. Beſides this, they had two other great points in view: the firſt of which was a wholeſome ſituation; and the next, to encamp where the enemy could neither ſurround, nor cut them off from water or proviſions. To prevent ſickneſs in their army therefore, they always avoided marſhy grounds, and ſuch as were expoſed to noxious winds: of which they formed their judgment not ſo much from the quality of the place, as from the conſtitution and appearance of the people who lived thereabout: for if they either had ſickly complexions, or were ſubject to aſthmas, or dropſies, or any other endemic diſorder, they would not encamp there. As to the other point of not being liable to be ſurrounded by an enemy, they conſidered where their friends and where their enemy lay, and judged from thence of the probability or poſſibility of their being ſurrounded or not: upon which account, it is neceſſary that a General ſhould be very well acquainted with the nature and ſituation of the country he is in, and that he ſhould have others about him who are as knowing in theſe reſpects as himſelf. There are other precautions alſo to be uſed in order to prevent diſtempers and famine in an army; ſuch as reſtraining all manner of exceſs and intemperance amongſt the Soldiers, by taking care that they ſleep under cover, that your Camp may be near trees that will afford them ſhade in the day-time, and wood enough for fuel to dreſs their victuals, and that they do not march when the heat of the Sun is too intenſe. For this reaſon, they ſhould decamp before day-light in the Summer, and take care not to march through ice and ſnow in the winter, except they have frequent opportunities of making good fires, and warm cloathing to guard them again the inclemency of the weather. It is neceſſary likewiſe to prevent them from drinking ſtagnated and fetid water: and if any of them happen to fall ill, you ſhould give ſtrict orders to the Phyſicians and Surgeons of the army to take great care of them: for bad indeed is the condition of a General, when he has a ſickneſs amongſt his men and an enemy to contend with at the ſame time. But nothing conduces ſo much to keep an army in good health and ſpirits as Exerciſe: and therefore the Ancients uſed to exerciſe their troops every day. Due exerciſe then is ſurely of great importance, as it preſerves your health in the Camp, and ſecures you victory in the field.

As to guarding againſt famine, it is only neceſſary to take timely care that the enemy may not be able to cut you off from proviſions, but to conſider from whence you may be conveniently ſupplied with them, and to ſee that thoſe which you have are properly diſtributed and preſerved. You ſhould therefore always have a month's proviſions at leaſt beforehand, and afterwards oblige your neighbouring friends and allies to furniſh you daily with a certain quantity: you ought likewiſe to eſtabliſh Magazines and Storehouſes in ſtrong places, and above all to diſtribute your proviſions duly and frugally amongſt your men, giving them a reaſonable proportion every day, and attending ſo ſtrictly to this point that you may not by any means exhauſt your ſtores, and run yourſelf a-ground: for though all other calamities in an army may be remedied in time, famine alone grows more and more grievous the longer it continues, and is ſure to deſtroy you at laſt; nor will any enemy ever come to an engagment with you when he is ſure to conquer you in ſuch circumſtances without it: for though a victory obtained in this manner may not be ſo honourable as one that is gained by dint of arms, it is certain however, and not attended with any riſque. An army then cannot poſſibly eſcape famine which wantonly and extravagantly waſtes its proviſions without foreſight, or regard to rule or meaſure, or the circumſtances of the times: for want of timely care will prevent its having ſupplies, and profuſion conſumes what it already has to no purpoſe: upon which conſideration, the Ancients took care their Soldiers ſhould eat no more than a daily and reaſonable allowance, and that too only at ſtated times; for they never were ſuffered either to breakfaſt, or dine, or ſup, but when their General did the ſame. How well theſe excellent rules are obſerved in our armies at preſent, I need not tell you; for every one knows that our Soldiers, inſtead of imitating the regularity and ſobriety of the Ancients, are a parcel of intemperate, licentious, and drunken fellows.

Battista. When our converſation firſt turned upon Encampments, you ſaid you would not confine yourſelf to two Regiments only, but take four, the better to ſhew how a complete army ſhould be encamped. But I ſhould be glad to know in the firſt place, how you would quarter your army if it conſiſted of a greater or ſmaller number of men than that? and in the next, what number you would think ſufficient to engage any enemy?

Fabrizio. To your firſt queſtion, I anſwer, that if your army has five or ſix thouſand, more or leſs than that number, in it, you have nothing to do but either to add or to diminiſh your rows of lodgments accordingly: and this you may do in what proportion you pleaſe. The Romans however had two different camps when they joined two Conſular armies together, the rear quarters of which (where the impediments and unarmed people were) faced each other. As to your ſecond queſtion, the common armies which the Romans brought into the field uſually conſiſted of about twenty-four thouſand men, and upon the moſt preſſing occaſions they never exceeded fifty thouſand. With this number they made head againſt two hundred thouſand Gauls who invaded them after the concluſion of the firſt Carthaginian war: with the ſame number they oppoſed Hannibal: indeed, both the Romans and Greeks, depending chiefly upon their diſcipline and good conduct, always carried on their wars with ſmall armies; whereas both the eaſtern and weſtern nations had vaſt and almoſt innumerable hoſts: the latter truſting wholly to their natural ferocity, and the former availing themſelves of the implicit ſubmiſſion which their ſubjects ſhew to their Princes. But neither the Greeks nor Romans being remarkable either for natural ferocity, or implicit ſubmiſſion to their Princes, were obliged to have recourſe to good diſcipline; the power and efficacy of which were ſo great, that one of their ſmall armies often defeated a prodigious multitude of the fierceſt and moſt obſtinate people. In imitation then of the Greeks and Romans, I would not have about fifty thouſand men in an army, but fewer if I might chuſe: for more are apt to create diſcord and confuſion, and not only become ungovernable themſelves, but corrupt others that have been well-diſciplined: Pyrrhus therefore uſed to ſay, that "with an army of fifteen thouſand good Soldiers he would fight the whole world *."

---

* "At the Siege of Alexia, the Gauls having drawn all their powers together to fight Cæſar, after they had made a general muſter of their forces, reſolved in a council of war to diſmiſs a good part of that great multitude, that they might not fall into confuſion. And indeed it ſtands to reaſon that the body of an Army ſhould conſiſt of a moderate number, and reſtrained to certain bounds, both in regard to the difficulty of providing for them, and the difficulty of governing and keeping them in order: at leaſt it is very eaſy to make it appear by example, that armies ſo monſtrous in number have ſeldom done any thing to the purpoſe.

But let us now proceed to other matters: You have ſeen our army gain a battle, and the accidents which may occur in the time of action: you have likewiſe ſeen it upon a march, and been acquainted with the dangers and embarraſſments it is ſubject to in thoſe circumſtances: and laſtly, you have ſeen it regularly quartered in camp, where it ought to ſtay awhile, not only to enjoy a little reſt after its fatigues, but to concert proper meaſures for bringing the Campaign to a happy concluſion: for many things are to be conſidered and digeſted in camp, eſpecially if either the enemy ſtill keeps the field; or there are any towns belonging to them not yet reduced, or any in poſſeſſion of people whoſe fidelity and affection you have reaſon to ſuſpect; becauſe in theſe caſes you muſt make yourſelf maſter of the one, and ſecure the attachment of the other. It is neceſſary therefore to ſhew in what manner, and by what means, theſe difficulties are to be ſurmounted with the ſame reputation with which we have hitherto carried on the war.——To deſcend to particulars then, I ſay, that if ſeveral different perſons, or different States, ſhould think of doing any particular thing which may tend to your advantage and their own prejudice, ſuch as diſmantling ſome of their towns, or baniſhing a great number of their inhabitants, you ſhould encourage them in it in ſuch a manner that none of them may ſuſpect that it will prejudice their intereſt; by which you may amuſe them ſo effectually, that inſtead of confederating together

---

According to the ſaying of Cyrus in Xenophon, "it is not the number of men, but the number of good men, that gives the advantage;" the remainder ſerving rather to embarraſs than aſſiſt: and Bajazet principally grounded his reſolution of giving Tamerlane battle, contrary to the opinion of all his Captains, upon this, that the numberleſs hoſt his enemy had brought into the field, gave him aſſured hope of their falling into confuſion. Scanderbeg, a good and expert judge in theſe matters, uſed to ſay, "that ten or twelve thouſand faithful fighting men were ſufficient for a good Leader to ſecure his reputation on all military occaſions." *See Montaigne*, book II. chap. xxxiv.

together for their own ſafety, they will not think of giving each other the leaſt aſſiſtance, and then you may ſuppreſs them all without any material oppoſition. But if this method will not ſucceed, you muſt order every one of them to execute what you deſire on the ſame day; that ſo each State imagining that no other has any orders of the ſame kind, may be obliged to obey, becauſe it has no ſupport from its neighbours to depend upon; and thus you may ſucceed in your deſigns without any reſiſtance or combination being formed againſt you.—— If you ſhould ſuſpect the fidelity of any State, and would ſecure yourſelf by falling upon them unawares, in order to diſguiſe your intentions the more effectually, it is the beſt way to pretend a perfect confidence in them, to conſult them in ſome deſign which you ſeem to have upon others, and to deſire their aſſiſtance, as if you had not the leaſt doubt of their ſincerity, or thought of moleſting them; which will put them off their guard, and give you an opportunity of treating them as you pleaſe.—— If you ſuſpect any perſon in your army of giving the enemy intelligence of your deſigns, you cannot do better than avail yourſelf of his treachery, by ſeeming to truſt him with ſome ſecret reſolution which you intend to execute, whilſt you carefully conceal your real deſign: by which, perhaps, you may diſcover the traitor, and lead the enemy into an error that may poſſibly end in their deſtruction.—— If, in order to relieve ſome friend, you would leſſen your army ſo privately that the enemy may not be aware of it (as Claudius Nero did) you ſhould not leſſen the number of your lodgments, but leave the vacant tents ſtanding, and the colours flying, making the ſame fires and keeping the ſame guards that you did before. In like manner, if you receive freſh ſupplies, and would not have the enemy know that you have been reinforced, you muſt not increaſe the number of your tents; for nothing is of greater importance than to keep theſe and other ſuch tranſactions as ſecret as poſſible. When Metellus commanded the Roman armies in Spain, a certain perſon took the liberty of aſking him what he intended to do the next day; upon which, he told him that "if he thought the Shirt upon his back knew that, he would immediately take it off and burn it." Marcus Craſſus being likewiſe importuned by one of his officers to let him know when he deſigned to decamp, aſked him "if he thought he ſhould be the only one in the camp that would not hear the ſound of the trumpets."——In order to penetrate into the ſecret deſigns, and diſcover the condition of an enemy, ſome have ſent Ambaſſadors to them with ſkilful and experienced officers in their train, dreſſed like the reſt of their attendants; who have taken an opportunity of viewing their army, and obſerving their ſtrength and weakneſs in ſo minute a manner that it has been of much ſervice. Others have pretended to quarrel with and baniſh ſome particular Confidant, who has gone over to the enemy, and afterwards informed them of their deſigns. The intentions of an enemy are likewiſe ſometimes diſcovered by the examination of the Priſoners you take.——When Marius commanded in the war againſt the Cimbrians, and wanted to try the fidelity of the Gauls, who at that time inhabited Lombardy, and were in confederacy with the Romans, he wrote ſome Letters to them which were left open, and others that were ſealed; in the former of which, he deſired they would not open thoſe that were ſealed till a certain day; but before that time he ſent for them again, and finding they had been opened, he perceived there was no confidence to be put in that people.——Some Princes have not immediately ſent an army to oppoſe the enemy when their territories have been invaded, but made an incurſion into their country, and thereby obliged them to return to defend themſelves;

a method which has often ſucceeded: for in ſuch caſes, your Soldiers being elated with victory, and loaded with plunder, fight with ſpirit and confidence; whilſt thoſe of the enemy are dejected at the thoughts of being beaten inſtead of conquering: ſo that a diverſion of this kind has frequently been attended with good conſequences. But this you muſt not attempt, except your country is better fortified than that of the enemy: for if you do, you will certainly be ruined.——If a General is blocked up in his camp by an enemy, he ſhould endeavour to ſet a treaty of accommodation on foot with them, and to obtain a truce for a few days; during which, they are apt to be ſo careleſs and remiſs that he may poſſibly find an opportunity of ſlipping out of their hands. By theſe means, Sylla twice eluded the enemy; and in this manner Aſdrubal got clear of Claudius Nero when he had ſurrounded him in Spain. Beſides theſe expedients, there are other methods likewiſe of extricating yourſelf from an enemy; as either by attacking them with one part of your forces only, that ſo while their attention is wholly turned upon that ſide, the reſt of your army may find means to ſave themſelves; or by ſome uncommon Stratagem, the novelty of which may fill them with terror and aſtoniſhment at the ſame time, ſo that they cannot reſolve how to act, or whether to act at all; as Hannibal did, when he was ſurrounded by Fabius Maximus: for having a great number of oxen in his camp, he faſtened lighted torches to their horns in the night-time and let them looſe to run about the country; at the ſtrangeneſs of which ſpectacle Fabius was ſo perplexed that he could not prevent their retreat.——But above all things, a General ought to endeavour to divide the enemy's ſtrength, either by making him ſuſpicious of his Counſellors and Confidants, or obliging him to employ his forces in different places and detachments at the ſame time, which conſequently muſt very much weaken his main army. The firſt may be done by ſparing the poſſeſſions of ſome particular men in whom he moſt confides, and not ſuffering their houſes or eſtates to be damaged in a time of general plunder and devaſtation; or by returning their children and other relations when they are taken priſoners, without any ranſom. Thus when Hannibal had ravaged and burnt all the towns and country round about Rome, he ſpared the eſtate of Fabius Maximus alone: Coriolanus likewiſe, returning at the head of an army to Rome, carefully preſerved the poſſeſſions of the Nobility, and burnt thoſe of the Plebeians. When Metellus commanded the Roman army againſt Jugurtha, he tampered with the Ambaſſadors who were ſent to him by that Prince, to deliver up their maſter priſoner to him, and kept up a correſpondence with them for the ſame purpoſe after they had left him, till Jugurtha diſcovered it, and grew ſo jealous of his Counſellors, that he put them all to death upon one pretence or other: and after Hannibal had taken refuge with Antiochus, the Roman Ambaſſadors managed ſo artfully that Antiochus became ſuſpicious of him, and would neither take his advice, nor truſt him again in any matter whatſoever.——As to dividing the enemy's ſtrength, there can be no better way of doing it than by making incurſions into their country, for that will oblige them to abandon all other enterprizes, and return home to defend their own. This was the method which Fabius took when he had not only the Gauls, but the Tuſcans, the Umbrians, and the Samnites to deal with at the ſame time. Titus Didius having but a ſmall army in compariſon of the enemy, and expecting to be reinforced by another Legion from Rome, was apprized that the enemy had formed a deſign to cut it off upon its march: to prevent which, he not only cauſed a report to be ſpread through his camp that he would engage the enemy the next day, but ſuffered ſome priſoners he had taken to eſcape, who informed their General of the Conſul's intentions; which had ſuch an effect, that he did not think fit to diminiſh his own forces by detaching any part of them to oppoſe the march of that Legion; ſo that it joined the Conſul in ſafety: and though this Stratagem indeed did not divide the enemy's army, yet it proved the means of reinforcing his own.——Some, in order to diminiſh the ſtrength of an invader, have ſuffered him to enter their country, and take ſeveral towns: that ſo when he has weakened his main army by putting garriſons into them, they might fall upon him with a greater probability of ſucceſs. Others, who have had a deſign upon one Province, have made a feint of invading another: after which, turning their forces ſuddenly upon that where they were not at all expected, they have made themſelves maſters of it before the enemy could ſend any relief: for in ſuch caſes, the enemy, being uncertain whether you may not return to attack the Province firſt threatened, is obliged to maintain his poſt, and not to leave one place to ſuccour another: ſo that (as it often happens) he is not able to ſecure them both. ——It is of great importance to prevent the ſpreading of mutiny or diſcord in an army: for which purpoſe, you ſhould puniſh the Ringleaders in an exemplary manner, but with ſuch addreſs that it may be done before they imagine you intend it. If they are at a diſtance from you, it is the beſt way to call both the innocent and the guilty together, leſt (if you ſummon the offenders alone) they ſhould ſuſpect your deſign, and either become contumacious, or take ſome other method to elude the puniſhment that is due to them: but if they are within your reach, you may avail yourſelf of thoſe that are innocent, and puniſh the others by their aſſiſtance. As to private diſcords amongſt your Soldiers, the only remedy is to expoſe them to ſome danger, for in ſuch caſes fear generally unites them: but what moſt commonly keeps an army united is the reputation of the General; that is, his courage and good conduct; for without theſe, neither high birth nor any ſort of authority are ſufficient. Now the chief thing incumbent upon a General, in order to maintain his reputation, is to pay well, and puniſh ſeverely: for if he does not pay his men duly, he cannot puniſh them properly when they deſerve it. Suppoſing, for inſtance, a Soldier ſhould be guilty of a robbery; how can you puniſh him for that when you give him no pay? And how can he help robbing when he has no other means of ſubſiſtence? But if you pay them well, and do not puniſh them ſeverely when they offend, the ywill ſoon grow inſolent and licentious: for then you will become deſpiſed, and loſe your authority; after which, tumults and diſcords will naturally enſue in your army, which probably will end in the ruin of it.

The Commanders of armies in former times had one difficulty to ſtruggle with, from which our Generals at preſent are in a great meaſure exempt; and that was the interpreting bad omens and auguries in ſuch a manner, that inſtead of ſeeming adverſe, they might appear to be favourable and propitious. For if a Storm of thunder and lightning * fell upon the camp, or either the Sun or Moon was eclipſed, or there was an Earthquake, or the General happened to get a fall in mounting or diſmounting his horſe, the Soldiers looked upon it as an unhappy preſage, and were ſo diſmayed, that they made but a faint reſiſtance againſt any Enemy that attacked them. Upon any accident of that kind therefore, they either endeavoured

---

* The words of the Author are, "perche ſe cadeva una *ſaetta* in uno eſſercito." Now the word *ſaetta* moſt here mean a ſtroke of lightning, muſt probably, or what the country people call a *thunder-bolt*. The old Tranſlation renders it thus: For if an arrow fell down in an army, &c. which I confeſs I do not underſtand.

deavoured to account for it from natural cauſes, or interpreted it to their own purpoſe and advantage. When Julius Cæſar landed in Africa, he happened to get a fall as ſoon as he ſet his foot on Shore, upon which, he immediately cried out, "Teneo te, O Africa, i. e. Africa, I take poſſeſſion of thee." Others have explained the reaſons of Earthquakes and Eclipſes to their Soldiers. But ſuch events have little or no effect in theſe times: for men are not ſo much given to Superſtition ſince the Chriſtian Religion has enlightened their minds, and diſpelled theſe vain fears: but if they ſhould ever happen to return, we muſt imitate the example of the Ancients upon ſuch occaſions.

If famine or any other kind of diſtreſs has reduced an enemy to deſpair, and they advance furiouſly to engage, you ſhould keep cloſe in your entrenchments, and avoid a battle, if poſſible; as the Lacedæmonians did when they were provoked to fight by the Meſſenians, and Julius Cæſar by Afranius and Petreius.——When Fulvius the Conſul commanded the Roman army againſt the Cimbrians, he cauſed his Cavalry to attack the enemy ſeveral days ſucceſſively, and obſerving that they always quitted their camp to purſue his troops when they retreated, he at laſt placed a body of men in ambuſh behind their camp, who ruſhed into it, and made themſelves maſters of it the next time they ſallied out to purſue his Cavalry.——Some Princes, when their dominions have been invaded, and their army has lain near that of the enemy, have ſent out parties under the enemy's colours to plunder and lay waſte their own territories: upon which, the enemy imagining them to be friends who were coming to their aſſiſtance, have gone out to join them; but upon diſcovering their miſtake, have fallen into confuſion, and given their adverſary an opportunity of beating them. This Stratagem was practiſed by Alexander of Epirus againſt the Illyrians, and Leptenes the Syracuſan againſt the Carthaginians, and they both found their account in it.——Many have gained an advantage by pretending to run away in great fear, and leaving their camp full of wine and proviſions, with which when the enemy have gorged themſelves, the others have returned and fallen upon them whilſt they were drunk or aſleep. In this manner Cyrus was deceived by Tomyris, and the Spaniards by Tiberius Gracchus. Others have mixed poiſon with the meat and drink they left behind them.——I told you a little before that I did not remember to have read that the Ancients placed any Centinels on the outſide of the ditch that ſurrounded their camp in the night; and that I ſuppoſed it was to prevent the miſchiefs they might occaſion: for it has often happened that Centinels, who have been ſtationed at out-poſts, even in the day-time, to obſerve the motions of an enemy, have been the ruin of an army; as they have ſometimes been ſurpriſed and forced to make the ſignals for their friends to advance, who have thereby been drawn into a ſnare, and either killed or taken priſoners.——In order to deceive an enemy, it may not be amiſs either to vary or omit ſome particular cuſtom or ſignal that you have conſtantly made uſe of before, as a certain great General did of old; who having cauſed ſome of his advanced parties always to give him notice of the enemy's approach by fires in the night, and ſmoke in the day-time, thought proper to vary that cuſtom at laſt, and ordered thoſe parties to keep conſtant fires all the night long, and to make a ſmoke every day, but to extinguiſh them when they perceived the enemy in motion: upon which, the enemy advancing again, and not ſeeing the uſual ſignals made to give notice of their approach, imagined they were not diſcovered, and puſhed on ſo precipitately to the attack, that they fell into diſorder, and were routed by their adverſary, who was prepared to receive them.——Memnon the Rhodian, in order to draw the enemy out of a ſtrong and advanageous ſituation of which they had poſſeſſed themſelves, got one of his own men to paſs over to them as a deſerter, with intelligence that his army was in a mutiny, and that the greater part of it was going to leave him: to confirm which, he cauſed a great uproar and commotion to be counterfeited every now and then in his camp; by which the enemy were ſo impoſed upon that they quitted their entrenchments to attack him, and were entirely defeated.——Great care is likewiſe to be taken not to reduce an enemy to utter deſpair. Julius Cæſar was always very attentive to this point in his wars with the Germans, and uſed to open them a way to eſcape, after he began to perceive that when they were hard preſſed, and could not run away, they would fight moſt deſperately; thinking it better to purſue them when they fled, than to run the riſque of not conquering when they defended themſelves with ſuch obſtinacy.——Lucullus obſerving that a body of Macedonian horſe, which he had in his army, were going over to the enemy, cauſed a Charge to be ſounded immediately, and ordered all the reſt of his army to advance: upon which, the enemy ſuppoſing he deſigned to attack them, preſently fell upon the Macedonians with ſuch fury, that they were obliged to defend themſelves, and fought bravely, inſtead of deſerting him as they deſigned.

It is of great importance alſo to ſecure a town, when you ſuſpect its loyalty, either before or after a victory.——Pompey ſuſpecting the fidelity of the Catinenſes, deſired them to let him ſend the ſick men whom he had in his army into their town, to be taken care of till they were well again: but inſtead of ſick men, he ſent a parcel of the ſtouteſt and moſt reſolute fellows he had in his army in diſguiſe, who made themſelves maſters of the town and kept it for him.——Publius Valerius having been offended by the Epidaurians, and miſtruſting their ſincerity, cauſed a pardon to be proclaimed for all ſuch as would come to accept of it at a certain Temple without the gates of their town: upon which, all the inhabitants repairing thither for that purpoſe, he ſhut the doors of the Temple upon them, and ſuffered none to return to the town but ſuch as he could confide in.——Alexander the Great, in order to ſecure Thrace when he was upon his march into Aſia, took all the Nobility and leading men of that Province along with him, and allowing them penſions, left the common people to be governed by men of their own condition: by which, the Nobility being content with their appointments, and the common people having no leading men to oppreſs, or inſtigate them to rebel, the whole Province continued quiet. But of all the methods that can be taken to gain the hearts of a people, none contribute ſo much as remarkable examples of continence and juſtice; like that of Scipio in Spain, when he returned a moſt beautiful young Lady, ſafe and untouched, to her huſband and relations; a circumſtance which conduced more to the reduction of Spain, than any force of arms could ever have done.——Julius Cæſar acquired ſuch reputation for his juſtice in paying for the wood which he cut down to make paliſades for his camps in Gaul, that it very much facilitated the conqueſt of that Province. I think I have now nothing more to add to theſe particular documents, or the Subject in general; except it be to ſay ſomething concerning the nature of attacking and defending towns; which I will do as briefly and clearly as I can, if I have not already treſpaſſed too much upon your patience.

Battista. You are ſo very complaiſant and obliging, Sir, that we ſhall deſire you to indulge our curioſity in theſe points, without any apprehenſion of being thought troubleſome to you; ſince you are ſo good to make a free offer of what we ſhould otherwiſe have been aſhamed to aſk. We ſhall eſteem it a very great favour therefore, as well as a pleaſure, if you will be ſo kind to go on with the Subject. But before you proceed to what you were ſpeaking of, let us entreat you to inform us whether it is better to continue a war all the winter (according to the cuſtom of theſe times) or to keep the field in the ſummer only, and put your troops into quarters before the winter comes on, as the Ancients uſed to do.

Fabrizio. Indeed, Sir, if you had not aſked this timely and pertinent queſtion, I believe I ſhould have forgot to have ſaid any thing of a matter which yet deſerves much conſideration and attention.——I muſt therefore beg leave to tell you again, that the Ancients were wiſer, and conducted their affairs with more prudence, than we do at preſent; but eſpecially their wars: for though we are guilty of great errors in many other reſpects, we certainly are guilty of more and greater in this. Nothing can be more dangerous or indiſcreet in a General than to carry on a war in winter-time: for in that caſe, the aggreſſor is ſure to run a greater riſque of being ruined than thoſe who act upon the defenſive. For as the main end and deſign of all the care and pains that are beſtowed in keeping up good order and diſcipline, is to fit and prepare an army to engage an enemy in a proper manner, a General ought always to have that point in view; becauſe a complete victory commonly puts an end to a war. He therefore, who has an orderly and well-diſciplined army under his command, will certainly have an advantage over another General who has not, and be more likely to come off with victory. Now it muſt be conſidered, that nothing is a greater impediment to good order and diſcipline than rough ſituations, and wet or cold weather:

ther: for in a bad ſituation you cannot range your forces according to your uſual order, and hard weather will oblige you to divide them: in which caſe you cannot act with your whole force againſt an enemy, as they are cantoned in villages and towns, and fortreſſes, at a diſtance from each other, without any order or regularity, and in ſuch a manner as neceſſity preſcribes: ſo that all the pains you have taken to diſcipline your men, and make them obſerve good order, will ſignify nothing in ſuch a ſeaſon. But it is not much to be wondered that the Generals of our times carry on their wars in the winter: for as they are ſtrangers to all ſort of diſcipline and military knowledge, they are neither ſenſible of the loſſes and inconveniencies which muſt neceſſarily reſult from dividing their forces, nor do they trouble their heads in endeavouring to eſtabliſh that diſcipline and good order amongſt their men, which they never learnt themſelves.——They ought to reflect, however, upon the numberleſs hardſhips and loſſes occaſioned by a winter-campaign, and to remember that the defeat of the French near the Garigliano, in the year 1503. was owing, not ſo much to the bravery of the Spaniards as to the rigour of the ſeaſon. For as I told you before, thoſe that reſolve to carry on a war in an enemy's country during the winter, muſt of neceſſity have the worſt of it: becauſe, if they keep their men all together in a camp, they muſt ſuffer much from rain and cold; and if they divide them into different cantonments, they muſt greatly weaken their army. Whereas, thoſe that wait for them at home may preſently unite their forces, and not only chuſe their time and place of attack, but keep their men ſafe and freſh under cover, till they have an opportunity of falling upon ſome of the enemy's quarters, who being divided and diſperſed, cannot be ſuppoſed to make any great reſiſtance. In this manner we may account for the defeat of the French, which I juſt now mentioned; and this will always be the fate of thoſe who invade an enemy in the winter, that has any conduct or knowledge in military affairs. If a General therefore would plunge himſelf into ſuch circumſtances, that neither the number, diſcipline, good order, nor bravery of his troops, can be of any ſervice to him, let him carry on a field war in the winter. The Romans, however, in order to make the moſt of thoſe qualifications which they took ſo much pains to acquire, always avoided winter-campaigns with as ſuch care as they did rough, confined and inconvenient ſituations, or any other impediment that might prevent them from availing themſelves of their valour and good diſcipline. This is all that I have to ſay at preſent in anſwer to your laſt queſtion. Let us now proceed, if you pleaſe, to the method of attacking and defending towns, and the manner of building and fortifying them.

THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

# THE ART OF WAR.

## BOOK VII.

### THE CONTENTS.

*In what manner Towns and Fortreſſes are to be built and fortified. Rules to be obſerved by thoſe that are to defend a Town that is threatened with a Siege. Advice to ſuch as are in want of proviſions, when they are beſieged; and to the beſiegers. That appearances are not to be truſted to. How to draw a Garriſon out of a town that is beſieged. That ſome towns may be corrupted, and others taken by ſurprize. That good guards ſhould be kept at all times and places by the beſieged. Different methods by which they may convey private intelligence to their friends. How to repair a breach, and defend it. Of Mines. That the beſieged ſhould take care to divide their forces as little as poſſible. That when a Town or Camp is ſurrounded on every ſide, it is ſometimes neceſſary to expoſe it to an aſſault on one ſide. General rules to be obſerved in military diſcipline. The method of raiſing plenty of horſes in any country. That a General ought ſometimes to ſtrike out new inventions of his own. The Concluſion.*

FABRIZIO. TOWNS and Fortreſſes may be ſtrong either by nature or art. Thoſe are ſtrong by nature that are either ſurrounded by rivers or moraſſes, or ſituated upon a rock or ſteep hill, like Monaco and Sanleo: for ſuch as are ſituated upon hills that are not difficult of aſcent, are looked upon as weak ſince the invention of mines and artillery: upon which account, thoſe that build fortreſſes in theſe times often chuſe a flat ſituation, and make it ſtrong by art. For this purpoſe, their firſt care is to fortify their walls with angles, baſtions, caſemates, half moons, and ravelines; that ſo no enemy can approach them without being taken both in front and flank. If the walls are built very high, they will be too much expoſed to artillery, if very low, they may eaſily be ſcaled: if you throw up a ditch on the outſide of them to make a ſcalade more difficult, and the enemy ſhould fill it up, (which may eaſily be done by a numerous army) they will preſently become maſters of them. In my opinion therefore, (with ſubmiſſion to better judges) the beſt way to prevent that would be to build the walls pretty high, and to throw up a ditch rather on the inſide than on the outſide of them. This is the ſtrongeſt method of fortifying a town: for it not only covers the beſieged from the fire of the artillery, but makes it a very difficult matter for the beſiegers either to ſcale the walls or fill up the ditch. Your walls then ſhould be of a due height, and two yards thick at leaſt, to ſtand the fire of the enemy's batteries: there ſhould likewiſe be towers all along them, at the diſtance of four hundred feet from each other. The ditch on the inſide ought to be no leſs than ſixty feet wide and twenty-four deep, and all the earth that is dug out of it ſhould be thrown up on that ſide which is next the town, and ſupported by a wall built in the ditch, and carried up the height of a man above the ground, which will make the ditch ſo much the deeper. In the bottom of the ditch I would have caſemates * about four hundred feet from each other, to take thoſe that might get down into it. The heavy artillery that is made uſe of for the defence of the town ſhould be planted on the inſide of the wall that ſupports the ditch: for as the other wall is to be a high one, you cannot make uſe of very large pieces there without much difficulty and inconvenience. If the enemy attempts a ſcalade, the height of the firſt wall ſecures you: if they batter you with artillery, they muſt beat down that wall in the firſt place; and when it is beat down (as a wall always falls towards that ſide from whence it is battered) the ruins of it having no ditch to bury them in, the outſide muſt naturally add to the depth of the ditch behind them: ſo that the enemy cannot well advance any further, being ſtopped there not only by thoſe ruins, but the ditch on the inſide of them, and the artillery planted on the other ſide of that ditch. The only expedient they have left upon ſuch occaſions, is to fill up the ditch, which is a very difficult matter on account of its great width and depth, the danger of approaching it from the baſtions and other fortifications with which it is flanked, and the labour of climbing over the ruins with burdens of faſcines upon their backs: ſo that I think a town fortified in this manner may be looked upon as impregnable †.

Battista. Would not the town be ſtronger do you think if there was another ditch on the outſide of the wall?

Fabrizio. Moſt certainly. But I meant that if there was to be one ditch only, it would be the beſt way to have it on the inſide.

Battista. Would you chuſe to have water in the ditches, or would you rather have them dry?

---

* Vaults of maſon's work in the flank of a Baſtion next the Curtain, to fire upon the enemy.

† Not ſince the invention of bombs.

Fabrizio. People differ in their opinions of that matter: becauſe ditches with water in them ſecure you againſt mines, and thoſe that have none are harder to be filled up. But upon the whole, I ſhould rather prefer dry ditches, becauſe they are a better ſecurity than the other: for ditches with water in them have ſometimes been frozen over in ſuch a manner in winter-time, that the towns they were deſigned to ſecure, have been taken without much difficulty; as it happened to Mirandola, when Pope Julius laid ſiege to it. But to guard againſt Mines, I would make my ditches ſo deep, that if any one ſhould attempt to work under them, they muſt be prevented by water. I would likewiſe build a Caſtle, or any kind of fortreſs, with the ſame ſort of walls and ditches; which would make them very difficult, if not impoſſible to be taken.

In the next place, I would adviſe thoſe that have the charge of defending a town that is going to be beſieged, by no means to ſuffer any baſtions or other works to be thrown up on the outſide of the walls, or at a little diſtance from the town: and I would alſo adviſe thoſe that build fortreſſes, not to make any place of retreat in them, whither the beſieged may retire when the walls are either beat down or in poſſeſſion of the enemy. The reaſon of my firſt caution is, that the Governor of a town that is beſieged, ought not to do a thing which will leſſen his reputation at the very beginning of the ſiege: for the diminution of that will make all his orders but little regarded, and diſcourage the Garriſon. But this will always be the caſe, if you build little forts out of the town you are to defend: becauſe they are ſure to fall into the enemy's hand, it being impoſſible in theſe times to maintain ſuch inconſiderable places againſt a train of artillery: ſo that the loſs of them will be the loſs of your reputation, and therefore moſt probably of the town itſelf. When the Genoeſe rebelled againſt Lewis XII. King of France, they built ſome trifling redoubts upon the hills that lie round about Genoa, which being preſently taken by the French, occaſioned the loſs of that City. As to the ſecond piece of advice, in relation to fortreſſes, I ſay, that nothing can expoſe a fortreſs to greater danger, than to have places of retreat into which the garriſon may retire when they are hard preſſed: for if it was not for the hopes of finding ſafety in one poſt, after they have abandoned another, they would exert themſelves with more obſtinacy and reſolution in defending the firſt; and when that is deſerted, all the reſt will ſoon fall into the enemy's hand. Of this we have a recent and memorable inſtance in the loſs of the Citadel at Forli, when the Counteſs Catharine was beſieged there by Cæſar Borgia, ſon to Pope Alexander VI. at the head of a French army. That fortreſs was ſo full of ſuch places of retreat, that a Garriſon might retire out of one into another, and out of that into many more ſucceſſively upon occaſion: for in the firſt place, there was the Citadel; and in the next, a Caſtle, ſeparated from it by a ditch, with a draw-bridge upon it, over which you might paſs out of one into the other; and in this Caſtle there were three diviſions ſeparated from one another by ditches full of water, with draw-bridges over them. The Duke therefore having made a breach in the wall of one of theſe diviſions with his artillery, Giovanni da Caſala, who was the Governor, inſtead of defending the breach, retreated into another diviſion: upon which, the Duke's forces immediately entered that diviſion without oppoſition, and having got poſſeſſion of the draw-bridges, ſoon made themſelves maſters of all the reſt. The loſs of that fortreſs then, which was thought inexpugnable, was owing to two great errors; the firſt in making ſo many conveniencies of retreating from one place to another; and the ſecond, in that none of thoſe places could command their bridges: ſo that the ill contrivance of the fortreſs, and the want of conduct in the garriſon, defeated the magnanimous reſolution of the Counteſs, who had the courage to wait for an army there, which neither the King of Naples nor the Duke of Milan durſt face: however, though her efforts did not ſucceed, ſhe gained much reputation by ſo generous a ſtand, as appears from many copies of verſes made in her praiſe upon that occaſion.——If I was to build a fortreſs then, I would make the walls of it very ſtrong, and fortify it with ſuch ditches as I have juſt now deſcribed: but I would have no retreating places, nor any thing in the inſide but dwelling-houſes, and thoſe too ſoo low, that the Governor ſeeing every part of the walls at one glance of the eye from the middle of it, might know where to ſend relief immediately upon occaſion, and the garriſon be convinced that when the walls and ditch were loſt, they had no other refuge left: but if I ſhould by any means happen to be prevailed upon to make places of retreat, I would contrive them in ſuch a manner, that every one of them ſhould be able to command its own draw-bridge, which I would build upon piles in the middle of the ditches that ſeparated them from each other.

Battista. You ſay that ſmall forts are not defenſible in theſe times: but if I miſtake not, I have heard others aſſert that the leſs any fort was, the better it might be defended.

Fabrizio. Their aſſertion is ill-grounded, becauſe no place can be called ſtrong at preſent where the beſieged have not room to ſecure themſelves by throwing up other ditches and ramparts when the enemy has got poſſeſſion of the firſt: for ſuch is the force of artillery, that whoever depends upon one wall and one ditch only will have reaſon to lament his error.

And ſince forts and baſtions (provided they do not exceed the common dimenſions, for then they may be deemed caſtles and fortreſſes) have no room for raiſing new works, they muſt preſently be taken when they are aſſaulted. It is therefore the beſt way not to build any ſuch forts at a diſtance from a town, but to fortify the entrance into it, and cover the gates with ravelines in ſuch a manner that no perſon can either come in or go out of them in a right line; beſides which, there ſhould be a ditch betwixt the raveline and the gate, with a draw-bridge upon it. It is a good way to have a Portcullis likewiſe at a every gate to let in your men again after they have made a ſally, and to hinder the enemy from entering with them if they ſhould be purſued. This is the uſe of Portcullises: (which the ancients called Cataractæ) for upon ſuch occaſions you could not receive any benefit either from the draw-bridge or the gate, both of them being crowded with men.

Battista. I have ſeen Portcullises in Germany made of wooden bars in the form of an iron grate; but thoſe that are uſed in Italy are all made of whole planks: pray what is the reaſon of this difference? and which of them are moſt ſerviceable?

Fabrizio. I muſt tell you again, that the ancient military cuſtoms and inſtitutions are almoſt aboliſhed in every part of the world; but in Italy they ſeem to be totally extinct; and if we have any good thing to boaſt of, it is entirely borrowed from the Ultramontanes. You muſt have heard, and perhaps ſome of the company may remember, in how feeble and ſlight a manner we uſed to fortify our towns and caſtles before the coming of Charles VIII. King of France, into Italy in the year 1594. The merlons or ſpaces in the walls betwixt the embraſures were not above a foot thick; the embraſures themſelves were made very narrow on the outſide, and wide within, with many other defects which it would be too tedious to enumerate: for when the merlons are made ſo ſlight they are ſoon beat down, and embraſures of that conſtruction are preſently laid open. But now we have learnt from the French to make our merlons ſtrong and ſubſtantial: and though our embraſures are ſtill wide within, and grow narrower and narrower to the middle of the wall, after which they begin to open again and grow wider and wider to the outſide, the artillery cannot be ſo eaſily diſmounted, nor the men driven from the parapets. The French have likewiſe many other improvements and inventions which our Soldiers have never ſeen, and therefore cannot imitate: amongſt theſe I might mention the portculliſſes you juſt now ſpoke of, made in the form of an iron grate, which are much better than ours: for if you make uſe of one that is made of whole planks for the defence of a gate, when it is let down you ſhut yourſelf cloſe up, and cannot annoy the enemy through it; ſo that they may either hew it down with axes, or ſet fire to it without any danger: but if it is made like a grate, you may eaſily defend it againſt them, either with ſpikes or firing ſhot through the interſtices of the bars.

Battista. I have obſerved another Ultramontane invention which has been imitated of late in Italy, which is, to make the ſpokes of the wheels of our artillery-carriages incline obliquely from the fellies to the nave. Now I ſhould be very glad to known the reaſon of this, becauſe I always thought ſtraight ſpokes had been ſtronger than any others.

Fabrizio. You muſt not look upon this deviation from common cuſtom as either the effect of whim or caprice, or for the ſake of ornament: for where ſtrength is abſolutely neceſſary but little account ought to be made of beauty. The true reaſon then of what you have obſerved, is that ſuch wheels are ſafer and ſtronger than our own: for when the carriage is loaded it either goes even or inclines to one ſide: when it goes even, each wheel ſuſtains an equal ſhare of the weight, and is not too much oppreſſed by it: but when it inclines to either ſide, the weight lies wholly upon one of the wheels. If the ſpokes therefore are ſtraight they are ſoon broken in that caſe; becauſe if the wheel inclines, the ſpokes muſt incline alſo, and cannot ſupport the weight that preſſes upon them. So that the French judge rightly in ſetting the ſpokes of their wheels obliquely to the nave: for when the carriage inclines to one ſide, and the weight bears directly upon them, inſtead of oblique they will then become ſtraight in a line with it, and conſequently better able to ſupport the whole than they were to bear one half of the load when the carriage went even. But to return to our towns and fortreſſes:

The French have likewiſe another method of ſecuring the gates of their towns, and of letting their men in and out of them with more eaſe and convenience when they are beſieged, which I have not yet ſeen practiſed in Italy. They erect two perpendicular piles or pillars at the end of the drawbridge on the outſide of the ditch; upon each of which they balance a beam in ſuch a manner that one half of it hangs over the bridge, and the other on the outſide of it. Thoſe parts of them which hang on the outſide are joined together with croſs bars like a grate, and at that end of each beam which hangs over the bridge they fix a chain and faſten it to the bridge: ſo that when they have a mind to ſhut up that end of the bridge they looſe the chains and let the grate fall; and when they would open it they draw home the chains and hoiſt the grate up again: by theſe means they can raiſe it up to ſuch a height that either foot only, or horſe, if it is neceſſary, may paſs under, or may ſhut the paſſage up ſo cloſe that no body at all can get through; as the grate is raiſed and lowered like the port of an embraſure. This I take to be a better contrivance than the Portcullis; becauſe the grate does not fall perpendicularly like a Portcullis; and therefore is not ſo liable to be obſtructed by an enemy. Thoſe then that would fortify a town in a proper manner, ſhould obſerve theſe directions: beſides which, they ſhould not ſuffer any lands to be tilled nor buildings to be erected within a mile at leaſt of it: the whole country round it ſhould be quite clear and open, free from all thickets, or banks, or plantations, or houſes, which may hinder the proſpect of the beſieged, and afford ſhelter to an enemy in his approaches.——Remember likewiſe that a town, where the banks of its outſide ditch are higher than the common ſurface of the earth, may be accounted very weak: for inſtead of doing you any good, they only ſerve to cover the enemy, and maſk their batteries, which they may eaſily open upon you from thence.——But let us now proceed to ſhew what is to be done within a fortified town, for its greater ſecurity againſt an enemy.

I will not treſpaſs ſo much upon your time and patience as to tell you that beſides the directions already given, it is abſolutely neceſſary to be well furniſhed with ammunition and proviſions for the garriſon; becauſe every body muſt know this, and that without ſuch ſtores all other precautions and preparations are to no purpoſe. I ſhall only ſay in general, that there are two rules which ſhould never be forgotten upon ſuch occaſions: the firſt is, to provide yourſelf with every thing that you think you may want; and the next, to prevent the enemy from availing themſelves of any thing that may be of ſervice to them in the country round about you: for which purpoſe, if there be any forage, or cattle, or any thing elſe, that you cannot carry off into the town, you ought by all means to deſtroy it. You ought likewiſe to take care that nothing be done in a tumultuous or diſorderly manner; and that every man may know his ſtation, and what part he his to act upon any occaſion. It is neceſſary therefore to give ſtrict orders that all the old men, women, children, and ſick people, ſhould keep cloſe in their houſes, in order to leave every paſſage clear and open for thoſe that are young and fit for action; ſome of whom ſhould always be under arms on the walls, others at the gates, and others at the principal paſſes in the town, to be ready upon any ſudden emergency: there ſhould be particular parties alſo which ſhould not be confined to any certain ſtation, but appointed to ſuccour any quarter where there ſhould be occaſion for it: ſo that when ſuch a diſpoſition is made, it is hardly poſſible that any tumult ſhould happen which can throw you into confuſion.——There is another thing to be remembered both in beſieging and defending a town; which is, that nothing encourages an enemy ſo much as their knowing that it has not been uſed to ſieges: for it often happens that a town is loſt through fear alone, without waiting for an aſſault. The beſiegers therefore ſhould endeavour by all means to appear as powerful and formidable as they can, and take every opportunity of making the moſt oſtentatious diſplay of their ſtrength: the beſieged, on the other hand, ought to poſt the ſtouteſt of their men in places where they are attacked with the greateſt fury, and ſuch as are neither to be impoſed upon by appearances, nor driven from their poſts by any thing but downright force of arms: for if the enemy fails in the firſt attempt, the beſieged will take courage; and the enemy perceiving they are not to be diſmayed by ſhew alone, muſt be obliged to have recourſe to other methods.——The engines which the Ancients made uſe of in the defence of a town were many; the chief of which were ſuch a threw darts and huge ſtones to a great diſtance, and with aſtoniſhing force: they made uſe of ſeveral likewiſe in beſieging towns, as the battering ram, the tortoiſe, and many others *: inſtead of which, great guns are now uſed both by beſiegers and thoſe that are beſieged. But to return.

A Governor of a town muſt take care neither to be ſurpriſed by famine, nor forced by aſſault; as to famine, I told you before that he ought to lay in a plentiful ſtock of proviſions and ammunition before the ſiege begins: but if the ſiege ſhould prove a very long one, and they ſhould fail, he muſt then deviſe ſome extraordinary method of procuring ſupplies from his friends and allies, eſpecially if a river runs through the town, as the inhabitants of Caſilinum did from the Romans: for when that place was ſo cloſely inveſted by Hannibal that they could ſend them no other proviſions, they threw great quantities of nuts into a river that ran through the middle of their town, which being carried down by the ſtream eſcaped the enemy's notice, and ſupplied the beſieged with food for a conſiderable time. The inhabitants of ſome towns which have been beſieged, in order to make the enemy deſpair of reducing them by famine, have either thrown a great quantity of bread over their walls, or gorged an ox with corn, and then turned it out to fall into the enemy's hand; that ſo when they killed it, and found its ſtomach ſo full of corn, they might imagine they had abundance in the town.——On the other hand, ſome great Generals have uſed as many artifices and expedients to diſtreſs a town. Fabius Maximus ſuffered the Campanians to ſow their fields before he inveſted their city, in order to diminiſh their Stores. When Dionyſius lay before Rhegium, he offered the people terms of accommodation, and during the treaty

---

* The Reader may ſee an account and deſcription of them all in Danet's Dictionary, under the word Arma.

prevailed upon them to furniſh him with a large quantity of proviſions: but when he had thus leſſened their ſtock and increaſed his own, he immediately blocked up the town ſo ſtraitly on every ſide, that he ſoon obliged them to give it up. Alexander the Great having a deſign upon Leucadia, firſt made himſelf maſter of the neighbouring towns, and turned all the inhabitants into that place; which at laſt filled it ſo full of people, that he preſently reduced it by famine.——As to aſſaults, I told you before that it is of the utmoſt importance to repel the firſt attack: for the Romans took many towns by ſuddenly aſſaulting them on every ſide, (which they called *aggredi urbem coronâ*) as Scipio did when he made himſelf maſter of New Carthage in Spain. If ſuch an aſſault therefore can be ſuſtained, the enemy will find it a difficult matter to ſucceed afterwards: for though they ſhould get into a town, the inhabitants may find ſome remedy, if they are not wanting to themſelves; and it has often happened even in that caſe, that the aſſailants have either been all ſlain, or driven out again; eſpecially when the inhabitants have got into garret windows, or upon the tops of houſes and turrets, and fought them from thence. To prevent this, the aſſailants commonly either ſet open the gates to make way for the others to eſcape with ſafety, or gave orders loud enough to be heard by every one, not to hurt any body but ſuch as were in arms, and to ſpare all thoſe that would lay them down: and this has frequently been of great ſervice upon ſuch occaſions.——It is an eaſy matter likewiſe to make yourſelf maſter of a town if you come ſuddenly and unexpectedly upon it; that is, if you are at ſuch a diſtance from it with your army, that the inhabitants do not ſuſpect you of any deſign of that kind, or imagine they ſhall have ſufficient notice of your approach: ſo that if you can make a long and haſty march or two, and fall unawares upon it, you are almoſt ſure to ſucceed.——I would willingly paſs over ſome tranſactions in ſilence that have happened in our own times, as it would be diſagreeable to talk of myſelf and my own exploits; and what to ſay of others I cannot well tell. Nevertheleſs, I cannot help propoſing the example of Cæſar Borgia (commonly called Duke Valentine) in this reſpect, as worthy of imitation: for when he lay with his army at Nocera, and pretended a deſign upon Camerino, he ſuddenly invaded the Duchy of Urbino, and made himſelf maſter of a ſtate in one day without any difficulty, which another man could not have reduced without beſtowing much time and expence upon it, if at all. It behoves thoſe that are beſieged likewiſe to beware of tricks and ſtratagems in the enemy, and therefore they ought not to truſt to any appearance, though ever ſo uſual and familiar to them, but to ſuſpect there is ſome miſchief lurking under it. Domitius Calvinus laying ſiege to a town, uſed to march round it every day with a good part of his army: ſo that the beſieged, imagining at laſt he did it only for exerciſe, began to grow remiſs in their guards; which Domitius perceiving, made an aſſault upon the town, and carried it. Some Generals who have had intelligence of troops that were upon their march to relieve a place they had inveſted, have dreſſed a body of their own Soldiers in the enemy's livery, and furniſhed them with the ſame colours, who being admitted into the town have preſently made themſelves maſters of it. Cimon, the Athenian, ſet fire to a Temple one night that ſtood without the gates of a town he deſigned to ſurprize: upon which, all the people running out of it to extinguiſh the flames, left the town to the mercy of the enemy. Others, having met with a party of forragers who were ſent out of a fortreſs, have put them all to the ſword, and diſguiſed ſome of their own men in their cloaths, who have afterwards given up the place to them.——Beſides theſe artifices, the Ancients uſed ſome others to draw the garriſon out of a town they had a deſign upon. When Scipio commanded the Roman armies in Africa, he was very deſirous to make himſelf maſter of ſome ſtrong places which were well garriſoned by the Carthaginians: for which purpoſe, he made a feint of aſſaulting them, but ſoon deſiſted from the attempt, and marched away again to a great diſtance, as if he was afraid of the enemy. Hannibal therefore being deceived by appearances, immediately drew all the garriſons out of them, in order to purſue him with greater force, in hopes of entirely cruſhing him: but Scipio being informed of this, ſent Maſſiniſſa with a ſufficient number of men by another route, who preſently got poſſeſſion of them. Pyrrhus laying ſiege to the Capital of Illyria (now Sclavonia) where there was a very ſtrong garriſon, pretended at laſt to deſpair of reducing it, and turning his arms againſt other towns which were not ſo well defended, obliged the enemy to draw the greater part of the garriſon out of the Capital to relieve them: after which, he ſuddenly returned thither with his army, and took it without any difficulty. Many have poiſoned wells and ſprings, and diverted the courſe of rivers, to make themſelves maſters of a town; but have not always ſucceeded in that: others have endeavoured to diſmay the inhabitants, by cauſing a report to be ſpread that they have lately gained ſome conſiderable advantage, and daily expect a powerful reinforcement. Some Generals have made themſelves maſters of towns by holding a private correſpondence with, and corrupting one party of the inhabitants; for which purpoſe they have made uſe of ſeveral methods: others have ſent one of their chief Confidants amongſt them, who, under the pretence of deſertion, has gained great credit in the town, and afterwards betrayed it, either by giving intelligence to his friend in what manner the guards were poſted, or by preventing a gate being ſhut by the breaking down a carriage in it, or by ſome other means facilitating the entrance of the enemy. Hannibal prevailed upon an officer to betray a garriſon to him belonging to the Romans, which was effected in this manner: the officer got leave to go a-hunting in the night, under a pretence tha the durſt not do it in the day-time, leſt he ſhould be taken by the enemy; and returning before morning, contrived matters ſo well that he got ſeveral of Hannibal's men admitted with him in diſguiſe, who immediately killed the guards, and delivered up one of the gates to Hannibal. Some towns have been taken by ſuffering their garriſon to make a ſally upon the enemy, and then to purſue them to too great a diſtance when they pretended to fly before them: by which they have been drawn into an ambuſh and cut off. Many Generals (and Hannibal among the reſt) have let a beſieged enemy get poſſeſſion of their camp, in order to throw themſelves betwixt them and the town, and ſo prevent their retreat. Others have impoſed upon them by pretending to raiſe the ſiege, as Phormio the Athenian did: for after he had lain ſome time before the city of Calcedon, and ravaged all the country round about it, the inhabitants ſent ambaſſadors to him, whom he received with much courteſy, and made them ſo many fair promiſes, that having lulled them into ſecurity, he decamped and marched away to a diſtance from the city; but whilſt they were weak enough to imagine they had got entirely quit of him, and had laid aſide all care of their defence upon the ſtrength of his promiſes, he ſuddenly returned, and falling upon them when they did not expect ſuch a viſit, preſently took the city. The inhabitans of a beſieged town ought likewiſe to ſecure themſelves by all means againſt any of their own townſmen whoſe fidelity they have reaſon to ſuſpect: but they may ſometimes work upon them more effectually by kindneſſes than ſeverity and harſh treatment. Marcellus knew that Lucius Bancius of Nola was inclined to favour Hannibal; yet he behaved to him with ſo much generoſity, that inſtead of an enemy he became his firm friend. They ſhould alſo be at leaſt as much upon their guard when the enemy is at ſome diſtance as when he is near at hand; and to be particularly careful in guarding thoſe places which they think are leaſt expoſed to danger: for many towns have been loſt by being aſſaulted in a part which has been thought the moſt ſecure. The reaſon of this is, either becauſe that part has been really ſtrong of itſelf, and therefore neglected; or becauſe the enemy has artfully made a ſhew of ſtorming one part with great noiſe and alarm, whilſt he was aſſaulting another in good order and ſilence. The beſieged therefore above all things ſhould take the utmoſt care to have their walls always well guarded, but eſpecially in the night-time; and not only to poſt men there, but fierce and quick-noſed dogs alſo, to ſmell out an enemy at a diſtance, and to give an alarm by their barking: for dogs and geeſe too have ſometimes been the preſervation of a fortreſs, as they were of the Capitol at Rome when it was beſieged by the Gauls. When the Spartans laid ſiege to Athens, Alcibiades ordered that whenever he ſhould hoiſt a light in the night, every guard ſhoud do the ſame, upon pain of ſevere puniſhment in caſe of neglect. Iphicrates the Athenian, finding a Centinel aſleep at his poſt, immediately killed him, and ſaid he had only left him as he found him.

Some who have been beſieged have found out different methods of conveying intelligence to their friends; as in the firſt place, by writing letters to them in cyphers, when they durſt not truſt the meſſenger with a verbal errand, and concealing the letters in ſome manner or other. The nature of the cyphers hath been deviſed and agreed upon by the parties before-hand; and the methods of concealing them various. Some have written what they had to ſay in the ſcabbard of a ſword: others have put their letters into paſte, which they have baked and given to the bearer for food upon the road: others have concealed them in their private parts: and others again under the collar of the meſſenger's dog. Some have written letters about common buſineſs, and interlined them with their main purpoſe written in a certain compoſition, which will not appear till they have been dipped in water, and held to a fire. This method has been very artfully practiſed in our own times by a perſon, who having occaſion to communicate a ſecret to ſome of his friends that lived in a town which was beſieged, and not daring to truſt any meſſenger with it, ſent letters of excommunication written in the uſual ſtile, but interlined in the manner I have been ſpeaking of; which being fixed to the doors of the Churches, were ſoon taken down, and the contents of them perfectly underſtood by thoſe who knew from whom they came by ſome particular marks: and this is a very good way; for thoſe that carry ſuch letters cannot know the ſecret contents of them, nor can there be any danger of their being diſcovered by an enemy. In ſhort there are a thouſand other methods of giving and receiving ſecret intelligence, which any man may either invent himſelf, or learn from others: but it is a much eaſier matter to convey intelligence to thoſe that are beſieged, than for them to ſend any to their friends; becauſe none can be carried out of a town, except by ſuch as pretend to be deſerters; which is a very uncertain and hazardous method, eſpecially if the enemy be vigilant and circumſpect: whereas thoſe that want to carry intelligence to the beſieged have nothing more to do than to get into the enemy's camp (which they may do under almoſt any pretence) and take their opportunity of ſlipping from thence into the town.

But let us now proceed to the preſent method of repairing and defending a breach in the walls of a town.——If you ſhould happen to be blocked up in a place where there is no ditch on the inſide of the walls, in order to prevent the enemy from entering at a breach that may be made by their artillery, you muſt make a ditch behind that part which they are battering, at leaſt ſixty feet wide, and throw up all the earth that is dug out of it towards the town, to form a good rampart, and add to the depth of the ditch: and this you muſt carry on with ſuch diligence, that when the wall is beat down, the ditch may be at leaſt ten or twelve feet deep. It is neceſſary likewiſe to flank the ditch with a caſemate at each end of it, if you have time: and if the wall be ſubſtantial enough to hold out till theſe works are finiſhed, you will be ſtronger on that ſide than in any other part of the town: for then you will have a complete ditch of that ſort which I recommended above; but if the wall be ſo weak that you cannot have time to do all this, you muſt then depend upon your men, and exert your utmoſt vigour to defend the breach. This method was purſued by the Piſans when the Florentines laid ſiege to their city: and indeed they were very well able to do it; for their walls were ſo ſtrong that they had time enough, and the ſoil upon which their city is built, is very proper for making ditches and ramparts: but if either of thoſe conveniencies had failed them, they muſt inevitably have been undone. It is the beſt way, however, as I ſaid before, to have ſuch ditches previouſly made all round the walls, for then you need not be afraid of any enemy.

The Ancients ſometimes made themſelves maſters of a town by mining: and this they did either by working a paſſage privately under ground into the middle of the place, and entering their men that way, as the Romans did at Veii; or by undermining

ing the walls only in ſuch a manner as to make them tumble down. The latter method is now moſt in uſe; which is the reaſon that towns that ſtand high are accounted weaker than others, becauſe more ſubject to be undermined: and when they are ſo, if the mines are filled with gunpowder, and a lighted match put to a train that leads to them, they not only blow up the walls, but ſplit the rocks upon which they are built, and tear a whole fortreſs to pieces at one. The way to prevent this is to build upon a plain, and to make the ditch that ſurrounds your fortreſs ſo deep that an enemy cannot work under it without coming to water, which is the beſt defence againſt mines. But if you are in a town which ſtands upon a rock or hill, the only remedy is to dig ſeveral deep wells along the foot of the wall on the inſide, which may ſerve to give vent to the powder when a mine is ſprung. There is indeed another expedient, and a very good one too, which is to countermine the enemy, provided you can diſcover their mines; but that is a very difficult matter, if they take proper care to conceal them.

The Governer of a town that is beſieged ought likewiſe to take great care that he be not ſurprized whilſt the garriſon are repoſing themſelves; as after an aſſault, or when the guards are relieved, (which is generally at the break of day in the morning, and by twilight in the evening) but eſpecially whilſt they are at their meals: for at thoſe time many towns have been ſurprized, and many ſallies made which have proved fatal to the beſiegers: upon which account, it is highly neceſſary to keep a ſtrict guard always in every quarter, and the greater part of the garriſon under arms. Another thing I muſt not forget to tell you, which is, that the chief difficulty in defending either a town or a camp is occaſioned by your being obliged to divide your men: for as the enemy may aſſault you at any time, or any place he thinks proper, with all his forces at once, you muſt keep a conſtant guard at every place: ſo that when he attacks you with his whole ſtrength, you can only defend yourſelf with part of your own *.——The beſieged are likewiſe often in danger of being totally ruined at one ſtroke; whereas the beſiegers have nothing to fear but a repulſe: upon which conſideration, ſome who have been blocked up either in a town or in a camp, have made a ſudden ſally with all their forces, though they were inferior to the enemy, and utterly diſperſed them; as Marcellus did at Nola, and Julius Cæſar in Gaul; the latter of whom being attacked in his camp by a very powerful army, and finding he was neither able to defend himſelf there, nor fall upon the enemy with his whole ſtrength, becauſe he was forced to divide it to ſecure every part of his camp, threw open the entrenchments on one ſide, and facing about that way with all his men, exerted himſelf with ſuch vigour and courage that he totally defeated the enemy. The conſtancy and reſolution of the beſieged likewiſe often diſmay and weary out the beſiegers. In the wars betwixt Pompey and Cæſar, their two armies lying near each other, and Cæſar's being in great want of proviſions, a piece of the bread which his men were forced to eat was brought to Pompey; who finding that it was made of herbs, gave ſtrict orders that none of own Soldiers ſhould ſee it, leſt they ſhould be daunted when they perceived what an enemy they had to deal with. Nothing did the Romans ſo much honour in their wars with Hannibal as their unſhaken firmneſs and conſtancy: for they never ſued for peace, nor ſhewed the leaſt ſigns of fear even in the loweſt ebb of their fortune: on the contrary, when Hannibal was almoſt at their gates, they ſold the ground upon which he was encamped at a much

---

* See Pol. Diſc. Book II. Chap. xxxii.

greater price than they would have aſked for it at any other time; and were ſo inflexible in the proſecution of the enterprizes they had in hand, that they would not raiſe the ſiege of Capua to defend Rome itſelf at a time when it was daily threatened with a ſiege.

I am ſenſible, that I have mentioned many things which ſome of you muſt have known before, and perhaps may have conſidered as well as myſelf: but this I did (as I told you) that you might more perfectly comprehend the nature of true military diſcipline and the Art of War, and for the inſtruction of ſuch of the company who may not have had the opportunity of learning them.——And now, Gentlemen, I think I have but little more to add to what I have ſaid upon this ſubject, except it be to lay down ſome general rules in military diſcipline, which yet you probably may think very obvious and common.

You muſt know then, that whatſoever is of ſervice to the enemy, muſt be prejudicial to you; and every advantage you gain is detrimental to them.——He that is moſt careful to obſerve the motions and deſigns of the enemy, and takes moſt pains in exerciſing and diſciplining his army, will be leaſt expoſed to danger, and has moſt reaſon to expect ſucceſs in his undertakings.——Never come to an engagement till you have inſpired your men with courage, and ſee them in good order and eager to fight; nor hazard a battle till they ſeem confident of victory.——It is better, if you can, to ſubdue an enemy by famine than the ſword: for in battle, Fortune has often a much greater ſhare than either prudence or valour.——No enterprize is more likely to ſucceed than one which is concealed from the enemy till it is ripe for execution.——Nothing is of greater importance in time of war than to know how to make the beſt uſe of a fair opportunity when it is offered.——Few men are brave by nature: but good diſcipline and experience make many ſo.——Good order and diſcipline in an army are more to be depended upon than courage alone.——If any of the enemy's troops deſert them, and come over to you, it is a great acquiſition, provided they prove faithful: for the loſs of them will be more felt than that of thoſe who are killed in battle; though deſerters indeed will always be ſuſpected by their new friends, and odious to their old ones.——In drawing up an army in order of battle, it is better to keep a ſufficient reſerve to ſupport your front line upon occaſion, than to extend it in ſuch a manner as to make but one rank as it were of your army.——If a General perfectly knows his own ſtrength and that of the enemy, he can hardly miſcarry.——The goodneſs of your Soldiers is of more conſequence than the number of them: and ſometimes the ſituation of the place is of greater advantage and ſecurity than the goodneſs of your Soldiers.——Sudden and unexpected accidents often throw an army into confuſion; but things that are familiar, and have come on by ſlow degrees, are little regarded: it is the beſt way therefore when you have a new enemy to deal with, to accuſtom your men to the ſight of them as often as you can by ſlight ſkirmiſhes before you come to a general engagement with them.——He whoſe troops are in diſorder whilſt they are purſuing a routed enemy, will moſt probably loſe the advantage he had gained before, and be routed in his turn.——Whoever has not taken proper care to furniſh himſelf with a ſufficient ſtock of proviſions and ammunition, bids fair to be vanquiſhed without ſtriking a ſtroke.——He that is either ſtronger in Infantry than Cavalry, or in Cavalry than Infantry, muſt chuſe his ground accordingly.——If you would know whether you have any Spies in your camp in the day-time, you have nothing more to do than to order every man to his tent.——When you are aware that the enemy my is acquainted with your deſigns, you muſt change them.——After you have conſulted many about what you ought do, confer with very few concerning what you are actually reſolved to do.——Whilſt your men are in quarters, you muſt keep them in good order by fear and puniſhment; but when they are in the field, by hopes and rewards.——Wiſe Generals never come to an engagement but when they are either compelled by downright neceſſity, or can do it with great advantage.——Take great care that the enemy may not be apprized of the order in which you deſign to draw up your army for battle: and above all things, make ſuch a diſpoſition that your firſt line may fall back with eaſe and convenience into the ſecond, and both of them into the third upon occaſion.——In time of action be ſure not to call off any of your Battalions to a different ſervice from what they were deſtined to at firſt, leſt you ſhould occaſion diſorder and confuſion in your army.——Unexpected accidents cannot well be prevented; but thoſe that are foreſeen may eaſily be obviated or remedied.——Men, arms, money, and proviſions, are the ſinews of war; but of theſe four, the two firſt are moſt neceſſary: for men and arms will always find money and proviſions; but money and proviſions cannot always raiſe men and arms.——A rich man without arms, muſt be a prey to a poor Soldier well armed. ——Accuſtom your men to abhor a ſoft and effeminate way of life, and to deſpiſe all manner of luxury, extravagance, and delicacy, either in their diet, or dreſs.

Let theſe general rules ſuffice at preſent as moſt neceſſary to be remembered, though I am ſenſible I might have introduced ſeveral other topics in the courſe of this converſation, which would have fallen in properly enough with our ſubject; for inſtance, I might have ſhewn in how many different diſpoſitions the Ancients drew up their armies, in what manner they cloathed their Soldiers, and how they employed them at different times; with ſeveral other particulars, which I thought might be omitted, not only becauſe you may have various other means of informing yourſelves of theſe things, but becauſe I did not propoſe to myſelf at firſt to enter into a minute detail of ancient military diſcipline, but only to point out the methods by which much better order and diſcipline might be eſtabliſhed in our armies than there is any where to be found at preſent: upon which account, I thought I had no occaſion to make any further mention of ancient rules and inſtitutions than what was abſolutely neceſſary for the introduction of ſuch an eſtabliſhment. I know very well that I might likewiſe have taken an opportunity of enlarging more copiouſly upon the method of exerciſing and diſciplining Cavalry, and of diſcourſing upon the nature of Sea-ſervice: for thoſe who write upon the Art of War tell us, there is a Sea-army, and a Land-army, an army of Infantry, and an army of Cavalry. Of naval affairs, however, I ſhall ſay nothing, becauſe I do not pretend to have any knowledge of them, but leave that to the Genoeſe and Venetians, who have done ſuch wonderful things by their experience in thoſe matters: nor ſhall I ſay any more of Cavalry, becauſe (as I told you before) that part of our Soldiery is the leaſt corrupted: for if your Infantry (in which the ſtrength of an army chiefly conſiſts) be well-diſciplined, your Cavalry be muſt of neceſſity be ſo too. I would adviſe every one, however, who is deſirous to raiſe and keep up a good body of Cavalry, in the firſt place, to fill his country with Stallions of the beſt breed that can be procured, and to encourage the farmers to rear colts as they do calves and mules; and in the next, (in order to promote the ſale of them) to make every one that keeps a mule keep a horſe alſo; and to oblige him that will keep but one beaſt to make uſe of a horſe:

beſides which, he ſhould oblige all thoſe that wear garments made of fine cloth to keep one horſe at leaſt. This method was taken by a certain Prince in our own memory, and in a very little time he ſaw his country abound with excellent horſes. As to any thing elſe relating to Cavalry, I muſt refer you to what I have ſaid before upon that Subject, and the preſent eſtabliſhed diſcipline.

But you may deſire perhaps to know, before we part, what qualifications a General ought to be poſſeſſed of, and I will ſatisfy you in a few words; for I cannot make choice of a more proper man than ſuch a one as is maſter of the qualifications I have already particularized and recommended: and * yet even thoſe are not ſufficient, except he has abilities to ſtrike out ſomething new of his own upon an emergency: for no man ever excelled in his profeſ-

---

* The Ancients, in reckoning up the qualities of a good General, gave Fortune a place by itſelf, and diſtinguiſhed it from Knowledge in the Art of War. "Ego ſic exiſtimo, ſays Tully, in ſummo imperatore quatuor has res ineſſe oportere, ſcientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem." He ſhews afterwards that theſe four qualities met eminently in Pompey. "Reliquum eſt ut de fellicitate quam præſtare de ſeipſo nemo poteſt, meminiſſe, & commemorare de altero poſſumus; ſicut æquum homini de poteſtate Deorum timide & pauca dicamus. Ego enim ſic exiſtimo: Maximo, Marcello, Scipioni, Mario, & cæteris Magnis Imperatoribus, not ſolum propter virtutem, ſed etiam propter fortunam, ſæpius imperia mandata, atque exercitus eſſe commiſſos. Fuit enim perfecto quibuſdam ſummis viris quædam ad amplitudinem, & gloriam, & ad res magnas bene gerendas divinitus adjuncta fortuna." Pro lege Manil. cap. x. xvi.——One might add another qualification that is requiſite in a General, and a very neceſſary one too, viz. that he ſhould be perfect in his bodily ſenſes, ſuch as ſeeing, hearing, &c. The great and deciſive battle of Yvry in France was loſt by the ſhort-ſightedneſs of one of the Generals. The Viſcount Tavannes being extremely ſhort-ſighted, had placed the ſeveral diviſions of horſe ſo cloſe to one another, that there was not only no ſpace left through which they might retire to rally in the rear of the army, after they had wheeled according to their orders: but even the very diviſions themſelves had no intervals, by means of which they might extend themſelves when they moved. So that if they ſtirred ever ſo little, they joſtled and crowded each other. An error, which not being obſerved by any body, and therefore left without remedy, very much diſtreſſed the army of the League, and put it into great confuſion.——Nay indeed, it entirely occaſioned the loſs of the battle. See Davila's Hiſt. of the Civil Wars of France, book XI.

ſion that could not do that; and if a ready and quick invention is neceſſary and honourable in any occupation, certainly it muſt be ſo in that of War above all others. Thus we ſee that any invention or new expedient, how trifling ſoever it was, is celebrated by Hiſtorians. Alexander was admired only for cauſing a cap to be held up at the point of a lance as a ſignal for decamping (inſtead of ſounding a trumpet as uſual) in order to decamp in ſilence and unobſerved. The ſame Prince is likewiſe commended for ordering his men to kneel down on the left knee to receive the enemy upon a certain occaſion, that ſo they might be able to ſuſtain the attack with greater firmneſs: by which means, he not only gained a victory, but ſuch a degree of reputation that Statues were erected to him in that attitude. But as it is now high time to put an end to this converſation, I will conclude it with returning to the point from whence we ſet out; leſt I ſhould expoſe myſelf to the ridicule which is uſually and juſtly beſtowed upon ſuch as make long digreſſions, and wander from their ſubject till they are loſt.——If you remember, Coſimo, you ſeemed to wonder that I who profeſſed to hold the Ancients in ſuch admiration, and ſo liberally beſtowed my cenſure upon others for not imitating them in matters of the greateſt conſequence, have not copied their example myſelf in the Art of War, which is my profeſſion, and in which I have ſpent ſo much of my time and ſtudies. In anſwer to this, I told you that men who have any great deſign in view, ought in the firſt place to make due preparations, and qualify themſelves in a proper manner to carry it into execution when they have a fair opporrunity of ſo doing. Now I muſt leave you to judge from the long converſation we have had to-day, whether I am maſter of ſufficent abilities to reduce our preſent military diſcicipline to the ſtandard of the Ancients, or not; and how often I muſt have revolved this matter in my mind: from whence you will be able to form a pretty good conjecture how much I have it at heart, and whether I would not actually have attempted to execute my deſign, if ever I had been favoured with a proper opportunity. For your further ſatiſfaction, and my own juſtification, and to diſcharge my promiſe in ſome meaſure, I will ſhew you how difficult a matter it is in ſome reſpects, and how eaſy in others, to copy the Ancients in this point at preſent.

I ſay then that nothing can be more eaſy, than to reduce military diſcipline to the ſtandard of the Ancients, if a Prince or State be able to raiſe an army of fifteen or twenty thouſand young men in their own dominions: on the other hand, nothing can be more difficult, if this power be wanting. Now to explain myſelf more fully, you muſt know that ſome Generals have done great things, and gained much reputation, with armies ready formed and well-diſciplined to their hands, as we might inſtance in ſeveral of the Roman Citizens, and others who have commanded armies which they found ready diſciplined, and therefore had nothing more to do but to keep them ſo, and to conduct them like able Commanders. Others, who have been no leſs renowned for their exploits, have not only been obliged to diſcipline their armies, but even to raiſe them out of the earth as it were, before they could face an enemy: and theſe certainly deſerve a much greater degree of applauſe than thoſe who had the command of veteran and well-diſciplined troops. Amongſt ſuch, we may reckon Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Tullus Hoſtilius, Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, Cyrus King of Perſia, and Gracchus the Roman, who all had their armies to raiſe and diſcipline before they could lead them into the field: and yet they were enabled to effect theſe things by their own abilities, and by having ſubjects of ſuch a diſpoſition, that they could diſcipline and train them up as they pleaſed. But it would have been uterly impoſſible that any one of them, how great ſoever his merit and qualifications might have been, ſhould ever have performed any thing memorable in a foreign country, the inhabitants of which were corrupt and adverſe to all good order and ſubordination. It is not ſufficient therefore in Italy to know how to command an army already raiſed and diſciplined; a General muſt firſt raiſe and diſcipline it himſelf, before he puts himſelf at the head of it: but nobody can do that except a Prince who is poſſeſſed of large territories, and has a great number of ſubjects, which I am not; nor did I ever yet, or ever can command any but foreign armies, compoſed of Soldiers who owed me no natural obedience: and whether it is poſſible to eſtabliſh ſuch diſcipline as I have been recommending amongſt troops of that kind, I ſubmit to your conſideration. Do you think I could ever make theſe men carry heavier arms than they have been uſed to; and not only arms but proviſions for two or three days, and a ſpade or mattock into the bargain? Could I ever make them dig, or keep them whole days together at their exerciſe, in order to fit them for the field? Could I keep them from gaming, drinking, whoring, ſwearing, and thoſe other vices which are got to ſuch a head amongſt the Soldiery of theſe times? How long muſt it be before I could eſtabliſh ſuch order, diſcipline, and obedience amongſt them, that if there ſhould happen to be a tree full of ripe fruit in the middle of the camp, not one of them ſhould dare to touch it; of which ſort we meet with ſeveral inſtances amongſt the Ancients? What rewards could I promiſe them of ſufficient weight to make them love me? or what threats could I uſe to make them fear me, when they know that when the war is over I ſhall have nothing more to do with them? How could

I ever make thoſe aſhamed of any thing, who have no ſhame in them? How can they reſpect me, when they hardly know my face? By what God or what Saint muſt they ſwear? by him whom they worſhip, or thoſe whom they blaſpheme? What God they worſhip I know not; nor do I know what Saint they do not blaſpheme. How could I hope they would ever obſerve any promiſe, when I ſaw they did not pay the leaſt regard to their word; or imagine they would reverence man, when they ſhew ſo much diſhonour to God? What good impreſſion then could I ſtamp upon ſo rotten and corrupt a maſs?—If you object that the Swiſs and Spaniards are good Soldiers, I freely confeſs that I think them much better than the Italians; but if you have attended to what I have been ſaying, and conſider the diſcipline of both thoſe nations, you will find they fall very far ſhort of the Ancients in many reſpects. The ſuperiority of the Swiſs is owing to their ancient inſtitutions, and the want of Cavalry, as I told you before; and that of the Spaniards, to neceſſity: for as they generally carry on their wars in foreign parts, they cannot hope to eſcape if they loſe a battle, and therefore muſt either conquer or die. This it is that makes them reſolute Soldiers; but they are very deficient however in ſeveral other reſpects: for their chief, if not their only excellence, conſiſts in ſtanding firm to receive a charge from the puſh of a pike, or the point of a Sword: and ſhould any man attempt to inſtruct them in what they are ſtill wanting, eſpecially if he be a foreigner, he would find all his endeavours to no purpoſe.——As to the Italians, their Princes have been ſo weak and puſillanimous for a long time, that they were not able to introduce any good military inſtitution; and not being reduced to it by neceſſity like the Spaniards, they have attempted nothing of themſelves; ſo that they are now become the ſcorn and deriſion of the world. The people indeed are not to be blamed for this, but their

Princes, who have been juſtly puniſhed for it, and loſt their dominions without being able to ſtrike a ſtroke in their defence. To confirm what I have ſaid, let me deſire you to recollect how many wars there have been in Italy ſince it was invaded by Charles VIII. of France: and though wars generally make men good Soldiers, yet the longer theſe wars laſted, the worſe were our officers and private men. This was owing to the nature of their military diſcipline and inſtitutions, which have long been very bad, and ſtill continue ſo: and what is ſtill worſe, there is no perſon that is able to reform them. It is in vain therefore to think of ever retrieving the reputation of the Italian arms by any other method than what I have preſcribed, and by the co-operation of ſome powerful Princes in Italy: for then the ancient diſcipline might be introduced again amongſt raw honeſt men who are their own Subjects; but it never can amongſt a parcel of corrupted debauched raſcals and foreigners. No Sculptor, how ſkilful ſoever in his art, can hope to make a good Statue out of a block of marble that has been mangled and ſpoiled before by ſome bungler; but he will be ſure to ſucceed if he has a freſh block to work upon.

Before our Italian Princes were ſcourged by the Ultramontanes, they thought it ſufficient for a Prince to write a handſome letter, or return a civil anſwer; to excel in drollery and repartee; to undermine and deceive; and to ſet themſelves off with jewels and lace; to eat and ſleep in greater magnificence and luxury than their neighbours; to ſpend their time in wanton dalliance and laſcivious pleaſures; to keep up a haughty kind of State, and grind the faces of their Subjects; to indulge themſelves in indolence and inactivity; to diſpoſe of their military honours and preferments to Pimps and Paraſites; to neglect and deſpiſe merit of every kind to browbeat thoſe that endeavoured to point :y thing that was ſalutary or praiſe-worthy; to have their words and ſayings looked upon as oracles;

cles; not foreſeeing, (weak and infatuated as they were) that by ſuch a conduct they were making a rod for their own backs, and expoſing themſelves to the mercy of the firſt invader. To this were owing the dreadful alarms, the diſgraceful defeats. and the aſtoniſhing loſſes they ſuſtained in the year one thouſand four hundred and ninety-four: and hence it came to paſs that three of the moſt powerful States in Italy were ſo often ravaged and laid waſte in thoſe times. But it is ſtill more deplorable to ſee that thoſe Princes, who are yet left in poſſeſſion of any dominions, are ſo far from taking warning from the downfal of others, that they purſue the ſame courſe, and live in the ſame ſort of miſrule and fatal ſecurity; not conſidering that Princes in former times, who were deſirous either to acquire new dominion, or at leaſt to preſerve their own, ſtrictly obſervéd all thoſe rules which I have laid down and recommended in the courſe of this converſation, and that their chief endeavours were to inure their bodies to all manner of hardſhip and fatigue, and to fortify their minds againſt danger and the fear of death. Thus Julius Cæſar, Alexander of Macedon, and many other great men and heroic Princes whom I have mentioned before, always fought at the head of their own armies, always marched with them on foot, and carried their own arms; and if any of them ever loſt their power, they loſt their life with it at the ſame time, and died with the ſame reputation and glory which they had always maintained whilſt they lived. So that, how much ſoever we condemn the inordinate thirſt of dominion in ſome of them, we cannot reproach any of them with ſoftneſs and effeminacy, or accuſe them of having lived in ſo delicate or indolent a manner, as to enervate and make them unfit to reign over mankind. If then our Princes would read and duly conſider the lives and fortunes of theſe great men, one would think it impoſſible they ſhould not alter their conduct, or that their dominions ſhould long continue in the feeble and languiſhing condition they are in at preſent.

But as you complained of your Militia in the beginning of this converſation, I muſt beg leave to tell you, that if you had formed it upon the model, and exerciſed it in the manner I have recommended, and it had not anſwered your expectation, you would then indeed have juſt reaſon for your complaint; but as you have neither formed nor diſciplined it in that manner, you yourſelf are more properly to be blamed, if it has proved an abortion inſtead of a perfect birth. The Venetians, and the Duke of Ferrara alſo, made a good beginning, but they did not perſevere: ſo that if they likewiſe miſcarried, it is to be imputed to their own miſmanagement, and not the defects of their men: for I will venture to affirm, that the firſt State in Italy that ſhall take up this method, and purſue it, will ſoon become maſter of the whole Province, and ſucceed as Philip of Macedon did; who having learnt from Epaminondas the Theban the right method of forming and diſciplining an army, grew ſo powerful, whilſt the other States of Greece were buried in indolence and luxury, and wholly taken up in plays and banquets, that he conquered them all in a few years, and left his Son ſuch a foundation to build upon, that he was able to ſubdue the whole world. Whoever therefore deſpiſes this advice (whether he be a Prince or Governor of a Commonwealth) has but little regard for himſelf or his country: and for my own part, I cannot help complaining of Fortune, which ſhould either not have ſuffered me to have known theſe things, or given me power to put them in execution; which is a thing I cannot hope for now I am ſo far advanced in years. For which reaſon, I have freely communicated my thoughts to you of this matter, as young men and well qualified not only to inſtil ſuch advice into the ears of your Princes, if you approve of it, but to aſſiſt them in carrying into execution whenever a proper opportunity ſhall offer: and let me conjure you not to deſpair of ſucceſs, ſince this Province ſeems deſtined to revive Arts and Sciences which have ſeemed long ſince dead; as we ſee it has already raiſed Poetry, Painting, and Sculpture as it were from the grave. As to myſelf indeed, I cannot expect to ſee ſo happy a change at my time of life: but if fortune had indulged me ſome years ago with a territory fit for ſuch an undertaking, I think I ſhould ſoon have convinced the world of the excellency of the ancient military diſcipline; for I would either have encreaſed my own dominions with glory, or at leaſt not have loſt them with infamy and diſgrace*.

---

* "After all, (ſays Dr. Leland in a Note upon his Life of Philip of Macedon) a ſcrupulous regard to ſyſtematical rules, and pedantically reducing war to a Science, ſometimes proves a fatal enemy to that enthuſiaſtic ardour, ſome ſpark of which muſt neceſſarily have a ſhare in greatneſs of all kinds, and particularly, in military greatneſs. Where the lively ſenſe of honour, and the true patriot Spirit which ſhould animate a Soldier, are wanting, it may ſerve to extinguiſh the ſenſe of ſhame, and the fear of diſgrace, by affording a fair pretence for juſtifying an inſtance of inactive conduct, or the declining an hazardous and dangerous enterprize. But when an exact knowledge of the military art is united with more elevated qualities, then it becomes really valuable. Of this, the preſent age hath an illuſtrious inſtance in a Prince, who muſt be acknowledged to bear a ſtrong and ſtriking reſemblance to the Macedonian, in all the bright and glorious parts of his Character; to poſſeſs the ſame exalted genius, the ſame penetration, the ſame indefatigable vigour, the ſame firmneſs and greatneſs of mind, the ſame boldneſs in enterprize, the ſame taſte for the polite arts, and the ſame regard to Learning and its Profeſſors. Like Philip, in his moſt diſtreſſed condition, his abilities have been employed in bearing up with an unconquered ſpirit againſt the united power of many different enemies ſurrounding him with their formidable numbers. But as his difficulties have been infinitely greater; ſo his abilities in triumphing over them, have hitherto appeared unparalleled: the preſent age beholds them with aſtoniſhment; poſterity muſt ſpeak of them with delight and admiration." Such is the magnanimous Prince whom we may juſtly call the greateſt Hero (in the true ſenſe of the word) that this or any other age has ever produced. As a Soldier, a Politician, a Legiſlator, a Philoſopher, a Poet, he leaves Julius Cæſar, Alexander, Charles XII. of Sweden, &c. at a long interval behind him.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH AND LAST BOOK OF THE ART OF WAR.

# THE

# MARRIAGE of BELPHEGOR.

## A NOVEL.

### The ARGUMENT.

*Belphegor, an Arch-devil, is ſent into this World by Pluto, and obliged to marry. He takes a wife, but not being able to ſupport her inſolence and extravagance, chuſes rather to return to Hell than to live any longer with her.*

IT is recorded in the old hiſtories of Florence, that a certain devout perſon, who was held in great veneration for the ſanctity of his life, being one day at prayers in his cloſet, had a viſion, in which he ſaw numbers of Souls deſcending into hell: the much greater part of which complained it was owing to their wives that they were ſent thither: at which, Minos, Æacus, Rhadamanthus, and the reſt of the infernal Judges were not a little aſtoniſhed. But though they looked upon it for ſome time only as a malicious ſlander raiſed upon married women; yet, as the complaint grew more and more frequent every day, they at laſt acquainted Pluto with it: upon which, he reſolved to have the matter thoroughly diſcuſſed in his Privy Council, and, after mature deliberation, to take ſuch meaſures as ſhould ſeem moſt expedient, to diſcover whether there was any truth in the complaint, or whether it was a mere calumny. The Council therefore being aſſembled, Pluto harangued them in this manner.

"Although, right truſty and well-beloved, we hold our dominions by the decree of Heaven and irrevocable deſtiny; and therefore are accountable to no other power for our actions: nevertheleſs, as it is a point of wiſdom even in the greateſt potentates to rule according to law, and to take the opinion of able Counſellors, eſpecially in matters of high concern; we are determined to be adviſed by you in what manner we ought to conduct ourſelves in an affair, which otherwiſe perhaps may bring infamy and reproach upon ourſelves and our Government. For though, indeed, the Souls of almoſt all married men which deſcend into theſe realms complain that it is owing to their wives; yet are we unwilling to be too haſty in giving credit to ſo ſtrange a report, leſt we ſhould expoſe ourſelves to cenſure, as either too merciful and indulgent in ſparing offenders who juſtly deſerve puniſhment, or too rigid and ſevere in condemning the innocent. For as one extreme argues weakneſs, and the other injuſtice, and we are equally deſirous to avoid the ſcandal that may reſult from either (if we could hit upon any proper expedient) we have called you together to demand your advice and aſſiſtance in making due proviſion that our Government, which hitherto has been renowned throughout all ages for the juſtice and impartiality of its decrees, may for ever enjoy the ſame unſpotted reputation."

The matter ſeemed of the utmoſt importance to the whole Council, and worthy of the matureſt deliberation: but though they all agreed that it was abſolutely neceſſary to ſift out the truth, yet they differed in the means which ought to be taken for that purpoſe: ſome thought it would be the beſt way to ſend a Devil in human ſhape into this world, to inform himſelf perſonally of the truth or falſity of ſo common a report; others ſaid it would be better, in their opinion, to ſend more than one, that ſo they might form a true judgment from their ſeveral accounts; a third party were of opinion they might ſpare themſelves the trouble of ſending any at all, by torturing the Souls of married men till they told the whole truth: the majority however agreeing in the firſt opinion, the reſt acquieſced in it, and it was reſolved accordingly to ſend ſome one particular Devil upon that errand: but as none of them appeared to be very fond of ſuch an expedition, nor offered their ſervice as volunteers, it was determined that the affair ſhould be decided by lot; and the lot fell upon Belphegor, one of the Arch-devils, but once an Arch-angel and ſpirit of light before his fall from Heaven. Belphegor however did not much reliſh the employment that had fallen to his lot: but as it was the unanimous decree of Pluto and the whole Council, he ſubmitted to the commands they laid upon him, and to take up with ſuch appointments as they ſhould think proper: which were, that he ſhould have an hundred thouſand ducats paid him down in ready money as ſoon as he entered upon his Commiſſion, to introduce him into this world with a handſome equipage in the form of a man, and to enable him to marry ſuch a wife as he pleaſed, with whom he was to live ten years: at the expiration of which term he was to return to Hell, to give Pluto a true account from his own experience of the happineſs or unhappineſs of a matrimonial life. It was likewiſe another condition annexed to his commiſſion, that he ſhould be ſubject, as long as he was a ſojourner upon earth, to all the miſery, diſtreſs, affliction, and paſſions that are the lot and inheritance of mortal man; ſuch as ſickneſs, and pain, and poverty, and exile, and impriſonment, and ſorrow of all ſorts, except he could find means to elude them by artifice.

Belphegor then having received the money and engaged to ſubmit to theſe conditions, ſet out for the upper world with a train of devils in the diſguiſe of Servants, and ſoon after his arrival upon earth made a magnificent entry into Florence (a city which he choſe to live in above all others for the ſake of improving his fortune) where he aſſumed the name of Don Roderigo of Caſtile, and took a very fine houſe in the ſuburbs of All Saints. But to conceal his real quality, he gave out that he left Spain when he was but a boy to make a voyage into the Levant, and having reſided at Aleppo ever ſince, had acquired a conſiderable fortune there; but that he had now retired from buſineſs with a deſign to marry and ſettle in Italy, as a country which he had heard much celebrated for the humanity and politeneſs of the people, and thought he ſhould like it better than any other in the world. Now Roderigo ſeemed a very handſome man about thirty years of age, and as he lived in great ſplendour and magnificence, the Florentines were ſoon convinced he muſt be exceeding rich: upon which account, ſeveral of the nobility, who had many daughters and but ſmall eſtates, courted his alliance. After ſome time therefore he made choice of a moſt beautiful young lady, whoſe name was Honeſta, the daughter of Amerigo Donati, who alſo had three other daughters and three ſons, all grown up: but notwithſtanding the Donati were one of the nobleſt and moſt honourable families in Florence, yet Amerigo having ſo many children, beſides the dignity of his rank to ſupport in a proper manner, was poor and could give his daughter little or no fortune. Roderigo however married the young Lady, and celebrated his nuptials in the moſt ſplendid and oſtentatious manner, being ſubject to vanity and all other human paſſions by the conditions he had ſubmitted to before he left the infernal regions. Soon after his wedding, he likewiſe entered into all the pleaſures and follies of the age, and ſpent vaſt ſums of money to make himſelf popular and much talked of: beſides which, he grew ſo paſſionately fond of his wife, that he was almoſt diſtracted whenever ſhe happened to be either indiſpoſed or diſpleaſed at any thing. But Madam Honeſta, beſides the reſt of her fortune, which conſiſted chiefly, if not altogether, in her beauty and the nobility of her blood, brought likewiſe ſuch a portion of pride and inſolence with her; that Roderigo, who was a competent judge (as he was well acquainted with both parties) thought ſhe excelled Lucifer himſelf in thoſe amiable qualities: for when ſhe found he was ſo enamoured of her that ſhe could make him jump over a ſtraw if ſhe pleaſed, ſhe laid aſide all manner of affection and regard, and would call him the moſt opprobrious and provoking names ſhe could think of whenever he denied her any thing, how unreaſonable ſoever it was to aſk it; which kind of treatment at laſt made poor Roderigo almoſt weary of his life: nevertheleſs, the reſpect he had for her father, her brothers, and the reſt of her relations, the conſideration of his marriage vow, and above all, the tenderneſs he ſtill had for her, made him reſolve to bear all with patience, and to keep her in temper if poſſible. For this purpoſe, he not only ſpent immenſe ſums to gratify her vanity with the richeſt cloaths that could be got for money, and to indulge her in every new faſhion that came up in a city where faſhions change as often as the wind; but gave handſome marriage-portions to all her Siſters, ſent one of her brothers with a cargo of fine cloath into the Levant, another with Silks into France and Spain, and ſet up the third in a Goldſmith's Shop at Florence. Beſides this, in the time of Carnival, and at the Feſtival of St. John, when all the nobility and rich Citizens made great feaſts and entertainments for their friends, Madam Honeſta took ſpecial care to ſee that her huſband ſhould exceed all others in luxury and profuſion. Yet all theſe expences, heavy as they were, he bore with patience to keep peace at home; nor would he ever have repined at them, if he could but have lived quietly in his own houſe, till all was ſpent. But vain were his endeavours; for ſuch was her extravagance and inſolent behaviour that brought him into many diſtreſſes and inconveniencies, and they were ſo inſupportable, that neither man-ſervant nor maid-ſervant could bear to ſtay in the houſe above two or three days at moſt: ſo that Roderigo was almoſt at his wits end, when he ſaw that not only his hired ſervants, but even the very devils themſelves whom he had brought with him into this world in the ſhape of men, deſerted him, and choſe rather to return to hell, and endure any ſort of torment there, than to live upon earth under the hatches of ſuch a vixen.

In theſe comfortleſs circumſtances, Roderigo having at laſt got almoſt to the bottom of his purſe by the aſſiſtance of his good wife, began to feed himſelf with the hopes of having ſome returns from the cargoes he had ſent into France, Spain, and the Levant: but as his credit was ſtill good, he reſolved to keep up to his rank and uſual manner of living. For this purpoſe, he borrowed money of the merchants and bankers, and gave them notes and bonds for it: but as many of them were circulating round the city, this tranſaction was publicly known; and, to complete his ruin, when his credit was become low, he received intelligence by the ſame poſt that his wife's brother, whom he had ſent into the Levant, having ſold his cargo, had loſt all the money at play; and alſo that the Ship in which the other brother was returning with a cargo of merchandize he had received in exchange for his own, had foundered at Sea, without having been inſured, and that is brother-in-law was drowned. As ſoon therefore as this came to be publicly known, Roderigo's creditors met privately; but not daring to arreſt him before his notes became payable, though they looked upon him as utterly ruined, determined to have him narrowly watched leſt he ſhould ſhew them a light pair of heels. Roderigo, on the other hand, ſeeing his affairs in ſo deſperate a ſituation that there was no remedy left, and remembering the rigorous conditions of his commiſſion, reſolved to run away at all events; and mounting his horſe early one morning, immediately fled out of the city, through the gate of Prato near which he lived; but as ſoon as his creditors heard he was gone off, they took the alarm, and having obtained leave from the Magiſtrates to ſeize him wherever he ſhould be found, they not only ſent bailiffs to purſue him, but rode after him themſelves as faſt as they could.

Roderigo had not got above a mile from the city when he perceived they were coming full cry after him, and ſeeing himſelf in great danger, reſolved to leave the high road, and traverſe the country to ſeek his fortune, if he ſhould be happy enough to make his eſcape. But when he got into the fields, he found himſelf ſo entangled amongſt the ditches and encloſures, that he was forced to quit his horſe and take to his heels; and ſkulking about from one field to another, under the cover of the vines and reeds with which that country abounds, he at laſt arrived at the houſe of one Giovanni Matteo del Bricca, a farmer and tenant to Meſſer Giovanni del Bene, whom he found in the yard giving fodder to his cattle; and recommending himſelf to his protection, promiſed him a great reward, and that he would make him a rich man, if he would conceal him from his creditors, who were purſuing him in order to throw him into jail; where he might lie rotting all the days of his life if they ſhould catch him: to gain credit to which promiſes he aſſured him he would give him ſuch proof of his ability to perform them, that if he was not ſufficiently convinced of it before they parted; he would freely give him leave to deliver him up into the hands of enemies.——Now this Matteo, though a peaſant, was a ſharp, ſenſible fellow; and has he thought he ſhould be wanting to himſelf and his family if he loſt ſo fair an opportunity of making his fortune; and could come to no harm if he did not ſucceed by charitably endeavouring to ſhelter a man in diſtreſs; after a ſhort pauſe told Roderigo he would afford him protection: for which purpoſe he covered him up cloſe in a heap of ſtraw that lay before the barn door, and threw a parcel of bruſhwood and reeds over it, which he had brought out of the fields for fuel. Roderigo was ſcarcely concealed when his creditors arrived; but though they made a very ſtrict enquiry after him, they could get nothing more out of Matteo than that he had neither ſeen nor heard of any ſuch perſon: ſo that they ſoon went a way; and having ſearched for him all over the country for the ſpace of two or three days to no purpoſe, they at laſt returned to Florence. Matteo, as ſoon as the ſtorm was blown over, took his gueſt out of the ſtraw and demanded the performance of his promiſe: upon which, Roderigo ſaid he was truly ſenſible of the great obligations he lay under to him, and would certainly be as good as his word; and to convince him of his ſincerity, he told him who he was, upon what errand he came into this world, and what ſort of a wife he had been bleſſed with: adding that (as he deſigned to make him a rich man) whenever he heard of any woman in the neighbourhood that was poſſeſſed with a

Devil, he might be aſſured that he was the Devil that poſſeſſed her, and would never quit her till his friend Matteo came to drive him away; which would give him an opportunity of making his own terms with her relations: after which promiſe, he immediately took his leave and went about his buſineſs.

Not many days after it happened that the daughter of Ambrogio Amadei, and wife of Buonaiuto Tebalducci, citizens of Florence, was poſſeſſed with a Devil: upon which, her huſband and parents had recourſe to all the remedies that are generally made uſe of upon ſuch occaſions: and amongſt the reſt, they not only applied St. Zanobi's ſkull to her head, but wrapped her up in St. Gaulbert's cloke: at all which Roderigo laughed in his ſleeve. Every body, however, was fully convinced that the woman was really poſſeſſed with a Devil, and that her diſtemper was not owing to vapours, or any whim of that ſort: for ſhe talked Latin, diſputed in Philoſophy, and diſcovered the private frailties and infirmities of ſeveral godly people: particularly thoſe of a righteous Monk, who, amongſt the reſt of his peccadiloes, had kept a handſome girl above four years in his cell, under the diſguiſe of a young lay-brother: all which things afforded matter of great ſurprize to every body that heard her. In the mean time her father Amadei was in great affliction, and having tried all remedies to no purpoſe, began to deſpair of a cure, when Matteo, luckily hearing of her caſe, came to wait upon him, and aſſured him he would diſpoſſeſs his daughter if he would give him five hundred florins to buy a little bit of land at Perettola. Theſe terms being readily accepted by her father, Matteo having in the firſt place cauſed two or three Maſſes to be ſung, and gone through certain other devout ceremonies to give a good colour to the matter, put his mouth cloſe to the Lady's ear and ſaid in a low voice; "Roderigo, I am come to deſire you will perform the promiſe you made me:" "That I will do moſt willingly, anſwered Roderigo; but this job will not be ſufficient to make you ſo rich as I would have you; and therefore as ſoon as I go out of this woman I will enter into King Charles's daughter of Naples, and never leave her till you come to beat up my quarters: for this ſervice you may make your own conditions, and when you have done your buſineſs there, pray give me no further trouble:" after which, he immediately quitted the Lady, to the great joy and aſtoniſhment of the whole city. Not long after, the above mentioned Princeſs was in the ſame condition; and though the King her father had recourſe not only to all manner of phyſical remedies, but the aſſiſtance of the moſt pious and able Divines, it ſignified nothing: but hearing what feats Matteo had done, he ſent for him to Naples. Matteo now thinking his fortune made, joyfully obeyed the ſummons, and arriving in that city, ſoon drove the Devil entirely out of the Princeſs; for which the King made him a preſent of fifty thouſand ducats: but before he took his leave of Matteo, he told him, that as he had honeſtly fulfilled his promiſe, he no longer thought himſelf under any obligation to him; and therefore hoped for his own ſake he would trouble him no more: for if he did, he would be a greater enemy to him than ever he had been a friend. Matteo then returned to Florence, and flattered himſelf with the hopes of enjoying his riches in peace all the reſt of his life, without any thoughts of ever offending his friend Roderigo. But it ſeems he reckoned without his hoſt: for ſoon after, a daughter of Lewis VII. King of France was likewiſe poſſeſſed with a Devil; the news of which greatly diſturbed Matteo, when he conſidered the King's authority.

authority on one hand, the threats of Roderigo on the other, and took it for granted that he ſhould be applied to upon the reputation of his late ſucceſs. The King of France finding all other means were of no ſervice, and being informed of Matteo's abilities in matters of exorciſm, firſt diſpatched one of his Meſſengers to deſire he would repair to his Court: but Matteo pretending to be dangerouſly ill and not able to travel ſo far, his Majeſty ſent to requeſt the Signiory of Florence would force him to come. Being thus obliged to ſet out for Paris much againſt the grain, he repreſented to his Majeſty upon his arrival at Court, that though indeed he had met with ſome ſucceſs in ejecting Devils out of ſuch as were poſſeſſed, he could not anſwer for doing the ſame in all caſes, as ſome of them were ſo ſtubborn and contumacious that they neither regarded threats, nor charms, nor any kind of religious ceremonies: But that ſince it was his Majeſty's pleaſure, he would uſe his beſt endeavours to ſerve him; and hoped if he failed he would impute it to nothing but abſolute inability. The king, however, in anſwer to this ſpeech, told him in plain terms that ſince he had cured others, he was ſure he could cure his daughter; and if he did not, he ſhould certainly be hanged: at which Matteo fell into a fit of trembling, and was ready to ſink into the earth. But collecting his ſpirits, he deſired he might be introduced to the Princeſs; and approaching gently to her ear, recommended himſelf to Roderigo's mercy in the moſt humble terms, conjuring him to remember the ſervices he had formerly done him, and conſider how ungrateful it would be to abandon his old friend in ſuch diſtreſs. You covetous raſcal, ſaid Roderigo, how dare you come near me any more after the caution I gave you when we parted laſt? Have you not been already well paid for the ſervices you upbraid me with? am I to help you out of every ſcrape you get into? Indeed, Sir, I ſhall convince you that I can be an enemy as well as a friend; for I will take care you ſhall be decently tucked up before I leave this place. Poor Matteo ſeeing himſelf thus left in the lurch, reſolved to try ſome other method; and having deſired the Princeſs might withdraw, told the King there were ſome Spirits, as he ſaid before, of ſo obſtinate and refractory a turn that there was no way of dealing with them, and that this was one of them; that however he had one expedient left, and if it ſucceeded, he hoped he ſhould be entitled to his Majeſty's favour: if not, he was at his mercy, and humbly implored him to ſpare a man who had been guilty of no crime: after which, he deſired the King would be pleaſed to cauſe a very large Stage to be erected in the Church of Nôtre Dame, capable of holding all the Nobility and Clergy in the City, and to have it covered with cloth of gold: that he would likewiſe order an Altar to be ſet up in the middle of it, and condeſcend to come thither himſelf with all his Clergy and Nobles richly habited, and in royal proceſſion, on the next Sunday morning: and laſtly, that after a Solemn Maſs had been celebrated, he would graciouſly be pleaſed to ſend for the Princeſs thither. He alſo deſired there might be twenty perſons at leaſt placed on one ſide of the Church-yard with trumpets, drums, horns, hautboys, and all ſorts of muſical inſtruments, ready to ſtrike up and advance towards the Stage when he threw up his hat into the air; all which, with ſome other ſecret remedies he was in poſſeſſion of, he hoped would not fail to ſend the Devil a packing. Every thing then being in readineſs on Sunday morning (as he had requeſted), the Stage full of the Clergy and Nobility, the Church-yard of common people, and Maſs ſung, the Princeſs was conducted thither by two Biſhops and a magnificent train of Nobles. But when Roderigo ſaw ſuch a multitude got together, and all the reſt of the apparatus, he began to wonder what was the matter, and muttered to himſelf, "What the plague is this Scoundrel about? Does he think to fright me with a Mob and a parade of Biſhops? Surely he muſt know I have ſeen all the pomp of Heaven, and the confuſion of Hell, and am not to be ſcared out of my wits in this manner. But I will ſwinge the rogue for it." Matteo, however, drawing up to the Princeſs's ear, humbly beſought him to quit her. "Quit her, ſaid Roderigo, this is a pleaſant conceit indeed! Pray what is all this apparatus for? Doſt think to elude my power and the King's reſentment by theſe gim-cracks? But I will ſurely have thee hanged, ungrateful wretch as thou art."—— After repeated ſupplications on one ſide, and variety of hard names on the other, Matteo finding there was no more time to be loſt, threw up his hat into the air: upon which, the muſicians immediately ſtruck up, the drums beat, the trumpets ſounded, the mob ſhouted, and advanced all together towards the Stage, to the great aſtoniſhment of Roderigo, who began to tremble like an aſpin leaf, and ſoftly ſaid to Matteo, "What is the meaning of this?" "Alas, anſwered Matteo, ſeemingly much frighted, your wife is coming!"——No ſooner did Roderigo hear the name of Wife but he loſt all preſence of mind, and without ſtaying to reflect that what Matteo ſaid could not poſſibly be true, he quitted the Princeſs in a moment and ran away as faſt as his legs could carry him; chuſing rather to go back again to Hell for eaſe, than to return to the thraldom of Matrimony, in which he had experienced ſuch torment and ſo many heart-breaking ſorrows.—— In this manner Belphegor having luckily eſcaped from his wife, made what haſte he could to the infernal Regions, to inform Pluto of what he had both ſeen and felt himſelf; and aſſure him he might depend upon the truth of what he had ſo often heard from the Souls of married men, but could not believe: and Matteo having thus outwitted the Devil, joyfully returned to his houſe at Peretтola.

# POSTHUMOUS WORKS

OF

# NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.

CONTAINING

I. A Diſcourſe concerning the proper ways and means of reforming the Government of Florence, written by the command of Pope Leo X.

II. Letters written by him in the name of that Republic, upon different occaſions, whilſt he was Secretary of State to it.

## ADVERTISEMENT to the READER.

THAT nothing might be omitted which could in any wiſe contribute to make this work uſeful and agreeable to the Public, the Editor has added a Tranſlation of ſome Poſthumous writings before-mentioned in the Life of Machiavel, and publiſhed in Italian at London in 1760, under the title of *Opere Inedite di Niccolò Machiavelli*; of which the Reader will meet with a more particular account in the following Preface to the original.

# THE

# PREFACE.

ABOUT ten years ago an Engliſh Gentleman travelling through Tuſcany, had the good fortune to meet with the following valuable pieces in manuſcript, which had never been publiſhed, though long and earneſtly ſought for, and deſired by the curious and learned. Phillippo Nerli had ſeen and read the Diſcourſe concerning the Ways and Means of reforming the Government of Florence whilſt he lived, as appears from a paſſage in the ſeventh book of his Commentaries, p. 137. Jacopo Nardi mentions it in the ſeventh book of his Hiſtory, p. 382. of the Florence Edition: it is taken notice of likewiſe by Jacopo Gaddi in his book De Scriptoribus non Eccleſiaſticis, par. II. p. 9; and indeed almoſt all thoſe that have ſpoken of the Life and Writings of Machiavel, have ſaid ſomething of it. The Manuſcript however lay hid in a private corner of the famous Gaddian Library above two hundred and forty years, and till very lately eluded the moſt diligent ſearches of the Literati, who juſtly ſet the higheſt value upon the productions of ſo great a genius.——The Reader will here alſo find thirty-nine Letters, written by Machiavel, in the name of the Republic of Florence, whilſt he was Secretary of State there: but theſe are only a part of a large volume in his own hand-writing, ſtill preſerved in the Chancery of the City, as appears from an authentic Document which I have ſubjoined to the end of them.

How the Engliſh Gentleman above mentioned came at theſe Manuſcripts, I know not, becauſe he is now dead: but this I know, that the ſpirit and genius of the Author is eaſy to be diſtinguiſhed both in the Diſcourſe and in the Letters. In the former, we diſcover the honeſt boldneſs of a free Republican; in the latter, all the marks of juſtice, prudence, humanity, and mercy; and in both, that ſagacity and penetration which manifeſtly ſhew him to have been a man of the moſt conſummate knowledge and abilities in Civil Government. Had Machiavel never written the Prince, or if that piece had had the good fortune either to have been interpreted with more judgment, or not been fallen upon by the moſt virulent adverſaries, he would have eſcaped that infamy and reproach which are now thrown upon him by the greater part of mankind: for theſe writings evidently demonſtrate that he was not only a moſt ſtrenuous defender and aſſerter of the liberties of his country, but a lover of juſtice and humanity, and eminently endowed with all other ſocial virtues. But could ſuch a man as he was, a man born, educated, and advanced to great and honourable preferments in a free State, who was afterwards reduced to extreme poverty and diſtreſs by the machinations of the Medici and their party, who was engaged in one conſpiracy with Aghoſtino Capponi and Pietro Paolo Boſcoli againſt Guiliano and Lorenzo de Medici, and in another with Luigi Alamanni and Zanobi Buondelmonte againſt Cardinal Giulio; could ſuch a man ever think of writing a book with a deſign to enſlave his country, when it had heaped honours and preferments upon him without end or meaſure, and that only to make Lorenzo de Medici, Duke of Urbino, Soverign Lord over it, againſt whom he had entered into a Conſpiracy not long before? Could a man who uſed to frequent the celebrated Aſſemblies in Coſimo Rucellai's Gardens, who conſtantly aſſociated with young men of great and generous minds, who made it his only ſtudy to maintain the liberties of his country, who in his Diſcourſes upon the firſt Decad of Livy has painted Tyranny in the moſt odious colours, and taught his Fellow-citizens how to live and die like true Republicans, who was continually extolling the generoſity and magnanimity of Brutus and Caſſius; could ſuch a man ever be thought in earneſt to have taught Lorenzo de Medici the way to oppreſs his country, and reduce it to the moſt abject and infamous ſtate of Slavery? "Itaque Tyranno non favet; (ſays Albericus Gentilis to this purpoſe, de Legationibus, Lib. III. cap. ix.) ſui propoſiti non eſt Tyrannum inſtruere, ſed arcanis ejus palam factis ipſum miſeris populis nudum ac conſpicuum exhibere."——"Conatus ſcriptoris eſt (adds Gaſpar Scioppius Pæd. Politic.) certum aliquem Tyrannum patriæ infeſtum deſcribere, eoque pacto partim populare odium in eum commovere, partim artes ejus detegere."——But the limits of a bare Preface are too narrow for ſuch an apology as ſo great a man deſerves.

As to the Diſcourſe, it was written ſoon after the death of Lorenzo de Medici, Duke of Urbino, and Nephew to Leo X. who died the fourth of May 1519, and left no legitimate Children, but Catherine, afterwards Queen of France, a Princeſs of rare abilities and more than maſculine courage, who will ever be renowned in Hiſtory for having maintained her Sons in the poſſeſſion of that Kingdom as long as ſhe lived, in the moſt troubleſome and dangerous times. Philippo Nerli and Jacopo Nardi indeed have fixed the date of this Diſcourſe ſomething later: but the Reader will eaſily perceive it muſt have been written about the time I mention.

Upon the death of the Duke of Urbino there aroſe great diſſenſions in Florence; ſome who were friends to liberty being deſirous to extend the plan of their Government, and fix it upon a bottom as remote from Monarchy as they could; whilſt the party of the Medici uſed their utmuſt endeavours to throw the Sovereign power into the hands of that family. But Cardinal Giulio de Medici, (natural Son to Giuliano, and Couſin to the Pope) who had come to Florence two days before the death of Lorenzo, endeavoured to prevent any tumult or commotion amongſt the people, by giving out that his Holineſs deſigned to reform the State to the ſatisfaction of every one, and to reſtore their liberties: after which, having compoſed all differences for the preſent, he ſet out for Rome in September 1519, leaving Silvio Paſſerini, Cardinal of Cortona, at Florence, a man of great prudence and addreſs, to keep the citizens in good temper, if poſſible. It was at that time therefore, according to all appearances, that Leo X. being informed of the diſcords that were ready to break out in the City of Florence, laid his commands upon Machiavel to draw him up a Plan for the Reformation of that State: a Commiſſion which gave birth to the following Diſcourſe, wherein he has ſufficiently diſplayed the greatneſs of his abilities, as well as the exquiſite adroitneſs and ſubtlety of his genius: for under the appearance of eſtabliſhing and ſecuring the Sovereign power in the Houſe of Medici, he as given a model of a moſt perfect Commonwealth; in which the attentive Reader will perceive that the Sovereign power is lodged both of right, and in fact, in the Citizens themſelves, and that the power of the Medici, though apparently very great, is in reality nothing more than a ſhadow.

The Reader will likewiſe be ſurprized perhaps to ſee all the eſſential qualities, as well as the principles and fundamentals of the ſeveral different forms of Government, ſketched out and comprized in ſo narrow a compaſs; and cannot well help feeling himſelf ſenſibly affected by the love and regard which this illuſtrious Republican expreſſes towards his Country.

The Letters were written before the Diſcourſe, and are dated in the year 1510 and 1511, before the exaltation of Leo X. to the Pontificate, which did not happen till 1513: but I thought proper to leave them in the order in which they were arranged in the Manuſcript, as a ſupplement to the Diſcourſe, which is the principal part of it. Theſe may ſerve to mark out the true character of Machiavel, and ſhew the goodneſs of his heart: ſince it is evident from them, that he muſt have been a man of extreme good nature, humanity, and juſtice. Natural equity and clemency, in preference to rigid juſtice, are the Virtues which diſtinguiſh themſelves throughout the greater part of theſe Letters, and which he there conſtantly recommends to the different States and perſons to whom they were written. The impartiality he inculcates in compoſing private animoſities and civil diſſenſions in a ſummary manner; his lenity and compaſſion to poor people, even in collecting the public Taxes; his regard for decency and modeſty; his reverence for the Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction; and his extreme care for the honour of Almighty God, will, at laſt, ſurely undeceive the malevolent and unwary, who upon the bare word of others have been perſuaded to think of Machiavel as a wicked and violent man both in his principles and practice. It might be added, by way of concluſion to this Preface, that particular notice ought to be taken of the inviolable regard to Public Faith which he never fails to preſcribe, as well as of ſeveral other Maxims full of juſtice and political prudence; but above all, of his manner of writing, which carries with it an air of Majeſty, and commands reſpect.

# A
# DISCOURSE

UPON THE

## Proper ways and means of reforming the Government of Florence.

Written by NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,
at the Command of Pope Leo X.

THE reaſon why Florence hath ſo often changed its form of Government is, becauſe there never was yet either a Commonwealth or Monarchy eſtabliſhed there upon true principles: for that Monarchy cannot be called perfect and ſtable where the buſineſs which ſhould be tranſacted according to the direction of one perſon only, is ſubmitted to the determination of many: nor can that be ſaid to be a true and durable Commonwealth where certain humours and inclinations are not gratified, which otherwiſe muſt naturally end in its ruin. To evince the truth of which, let us examine the ſeveral forms of Government which Florence has been ſubject to from the year 1393 to this time.

If we begin with the Reformation conducted at that time by Maſo degli Albizi *, we ſhall ſee that he moulded the Republic into a ſort of Ariſtocracy; in which there were ſo many defects that it did not continue above forty years: and indeed it would not have laſted ſo long, had it not been for the wars with the Viſconti, Dukes of Milan, which happened in that period, and kept it united. The chief defect was, that the power was continued too long in the ſame perſons, and that the Elections were ſubject to fraud and underhand practices, which might throw the Government into the hands of bad men: beſides which, as mankind are liable to be corrupted, and good men too often become bad by a long continuance of power, it might happen that though the Election was a fair one at firſt, and upright men had been made choice of, it might prove a bad one in the end by the change of their manners. There was likewiſe no check upon the Grandees to deter them from forming Parties and Factions, which generally are the deſtruction of a State: and it might be added, that the Signiory had but little reputation, whilſt they had too much authority; for they had a power of taking away the life and property of any Citizen without appeal, and of calling the People together to a conference whenever they pleaſed: ſo that inſtead of being a defence and protection to the State, they were rather an inſtrument of its ruin, when they were under the influence of any popular and ambitious man. On the other hand, they had but little reputation, as I ſaid before; for as it often happened that raw young men, of little experience, and abject condition (and therefore incapable of ſupporting their dignity in a proper manner) were introduced into the Signiory, it was not poſſible they ſhould have any conſiderable degree of weight. There was ſtill another imper-

---

* See the Hiſtory of Florence, book III.

fection in this form of Government of no ſmall conſequence, namely, that certain private men were admitted into the public Councils, which gave great reputation to them, whilſt it diminiſhed that of the body, and took away from the authority of the Magiſtrates; a circumſtance contrary to all civil eſtabliſhment. But what was of the laſt importance, was, that the People had no ſhare at all in the Government: all which defects joined together occaſioned infinite diſorder and confuſion; and if the wars above mentioned had not happened to have kept the State united, it muſt have been diſſolved long before it was.

This form of Government was ſucceeded by that of Coſimo de Medici, which inclined more to Monarchy than a Republic: and if it was of longer duration than the preceding, it was owing in the firſt place to the favour of the people, by whoſe conſent and approbation it was eſtabliſhed; and in the next, to the uncommon prudence of two ſuch men as Coſimo and his grandſon Lorenzo, who are at the head of it. Nevertheleſs, it was ſo weakened by their being obliged to ſubmit their meaſures to the deliberation of many, that it was often in great danger; which occaſioned many Balias and the frequent Baniſhments which happened under that Government, and at laſt its utter diſſolution when Charles VIII. of France invaded Italy. After this, the City endeavoured to reſume the form of a Republic; but the meaſures which were taken for that purpoſe made it of ſhort duration, becauſe they were neither calculated to gratify the humours of all the Citizens, nor had ſufficient force to correct them: and it was ſo far from being a true and perfect Commonwealth, that a Gonfalonier for life, if he had been an able and bad men, might eaſily have made himſelf abſolute Lord over it; but if he had been a weak and good man, he might ſoon have been pulled from his ſeat, and that eſtabliſhment entirely overturned. But as it would be endleſs to adduce reaſons for the confirmation of this aſſertion, I ſhall only mention one, which is, that there was not ſtrength enough in that Government to ſupport the Gonfalonier if he was a good man, nor to check and controul him if he was a bad one: to which let me add likewiſe, that the reaſon why all theſe Governments were deficient, was, that the Reforms which were made were not with any view to the Public good, but to ſtrengthen and ſupport different factions in their turns; which ends however were not accompliſhed, becauſe there was always a diſcontented Party, which proved a very powerful inſtrument in the hands of thoſe that were deſirous to effect any change or innovation in the State.

It now remains that I ſhould ſay ſomething of the Adminiſtration of the Twelve from its firſt eſtabliſhment to this time, and to point out its ſtrength and imperfections: but as theſe things are already well known, and freſh in every one's memory, I ſhall here omit all mention of them. It is certain however, that as things are circumſtanced ſince the Death of the Duke of Urbino, it is neceſſary to think of ſome new form of Government: and I hope I ſhall be excuſed, if, in obedience to the commands of your Holineſs, I venture to deliver my opinion upon the matter. But firſt I beg leave to lay that of others before you, according to what I have collected in converſation, and then to ſubjoin my own: in which, if I ſhould err, I truſt your Holineſs will pardon a man who has ſhewn his zeal to your perſon, though he may have failed in his judgment and abilities.

I ſay then that ſome think a better kind of Government cannot be deviſed than that which was eſtabliſhed in the times of Coſimo and Lorenzo de Medici: others wiſh for one ſettled upon a broader bottom. The former alledge that things eaſily return into their old channel; and that the Florentines having been uſed to honour your family, to ſhelter themſelves under its favour and protection, to delight in whatſoever was moſt agreeable to it, and indeed habituated to theſe things for the ſpace of ſixty years, it muſt naturally happen that when they ſee the ſame plan of Government reſtored, the ſame degree of affection and reſpect will revive in them. They affirm likewiſe that very few would be adverſe to it; and that thoſe few might eaſily be brought over by different methods. To all which, they add the evident neceſſity of the matter, and ſay that as the State of Florence cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt without a head, it is much better to chuſe one out of that family which uſed to be ſo much beloved and revered there, than either to live in confuſion and diſorder for want of ſuch a head, or to take one out of ſome undiſtinguiſhed family, which would of courſe excite the diſguſt and indignation of the whole City.

In anſwer to this, it is aſſerted by others, that ſuch an Adminiſtration muſt be dangerous, becauſe it would be weak: for if that of Coſimo was feeble and infirm from the cauſes already aſſigned, one of the ſame ſtamp muſt be doubly ſo at preſent; when not only the form of Government, but the temper of the Citizens, and the circumſtances of the times, are totally different from what they were in thoſe days. So that it would be utterly impoſſible to contrive any eſtabliſhment in Florence which ſhould reſſemble that of the Medici, and be of long duration. In the firſt place (ſay they) that form of Government was then univerſally approved; but now it would be as much diſliked: the Citizens of thoſe times thought they could not have one founded upon a better bottom; but the preſent Generation imagine there has been ſince found out one that is more compatible with liberty, and gives no leſs ſatisfaction than the other. There was then (continue they) no army, nor any power in Italy, which the Florentines were not able to cope with, and that too without the leaſt aſſiſtance: but now France and Spain have got footing in it, there is a neceſſity for joining one of them; and if the ſide which the Florentines join ſhould happen to be overpowered by the other, they can afterwards expect nothing but to be ſwallowed up by the Conqueror; which was not the caſe in thoſe times. The Citizens had likewiſe been long accuſtomed, under that Government, to ſubmit to the burden of heavy taxes and impoſitions: but now they have been freed from it, either from their inability to pay them, or long diſuſe, it muſt be an odious as well as dangerous attempt to revive them. The Medici too, who then governed Florence, having been born and educated amongſt their Fellow-citizens, afterwards kept up a ſort of familiarity with them, which wonderfully conciliated their affections to that family: but now the family is grown ſo great, all that familiarity is dropped, and conſequently the edge of their affections taken off: ſo that conſidering the diſſimilitude of the times and men, any one muſt be fatally deceived who expects to make the ſame impreſſion upon ſo different a maſs: and if the Medici were every ten years in danger of loſing their power in thoſe days (as I ſaid above) they would now be quickly diſplaced. It is ridiculous therefore to imagine that men under ſuch circumſtances will eaſily return to their former manner of living: for though indeed this may be brought about when they are more inclined of themſelves to that than to any new form of Government; yet when it happens otherwiſe, they will conform to it no longer than they are forced: and whenever that force ceaſes, their conformity will vaniſh into the air. Beſides, though it may be true that the State of Florence cannot ſubſiſt without ſome head; and that if the

Citizens were diſpoſed to chuſe one out of ſome particular family, they would ſooner take one out of the family of the Medici than any other: yet if it ſhould be propoſed to veſt the ſupreme power in ſeveral perſons of any condition whatſoever, they would prefer ſuch a head to a ſingle one.

Some are of opinion that ſuch a Government could not be ſhaken without ſome external force; and that there would always be time enough to accommodate matters with thoſe that ſhould make any attempt upon it. But in this they are much miſtaken: for it often happens that you muſt be obliged to patch up a Treaty of friendſhip, not with thoſe that are actually your moſt formidable enemies, but with thoſe that either have it moſt in their power at that juncture to annoy, or are more agreeable to you than any others: and it may come to paſs that both you and ſuch an ally may not only be overpowered by the enemy, and left at his diſcretion, but that he will not liſten to any terms of accommodation; either becauſe you did not court his friendſhip in time, or out of the diſguſt he may have conceived againſt you for entering into an alliance with his enemies. Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan, would gladly have made his peace with Lewis XII. of France, if he could have found means: Frederic King of Naples would have done ſo likewiſe with the ſame Prince; but they were both diſappointed in their endeavours: for a thouſand accidents may happen to prevent and fruſtrate ſuch deſigns. So that, all theſe things being duly weighed, it ſeems as if ſuch an eſtabliſhment could be neither ſecure nor permanent, when it has ſo many ſeeds of weakneſs in it; and therefore that it cannot be wiſhed for either by your Holineſs or your friends.

As for thoſe that would have the Government ſettled upon a broader bottom, I ſay, that if it is not modelled in ſuch a manner as to become a regular and well-ordered Commonweath, the breadth of its bottom will only ſerve to accelerate its ruin: if they would be particular, however, in telling me into what form they would have it moulded, I would alſo deſcend to particulars in anſwering them; but as they deal altogether in generals, I can only anſwer them in the ſame manner. Let this ſuffice with regard to them: and in order to evince the weakneſs of Coſimo's eſtabliſhment the more fully, in as few words as poſſible, it is only neceſſary to add, that no form of Government can be deviſed that will be firm and laſting, which is not either a true Principality, or a true Commonwealth; and that all intermediate forms betwixt theſe two extremes, (if I may ſo call them) will be defective. The reaſon is plain: for a Principality can only be ruined one way; and that is, by deſcending into a Commonwealth. The ſame may be ſaid of a Commonwealth alſo: for the only way by which it can be ruined, is by aſcending to a Principality. Whereas all intermediate forms may be ruined two ways, i. e. either by aſcending to a Principality, or deſcending into a Commonwealth; and this is the cauſe of their inſtability.

If then your Holineſs would eſtabliſh ſuch a Government at Florence as will be firm and durable, and redound to your own glory, as well as the ſecurity of your friends, it muſt be either a true Principality, or a Commonwealth which has all its due qualities: for all other forms will be tottering and ſhort-lived. As to a Principality, I ſhall ſay but little in this place, both on account of the great difficulty of eſtabliſhing one in our City, and becauſe the moſt proper inſtrument for effecting it is now no more: for your Holineſs muſt underſtand, that in all States where there is a great equality amongſt the Citizens, it is very difficult, if not impoſſible, to erect a Principality. If any one ſhould go about to found a Commonwealth at Milan, where there is a great inequality amongſt the Citizens, he muſt firſt reduce all the Nobility, who are there very numerous, to a level with others: for they are ſo powerful that they trample upon the laws, and nothing but Royal authority can birdle and controul them. On the contrary, whoſoever would eſtabliſh a Principality at Florence, where there is a remarkable equality amongſt the Citizens, muſt in the firſt place deſtroy that equality, by creating many Noblemen and building them Caſtles, and Villas, and ſtrong-holds, who, in conjunction with the Prince, may ſerve to keep not only the City, but whole Provinces in Subjection by the terror of their arms and dependants *: for a Prince alone, unſupported by Nobility, cannot ſuſtain the weight of Royalty; and therefore it is neceſſary there ſhould be ſome middle State betwixt him and the Commonalty to aid and aſſiſt him. This is obſervable in all Principalities; eſpecially in France, where the Gentry lord it over the people, the Nobles over the Gentry, and the King over the Nobles. But ſince it is ſo difficult a matter to found a Principality where a Commonwealth might eaſily be eſtabliſhed, and *vice verſâ*; and as the difficulty muſt lay the undertaker under the neceſſity of committing great violence, and doing many things unworthy of a good and virtuous man, I will ſay no more of a Principality, but proceed to lay the plan of a Commonwealth; becauſe your Holineſs is known to be more inclined to that form of Government, and has only deferred the eſtabliſhment of it at Florence, till ſuch a model could be thought of as might at the ſame time ſecure your own authority there, and contribute moſt to the peace and welfare of your friends. And now I am vain enough to conceive that I have hit upon ſuch a one, I humbly ſubmit it to your conſummate wiſdom; that ſo if there ſhould happen to be any thing worth your notice in it, it may be carried into execution; if not, that your Holineſs may at leaſt be convinced of my perfect devotion and obedience to your commands.

---

* See Pol. Diſc. upon Livy, book I. chap. lv.

But I am not altogether without hopes, I confeſs, that you will find that by this plan your own authority is not only firmly ſupported, but increaſed, that your friends will ſtill enjoy their honours in ſecurity, and that the reſt of the Citizens will have the higheſt reaſon not barely to be ſatisfied, but to be pleaſed and delighted with it. Let me entreat your Holineſs, however, neither to approve, nor condemn this Diſcourſe till you have read it quite through, nor yet to be ſurprized at ſome alterations that are propoſed to be made in the Magiſtracy: for where a Government was not well regulated before, the leſs there is retained of the old form, the better it muſt naturally be ſuppoſed to be afterwards.

I ſay then, that thoſe who model a Commonwealth, muſt take ſuch proviſions as may gratify three ſorts of men, of which all States are compoſed; that is, the high, the middle ſort, and the low: and though there is a great equality amongſt the Citizens of Florence, as hath been ſaid before; yet there are ſome there who think ſo highly of themſelves that they would expect to have the precedence of others: and theſe people muſt be gratified in regulating the Commonwealth; for it was owing to the want of this that the laſt adminiſtration was ruined. Theſe people then will never be ſatisfied if they have not the firſt rank and honours in the Commonwealth; which dignity they ought to ſupport by their own perſonal weight and importance. But it is impoſſible to entail this dignity upon the firſt order in the Commonwealth, whilſt Signiory and Councils continue upon the ſame footing they have been of late: for as it muſt happen from the manner in which the members of them have been elected, that men of weight and reputation will ſeldom be made choice of, there is no other remedy but to lodge that dignity either in the next rank, or in the loweſt of all; which is contrary to all good order and civil polity. It is abſolutely neceſſary therefore to alter the manner of elections, and at the ſame time to gratify the ambition of all the three ſeveral ranks of people; which may be done by diſſolving the Signory, the Council of Eight, and the twelve *Buonhomini*; and by electing ſixty-five Citizens of not leſs than forty-five years of age (in order to give dignity to the Government), fifty-three out of the higheſt Claſs, and twelve out of the next, who ſhould continue in the Adminiſtration for life, ſubject to the following reſtrictions. In the firſt place, one of them ſhould be appointed Gonfalonier of Juſtice for a term of two or three years, if it is not thought proper to appoint one for Life; and in the next, the other ſixty-four Citizens already elected ſhould be divided into two diſtinct bodies, each conſiſting of thirty-two; one of which diviſions, in conjunction with the Gonfalonier, ſhould govern the firſt year, and the other the next: ſo that they would be changed alternately every year, and altogether ſhould be called the Signiory.

After this, let the thirty-two be divided into four parts, eight in each; every one of which ſhould reſide three months in its turn with the Gonfalonier in the Palace, and not only aſſume the Magiſtracy with the uſual forms and ceremonies, but tranſact all the buſineſs which before paſſed through the hands of the Signiory, the Council of Eight, and the other Councils; all which muſt be diſſolved, as I ſaid before. This ſhould be the firſt member, or rather the Head of the State; and by this proviſion, when it is well conſidered, your Holineſs will ſee the Dignity of the Signiory will be reſtored: for as none but men of gravity and authority will ever ſit there, it will be no longer neceſſary to employ private men in the affairs of State, (which, as I obſerved before, is always of prejudice to any Republic) ſince the thirty-two who are not in office that year may be adviſed with upon occaſion, ſent upon Embaſſies, and made uſeful in other functions. And this firſt Signiory your Holineſs may eaſily find means to fill with your moſt intimate friends and confidants, as I ſhall ſhew preſently; but in the mean time let us come to the ſecond order in the State.

Since there are three orders of men in every State, as I ſaid before, there ſhould alſo be three ranks or degrees in a Republic, and no more; upon which account, it is neceſſary to prevent the confuſion occaſioned of late by the Multiplicity of Councils in our City; which have been eſtabliſhed, not becauſe they were conducive to good order, but merely to create friends and dependants, and to gratify the humour and ambition of numbers in a point which yet was of no ſervice to liberty or the public; becauſe they might all be corrupted and biaſſed by party. In order therefore to reduce the Commonwealth to ſuch a form, the Council of Seventy, that of an hundred, and that of the People and Commonalty, ſhould all be aboliſhed; and in the room of them I would appoint a Council of two hundred, every member of which ſhould be not leſs than forty years of age; an hundred and ſixty of them to be taken out of the middle claſs, and the other forty out of the loweſt, but not one out of the Sixty-five. They ſhould likewiſe continue for life, and be called the Council Elect: which Council, in conjunction with the Sixty-five, ſhould tranſact all the affairs that uſed to be tranſacted by the above mentioned Councils, (now ſuppoſed to be aboliſhed) and be veſted with the ſame degree of authority, and all the members of it appointed by your Holineſs. For which purpoſe, as well as to maintain and regulate theſe proviſions, and others that I ſhall mention hereafter, and for the further ſecurity of your power and friends, it is neceſſary that a degree of authority, equal to that of the whole collective body of the people of Florence, ſhould be veſted by a Balia in your Holineſs, and the moſt Reverend Cardinal de Medici, during the lives of both: and that the Magiſtracy of the Eight di Guardia, as well as the Balia *, ſhould be appointed from time to time by your Holineſs. It is likewiſe expedient, for the ſupport of your authority and your friends, that your Holineſs ſhould divide the Militia into two diſtinct Corps, over which you may appoint two Commiſſaries, one for each.

By theſe proviſions your Holineſs will ſee that two out of the three claſſes may be thoroughly ſatisfied, and that both your own authority, and that of your friends, will be effectually confirmed and corroborated; as you will have the Militia and Courts of Juſtice in your hands, the laws in your own breaſt, and the Heads of the State entirely at your devotion.

It remains now to ſatisfy the third and loweſt rank of the Citizens, which conſtitutes the greater part of the People. But theſe will never be ſatisfied, (and whoever thinks otherwiſe will find himſelf miſtaken) except their authority is either actually reſtored, or they are made eaſy by a promiſe that it ſhall be. And ſince it might endanger your authority as well as that of your friends to reſtore it all at once, it would be better for your Holineſs to reſtore part of it only at firſt, and give them ſuch aſſurances of reſtoring the reſt in due time as they may fully confide in: for which purpoſe, I conceive it will be neceſſary alſo to revive the Council of a thouſand, or at leaſt one of ſix hundred Citizens, who ſhould nominate all the Magiſtrates and officers in the ſame manner they uſed to do formerly, except the above mentioned Sixty-five, the Council of Two hundred, the Eight di Guardia, and the Balia, who ſhould be appointed by your Holineſs and the Cardinal, during the lives of you both.

And that your friends when going to be ballotted for in the Council, may be certain of being imborſ-

---

* Theſe Magiſtrates, Officers, &c. as well as ſeveral other things which occur in theſe pieces, have been ſo often mentioned in the Hiſtory of Florence, that it would be needleſs here to add any thing to what has been already ſaid of them, by way of explaining the nature of their reſpective duties and functions.

ed*; your Holineſs ought to depute eight aſſeſſors, who being in the ſecret, may make the election fall upon whom they pleaſe, without power of wronging any of them; and that the generality may believe that the candidates names have been imborſed, the Council, for their ſecurity, may ſend two Citizens, put into a joint Commiſſion by itſelf, to be witneſſes of the imborſation.

Without ſatisfying the common people, no Republic ever yet ſtood upon a ſtable foundation; and it is certain thoſe of Florence will never be ſatisfied, except the Hall of a Thouſand be opened again, and the diſtribution of offices reſtored to it. Your Holineſs ſhould likewiſe be further informed, that whoever meditates any revolution in the State will certainly endeavour above all things, in the firſt place, to open that Hall; and therefore it muſt ſurely be the beſt way to do it yourſelf in ſuch a manner as may leave no opportunity for any one to make an attempt which muſt end in the downfal of your authority, and the ruin of your friends.

The State being thus modelled, no other proviſions would be wanting for its ſecurity, if your Holineſs and the moſt Reverend Cardinal were to live for ever: but as you are ſubject to mortality, it is neceſſary (if you would have the Republic continue firm and ſtrongly ſupported on every ſide, in ſuch a manner that every one may ſee himſelf perfectly ſecure, when the generality are ſatisfied by reſtoring part of their authority, and an aſſurance of the reſt) that there ſhould alſo be Sixteen Gonfaloniers appointed over the Companies of the Citizens, in the ſame manner and for the ſame time that they have been hitherto appointed: which may be done either by your own authority, or by leaving the appointment of them to the great Council, as your Holineſs ſhall think moſt proper; remembering only to increaſe the number of the Divieri *, that ſo they may be more ſpread over the City; and that none of the Gonfaloniers ſhould be of the Sixty-five. After their appointment, four Prevôts ſhould be drawn out of them by lot, and continue in office one month; ſo that at the end of four months they will all have been Prevôts. Out of theſe four, one ſhould be drawn to reſide for a week only with the eight Signiors and the Gonfalonier in the Palace; by which rotation all the four will have kept their reſidence there at the end of the month. Without the preſence of this officer, the ſaid reſident Signiory ſhould not be allowed to paſs any act, nor ſhould he himſelf have any vote there, but only be a witneſs and inſpector of their proceedings; to which he may be ſuffered to put a ſtop till he has aſked the opinion of all the Thirty-two, together, and had the matter fully diſcuſſed by them. But even the Thirty-two, when all together, ſhould not have power to reſolve upon any thing, except two of the ſaid Prevôts were preſent, who ſhould have no further authority than to put a ſtop to their reſolutions for that time, and report them to the Council elect: nor ſhould that Council have a power of reſolving upon any thing, except ſix at leaſt of the ſixteen Gonfaloniers, and two Prevôts, where there, who ſhould only have the liberty of taking the matter out of the hands of that Council, and referring it to the great Council, provided that any three of them ſhould think it neceſſary ſo to do: and as to the great Council, it ſhould

---

* It appears from this paſſage, that though the method of electing the Florentine magiſtrates by imborſations, or putting the names of the candidates into purſes, was plauſible, yet it might be defeated; becauſe it was in the power of the returning officers, whom Machiavel here calls Accoppiatori, or aſſeſſors, to make the election fall upon whom they pleaſed, by pretending that their friends had the majority. The methods of imborſations in Florence differed as the ariſtocratical or democratical powers prevailed. That which is here recommended by Machiavel, was practiſed under the Medici family, who did no violence to the forms of the democratical conſtitution, but aboliſhed its ſpirit, by always having the returning officers in their intereſt; ſo that in fact, they, inſtead of the people, named the magiſtrates and ſervants of the public, or had it in their power to do ſo.

---

* The Divieri were aſſiſtants to the Gonfalonier, and commanded detachments of the people under him.

not be allowed to meet, unleſs three of the Prevôts at leaſt were there, who might give their votes in it like the other Citizens.

This order ſhould be obſerved after the death of your Holineſs and the moſt Reverend Cardinal, for two reaſons: in the firſt place, that if the Signiory or other Council ſhould either diſagree in their reſolutions, or attempt any thing againſt the public good, there might be ſomebody veſted with a power to take the matter out of their hands, and refer it to the people: for it would be a great defect in the Conſtitution, that any one ſet of Magiſtrates, or ſingle Council, ſhould have a power to paſs a law by its own authority alone; and that too without any remedy or appeal: upon which account, it is highly neceſſary that the Citizens ſhould have ſome proper officers, not only to inſpect their proceedings, but even to put a ſtop to them, if they ſeem to be of pernicious tendency. The other reaſon is, that when the preſent Signiory is diſſolved, and the privilege of being admitted into the new one is taken away from the common people, it will be expedient to give them ſome degree of rank and authority, which may in ſuch meaſure reſemble that of which they have been deprived: now that which I have recommanded will be ſtill greater, more ſerviceable, and more honourable than what they have loſt. The Gonfaloniers therefore ſhould be appointed as ſoon as poſſible, to reduce the City into the aforementioned claſſes and degrees; but they ſhould not be ſuffered to exerciſe any other functions of their Office without a licence from your Holineſs, of which you may avail yourſelf, (by cauſing them to report the proceedings of theſe ſeveral orders to you) to ſupport your dignity with ſo much the more ſtate and authority.

Beſides this, in order to give ſuch a degree of ſtability and perfection to the Commonwealth, that no part of it may ſhrink or fail after the deceaſe of your Holineſs and the moſt Reverend Cardinal, it is neceſſary that a Court ſhould be erected upon occaſion, conſiſting of the Eight di Guardia, and a Balia of thirty Citizens, to be choſen by lot out of the Council of Two hundred and that of Six hundred together: which Court ſhould have a power, in criminal caſes, of ſummoning the Accuſer and the Accuſed to appear face to face before it in a certain time: but it ſhould never be ſuffered to aſſemble during the lives of your Holineſs and the Cardinal, without your ſpecial licence. Such a Court is of great uſe in a Commonwealth: for a few Citizens are afraid to call great and powerful delinquents to account, and therefore it is neceſſary that many ſhould concur for that purpoſe: that ſo when their judgments are concealed, (as they may be by balloting) every man may give his opinion freely and in ſecurity. It may ſerve alſo, during your lives, as a check upon the Eight, and make them more careful in adminiſtering juſtice, as well as more diligent in expediting public affairs, leſt they ſhould be called before this Court. But that it may not be obliged to aſſemble upon every little frivolous occaſion, it may be ordained that it ſhall not take cognizance of any matter of fraud not amounting to the ſum of fifty ducats, nor of any act of violence where there is no effuſion of blood, or maiming, or bone broken, or where the loſs ſuſtained is under the value of fifty ducats.

This model of a Commonwealth being duly conſidered, I think nothing will be wanting in it, even when your authority ſhall ceaſe, as I have ſhew before at large: but if it be conſidered during your life and that of the Cardinal, it appears to be a Monarchy; for you have the command of the Militia, the appointment of the Judges, and the Laws, in your own breaſt: ſo that I cannot ſee what further power any one can deſire in a State; nor can I conceive what any of your friends who are good and peaceable men, have to fear whilſt the authority of your Holineſs is ſo great, and they themſelves ſtill fill the firſt employments in the Government; nor yet do I ſee any reaſon why the common people ſhould not be very well ſatisfied, when they find the diſtribution of Offices in part already reſtored to them, and the reſt falling by degrees into their hands. For your Holineſs may now and then ſuffer the Council of Two hundred to nominate one of the Sixty-five when there is a vacancy, and ſometimes the great Council to appoint one of the Two hundred, and ſometimes you may create them yourſelf, according to the circumſtances of the times: and I am very certain that by the interpoſition of your Holineſs's authority, every thing may be conducted in ſuch a manner, that the ſecond of theſe orders may at laſt be converted into the firſt, and the third into the ſecond, &c. and that the whole body may be governed in peace, with perpetual glory to your Holineſs; ſince your power may very eaſily at all times remedy any inconveniency that ſhall happen.

For my own part, I am of opinion that the higheſt honour that can be attained to by any man is that which is voluntarily conferred on him by his Countrymen; and that the greateſt good he can do, as well as the moſt acceptable to God, is that which he does to his Country. Next to that, I think none are to be compared with thoſe who have reformed Kingdoms and Commonwealths by wholeſome Laws and Conſtitutions. Theſe men have always held the next rank to thoſe that have been deified for their great actions: but as there have been but few that have had an opportunity, and ſtill fewer that knew how to do this, the number is very ſmall that have done it. This kind of glory has always been ſo much coveted by ſuch as made glory the ſole end of their labours, that when they have not had power either to found or reform a ſtate, they have left models and plans in writing to be executed by others that ſhould have in future times; as Plato, Ariſtotle, and many others, who have ſhewn the world that if they did not found free States themſelves,

ſelves, like Solon and Lycurgus, it was not owing either to ignorance or want of good will to mankind, but to want of power.

Heaven then cannot beſtow a nobler gift upon any man, nor point out of fairer road to true glory: and amongſt all the bleſſings which God has been pleaſed to ſhower down upon your Holineſs and your auguſt family, the moſt conſiderable is, tha the has given you both power and opportunity of immortalizing your name, and of far ſurpaſſing all your Anceſtors in the ſplendor of your actions. Let me entreat your Holineſs therefore, to conſider in the firſt place, that if you intend to let the Government of Florence continue upon the ſame bottom it is at preſent, many accidents muſt inevitably happen which will be attended with great danger; and that before they happen, you will be teazed and tutored in ſuch a manner as would ſeem intolerable to any man, as you will be more particularly informed by the moſt Reverend Cardinal, who has reſided for ſome months paſt at Florence. This is partly owing to the importunity of ſeveral Citizens, who indeed are much too preſumptuous in their demands; and partly to the fears of others, who think they do not live in ſecurity under the preſent eſtabliſhment: ſo that they are continually crying out for a reformation, one deſiring the Government may be ſettled upon a broader bottom, and another upon a narrower, whilſt nobody pretends to point out the particular meaſures by which it may either be contracted or extended with ſafety; for being puzzled and confuſed themſelves, and at the ſame time terrified at the proſpect of impending danger, they neither know how to prevent it themſelves, nor will put any confidence in thoſe that do: from whence it comes to paſs that amidſt ſuch difference of opinions and variety of advice, the wiſeſt and moſt able man in the world muſt live in continual doubt and diſtraction amongſt them.

To remedy theſe inconveniencies then, there are but two methods, viz. either to deny them audience, and give them no opportunity of mentioning theſe matters at any time whatſoever, except their opinion is aſked, (as the late Duke of illuſtrious memory uſed to do) or to ſettle the Government at once upon ſuch a footing that it may adminiſter itſelf, and that now and then a little of your Holineſs's inſpection may ſuffice to keep it in a good order: by the latter of theſe methods you may be freed from all danger and trouble; by the former, from trouble and impertinence only. But to ſay ſomething further of the dangers that muſt enſue if things continue as they are, I will venture to propheſy, that whenever any commotion or inſurrection ſhall happen, either one or other of the following events, if not both, muſt certainly be the conſequence; i. e. either ſome Head will be appointed in a ſudden and tumultuary manner, who will reſcue the ſtate by violence and force of arms; or one part of the Citizens will immediately open the Council of a Thouſand again, and ſacrifice the other without mercy. In caſe either of theſe events ſhould happen, (which God avert) your Holineſs will be pleaſed to conſider how many executions, how many baniſhments, and how many confiſcations muſt of neceſſity enſue: a reflection which ſurely muſt ſhock the moſt hard-hearted man alive, much more a man of that remarkable humanity and tenderneſs which have always diſtinguiſhed your Holineſs. The only way then to prevent theſe evils, is to eſtabliſh the ſeveral claſſes and ordinances of the Commonwealth in ſuch a manner, that they may ſupport themſelves: and that they will always be able to do, when each rank has its due ſhare in the adminiſtration, when every one knows his proper ſphere of action, and whom he can confide in; and laſtly, when no one has any occaſion to wiſh for a change of Government, either becauſe his ambition is not thoroughly gratified, or that he does not think himſelf ſufficiently ſecure under ſuch an Adminiſtration.

# LETTERS

WRITTEN TO

Several States and Perſons, in the name of the Republic of FLORENCE,

By NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State there in the years 1510 and 1511.

---

## LETTER I.

### To the Reverend Marco Priori, Vicar * to the Biſhop of Luca †, at Lower Caſtro Franco.

WE are informed that a certain prieſt, named Antonio, the Son of Simone da S. Pietro, has forcibly ſeized upon ſome goods and chattels

---

* The perſons by whom the ſtates of Italy uſed to govern ſmall territories and dependencies were often ſtiled Vicars, but they were Laymen: beſides whom there were alſo Spiritual Vicars to inſpect the manners of Eccleſiaſtics; and if an Eccleſiaſtic was guilty of any crime or miſdemeanor which was cognizable by the Secular Magiſtrate, yet that Magiſtrate durſt not cite, much leſs lay hands upon, the offender, till he had obtained Licence for ſo doing from the Spiritual Vicar, under whoſe juriſdiction he was, leſt he ſhould incur the Pope's diſpleaſure, as appears from this and other inſtances in the courſe of theſe Letters: which has introduced that Soleciſm in Politics, Imperium in Imperio, into moſt Popiſh Governments.

† Not Lucca, but Luca, (as it is here ſpelt) a little territory in Tuſcany.

in the Vicariate of Lari, which had been made over ſome months ago to Maria Tedda, widow to the late Pietro, Son of Simone da St. Pietro, according to the laws of Piſa: at which we are much diſpleaſed; becauſe we would not have the leaſt violence uſed in our territories by any perſon whatſoever, much leſs by a Religious: but if he has any pretenſions to thoſe goods, or any part of them, let him have recourſe to the laws, as every honeſt man ought to have. We therefore deſire your reverence to ſend for the ſaid Antonio, who is under your juriſdiction, and order him not only to deſiſt from all further violence, but to give ſufficient ſecurity to the widow and her tenants that he will not perſonally moleſt or annoy either her or any of them, upon this account: becauſe, we hear, he goes continually armed for that purpoſe; which is very unbecoming in a Religious. This you may do under ſuch penalties as you think moſt proper; and it will be acting in a manner that will be very agreeable to our moſt Serene Republic, and worthy of your Reverence. But if he is contumacious, and refuſes to appear before you, be pleaſed to grant your Licence to our Vicar at Lari (where the premiſes lie) to take him into cuſtody, and we will ſend him orders to do it; that ſo he may be compelled to ſubmit to your Reverence. Farewell, 13 July, 1510.

## LETTER II.

### To the Conſuls of the Marine.

ONE M. Chriſtofano da Marchio, a Portugueſe Gentleman, and Student in the Canon Law, has been before us, and complains that as he was going to the Univerſity at Piſa, he was ſtopped at the gates of that city, and had not only all the cloaths and houſhold furniture he brought with him, but likewiſe all his money, taken from him, and was obliged to pay twelve Ducats in Gold, as Duty for the ſaid money. Now, as he is no Trader, (according to his own report of the matter) but a Lawyer and a Gentleman in his own country, and carries ſuch furniture and ſums of money with him for his convenience and ſupport, wherever he goes to ſtudy, he thinks he ought to be exempt from any ſuch duty. We are of opinion, therefore, that the ſaid twelve Ducats ſhould be refunded to him; that ſo he may have no reaſon to complain of having ſuffered any violence in our Dominions, and that our Subjects may not be uſed in the ſame manner in Portugal. For in truth, if the money he had with him was only to ſupport him in his Studies like a Gentleman, you ought to proceed with great caution and diſcretion in this matter, as we truſt you will do. Farewell, 23 July, 1510.

## LETTER III.

To Alamanno de Petrucci, chief Magiſtrate of Campiglia.

WE make no doubt but you muſt have heard that our Corn-harveſt has not proved ſo plentiful a one as was expected: and that our people may not have any cauſe to fear a dearth, we will and command you, to take all poſſible care that no ſort of corn or grain of any kind which grows in your neighbourhood, or elſewhere, upon the coaſt of Campiglia, may be conveyed out of thoſe parts upon any account whatſoever. For which purpoſe, you are to puniſh all thoſe that preſume to diſobey your orders in this reſpect, by ſeizing upon the grain only for the firſt offence; and for the ſecond, by taking away their horſes, or other beaſts of burden, and carriages alſo. But all this muſt be done with as little noiſe as poſſible : for as we have in general a tolerable ſufficiency of all neceſſaries, we would not willingly occaſion any diſturbance, or have the people alarmed. You are a prudent man, and underſtand our meaning: act accordingly, as you are wont to do; and if you hear of any ſort of grain that is upon the road to our City, don't ſtop it. Farewell, 14 Auguſt, 1510.

## LETTER IV.

To the Vicar of Piſa and St. Miniato; and alſo to the Magiſtrates of Buggiani and Fucecchio.

WE are informed that great quantities of Corn have been conveyed out of our Dominions from your Diſtrict, and are much offended at it; for the harveſt in theſe parts has not been ſo abundant as we hoped: and as we ought not to ſuffer our own ſubjects to be reduced to the want of bread, by letting it be tranſported out of our own territories into thoſe of others, we will and command you to make it known either by Proclamation, or in ſome other public manner, that if any perſon, of what rank, eſtate, or condition ſoever he may be, ſhall be found tranſporting any ſort of grain out of our territories, he ſhall be puniſhed with the loſs of his carriages, horſes, and loading, without remedy or appeal. After this warning is publiſhed, you are to cauſe a ſtrict watch to be kept night and day at all paſſes; and to take care that all ſuch as ſhall offend that way may be puniſhed in the manner above preſcribed. You are men of underſtanding, and now you know our pleaſure, let it be your principal concern that it may be duly executed. Farewell, 23 Auguſt, 1510.

LET-

## LETTER V.

To Buonaccorſo de Serragli, chief Magiſtrate of Palaia.

TOMASO, the Son of Antonio di Pagno, hath been before us, and humbly beſought our pardon for his late offences. Wherefore, in purſuance of a Law made in favour of ſuch inhabitants of that City as ſhould return thither, we have granted him a free pardon: and it is our further pleaſure that all the eſtates and goods he was poſſeſſed of before the year 1494, and ſince that time, which, he ſays, lie about Marti, and conſiſt of houſes, olive-yards, and vineyards, ſhould be immediately reſtored to him. We therefore hereby will and command, as he is now returned to live peaceably and quietly at Piſa, that you not only cauſe all the ſaid goods and eſtates to be reſtored to him, by ejecting the preſent occupiers of them; but that you likewiſe henceforth treat him in a friendly and amicable manner, as one who hath ſubmitted to our Government in conſequence of the aforeſaid Law. Hereof you are not to fail. Farewell, 26 Auguſt, 1510.

## LETTER VI.

To Franciſco de Bramanti, Chief Magiſtrate of Caſcina, in the territory of Piſa.

WE ſuppoſe you can be no ſtranger to the loſſes which the inhabitants of the country on this ſide Piſa ſuſtained by the frequent depredations, murders, and other ſorts of violence that were committed upon them during the war betwixt us and that City, before we became poſſeſſed of it, and muſt know that the greater part of them were thereby reduced to extreme poverty. We are informed, however, that the inhabitants of Caſcina, in particular, are ſued and diſtreſſed in ſuch a manner at this time by the officers of your Courts, for debts which they had contracted before the year 1494, that if theſe proceedings are not dropped, they muſt either fly their Country, or lie in priſon all the days of their life; which would give great uneaſineſs and offence to our moſt Serene Republic, as we would willingly keep theſe poor people at home, and in poſſeſſion of their liberty. It is our pleaſure, therefore, that whenever any of their creditors apply to your Courts to enforce the payment of ſuch debts as were contracted before the year 1494, you enquire ſtrictly into the nature and circumſtances of thoſe debts, and ſhew as much favour as you can conſiſtently with common equity, to the Debtors, out of compaſſion to their ſufferings, and to keep them if poſſible in their own country. Now you know your pleaſure, let it be your endeavour to aſſiſt theſe miſerable people according to their neceſſities, and with as much addreſs as you can. Farewell, 27 Auguſt, 1510.

## LETTER VII.

To Certaldo Raphaele de Antinori.

CONSIDERING the circumſtances of the times, though indeed there is no appearance of open war at preſent, yet for our own ſatisfaction, we have put a garriſon into Poggio Imperiale. But there is ſtill ſomething further wanting to ſecure that fortreſs; and what we deſigned to have done in the ſpace of a month or two for that purpoſe, we could now wiſh might be completed in five or ſix days, if poſſible. We therefore command you to repair immediately to Poggio, but without noiſe or buſtle, under a pretence that you only came thither for a ride and a little recreation. But when you are there, you are not only to ſurvey the walls as privately as you can, but to obſerve whether any Foſſes are neceſſary for its preſent defence, whoſe houſes muſt be pulled down, and what places levelled, in order to ſecure it againſt any force. If you ſhall have reaſon to think, however, that the inhabitants of that Vicariate, and eſpecially thoſe that live neareſt to Caſtello Fiorentino, will readily concur with you in the matter, you are to uſe your utmoſt endeavours to put the town in a proper poſture of defence in five or ſix days. For which purpoſe, it is neceſſary that you ſhould leave ſome perſon there to inſpect the works in your abſence, and that you yourſelf ſhould go thither once in two days till the whole is finiſhed: but if you ſuſpect there will be any great difficulty in the matter, and that the people will be much averſe to it; ſay nothing of it, but acquaint us with your proceedings, and what obſervations you have made there. Farewell, 29 Auguſt, 1510.

## LETTER VIII.

To the Commiſſioners and other Officers for inſpecting the Ditches and Banks in the Diſtrict of Piſa.

THERE are now two Deputies with us, one from the Pariſh of S. Caſſiano, and another from S. Lorenzo; the latter of whom has alſo applied to the Courts at Caſcina. They complain that you have ordered thoſe Diſtricts to ſend labourers to work at the Ditches and Banks in the territory of Piſa, and have laid ſeveral fines upon them for not ſending any, though they are expreſsly exempted from ſuch labour by certain privileges granted them by this moſt Serene Republic, as you may ſee from the tenor of an inſtrument in writing drawn up for that purpoſe, and ſtill in their poſſeſſion: upon which account, they demand that a due regard ſhould be paid to the contents of that inſtrument. Now as you know that the public faith given to Subjects ought always to be moſt religiouſly obſerved, it is our pleaſure that you have recourſe to the ſaid inſtrument; and that if you find they are actually exempted from ſuch duty by virtue of it, you ſhould not only obſerve the purport of it inviolably yourſelf, but cauſe all others under your Juriſdiction to do the ſame, and remit the fines that have been laid upon them, as illegal and contrary to the tenor of the aforeſaid inſtrument. You are to ſee that all this be duly executed without fail. Farewell, 29 Auguſt, 1510.

## LETTER IX.

To Bernardino da Colle, Vicar of Monte Caſtello.

THERE have been two Deputies before us from the Community of S. Almazio, who have repreſented to us, that the river Pagone, running betwixt their Diſtrict and that of Monte Caſtello, when the inhabitants of S. Almazio take their Cattle to water there, they are ſued by the Cowkeepers of Monte Caſtello for damages, though the River is no more in one Liberty than another, and the Cattle never ſtray over it. On the contrary, the people of S. Almazio ſue thoſe of Monte Caſtello for the ſame ſort of treſpaſs. Now theſe frivolous and vexatious ſuits are daily multiplied by each ſide in ſuch a manner, that both are miſerably impoveriſhed and almoſt ruined by them; though there does not appear any great reaſon for it on either: for certainly all men are at liberty to water their Cattle at any river, provided they do not injure another perſon by it; which does not ſeem to have been the caſe in this matter. It is our will and command therefore, that upon the receipt of this, you immediately ſummon both parties to appear before you; and that when you have thoroughly examined the nature of their grievances, you uſe your utmoſt endeavours to compoſe all differences betwixt them; not by any violent or compulſive means, but in an amicable manner, as far as it can be done without prejudice to common honeſty and juſtice; which will be a piece of ſervice that will merit our commendation. But if you ſhould fail in theſe laudable endeavours, after you have tried all fair means, you are to refer the two parties to us, with an account of their ſeveral pretenſions, and an exact draught of the water-courſe; and after we have heard what each has to ſay for itſelf, we will take care that ſtrict juſtice ſhall be done to both. Be ſure then not only to give us ſpeedy advice of your proceedings in this affair, for your own reputation, but at what time you heard the cauſe, and what you think of the matter yourſelf. Farewell, 2 September, 1510.

## LETTER X.

### To the Conſuls of the Marine.

THOUGH we could wiſh all the ditches and water-courſes in the country might be ſcoured and cleanſed with all poſſible expedition, as well for the plenty and improvement it would occaſion, as for the health of the inhabitants: nevertheleſs, conſidering that many townſhips are exempted from labouring at ſuch work by expreſs articles; and that others, who have no ſuch exemption to plead, are reduced to ſuch miſery and poverty by the late devaſtations in the territories of Piſa, and the failure of their harveſt this year, in which they had placed their laſt hope, that they ſay they are not able to give us the leaſt aſſiſtance; it is our will and pleaſure (to prevent their being driven to deſpair, and forced to fly their Country) that with regard to thoſe who have ſuch exemptions to ſhew, you ſhould both ſtrictly obſerve the tenor of thoſe articles yourſelves, and take care that all others do the ſame; becauſe we would not have the faith that has been given by this moſt Serene Republic in the leaſt violated upon any account whatſoever. As to others, who have no ſuch exemptions to plead in their behalf, and therefore are liable to be compelled to this work, we would have you act with diſcretion (for the reaſons above mentioned) and not be too haſty in puniſhing them if they do not appear; but to treat them in ſo mild and tender a manner, as may induce them to come voluntarily and without compulſion of any kind; for if the matter cannot be conveniently diſpatched this year, it muſt be deferred till the next; becauſe you muſt be ſenſible how much greater regard we have, and ought to have, to the circumſtances of theſe poor people, than to expediting the preſent undertaking. Now you know our pleaſure, we make no doubt but you will act with your uſual prudence upon this occaſion, and favour them as much as you can, leſt they ſhould be reduced to deſpair. Farewell, 5 September, 1510.

## LETTER XI.

### To Philippo de Arigucci, Chief Magiſtrate of Terracolle.

ALESSANDRO di Mariano of your town has been committed to priſon here by the worſhipful Eight of the guard, and the Balia of this City, for abuſing a Servant Girl of no more than eleven years of age, in ſuch a manner that he has ruined her. Now the wife of Chriſtofano Meſſo of your town, as well as the wife of one Lazzero a Black-ſmith, and another woman called Parvola, who afterwards met her at a well out of the Porta Paſſerina, where ſhe was waſhing her cloaths, are fully acquainted it ſeems with all the circumſtances of this affair. And as we are determined to take ſtrict cognizance of the whole ourſelves, we hereby enjoin you to ſend for the ſaid three women and the Girl herſelf before you, and to cauſe them to be examined cloſely and ſeparately upon oath by your Chief Juſtice, in the preſence of a public Notary, but with all due regard to Decency and Modeſty; that ſo we may have full information of the matter. After they have been ſo examined, you are to ſend us a copy of their Depoſitions incloſed in a Letter, ſealed with your own Seal, by the hands of a faithful Meſſenger. At the ſame time you are alſo to ſend the Girl herſelf hither, with a proper attendance to ſecure her perſon, and as ſpeedily as poſſible, for your own credit; giving us likewiſe a circumſtantial account of all that is come to your knowledge in this buſineſs, by the perſon who brings us the Depoſitions, and who is to come himſelf with the Girl. Farewell, 11 September, 1510.

## LETTER XII.

To Tomaſo Franciſco de Caponſacchi, Chamberlain of St. John's.

A Deputy from the Community of Lannolina has been with us, and repreſented to us, that all their corn, grapes, and cheſnuts have been deſtroyed this Seaſon by a dreadful ſtorm, in ſuch a manner that they cannot tell how to ſupport themſelves the reſt of the year: upon which account they have humbly beſought us to have pity on them; for if they are ſent to priſon for the tenths and other taxes ariſing from thoſe fruits, they muſt inevitably periſh there with hunger. And as it is our duty to have compaſſion upon the poor and miſerable, you are hereby required to inquire into the matter, and if you find they have actually ſuſtained theſe loſſes, you are to favour them in ſuch a manner in remitting the aforeſaid duties, as your diſcretion ſhall think neceſſary in ſo grievous a calamity. You are a prudent man, and now you know our diſpoſition in this reſpect, you will behave yourſelf, we make no queſtion, ſo as to deſerve our approbation. Farewell, 5 October, 1510.

## LETTER XIII.

To Giovanni Battiſta de Bartolini, Commiſſary and Chief Magiſtrate of Piſa.

WE find by your laſt Letters to the Council of Ten, that a certain Portugueſe Phyſician, and ſome others of that nation are come to Piſa, under a ſafe-conduct from the late Council of Ten, but that they are thought to be either Heretics or

Infidels: upon which account, you ſay, you are reſolved to ſend them elſewhere about their buſineſs. But for many reaſons, and particularly becauſe they came to Piſa under the ſanction of the Public Faith, (though indeed that protection is now at an end) as well as becauſe it is a very difficult matter to form a true judgment of men in points of Religious Faith, and that we are deſirous to have your City as well filled with inhabitants as poſſible, it is our pleaſure that you ſuffer the ſaid Phyſician and his countrymen to ſtay amongſt you for three or four months; during which time, by keeping a good watch upon their actions and behaviour, you will be able to gueſs pretty truly at their Principles; and if you find, at the end of that term, that their further ſtay will be of prejudice to the Community, you may then diſmiſs them. Farewell, 22 December, 1510.

## LETTER XIV.

### To the Same.

BY your laſt of the 24th inſtant, in anſwer to our commands concerning the reputed Heretics you mentioned in your former Letter, we were informed of what you had then obſerved with regard to their conduct and actions; and we commend you for your early and neceſſary advice. The intention of this therefore is to recommend to you that you ſtill continue to keep a watchful eye upon thoſe people, that you may be enabled to diſtinguiſh the good from the bad amongſt them; and that you tolerate thoſe that behave themſelves well and like Chriſtians, ſince they may be of ſervice to the Community: but to diſmiſs ſuch as ſhall demean themſelves otherwiſe, and therefore cannot poſſibly do any good there, but much harm, and may excite the indignation of the people. Theſe matters you will be able to judge better of upon the Spot, than we can poſſibly do here; and therefore you muſt act accordingly. As to bringing any diſtemper amongſt you, you muſt diligently enquire into that; and if you have ſufficient proof that they came lately from an infected place, let them be immediately ſent away, leſt they ſhould ſpread the Contagion in a City which at preſent is free from any thing of that kind. Farewell, 26 December, 1510.

## LETTER XV.

### To Giovanni de Serragli, Chief Magiſtrate of Peccioli.

YOU will find that, by virtue of a Law very ſeaſonably made by the Legiſlature of your Republic in the month of Auguſt 1492, whoever ſhall afterwards come with their families to live in the territory of Piſa, ſhall be entirely exempt from all manner of taxes, both ordinary and extraordinary, for twenty years to come, as well in the territory of Florence as in that of Piſa; excepting that they ſhall be obliged to contribute to the expence of repairing and keeping in good order the ditches, highways, and bridges in the reſpective diſtricts where they live, in the ſame manner with the other inhabitants of thoſe places, as you may ſee more fully by having recourſe to the ſaid Law. Now ſome people from the Community of Fabricia have been with us to complain in their own names, and thoſe of ſeveral other ſtrangers, who have come with their families to ſettle there, that you have laid ſome duties upon cloaths and other goods which they have, at the inſtance of that Community, in order to make them contribute to the expence of ſupporting Soldiers and other extraordinary charges;

from all which they plead an exemption in conſequence of the aforeſaid Law, and indeed demand it: for they ſolemnly declare they ſhould never have gone to live there, but for the privileges granted by it. It is our pleaſure therefore that, immediately upon the receipt of this, you ſummon the Repreſentatives of Fabricia, as well as the ſtrangers who have been ſo aggrieved, to appear before you; and that when you have read the ſaid Law in their preſence, you cauſe due regard to be paid to it, by reſtoring to them, and every one of them, the ſeveral ſums that have been levied upon their goods in contempt of it, without putting them to any further expence. For we are determined it ſhall be inviolably obſerved for the ſpace of twenty years, with regard to all ſuch as have come to ſettle within the territories of Piſa for the ſake of enjoying the privileges and immunities granted by it; in order to repeople that country as well, and as ſoon as we can. Take care then that theſe orders be duly put in execution, and Farewell, 18 February, 1510.

## LETTER XVI.

To the Chief Magiſtrate and Commiſſary of the City of Piſa, and their Succeſſors; and likewiſe to the Vicar of Lari, the Vicar of Vico Piſano, the Chief Magiſtrate of Campiglia, and their reſpective Succeſſors.

WE are informed that great quantities of Myrtle, and other materials made uſe of in tanning and dreſſing Leather, have been tranſported out of our Dominions from your ſide: by which we are likely to ſuffer much inconvenience; as we ſhall not have a ſufficient quantity of ſuch materials left in our parts for the uſe of our own Tanners and Leather-dreſſers. In order therefore to repair this loſs, and to prevent foreigners being ſupplied with theſe things to your own prejudice, we command you, upon the receipt of this, to cauſe Proclamation to be made in all the public places of your ſeveral juriſdictions, that if any perſon, of what rank or condition ſoever he may be, ſhall henceforth preſume either himſelf, or by the aſſiſtance of others, or under any pretence whatſoever, to tranſport or cauſe to be tranſported out of our Dominions, either by land or water, any ſuch materials, he ſhall forfeit not only the loading, but the carriages and beaſts that draw them, or the veſſel in which they are freighted, if conveyed by water. After you have cauſed this Proclamation to be printed, and ſtuck up in the moſt frequented places of your reſpective Juriſdictions, that ſo nobody may pretend ignorance, you are likewiſe to exert your utmoſt activity and diligence in puniſhing all offenders in the aforeſaid manner, as ſoon as they ſhall be convicted: for you muſt be very ſenſible yourſelves how much we ſhould ſuffer by a continuance of ſuch practices. Let it be your principal endeavour therefore to prevent them. Farewell, 25 February, 1510.

## LETTER XVII.

### A Patent.

THE Priori and Gonfalonier of the Republic of Florence, to the Chief Magiſtrate, Commiſſary, and Conſuls of the City of Piſa, greeting. You are no ſtrangers, we ſuppoſe, to the great pains that have been taken for a long time paſt by this Republic, and particularly by the officers of the Mint, to put a ſtop to the currency of all baſe and clipped coin in our Dominions; in which indeed they have in a great meaſure ſucceeded according to our wiſhes. But we have been lately informed that ſuch ſort of money has been again introduced into your City, and is commonly paſſed off from one to another without any fear or reſerve; at which we cannot help being very much concerned: for you muſt be thoroughly ſenſible, we are aſſured, how prejudicial ſuch a thing muſt be both to the Public and every Individual; eſpecially as we have taken great care to circulate good and genuine coin of all denominations throughout almoſt every part of our Dominions, according to the uſual cuſtom and inſtitutions of this Republic. As we are very deſirous therefore to eradicate this evil, which is of the moſt pernicious tendency, we command you to aſſemble altogether upon the receipt of this, and to make ſuch proviſions as ſhall ſeem moſt proper and expedient, not only to prevent the currency of all bad money, but to clear our Dominions intirely of it, if poſſible. You are men of ſenſe, and muſt know how detrimental the ſufferance of it will be to every ſort of people in the end. Let it be your buſineſs to take all neceſſary meaſures to remedy ſo great an evil. Farewell, 15 March, 1510.

## LETTER XVIII.

To Galeotto de Leoni, Chief Magiſtrate and Commiſſary of Burgi.

AN information hath been laid before us that Jacopo Venuto, Doctor of Law in your town, about four year ago married Madonna Giacopa, daughter of the late Chriſtofano Picchi, a woman of good reputation and family. But that he keeps another woman in the houſe, by whom he has ſeveral children, under the very eyes of his wife, whom he has abuſed in ſuch a manner that ſhe has been forced to quit the houſe, and return to her relations, for want of bread and other neceſſaries of life, whilſt he and his Concubine are ſpending her fortune and inheritance. Now this being a matter of very bad example, and not only highly culpable, but likely to be attended with dangerous conſequences, we have been humbly petitioned to take cognizance of it: upon which account, it is our pleaſure, that on the receipt of this, you preſently cite the ſaid Jacopo Venuto to appear before you, together with his wife, or ſome of her neareſt relations, that you may know the truth of the matter: and if you ſhall find it to be as it hath been repreſented to us, you are to reprimand the ſaid Jacopo in a proper manner for his cruel behaviour to his wife, giving him to underſtand that ſuch a conduct very ill becomes a perſon of his profeſſion, and that if he perſiſts in it, the Signiory of this Republic will take ſuch a courſe with him as ſhall not fail to reclaim him, and make him ſenſible of his error. In the mean time, however, you are to take care that he provide her with a proper table, cloaths, and other conveniencies ſuitable to her rank, and that he return her fortune immediately. Theſe are our poſitive orders; act with your uſual prudence in the execution of them, and endeavour to reduce the man to reaſon, for your own reputation: but if you find him obſtinate and incorrigible, let us have a particular account of his behaviour; for we are determined to redreſs the poor woman's grievances in a proper manner. Farewell, 15 March, 1510.

## LETTER XIX.

To Bartolomeo de Mancini, Vicar of Piſcia.

WE are informed that the Community of Monte Catini are deſirous to have a reform made in their Magiſtracy, now the time of chuſing new Officers is at hand. For which purpoſe ſome private perſons have been with us from that place, in their own names, and thoſe of many others, who wiſh to have the Government altered for the better, and complain that their Community, which conſiſts of about five hundred inhabitants, is entirely governed by thirty or forty perſons, who never go out of office but they are ſucceeded either by their ſons, or brothers, or ſome near relations; ſo that they are always in the Adminiſtration, and throw the power into whatſoever hands they pleaſe, without any regard to juſtice or merit. In this manner, they ſay, a few perſons ſhare all the honours amongſt them, as well as the revenues of the Public, which annually amount to four thouſand Ducats; and that though the expences of the Community never exceed two thouſand, yet they conſtantly make up accounts at the end of the year, by which they bring the reſt of their fellow-townſmen in their debt: for which reaſons the complain, as we ſaid before, of being ill governed by a little circle of Officers, who chuſe each other by turns in ſuch a manner, that when one of them goes out of power, another of them is ſure to come in: a courſe of adminiſtration ſo iniquitous, that they think they cannot fall into worſe hands upon any change whatſoever. It is our will, therefore, that either you yourſelf, or your Chief Juſtice, ſhould repair directly to Monte Catini, and not only inform yourſelves of the manner in which this Reform is to be conducted, but to take care that the Chief Magiſtrates and Council, who are to nominate the Reformers, may not appoint any relation of their own; even in the fourth degree, according to the tenor of their Laws; and that none of the old Circle (that is, of thoſe who have been ſo long in office) may be elected; that ſo other people may have their turn in the Adminiſtration, and the Reform proceed with equity and impartiality, by diſtributing the honours and employments amongſt thoſe who have always behaved themſelves well, and formerly uſed to have their ſhare in them; as well as by excluding others who have forfeited all pretenſions to them, either by having been outlawed, or otherwiſe rendered infamous by their actions. In ſhort, if you cannot attend there yourſelf, you are to lay a ſtrict injunction upon your Chief Juſtice; that he take particular care this Reform may be made with all due regard to juſtice and peace, and, if poſſible, with general ſatisfaction, by acting without paſſion or prejudice, and by conſidering the merits of every one, as their Laws expreſsly require. But if the Repreſentatives of the Community ſhall think themſelves in any wiſe aggrieved by the manner of proceeding we preſcribe, they are at liberty to apply to our moſt Auguſt Signiory. Farewell; 26 March, 1511.

## LETTER XX.

To Giovanni de Popoleſchi, Chief Magiſtrate and Commiſſary of the City of Piſtoia.

SOME people from Piſtoia (of both the Parties which divide that City) who came hither not long ago in your name, have been with us again, about the three Fellowſhips which are likely to be ſoon vacant in your College; the Panciatichi * complaining they have but few Graduates of their Party in the College, and much leſs intereſt there than they ought to have." Upon which account, having heard all that both Parties had to ſay for themſelves upon this occaſion at ſeveral times; and laſtly, having cauſed the Reverend Cardinal of Trano's will to be read to them, which preſcribes the order that is to be followed in ſuch Elections, we are of opinion that we cannot deviate from the ſaid will, without incurring much ſcandal and cenſure. For this reaſon, we will and command that the order preſcribed by it be punctually obſerved at the next Election: and if the Panciatichi have not ſo many Graduates as the other Party, you muſt exort them to patience this time; that ſo the Election may be conducted as it ſhould be, and thoſe only choſen who have the beſt right to be ſo according to the tenor of that will, without regard to any other conſideration whatſoever; becauſe it is our pleaſure that it ſhould be duly obſerved in every reſpect. On the other hand, you muſt give both Parties to underſtand that we expect they ſhould come to ſome compromiſe in theſe matters for the future, and that a proviſion be made that the Panciatichi may not be totally excluded by degrees; as it was not the Cardinal's intention that either Party ſhould have a larger ſhare in his Donation than the other. This you are to ſee executed with the utmoſt impartiality, taking great care that every ſtep may be avoided which may occaſion any ſcandal or diſturbance, and exhorting the Electors to behave themſelves in ſuch a manner upon this occaſion, as may recommend them to the notice and favour of our Auguſt Signiory. Farewell, 18 April, 1511.

---

* The name of one of the Parties.

## LETTER XXI.

### To Franciſco de Pitti, Vicar and Commiſſary of St. Miniato.

WE are informed that on Sunday next, the eleventh of this month, the Chapter of the Minor Friars for the Province of Tuſcany are to aſſemble at St. Miniato for the choice of a new Rector of their order, and that the Sieneſe Friars are determined to elect ſomebody of their own City into that office. Now as our City is the Head of Tuſcany, we think it will be more honourable that ſome Friar of our own territories ſhould be elected; and if they can be perſuaded to think well that Franciſco de Ghinucci da Monte Varchi, a man of learning and good conduct, and their preſent Rector, ſhould continue in his office, (which we underſtand would be very agreeable to their General) it would alſo be very pleaſing to us, on account of his excellent character. We therefore will and command you hereby to give all manner of aſſiſtance (as far as is conſiſtent with juſtice and decency) to our immediate Subject, the preſent Rector; taking all poſſible care to prevent any ſcandal or diſturbance that may ariſe upon this occaſion You know our pleaſure; endeavour to ſee it executed in a proper manner, without making it public, or violating your own Conſcience. Farewell, 30 May, 1511.

# LETTER XXII.

## To the Moſt Reverend Father Hieronimo de Pandolfini, Biſhop of Piſtoia.

SEVERAL perſons belonging to the Church of S. Pietro Maggiore in Piſtoia have been before our Auguſt Signiory, and aſſert that the Chapter of the ſaid Church, by virtue of a Bull granted by Pope Eugenius in the year 1433, are Patrons of it, and all the beneficed Altars in it: and that your Reverence being deſirous to ſee the Bull and ſome other writings relating to the Patronage of that Church, they were freely entruſted in your hands; but that you now refuſe to return them: at which we cannot help being much concerned, as well as offended; becauſe (not to mention the violence committed upon other people's rights) it ſeems to be a ſtep, if their allegations are true, every way unworthy of your Reverence. Upon which accounts, we adviſe you to reſtore the ſaid Bull and other writings, and to behave yourſelf with ſuch modeſty and juſtice in this affair, as may prevent all occaſion of ſcandal in the City: and indeed we make no doubt but your Reverence will be much more ready to compoſe all diſturbances than to excite and inflame them; as you muſt certainly know that when men are injured in their rights, they will take ſome means to ſhew their reſentment. Your Reverence then, being a Prelate of great prudence and moderation, will ſuffer things, we dare ſay, to proceed in their uſual courſe, and without encroaching upon the juſt claims of any; which will be very agreeable to us, and put an end to all further uneaſineſs in others. Farewell, 7 June, 1511.

## LETTER XXIII.

### To Matteo de Niccolini, Vicar of St. John's.

THE Church of S. Pietro at Preſciano being now vacant by the death of the laſt Rector, and our Auguſt Signiory having the Patronage thereof, they have conferred that Benefice upon Franciſco Fagiuoli, one of their own Citizens, and a very worthy Eccleſiaſtic: in conſequence of which, they lately ſent Dommoro di Domenico, their Bailiff, to enter and take poſſeſſion of the premiſes for the ſaid Franciſco. But our Bailiff informs us by Letter, that ſome people there not only ſhut the doors upon him, and bid him go about his buſineſs (as they intended to keep poſſeſſion of it themſelves), but preſented loaded Croſs-bows, which they threatened to diſcharge at him. Upon which, in order to avoid raiſing any ſcandal or diſturbance, he preſently left the place, and retired to Caſtello di Preſciano, to wait there for our further orders. Now as the honour of our Auguſt Signiory is concerned in the affair, we ſend one of our own officers expreſs with this; upon the receipt of which, we command you immediately to diſpatch your Sheriff and his whole Poſſe, well armed, to the ſaid Church, having firſt given notice thereof to our Bailiff at Caſtello di Preſciano, that he may repair directly to him: after which, you are to uſe all means to put the ſaid Bailiff in poſſeſſion of it, which he is to keep in the name of our Signiory.

You are likewiſe to drive out all ſecular perſons who have ſhut themſelves up there, taking down their names and places of abode in writing, and to give us a particular account of the whole: but if you happen to find any Prieſts, or other Eccleſiaſtics of any kind, amongſt them, you are to let them alone, and neither to ſay nor do any thing to them; for we have no buſineſs to put our Sickle into other people's corn *. In the next place, you are to cite the father of Ser Chriſtofano of S. Leolino, a Prieſt in Valdambra (if he has one), together with his brothers, nephews, and ſome others of his neareſt relations, to appear perſonally before us within two days after they receive the citation, on pain of having a fine of two hundred Ducats laid upon every one of them that does not appear at that time: after which, you are to give us immediate advice of what you have done, whom you have ſummoned, and upon what day. In all theſe ſeveral proceedings you are to act with all poſſible vigour and expedition; ſince, as we ſaid before, the honour of our Auguſt Signiory is highly intereſted in this matter. Farewell, 25 June, 1511.

## LETTER XXIV.

To the Same.

BY your diſpatches of yeſterday concerning the affair of the Church at Preſciano, we are informed of the perſons who forcibly kept poſſeſſion of it, and the contempt they have ſhewn of our authority in their behaviour to our Bailiff and your Sheriff. Now as the honour of this Serene Republic is at ſtake, we will and command you, upon the receipt of this, to ſend your Sheriff with his Poſſe, and as many other armed men as you can ſuddenly raiſe in your Vicariate, to burn down and level to the ground the houſe of Matteo di Simone, commonly called the Finocchino † of the ſaid Church; as alſo that of Fruoſino da S. Leolino in your Vicariate,

---

* See Note * Letter I. p. 285.

† An officer ſomewhat of the nature of a collector or treaſurer of the taxes.

riate, both whom you make mention of in your laſt. After which, you are to order the ſaid Matteo and Fruoſino to appear perſonally before us on the twenty-ninth of this month without fail, on pain of being proclaimed Rebels, and having all their goods confiſcated in caſe of diſobedience to our commands. You are further to make diligent enquiry after all the reſt who violently took poſſeſſion of the ſaid Church, and to take down their names in writing, as we inſtructed you in our former Letter: of which you muſt give us an immediate account. We ſend this by an expreſs, becauſe we are determined not to trifle any longer. Fail not therefore to execute theſe commands with vigour and diſpatch. Farewell, 27 June, 1511.

## LETTER XXV.

To the Commiſſary and Chief Magiſtrates of Piſtoia.

WE have been informed, to our great diſpleaſure, that on the ſecond of this month, people could not have bread for their money from the bakers in your City; at which we cannot help being very much ſurprized, ſince there has been ſo fine a harveſt this year, that there can be no want of corn ſufficient to occaſion ſuch an inconvenience: and we are ſtill more ſurprized that you have not acquainted us with this matter before now, that ſo we might immediately have provided you with a proper ſupply. Is is our pleaſure therefore, that, after due conſultation, you cauſe a ſpeedy and diligent ſearch to be made whether there be really a ſufficient quantity of corn in and about the City; and if you find there is, that you force thoſe that have it, to bring it to market, and ſell it at a fair and reaſonable price, as we ſhould think they would naturally be inclined to do for their own intereſt, after ſo plentiful a harveſt. But if you find there is a real ſcarcity, you are to let us know directly, and we ſhall provide accordingly: for it is a ſhameful thing that people cannot have bread for their money in ſuch a City, after ſo plentiful a harveſt (as we ſaid before), and that you ſhould have ſuffered it to be ſold at the rate of forty Soldi per Buſhel*, ſince it will not fetch that price, or any thing like it, either in our City, or any other part of our Dominions. See that theſe orders be executed without fail, and farewell, 8 July, 1511.

## LETTER XXVI.

To Leonardo de Rodulfi, Chief Magiſtrate of Piſtoia.

THE Reverend Father Aghoſtino Filippo, ſon of Antonio our Fellow-citizen, and Provincial Vicar of the order of Servites in our City, hath been before us, and ſays they have a Convent of the ſame order at Piſtoia, in which there are ſome diſſolute brethren, who refuſe to pay due obedience to him and the eſtabliſhed rules of the Society, with whoſe names he will acquaint you. And though he is deſirous to reduce them to reaſon and obedience, as the duty of his office, and the diſcipline of the Convent, require, he has not ſufficient power to effect it, and correct them in a proper manner: upon which account he has petitioned the aſſiſtance of the ſecular Magiſtrate. It is our pleaſure therefore, that when the ſaid Provincial Vicar, or his Deputy, ſhall ſhew you ſufficient licence and authority from their Superior to correct thoſe Monks, and reduce them to obedience, and that he is thereby duly empowered to ſollicit the interpoſition of the ſecular Magiſtrate, you ſhall give him all manner of proper aſſiſtance, as often as he ſhall require it, for the above mentioned purpoſes; taking great care, however, to prevent all frays and tumults, and ſcandal, that may ariſe upon this occaſion. You are a diſcreet man, and know how we would have you behave in the affair: act therefore in ſuch a manner as may deſerve our commendation, by reducing the ſaid brethren to their duty; conſidering, above all things, that the honour of Almighty God is here immediately concerned. Farewell, 20 July, 1511.

---

* The original ſays "a Soldi 40 lo ſtaio." An Italian Soldo is of the ſame value with a French Sou, twenty of which make a Livre: ſo that forty Soldi make about 1 s. 10 d. Sterling. This would be thought a very inconſiderable price for a Buſhel of wheat at preſent, though it was looked upon as ſo exorbitant in Machiavel's time. But whoever conſiders how ſcarce money was in Europe about two hundred and fifty years ago, in compariſon of what it is now, will eaſily account for this difference in the price of grain.

## LETTER XXVII.

### A Patent,

The Priori and Gonfalonier of the Republic of Florence, to all our Governors and Magiſtrates, as well preſent as to come, and to every one of them in particular, to whom theſe our Letters Patent ſhall come, greeting.

WE herewith ſend you a Proclamation to be publiſhed, in order to notify the treaty of peace, friendſhip, and confederacy, concluded on the ſecond of this month betwixt this Auguſt Republic and the Magnificent Community of Siena, which contains a mutual pardon and oblivion of all injuries and damages that have ever been committed by one upon the other, with ſeveral other ſuch pacts and ſtipulations as are uſually made in the like Conventions.

tions. We therefore will and command you all, and every one of you reſpectively, to cauſe the ſaid Proclamation to be publiſhed throughout your ſeveral juriſdictions; that ſo from henceforth the citizens and ſubjects of both Republics may freely and ſecurely paſs out of the Dominions of one into thoſe of the other, to traffick, negotiate, and tranſact all other ſuch affairs as good friends and neighbours are wont to do together. Farewell, 9 Auguſt, 1511.

## LETTER XXVIII.

### To the Conſuls of the Marine.

WE underſtand that this Auguſt Republic having ſome years ago taken a reſolution to divert the ſtream of the river Arno in ſuch a manner as to overflow the territories of Piſa, in order to reduce that State to its duty to our City; the work was actually begun, and ſeveral ditches cut for that purpoſe. So that ever ſince the river began to take a new courſe, it appears that all the lands belonging to the Community of Fagiana, have been ſo flooded and covered with mud, that no ſigns of any former boundaries or land-marks are now to be diſcovered; but all the meadows are diſguiſed with roots of trees, mire, and ſand to ſuch a degree, that it is impoſſible for any man to diſtinguiſh his own from that of his neighbour. Now the owners of the ſaid Lands being deſirous to recover them (as it is natural to ſuppoſe they ſhould be), and to make them turn to ſome account again when every man knows his own, (which cannot poſſibly be effected till that is aſcertained by due authority) ſome of the moſt conſiderable of them have been before us, and petitioned that you may take all neceſſary and proper meaſures to have thoſe lands ſurveyed in ſuch a manner, that every man may have his own property reſtored to him with certainty, and reap the profits of it in due time. Now as this expectation is but juſt and reaſonable, we command you to take the matter in hand immediately, and not only to ſend for the ſeveral owners of the ſaid lands, but to ſearch narrowly into the nature of every man's claim, and then to aſſign them ſuch a portion of ground as they had there before; taking care at the ſame time to diſtinguiſh the ſeveral pieces by proper names, boundaries, and landmarks, and to have them ſpecified and recorded in a writing, which any one may have recourſe to hereafter for ſatisfaction upon occaſion. Notwithſtanding this diviſion, however, it is our pleaſure, that if any one of the proprietors ſhall think himſelf aggrieved by it, he ſhall have free appeal at all times to our Auguſt Signiory: for we would not upon any account deprive one perſon of his right, and give it to another that has none. Now you know our pleaſure, take care to act with prudence and juſtice in it. Farewell, 19 Auguſt, 1511.

## LETTER XXIX.

To Giovanni de Barducci, Chief Magiſtrate and Commiſſary of Fiviziani.

IT hath been repreſented to our Auguſt Signiory, that the Marquis Giovanni Lorenzo da Treſpie, not only behaves with great rudeneſs and inſolence to the Marquis of Morello, his near relation, but actually diſturbs him by force and violence in the poſſeſſion of his eſtate; which certainly is acting in a manner that little becomes a man of quality and a near relation. We command you therefore to go in perſon to the ſaid Marquis Giovanni Lorenzo (taking care at the ſame time to keep up your dignity in a proper manner) and give him to underſtand, that it is the pleaſure of this Auguſt Signiory he ſhould deſiſt from all further violence and rudeneſs to his kinſman: for that if he perſiſts in it, we ſhall take the Marquis of Morello under our immediate protection, and afford him all convenient aſſiſtance for his ſecurity, as he hath been well recommended to our care. For this purpoſe, you are to make uſe of ſuch arguments and perſuaſions as ſhall ſeem good to your prudence: and if you find he is inclinable to peace, let him ſue for juſtice in the ordinary way, in caſe he thinks he has been in any wiſe injured; that ſo the Marquis of Morello may likewiſe have an opportunity of juſtifying himſelf in a legal manner: for no private man ought to be permitted to right himſelf when he thinks he has ſuffered wrong. Farewell, 18 September, 1511.

## LETTER XXX.

### To the Conſuls of the Marine.

BARTOLOMEO, the Son of Franciſco Graſſolino, a citizen of Piſa, hath been before our Auguſt Signiory, and ſays, that about ten months ago he returned to live at Piſa after an abode of fifteen years at Rome; and that as his houſhold goods and furniture were coming from Rome to Piſa by water ſome days ago (having been packed up and ſent away by a particular friend at Rome) it ſeems about fifteen pounds of Salt had been inadvertently put amongſt other kitchen neceſſaries by the care of his friend's wife, who had been very exact in ſending every thing that might be of the leaſt uſe in houſekeeping, but without any ill deſign, or thoughts of offending againſt the Laws relating to the tranſportation of Salt. Now when the box where the Salt was came to be opened by the Cuſtomhouſe officers, to ſee whether there were any contraband goods in it, they found it there amongſt other things, and condemned the whole freight, according to the tenor of the Laws made for that purpoſe. The ſaid Bartholomeo therefore hath humbly beſought us to afford him ſome redreſs in this affair, as, he ſays, he had no intention of tranſgreſſing the Law, nor indeed knew any thing of the matter: ſo that, if what he ſays is true, it is a caſe that deſerves commiſeration. Upon which account, if you find things to be as he hath repreſented to us, it is our pleaſure that you treat him with ſuch clemency as ought to be ſhewn in ſo ſingular and unexpected a caſe. For though the Laws relating to Salt are very ſtrict and ſevere, yet, upon ſuch an occaſion as this, they ſhould be mitigated according to the circumſtances of it. Proceed therefore with your uſual prudence and lenity, now you know our pleaſure, and farewell, 28 September, 1511.

## LETTER XXXI.

To Pietro de Compagni, Vicar of Piſa.

WE ſuppoſe you, and all the people in your Vicariate, have heard of the Interdict which his Holineſs the Pope * hath thundered out againſt us; though both we ourſelves, and almoſt all the City, look upon it as vain and inſignificant for many reaſons; eſpecially becauſe his Holineſs having been cited to appear before a General Council, could not publiſh ſuch an Interdict according to the Canons of the Church, without leaving us at liberty to appeal to the ſaid Council, or any other Tribunal where our cauſe could be formally and judicially

---

* Julius II.

judicially heard: for ſuch an appeal is to be conſidered as ſelf-defence, and that being allowed by the Laws of nature, cannot be refuſed or objected as a crime to any man. We might add, that this Interdict has been publiſhed by his Holineſs without ever citing us to appear before him; whereas a citation ſhould always precede condemnation and puniſhment. God himſelf has given us an example of it in the caſe of Adam, by citing him after he had ſinned, and ſaying, "Adam, Adam, ubi es? Adam, Adam, where art thou*?" before he drove him out of Paradiſe. Many other reaſons might be alledged, but to avoid prolixity we ſhall not ſpecify them here. That we may live like Chriſtians therefore, and have Maſs and other Divine Service duly celebrated, we oblige ſuch Conventuals of our city to officiate, as always uſed to perform thoſe Duties at our Palace, viz. the Servites, the order of S. Maria Novella, of Santa Croce, of Santo Spirito, the Carmelites, and the order of All Saints. As to the other Orders and the ſeculars, eſpecially thoſe of our Principal Church, we have given them leave to obſerve the Interdict if they pleaſe, leſt they ſhould be deprived of their benefices and revenues. This is all that we think neceſſary to ſay at preſent relating to the Interdict, and the manner in which we conduct ourſelves upon this occaſion; and it is our pleaſure that you communicate it to all our faithful ſubjects under your juriſdiction. Farewell, 1 October, 1511.

## LETTER XXXII.

To the Same.

THERE is no occaſion for any further anſwer to yours of the 30th, than that you are to underſtand we do not look upon the preſent Interdict (as it is called) to be valid, for ſeveral reaſons. In the firſt place, becauſe the Pope has been cited ſome months ago to appear before a General Council: in the ſecond, becauſe we have appealed to that Council ourſelves: thirdly, becauſe we have had no citation from his Holineſs, as is always uſual upon ſuch occaſions; and for many other reaſons which are not neceſſary to be mentioned at preſent. We therefore have cauſed the Conventuals who have no Benefices to loſe, and have always been accuſtomed to celebrate Maſs and other Divine Service in our Palace, to perform the ſame duties as uſual, for the ſatisfaction and conſolation of our city. But for the reſt of our Clergy who are beneficed, we would not expoſe them to any inconvenience; becauſe the Conventuals at preſent are ſufficient to perform all the neceſſary duties, and we hope in God the matter will blow over in a few days. Now you know how we act here upon this occaſion, we would have you conduct yourſelf accordingly, and with diſcretion. Farewell, 1 October, 1511.

---

* Gen. iii. 9.

## LETTER XXXIII.

### A Patent.

The Priori and Gonfalonier of the Republic of Florence, to all and every one to whom theſe preſents ſhall come, greeting.

WE hereby notify to you, that we, together with the Reſpectable Council of Eight for the maintenance of Liberty and Peace, the Council of Eighty, and the other Colleges of our city, according to the Ordinances thereof, have elected and appointed our truſty and well-beloved Fellow-citizen Giovanni de Rodolfi to be Governor over all the Province of Romagna, with full and ample power to provide for the ſecurity, good government, and welfare of the ſaid Province. Wherefore, we will and command you all that you obey him in every thing in the ſame manner as if our Auguſt Signiory were actually preſent amongſt you, and to behave yourſelves towards him with ſuch dutiful reſpect and ſubmiſſion, that you may merit our approbation for it. Farewell, 3 November, 1511.

## LETTER XXXIV.

### To the Reverend Donato de Chianni, Vicar to the Biſhop of Arezzo.

WE have had information of an affair which cannot but give us great offence and diſpleaſure, as the honour and dignity of our Governors (who are members of our Auguſt Signiory) is much impaired by it. It ſeems, one Gaſpari, the Son of Meo di Cecco, and chaplain to the Church of Faltona, ſuffered himſelf to be ſo tranſported with choler, that on St. Simon's day laſt, he not only abuſed and vilified our truſty and well-beloved Fellow-citizen Carlo Macigni, Governor of Caſtello Focagnano, in the moſt opprobrious and contumelious terms, but actually came with arms in his hands to aſſault him; and how becoming that was in a Religious, we leave your Reverence (as you are a very prudent man) to judge yourſelf. Now as ſo grievous an indignity ought to be puniſhed in the moſt exemplary manner, we earneſtly exhort your Reverence to examine into the circumſtances of the matter, and cauſe the offender to be chaſtiſed in ſuch a manner, as may not only deter others from the like outrages for the future, but make ſufficient reſtitution to the honour of our Republic, which has been ſo grievouſly inſulted upon this occaſion. But if your Reverence is backward in doing this, we ſhall be forced to take the affair into our own hands; and then we ſhall make him ſenſible whom he has offended, and ſee due ſatisfaction rendered to our Republic. Confiding therefore in your prudence and juſtice, we make no doubt but you will cauſe the offender to be puniſhed to our ſatisfaction for this, and ſeveral other crimes and delinquencies he has been guilty of. Farewell, 8 November, 1511.

## LETTER XXXV.

### To Giovanni de Barducci, Commiſſary and Chief Magiſtrate of Fiviziani.

MERCATO, the ſon of Giacopo da Botignano, a little town and court in the juriſdiction of Fiviziano, about twelve years ago, as we are informed, obtained a ſafe-conduct from the Signiory of Lucca to drive a herd of Cattle through their territories towards the ſea-coaſt and back again. But as he was returning from thence, and had got almoſt to the gates of Lucca with his Cattle, they were taken from him, it ſeems, by the Luccheſe, to the value of three hundred Ducats and upwards. Seeing, therefore, they had violated their faith in this manner, and robbed him almoſt cloſe to the gates of their city, he made complaint of it to our Auguſt Signiory; who, taking the matter into conſideration, came to a reſolution that their ſubject ſhould have proper ſatisfaction made him for his loſs. For which purpoſe, they wrote a letter to their Commiſſary for the time being to ſeize upon ſome inhabitants in that part of the juriſdiction of Lucca which lies neareſt the territory of Fiviziani, and to fine them in ſuch a manner as might indemnify our ſaid ſubject Mercato: which being executed ed in ſome meaſure, he recovered about one hundred Ducats. But the Signiory of Lucca being informed of this, immediately cauſed three of the principal men that belonged to the territory of Fiviziani, and lived in their juriſdiction, to be outlawed, viz. Pietro del Maeſtro, Pietro Agnolo Berni, and Lazzerotto di Chriſtofáno, of whom the ſaid Lazzerotto only is now alive, but ſtill outlawed, and in daily apprehenſion of being ſeized, as they watch continually for him; which he thinks is a very hard caſe, being in no fault at all himſelf. Having humbly beſought us therefore to commiſerate his condition, and to afford him ſome relief, we command you, upon the receipt of this, immediately to acquaint four of the principal inhabitants belonging to the Vicariate of Minuzzano, in the Juriſdiction of Lucca, (of whoſe names Lazzerotto will inform you) that if within twenty days after that notice, they do not effectually prevail upon the Signiory of Lucca (or whomſoever elſe it may belong to) to revoke and utterly cancel the outlawry againſt the ſaid Lazzerotto, you will cauſe them to be ſerved in the ſame manner that he has been. This is our pleaſure: take care to execute it with your uſual prudence and regard to juſtice; that ſo Lazzerotto may at laſt be freed from all further danger and apprehenſion. Farewell, 27 November, 1511.

## LETTER XXXVI.

To Bernardo de Vittorii, Vicar and Commiſſary of Peſcia.

FATHER Ludovico degli Oneſti, Deputy from the Community of Pietra Buona, hath been before us; and ſays, that in September laſt ſome flocks of goats belonging to the Luccheſe peaſants having committed great treſpaſs in the lands of the ſaid Community, the tenants ſeized upon and delivered them into the hands of their reſpective landlords, that ſo thoſe to whom they belonged might be obliged to make proper ſatisfaction for the damage they had done before they had them again: and further, that Pietro di Cante, your predeceſſor, had the ſeveral parties before him, and compoſed all differences betwixt them, as appears by a written inſtrument drawn up on that occaſion. But we are informed that the Lucchéſe peaſants having ſince repreſented the matter in a manner very different from truth to the Chief Magiſtrate of Lucca, in order to throw all the blame upon our Subjects the inhabitants of Pietra Buona, he has not only confiſcated the goods of ſix of the moſt ſubſtantial people in the Luccheſe territories who belong to that Community, but threatens to hang them, and has ſet a price upon their heads, promiſing a reward of fifty Ducats to any one who ſhall deliver them up to him either dead or alive: at all which proceedings we cannot help being greatly ſurpriſed, as thoſe men have not been guilty of the leaſt crime to merit ſuch ſeverity. As it ought to be reſented therefore in a proper manner for the honour of our Auguſt Republic, we will and command you, upon the receipt of this, to treat twelve of the moſt ſubſtantial men and heads of the family of the Giuſti at Caſtello di Medicini, who belong to the juriſdiction of Lucca, in the ſame manner that our ſubjects of Pietra Buona have been treated by the Magiſtracy of that City; that ſo by returning like for like, they may be made ſenſible of their error. Fail not execute theſe commands with vigour and expedition. Farewell, 16 December, 1511.

LET-

## LETTER XXXVII.

To Lorenzo de Acciaiuoli, Chief Magiſtrate and Commiſſary of Caſtro Caro.

WE underſtand by your Letter to his Excellency the Gonfalonier, that there is a quarrel of a dangerous nature in your town, betwixt the families of Caſa Nuova and the Fabri on one ſide, and that of the Taſſinari on the other, but that there is at preſent a ſort of a tacit truce betwixt them. Now as theſe families are very numerous, and have many relations and dependants in the ſeveral ſtreets where they live, we could wiſh, in order to prevent all further diſturbances, the ſeveral families would come to ſome amicable accommodation amongſt themſelves, eſpecially as there has been yet no-body killed on either ſide, and only ſome few people ſlightly wounded. For this purpoſe, we command you, upon the receipt of this, to ſend for the Heads of both parties to appear before you, and, with your uſual prudence, to adviſe them in a friendly and gentle manner to be ſincerely reconciled to each other for their mutual honour, ſatisfaction, and welfare. If you perceive them diſpoſed to this, you are to commend their prudence and good nature, ſetting forth the ſweets and advantages of good neighbourhood, as well as the many evils and inconveniencies that always reſult from quarrels. But if you find that all fair and perſuaſive means are in vain; and there is no poſſibility of bringing about an accommodation betwixt them without ſome ſort of compulſion, you are to order the Heads of that party which is moſt obſtinate in rejecting all terms, to appear perſonally before us within four days at the furtheſt after ſuch notice, without fail, and on pain of our diſpleaſure; giving the Heads of the other party notice likewiſe to appear at the ſame time, that we may ſettle all differences betwixt them, and make a proper diſtinction betwixt thoſe that are refractory, and thoſe that are deſirous to live in peace. In this caſe you are to let us have immediate advice, and to acquaint us upon what day you gave them ſuch orders, taking all poſſible care to prevent them from quarrelling upon the road as they come hither. Farewell, 11 February, 1511.

## LETTER XXXVIII.

To Filippo de Lorini, Chief Magiſtrate and Commiſſary of Fiviziani.

THERE has been a diſpute, it ſeems, for ſome time, which may at laſt very probably be attended with bad conſequences, betwixt the Community of Vinca in your juriſdiction on one ſide, and the people of Fornole, who are ſubject to the Marquis of Maſſa, on the other, on account of Mount Rutaia; concerning which our Signiory has written many Letters, and laſtly one to your predeceſſor Giovanni de Barducci, dated the nineteenth of January laſt, which perhaps may be regiſtered in your Chancery. This diſpute is not yet ſettled; which has not been owing to our ſubjects, we hear, but to the ſaid Marquis, who has always prevaricated, and put off the matter without any ſeeming deſire to come to an accommodation, whilſt in the mean time his ſubjects of Fornole have come every day, and ſtill do, to aſſert their right to the ſaid Mount, by committing all ſorts of violence upon the people of Vinca, ſuch as beating them, entering their lands by force, and keeping poſſeſſion of them by ſuch means as ſeem neither juſt nor warrantable, nor becoming people that would be good neighbours. It is our duty, therefore, to afford theſe our ſubjects all manner of neceſſary aſſiſtance in the maintenance of their rights and properties; eſpecially as they have been at all times, and ſtill are, remarkably loyal and faithful to our Auguſt Republic. But as it is our deſire to proceed by fair and amicable means in compromiſing this matter, we hereby order you to acquaint the ſaid Marquis as ſoon as poſſible, that you have a Commiſſion from us to treat and confer with him in behalf of our ſubjects at Vinca, on the ſpot, concerning the lands in diſpute, and after an ocular ſurvey, and hearing the claims on both ſides, to determine it in a ſummary way, taking good care at the ſame time, however, to ſupport the juſt rights of our ſubjects in a proper manner. But if he ſtill perſiſts in ſhuffling and evading a fair accommodation, as uſual, and will come to no reaſonable compoſition in favour of his people, but ſuffers them to uſe force and violence, as they have hitherto been accuſtomed to do, you are then (ſince it is lawful to repel force by force) to ſend for Gianneſino, Captain of the battalion di Caſtiglione, and employ the forces under his command to prevent our ſubjects at Vinca from having any further violence committed upon them, contrary to all juſtice and equity, taking heed to act rather upon the defenſive than the offenſive, and to ſupport our people inſtead of attacking others. We would have you nevertheleſs, in the firſt place, to make uſe of all gentle and perſuaſive arguments, according to your uſual prudence, in order to bring about a fair and amicable adjuſtment of this matter. Farewell, 7 March, 1511.

## LETTER XXXIX.

### A Patent.

The Priori and Gonfalonier of the Republic of Florence, to Giuliano de Orlandini, Chief Magiſtrate of Prato; Pelegrino de Lorini, Commiſſary of Piſtoia; and Bernardo de Vittorii, Vicar and Commiſſary of Peſcia, greeting.

WE have ſent Pietro Paolo, the bearer of this, and an officer belonging to our Auguſt Signiory, with all expedition, to prepare magnificent lodgings at Prato for his Eminency, the moſt Reverend Legate from his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty to our Auguſt Signiory, who is returning according to his commiſſion into France. It is our pleaſure therefore, that his eminency, together with all his train and attendants, be honourably received and entertained by you and every one of you, as well as by your principal citizens; and that you provide him with magnificent lodgings, and ſuch as are fitting for the Ambaſſador of ſo great a Prince. And if his Eminency has a mind to ſee the environs of Prato, you, the Chief Magiſtrate of the ſaid town, are to take care that he be attended in a proper manner, and that all manner of honour and reſpect be ſhewn him, as he juſtly deſerves, according to the inſtructions we have given to the bearer of this, which he will communicate more fully to you by word of mouth. Farewell, 18 March, 1511.

We would not willingly deprive the Public of the following Letter, written by Machiavel, and tranſmitted to us by a perſon of learning in Italy, though it is upon a Subject very different from the reſt.

## LETTER XL.

### Nicholas Machiavel to his excellent Friend Alamanno Salviato, greeting.

YOU may here read, ſince you deſired it, my dear Alamanno, the ſufferings of Italy during the courſe of ten years, and the fruits of my labours for fifteen days: but I know very well you will have no pleaſure either in one or the other; ſince you muſt be moved with compaſſion at the misfortunes of your Country, and entertain ſome pity for me who have attempted a recital of ſo many great events in ſo narrow a compaſs. Yet I am aſſured you will bear with both, as the former were owing to fatal neceſſity, and the latter to the ſhortneſs of thoſe few intervals of leiſure that fall to my ſhare: and as you nobly ſupport one of the chief members of your Country in its liberties, I hope you will alſo kindly vouchſafe your aſſiſtance to the reciter of its troubles, by poliſhing my verſes in ſuch a manner as may make them worthy of your acceptance, and the greatneſs of the ſubject. Farewell, 9 November, 154[*].

---

[*] The original of this letter is in the Medicean Library at Florence, Cod. xiii. Membr. in 8o. Pl. xliv. It was written by Machiavel to Salviati, when he ſent him his two Poems, called i Decennali; the former of which begins in this manner,

Io canterò l'Italiche fatiche
Seguite gia ne' duo paſſati luſtri,
Sotto le Stelle all ſuo bene inimiche, &c.

The latter thus:

Gli accidenti e caſi furioſi
Che in dieci anni ſeguenti ſono ſtati,
Poiche tacendo la penna repoſi;
Le mutation de Regni, Imperii e Stati
Seguiti pur per l'Italico ſito,
Dal conſiglio divin predeſtinati,
Canterò io, &c.

THE END OF THE LETTERS.

A Copy of what is prefixed to the Regiſter, in which all the Letters that were written by the Secretary of State to the Republic of Florence are preſerved in the Chancery of that City *.

In Dei nomine Amen. Anno Domini noſtri Jeſu Chriſti ab ejus ſalutiferâ incarnatione milleſimo quingenteſimo undecimo, Indictione quarta decimâ †, diebus vero & menſibus infra ſcriptis.

In hoc ſequenti chartarum numero præſentis Regiſtri, ſcribentur omnes & ſingulæ Deliberationes pertinentes & expectantes ad officium ſecundæ Cancelleriæ Magnificorum Dominorum D. Priorum libertatis & Vexilliferi juſtitiæ perpetui Populi Florentini rogatæ & publicatæ per me Nicolaum Domini Bernard de Maclavellis unum ex Cancellariis præfatæ Dominationis exiſtentibus de dictis Dominis,

| | |
|---|---|
| Johanne Franciſco Bartolomei<br>Franciſci de Bramantibus<br>Cino Hieronymi Cini Lucæ Cini | Pro Quart,$^{rio}$ S. Spiritus. |
| Bernardo Hieronymi Matthæi de Morellis<br>Angelo Andreoli alterius Andreoli de Sacchettis | Pro Quart,$^{rio}$ S. Crucis. |
| Alberto Cantis Johannis de Compagnis<br>Pieradovardo Hieronymi Adovardi de Giacchinottis | Pro Quart,$^{rio}$ S. M. Nouvellæ. |
| Lactantio Franciſci Papi de Thedaldis<br>Johanne Philippi Johannis de Cappellis | Pro Quart,$^{rio}$ S. Johannis. |

Petro Domini Tommaſii Laurentii de Soderinis Vexillifero juſtitiæ perpetuo Populi Florentini.

---

* We cannot ſay much here in praiſe either of the elegance or intelligibility of Machiavel's Latin.

† The word Indictio ſignifies a period of fifteen years; a way of computing time introduced by Conſtantine the Great.

*Here the following note is inſerted in the Margin.*

Filius juſtitiæ ſub cujus umbrâ totum Imperium Florentinum feliciſſimum recubat.——
Exiſtente eorum Notario Ser Juliano Johannis Antonii de Valle——Cancell.——

Die primâ Novembris MDXI.

Præfati excelſi Domini in ſufficienti numero congregati, per eorum ſolemne partitum miſſum inter eos ad fabas nigras & albas, & eo quidem obtento ſecundum ordinamenta Civitatis Florentiæ, deliberaverunt per præfatum eorum Cancellarium, ſolutis in primis debitis taxis Communi Florentiæ, poſſint & debeant tradi Litteræ civibus Florentinis euntibus in Capitaneos, Vicarios, Poteſtates, & Caſtellanos; & pari modo Litteræ noſtræ notificatoriæ, Revocationum Bullectinorum, ut moris eſt. Laus Deo.

It appears from the ſame Regiſter, that the Priori and Notary were changed every two months; and that no Public officer was conſtantly employed in the Service of the Republic when theſe Letters were written, except Pietro Solderini, the Gonfalonier, and Niccoló Machiavelli, the Secretary of State.

FINIS.

THE following letter having been printed in all the Editions of the old Tranſlation, it is here given to the reader, though it certainly was not written by Machiavel; it bears date 1537, and his death is placed by all the beſt Hiſtorians in 1530. —There are beſides in it many internal marks, which to the judicious will clearly prove it to be the work of ſome other writer, vainly endeavouring at the ſtile and manner of our excellent author. The letter is indeed a ſpirited and judicious defence of Machiavel and his writings, but it is written in a ſtile too inflated, and is utterly void of that elegance and preciſion which ſo much dinguiſh the works of the Florentine Secretary.

# THE

# PUBLISHER to the READER,

## CONCERNING

## The following LETTER.

COURTEOUS READER,

IT hath been uſual with moſt of thoſe who have tranſlated this Author into any Language, to ſpend much of their time and paper in taxing his impieties, and confuting his errors and falſe principles, as they are pleaſed to call them. If, upon peruſal of his Writings, I had found him guilty of any thing that could deceive the ſimple, or prejudice the reſt of mankind, I ſhould not have put thee to the hazard of reading him in thy own Language; but rather have ſuffered him ſtill to ſleep in the obſcurity of his own, than endanger the world; but being very well aſſured of the contrary, and that the Age will rather receive advantage than damage by this Publication, I did yet think that it was fit to ſay ſomething in a Preface to vindicate our Author from thoſe Slanders, which Prieſts and other biaſſed Pens have laid upon him; but ſtill I thought, that it might prove a bold and preſumptuous undertaking, and might excite laughter, for a perſon of my ſmall parts and abilities to apologize for one of the greateſt Wits and profoundeſt Judgments that ever lived amongſt the Moderns: in this perplexity, I had the good fortune to meet with this Letter of his own writing; which hath delivered me from thoſe ſcruples, and furniſhed me with an opportunity of juſtifying this great perſon by his own pen. Receive then this choice Piece with benignity; it hath never before been publiſhed in any Language, but lurked for above 80 years, in the private Cabinets of his own Kindred, and the Deſcendants of his own admirers in Florence, till in the beginning of the Pontificate of Urban VIII. it was procured by the Jeſuits and other buſy-bodies, and brought to Rome with an intention to divert that wiſe Pope from his deſign of making one of Nicholas Machiavel's Name and Family Cardinal, as (notwithſtanding all their oppoſition) he did, not long after. When it was gotten into that City, it wanted not thoſe who had the judgment and curioſity to copy it, and ſo at length came to enjoy that privilege which all rare Pieces (even the ſharpeſt Libels and Paſquils) challenge in that Court, which is to be ſold to Strangers, one of which being a Gentleman of this Country, brought it over with him at his return from thence in the year 1645, and having tranſlated it into Engliſh, did communicate it to divers of his friends, and by means of ſome of them, it hath been my good fortune to be capable of making thee a preſent of it; and let it ſerve as an Apology for our Author and his Writings, if thou thinkeſt he need any. I muſt confeſs I believe his Works require little, but rather praiſe and admiration; yet I wiſh I could as well juſtify one undertaking of his not long after the writing of this Letter; for we find in the Story of thoſe times, that in the Month of Auguſt following, in the ſame year 1537, this Nicolo Machiavelli (except there were another of that name) was committed Priſoner to the Bargello, amongſt thoſe who were taken in Arms againſt Coſimo at the caſtle of Montemurli, notwithſtanding all in his Compliments in this Letter to that Prince, and profeſſed Obligations to him. If this be ſo, we muſt impute it to his too great zeal to concur with the deſires of the univerſality at that time, in reſtoring the liberty of their Country, which hath ſo far dazzled the judgments even of great and wiſe men, that thou ſeeſt many grave Authors amongſt the Ancients have even commended and deified the ingratitude and treachery of Brutus and Caſſius.

But certainly this crime of his would have been much more unpardonable, if he had lived to ſee his own Propheſy fulfilled in the Perſons and Deſcendants of this great Coſimo, for there was never any ſucceſſion of Princes ſince the world began, in which all the Royal virtues and other qualities neceſſary to thoſe who rule over men, were more eminently perſpicuous than in every individual of this line; ſo that thoſe people have as little cauſe as ever any had to lament the change of their Government; their great Dukes having been truly Fathers of their Country, and treated their Subjects like Children, though their power be above all limitation, above all fundamental Laws; but they, having no Law, are a Law to themſelves. I cannot chuſe but inſtance in ſome few of their benefits to their people; firſt, the making the River Arno navigable from Piſa to Florence in a year of dearth, that ſo the poor might be ſet on work and have bread, and the Traffick of both Cities infinitely facilitated; their making at their own charge a Canal from Livorne to Piſa; their erecting at Piſa a famous Univerſity, paying the Profeſſors, who are eminent for Learning, and diſcharging all other incidencies out of their own Revenue, beſides the raiſing ſtately Buildings for Schools and Libraries; their founding a renowed Order of Knighthood, and keeping the Chapter in the ſame City, and ordering a conſiderable number of Knights conſtantly to reſide there, both which were intended and performed by them, to encreaſe the concourſe, and reſtore the wealth to the once opulent Inhabitants of that place; their new building, fortifying and enfranchizing Livorne, that, even by the aboliſhing their own cuſtoms, they might enrich their Subjects, and make that Port (as it now is) the Magazine of all the Levant Trade; and laſtly, their not having in 140 years ever levied any new Tax upon their people, excepting in the year 1642, to defend the Liberties of Italy againſt the Barbarini. Theſe things would merit a *Panegyric*, if either my parts, or this ſhort Advertiſement, would admit it. I ſhall conclude then, after I have borne a juſt and dutiful teſtimony to the merits of the Prince who now governs that State, in whom (if all the princely virtues and endowments ſhould be loſt) they might be found reſtored again to the world; as ſome ingenious Artiſts in the laſt Age retrieved the Art of Sculpture by certain Bas Relievos remaining on ſome Pillars and Walls at Rome. The Prudence, Magnanimity, Charity, Liberality, and above all, the Humanity, Courteſy, and Affability of this Prince, though they exceed my expreſſions, yet they are ſufficiently known, not only to his own Subjects (the conſtant objects of his care and goodneſs) but even to all Strangers, more particularly to our Nation, he having undertaken a troubleſome Journey to viſit this Kingdom, and to make it a witneſs and partaker of his tranſcendent generoſity and bounty, which he hath continued ever ſince, as can be teſtified by all who have had the honour to wait upon him in his own Country, or the good fortune but to ſee him in ours. I myſelf, who have been ſo happy to be admitted into his preſence, and have been honoured ſince in having his Highneſs my cuſtomer for many choice Books, to encreaſe (not his knowledge, for that his beyond receiving any addition by Books) but his curioſity, and his Library, do think myſelf bound in Duty to take this poor opportunity of teſtifying my gratitude and devotion to this excellent Prince. As to this Letter, I have nothing more to ſay, but that thou mayeſt ſee how right this Author was ſet in Principles of Religion, before he could have the information, which we have had ſince from the Pens of moſt learned and rational Controverſiſts in thoſe points, and therefore thou mayeſt admire the ſagacity of his Judgment. Read him then, and ſerve God, thy King, and thy Country, with the knowledge he will teach thee Farewell.

# NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL's

# LETTER

# TO

# ZANOBIUS BUONDELMONTIUS

# IN

# VINDICATION of himſelf and his WRITINGS.

THE Diſcourſe we had lately (dear Zenobio) in the delightful Gardens of our old deceaſed Friend Coſimo Rucellai, and the preſſing importunity of Guilio Salviati, that I would uſe ſome means to wipe off the many aſperſions caſt upon my Writings, gives you the preſent trouble of reading this Letter, and me the pleaſure of writing it; which laſt would be infinitely greater, if I were not at this day too old, and too inconſiderable, and by the change of our Government wholly incapable, of performing, either with my brain or my hand, any further ſervice to my Country; for it hath ever been my opinion, that whoſoever goes about to make men publicly acquainted with his actions, or apologize to the world for imputations laid upon him, cannot be excuſed from vanity and impertinence, except his parts and opportunities be ſuch, as may enable him to be inſtrumental for the good of others, and that he cannot atchieve that excellent end, without juſtifying himſelf from having any indirect and baſe ones, and procuring truſt from men, by clearing the repute of his juſtice and integrity to them. But although this be far from my caſe; yet I have yielded (you ſee) to the entreaty of Guilio and the reſt of that Company, not only becauſe I am ſufficiently (both by the reſtraint of our Preſs, and the diſcretion of the perſon I write to) aſſured that this Letter will never be made public; but for that I eſteem it a duty to clear that excellent Society from the ſcandal of having ſo dangerous and pernicious a perſon to be a member of their converſation; for by reaſon of my Age, and ſince the Loſs of our Liberty, and my ſufferings under that Monſter of luſt and cruelty Alexander de' Medici, ſet over us by the Divine vengeance for our ſins, I can be capable of no other deſign or enjoyment, than to delight, and be delighted, in the company of ſo many choice and virtuous perſons, who now aſſemble themſelves with all ſecurity, under the happy and hopeful Reign of our new Prince, Coſimo; and we may ſay, that though our Commonwealth be not reſtored, our ſlavery is at an end, and that he coming in by our own choice, may prove (if I have as good Skill in Propheſying as I have had formerly) Anceſtor to many renowned Princes, who will govern this State in great quietneſs, and with great clemency; ſo that our Poſterity is like to enjoy eaſe and ſecurity, though not that greatneſs, wealth, and glory, by which our City hath for ſome years paſt (even in the moſt factious and tumultuous times of our Democracy) given Law to Italy, and bridled the ambition of foreign Princes. But, that I may avoid the Loquacity incident to old men, I will come to the buſineſs. If I remember well, the exceptions that are taken to theſe poor things I have publiſhed, are reducible to three.

Firſt, That in all my Writings, I inſinuate my great affection to the Democratical Government, even ſo much as to undervalue that of Monarchy in reſpect of it, which laſt I do, not obſcurely, in many paſſages teach, and as it were, perſuade the People to throw off.

Next, That in ſome places I vent very great impieties, ſlighting and villifying the Church, as Author of all the miſgovernment in the world, and by ſuch contempt make way for Atheiſm and Prophaneneſs.

And Laſtly, that in my Book of the Prince I teach Monarchs all the execrable Villainies that can be invented, and inſtruct them how to break faith, and to oppreſs and enſlave their Subjects.

I ſhall anſwer ſomething to every one of theſe; and, that I may obſerve a right method, will begin with the firſt.

Having lived in an Age when our poor Country and Government have ſuffered more changes and revolutions, than ever did perhaps befal any people in ſo ſhort a time, and having had, till the taking of Florence, my ſhare in the managing of affairs, during almoſt all theſe alterations, ſometimes in the quality of Secretary of our City, and ſometimes employed in Embaſſages abroad, I ſet myſelf to read the Hiſtories of Ancient and Modern times, that I might by that means find out whether there had not been in all Ages the like viciſſitudes and accidents in State affairs, and to ſearch out the cauſes of them; and having in ſome ſort ſatisfied myſelf therein, I could not abſtain from ſcribbling ſomething of the two chief kinds of Government, Monarchy and Democracy, of which all other forms are but mixtures; and ſince neither my Parts nor Learning could arrive to follow the ſteps of the Ancients, by writing according to Method and Art, as Plato, Ariſtotle, and many others have done upon this Subject, I did content myſelf to make ſlight obſervations upon both; by giving a bare Character of a Prince, as to the Monarchical frame; and as to the Popular, chuſing the perfecteſt and moſt ſucceſsful of all Governments of that kind upon earth, and in my Diſcourſes upon it, following the order of my Author, without ever taking upon me to argue problematically, much leſs to decide which of theſe two Governments is the beſt. If from my way of handling matters in my Diſcourſes upon Livy, and from thoſe incomparable virtues and great actions we read of in that Hiſtory, and from the obſervations I make, men will conclude (which is, I muſt confeſs my opinion) that the excellency of thoſe Counſels and Atchievements, and the improvements which Mankind, and, if I may ſo ſay, human nature itſelf obtained amongſt the Romans, did proceed naturally from their Government, and was but a plain effect and conſequence of the perfection of their Commonwealth; I ſay, if Readers will thus judge, how can I in reaſon be accuſed for that? It would become thoſe who lay this blame upon me to undeceive them whom my Papers have miſled, and to ſhew the world to what other cauſes we may impute thoſe admirable effects, thoſe heroic qualities and performances, that integrity and purity of manners, that ſcorning of riches and life itſelf, when the public was concerned: If they pleaſe to do this, they will oblige my Readers, who will owe to ſuch the rectifying their judgments, and not at all offend me, who have reaſoned this matter impartially and without paſſion, nor have poſitively affirmed any thing. But what if this part of my accuſation had been true? Why ſhould I be condemned of Hereſy or indiſcretion for preferring a Commonwealth before a Monarchy? Was I not born, bred, and employed in a City, which being at the time I writ, under that form of Government, did owe all wealth and greatneſs, and all proſperity to it? If I had not very deſignedly avoided all dogmaticalneſs in my obſervations (being not willing to imitate young Scholars in their Declamations) I might eaſily have concluded from the premiſes I lay down, that a Democracy, founded upon good order, is the beſt and moſt excellent Government, and this without the leaſt fear of confutation; for I firmly believe, that there are none but Flatterers and Sophiſters would oppoſe me, ſuch as will wreſt Ariſtotle, and even Plato himſelf, to make them write for Monarchy, by miſapplying ſome looſe paſſages in thoſe great Authors: nay, they will tell their Readers, that what is moſt like the Government of the world by God is the beſt, which wholly depends upon his abſolute power. To make this compariſon run with four feet, theſe Sycophants muſt give the poor Prince they intend to deify, a better and ſuperior Nature to humanity, muſt create a neceſſary dependance of all Creatures upon him, muſt endow him with infinite wiſdom and goodneſs, and even with Omnipotency itſelf. It will be hard for any man to be miſled in this Argument by proofs wreſted from Theology, ſince whoſoever reads attentively the Hiſtorical part of the Old Teſtament, ſhall find that God himſelf never made but one Government *for men*; that this Government was a Commonwealth (wherein the Sanhedrim or Senate, and the Congregation or popular Aſſembly, had their ſhare) and that he manifeſted his high diſpleaſure when the rebellious people would turn it into a Monarchy; but that I may not ſtrike upon the rock I profeſs to ſhun, I ſhall paſs to that which is indeed fit to be wiped off, and which if it were true, would not only juſtly expoſe me to the hatred and vengeance of God, and all good men, but even deſtroy the deſign and purpoſe of all my

Writings, which is to treat in ſome ſort (as well as one of my ſmall parts can hope to do) of the Politics; and how can any man pretend to write concerning Policy, who deſtroys the moſt eſſential part of it, which is obedience to all Governments? It will be very eaſy then for Guilio Salviati, or any other member of our Society, to believe the Proteſtation I make, that the animating of private men either directly or indirectly to diſobey, much leſs to ſhake off, any Government, how deſpotical ſoever, was never in my Thoughts or Writings; thoſe who are unwilling to give credit to this, may take the pains to aſſign in any of my Books, the paſſages they imagine to tend that way, (for I can think of none myſelf) that ſo I may give ſuch perſon more particular ſatisfaction. I muſt confeſs I have a diſcourſe in one of my Books, to encourage the Italian Nation to aſſume their ancient valour, and to expel the Barbarians, meaning (as the ancient Romans uſed the word) all Strangers from amongſt us; but that was before the Kings of Spain had quiet poſſeſſion of the Kingdom of Naples, or the Emperor of the Dutchy of Milan; ſo that I could not be interpreted to mean that the people of thoſe two Dominions ſhould be ſtirred up to ſhake off their Princes, becauſe they were Foreigners, ſince at that time Lodovic Sforza was in poſſeſſion of the one, and K. Frederic reſtored to the other, both Natives of Italy; but my deſign was to exhort our Countrymen not to ſuffer this Province to be the Scene of the arms and ambition of Charles the VIII. or K. Lewis his Succeſſor, who when they had a mind to renew the old Title of the houſe of Anjou to the Kingdom of Naples, came with ſuch force into Italy, that not only our Goods were plundered, and our Lands waſted, but even the liberty of our Cities and Governments endangered, but to unite and oppoſe them, and to keep this Province in the hands of Princes of our own Nation: this my intention is ſo viſible in the Chapter itſelf, that I need but refer you to it. Yet that I may not anſwer this imputation barely by denying, I ſhall aſſert in this place what my principles are in that which the world calls Rebellion, which I believe to be not only riſing in Arms againſt any Government we live under, but to acknowledge that word to extend to all clandeſtine Conſpiracies too, by which the peace and quiet of any Country may be interrupted, and by conſequence the Lives and Eſtates of innocent perſons endangered. Rebellion then, ſo deſcribed, I hold to be the greateſt crime that can be committed amongſt men, both againſt Policy, Morality, and in foro Conſcientiæ ; but notwithſtanding all this, it is an offence which will be committed whilſt the world laſts, as often as Princes tyrannize, and by enſlaving and oppreſſing their Subjects, make Magiſtracy, which was intended for the benefit of Mankind, prove a Plague and Deſtruction to it ; for let the terror and the guilt be ever ſo great, it is impoſſible that human Nature, which conſiſts of paſſion as well as virtue, can ſupport with patience and ſubmiſſion the greateſt cruelty and injuſtice, whenever either the weakneſs of their Princes, the unanimity of the people, or any other favourable accident, ſhall give them reaſonable hopes to mend their condition, and provide better for their own intereſt by inſurrection. So that Princes and States ought, in the Conduct of their Affairs, not only to conſider what their people are bound to ſubmit to, if they were inſpired from Heaven, or were all Moral Philoſophers, but to weigh likewiſe what is probable, de facto, to fall out inthis corrupt age of the world, and to reflect upon thoſe dangerous Tumults, which have happened frequently not only upon oppreſſion, but even by reaſon of Malverſation, and how ſome Monarchies have been wholly ſubverted and changed into Democracies by the Tyranny of their Princes, as we ſee (to ſay nothing of Rome) the powerful Cantons of Swiſſerland brought by that means, a little before the laſt age, to a conſiderable Commonwealth, courted and ſought to by all the Potentates in Chriſtendom. If Princes will ſeriouſly conſider this matter, I make no queſtion but they will rule with Clemency and Moderation, and return to that excellent Maxim of the Ancients (almoſt exploded in this Age) that the intereſt of Kings and of their People is the ſame, which truth it hath been the whole deſign of my Writings to convince them of.

I am charged then, in the ſecond place, with impiety, in villifying the Church, and ſo to make way for Atheiſm. I do not deny but that I have very frequently, in my Writings, laid the blame upon the Church of Rome, not only for all the miſgovernment of Chriſtendom, but even for the depravation and almoſt total deſtruction of the Chriſtian Religion itſelf in this Province; but that this Diſcourſe of mine doth, or can tend to teach men impiety, or to make way for Atheiſm, I peremptorily deny: and although for proof of my innocence herein, I need but refer you and all others to my Papers themſelves, as they are now publiſhed (where you will find all my reaſons drawn from experience, and frequent examples cited, which is ever my way of arguing), yet ſince I am put upon it, I ſhall in a few lines make that matter poſſibly a little clearer; and ſhall firſt make proteſtation, that as I do undoubtedly hope, by the merits of Chriſt, and by Faith in him, to attain eternal Salvation; ſo I do firmly believe the Chriſtian profeſſion to be the only true Religion now in the world: next, I am fully perſuaded, that all divine verities which God then deſigned to teach the world, are contained in the Books of Holy Scripture, as they are now extant and received amongſt us. From them I underſtand that God created man in purity and innocence, and that the firſt of that Species, by their frailty, loſt at once their integrity and their Paradiſe, and intailed ſin and miſery upon their poſterity; that Almighty God, to repair this loſs, did out of his infinite mercy, and with unparalleled grace and goodneſs, ſend his only begotten Son into the world, to teach us new truths, to be a perfect example of virtue, goodneſs, and obedience, to reſtore true Religion, degenerated amongſt the Jews into Superſtition, Formality, and Hypocriſy, to die for the ſalvation of Mankind, and, in fine, to give to us the Holy Spirit, to regenerate our Hearts, ſupport our Faith, and lead us unto all Truth. Now if it ſhall appear, that as the luſts of our firſt Parents did at that time diſappoint the good intention of God, in making a pure world, and brought in by their diſobedience the corruptions that are now in it; ſo that ſince likewiſe the Biſhops of Rome, by their inſatiable ambition and avarice, have deſignedly, as much as in them lies, fruſtrated the merciful purpoſe he had, in the happy reſtoration he intended the world by his Son, and in the renewing and reforming of human Nature, and have wholly defaced and ſpoiled Chriſtian Religion, and made it a worldly and a Heatheniſh thing; and altogether incapable, as it is practiſed amongſt them, either of directing the ways of its Profeſſors to virtue and good life, or of ſaving their Souls hereafter. If, I ſay, this do appear, I know no reaſon why I, for detecting thus much, and for giving warning to the world to take heed of their ways, ſhould be accuſed of Impiety or Atheiſm; or why his Holineſs ſhould be ſo inraged againſt the poor Inhabitants of the Vallies in Savoy, and againſt the Albigeſi, for calling him Antichriſt; but to find that this is an undoubted truth, I mean that the Popes have corrupted the Chriſtian Religion, we need but read the New Teſtament (acknowledged by themſelves to be of infallible truth), and there we ſhall ſee, that the Faith and Religion preached by Chriſt, and ſettled afterwards by his Apoſtles, and cultivated by their Sacred Epiſtles, is ſo different a thing from the Chriſtianity that is now profeſſed and taught at Rome, that we ſhould be convinced, that if thoſe Holy men ſhould be ſent by God again into the world, they would take more pains to confute this Gallimaufry, than ever they did to preach down the Tradition of the Phariſees, or the Fables and Idolatry of the Gentiles; and would in all probability ſuffer a new Martyrdom in that City under the Vicar of Chriſt, for the ſame Doctrine which once animated the Heathen Tyrants againſt them. Nay, we have ſomething more to ſay againſt theſe ſacrilegious pretenders to God's power; for whereas all other falſe worſhips have been ſet up by ſome politic Legiſlators, for the ſupport and preſervation of Government, this falſe, this ſpurious Religion, brought in upon the ruins of Chriſtianity by the Popes, hath deformed the face of Government in Europe, deſtroying all the good principles and Morality left us by the Heathens themſelves, and introduced inſtead thereof, Sordid, Cowardly, and impolitic Notions, whereby they have ſubjected Mankind, and even great Princes and States, to their own Empire, and never ſuffered any Orders or Maxims to take place where they have power, that might make a Nation Wiſe, Honeſt, Great or Wealthy. This I have ſet down ſo plainly in thoſe paſſages of my Book which are complained of, that I ſhall ſay nothing at all for the proof of it in this place, but refer you thither, and come to ſpeak a little more particularly of my firſt aſſertion, that the Pope and his Clergy have depraved the Chriſtian Religion. Upon this ſubject I could infinitely wiſh, now Letters begin to revive again, that ſome learned pen would employ itſelf, and that ſome perſon verſed in the Chronology of the Church (as they call it) would deduce out of the Eccleſiaſtical Writers, the time and manner how theſe abuſes crept in, and by what arts and ſteps this Babel that reaches at Heaven, was built by theſe Sons of the Earth: but this matter, as unſuitable to the brevity of a Letter, and indeed more to my ſmall Parts and Learning, I ſhall not pretend to, being one who never hitherto ſtudied or writ of Theology, further, than it did naturally concern the Politics: therefore I ſhall only deal by the New Teſtament as I have done formerly by Titus Livius; that is, make obſervations or reflexions upon it, and leave you and Mr. Guilio, and the reſt of our Society to make the judgment, not citing like Preachers, the Chapter or Verſe; becauſe the reading of Holy Scripture is little uſed, and indeed hardly permitted amongſt us. To begin at the top, I would have any reaſonable man tell me, whence this unmeaſurable power, long claimed, and now poſſeſſed by the Biſhop of Rome, is derived, firſt of being Chriſt's Vicar, and by that (as I may ſo ſay) pretending to a Monopoly of the Holy Spirit (which was promiſed and given to the whole Church; that is, to the Elect or Saints) as is plain by a Clauſe in St. Peter's Sermon, made the very ſame time that the miraculous gifts of the Spirit of God were firſt given to the Apoſtles, who ſays to the Jews and Gentiles; "Repent and be baptizedevery one of you in the name of Jeſus Chriſt for the remiſſion of Sins, and you ſhall receive the gift of the Holy Ghoſt, for this promiſe is to you and to your Children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God ſhall call." Next, to judge infaillibly of Divine Truth, and to forgive Sins as Chriſt did. Then to be the Head of all Eccleſiaſtical perſons and cauſes in the world; to be ſo far above Kings and Princes, as to judge, depoſe, and deprive them, and to have an abſolute juriſdiction over all the Affairs in Chriſtendom, in Ordine ad Spiritualia: yet all this the Canoniſts allow him, and he makes no ſcruple to aſſume, whilſt it is plain that in the whole New Teſtament there is no deſcription made of ſuch an Officer to be at any time in the Church, except it be in the Prophecy of the Apocalypſe, or in one of St. Paul's Epiſtles, where he ſays, "who is it that ſhall ſit in the Temple of God, ſhewing himſelf that he is God." Chriſt tell us his Kingdom is not of this world; and if any will be the greateſt amongſt his Diſciples, that he muſt be ſervant to the reſt, which ſhews that his followers were to be great in ſanctity and humility, and not in worldly power.

The Apoſtle Paul, writing to the Chriſtians of thoſe times, almoſt in every Epiſtle commands them to be obedient to the higher Powers, or Magiſtrates ſet over them; and St. Peter himſelf (from whom this extravagant Empire is pretended to be derived) in his firſt Epiſtle, bids us ſubmit ourſelves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's ſake, whether it be to the King, or, &c. and this is enjoined, although it is plain, that they who governed the world in thoſe days, were both Heathens, Tyrants, and Uſurpers; and in this ſubmiſſion there is no exception or proviſo for Eccleſiaſtical immunity. The Practice as well as Precepts of theſe Holy men ſhew plainly that they had no intention to leave Succeſſors, who ſhould deprive Hereditary Princes from their right of Reigning for differing in Religion, who without all doubt are, by the appointment of the Apoſtle, and by the principles of Chriſtianity, to be obeyed and ſubmitted to (in things wherein the fundamental Laws of the Government give them power) though they were Jews or Gentiles. If I ſhould tell you by what Texts in Scripture the Popes claim the Powers before mentioned, it would ſtir up your laughter, and prove too light for ſo ſerious a matter; yet becauſe poſſibly you may never have heard ſo much of this Subject before, I ſhall inſtance in a few: they tell you therefore that the Juriſdiction they pretend over the Church, and the power of pardoning Sins, comes from Chriſt to

St. Peter, and from him to them. "Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build my Church. I will give thee the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven; whatſoever thou ſhalt bind on Earth ſhall be bound in Heaven, and whatſoever thou ſhalt looſe on Earth," &c. From theſe two Texts ridiculouſly applied, comes this great Tree which hath with its Branches overſpread the whole Earth, and killed all the good and wholſome Plants growing upon it; the firſt text will never by any man of ſenſe be underſtood to ſay more, than that the Preaching, Suffering, and Miniſtry of Peter, were like to be a great foundation and pillar of the Doctrine of Chriſt; the other Text (as alſo another ſpoken by our Saviour to all his Apoſtles, "whoſe ſins ye remit they are remitted, and whoſe ſins ye retain they are retained)" are by all the Primitive fathers interpreted in this manner; whereſoever you ſhall effectually preach the Goſpel, you ſhall carry with you Grace and Remiſſion of Sins to them which ſhall follow your inſtructions; but the people who ſhall not have theſe joyful Tidings communicated by you to them, ſhall remain in darkneſs, and in their Sins. But if any will conteſt, that by ſome of theſe laſt Texts, that Evangelical Excommunication, which was afterwards brought into the Church by the Apoſtles, was here preſignified by our great Maſter, how unlike were thoſe cenſures to thoſe now thundered out (as he calls it) by the Pope? Theſe were for edification, and not deſtruction, to afflict the fleſh for the ſalvation of the Soul; that Apoſtolical ordinance was pronounced for ſome notorious Scandal or Apoſtacy from the Faith, and firſt decreed by the Church; that is, the whole Congregation preſent, and then denounced by the Paſtor, and reached only to debar ſuch perſon from partaking of the Communion or fellowſhip of that Church, till repentance ſhould re-admit him, but was followed by no other proſecution or chaſtiſement, as is now practiſed.

ed. But ſuppoſe all theſe Texts had been as they would have them, how does this make for the Succeſſors of St. Peter or the reſt? or how can this prove the Biſhops of Rome to have right to ſuch ſucceſſion? But I make haſte from this ſubject, and ſhall urge but one Text more; which is, "The ſpiritual man judgeth all men, but is himſelf judged of none;" from whence is inferred by the Canoniſts, that firſt the Pope is the Spiritual man; and then, that he is to be Judge of all the world; and laſt, that he is never to be liable to any judgment himſelf; whereas it is obvious to the meaneſt underſtanding, St. Paul in this Text means to diſtinguſh between a perſon inſpired with the Spirit of God, and one remaining in the State of Nature, which latter, he ſays, cannot judge of thoſe Heavenly gifts and graces, as he explains himſelf when he ſays, "The Natural man cannot diſcern the things of the Spirit, becauſe they are fooliſhneſs unto him." To take my leave of this matter, wholly out of the way of my Studies, I ſhall beg of you, Zanobio, and of Guilio, and the reſt of our Society, to read over carefully the New Teſtament, and then to ſee what ground there is for Purgatory (by which all the wealth and greatneſs hath accrued to theſe men) what colour for the Idolatrous worſhip of Saints, and their Images, and particularly for ſpeaking in their hymns and prayers to a piece of wood (the Croſs I mean) "Salve Lignum," &c. and then "fac nos dignos beneficiorum Chriſti," as you may read in that Office; what colour or rather what excuſe for that horrid, unchriſtian, and barbarous Engine called the Inquiſition, brought in by the command and authority of the Pope, the Inventor of which, Peter a Dominican Friar having been ſlain amongſt the Albigeſi, as he well deſerved, is now canonized for a Saint, and ſtiled San Pietro Martine. In the dreadful priſons of this Inquiſition, many faithful and pious Chriſtians (to ſay nothing of honeſt Moral

Moors or Mahometans) are tormented and famiſhed, or if they outlive their ſufferings, burnt publicly to death, and that only for differing in Religion from the Pope, without having any crime, or the leaſt miſdemeanor proved or alledged againſt them; and this is inflicted upon theſe poor Creatures by thoſe who profeſs to believe the Scripture, which tell us, that faith is the gift of God, without whoſe ſpecial illumination no man can obtain it, and therefore is not in reaſon or humanity to be puniſhed for wanting it: and Chriſt himſelf hath ſo clearly decided that point in bidding us let the tares and the wheat grow together till the Harveſt, that I ſhall never make any difficulty to call him Antichriſt, who ſhall uſe the leaſt perſecution whatſoever againſt any differing in matters of faith from himſelf, whether, the perſon ſo diſſenting be Heretic, Jew, Gentile, or Mahometan: next, I beſeech you to obſerve in reading that Holy Book (though Chriſtian faſts are doubtleſs of Divine right) what ground there is for enjoining fiſh to be eaten (at leaſt fleſh to be abſtained from) for one third part of the year, by which they put the poor to great hardſhip, who not having purſes to buy wholſome fiſh, are ſubjected to all the miſeries and diſeaſes incident to a bad and unhealthful diet, whilſt the rich, and chiefly themſelves and their Cardinals, exceed Lucullus in their Luxury, of Oyſters, Turbots, tender Crabs, and Carpioni brought ſome hundreds of miles to feed their gluttony upon theſe penitential days of abſtinence from Beef and Pork. It may be it will lie in the way of thoſe who obſerve this, to inquire what St. Paul means, when he ſays, "That in the latter days ſome ſhall depart from the faith, forbidding to marry, and commanding to obſtain from meats which God hath created to be received with thankſgiving;" but all theſe things, and many other abuſes brought in by theſe Perverters of Chriſtianity, will I hope ere long be enquired into by ſome of the Diſciples of that bold Friar, who the very ſame year in which I propheſied that the ſcourge of the Church was not far off, began to thunder againſt their Indulgencies, and ſince hath queſtioned many tenets long received and impoſed upon the world. I ſhall conclude this diſcourſe, after I have ſaid a word of the moſt Helliſh of all the innovations brought in by the Popes, which is the Clergy; theſe are a ſort of men under pretence of miniſtring to the people in holy things, ſet apart and ſeparated from the reſt of mankind (from whom they have a very diſtinct, and a very oppoſite intereſt) by a human Ceremony called by a divine name, viz. Ordination. Theſe, wherever they are found (with the whole body of the Monks and Friars, who are called the regular Clergy) make a Band which may be called the Janizaries of the Papacy; theſe have been the cauſers of all the Soleſciſms and immortalities in Government, and of all the impieties and abominations in Religion, and by conſequence of all the diſorder, villainy, and corruption we ſuffer under in this deteſtable Age; theſe men, by the Biſhop of Rome's help, have crept into all the Governments in Chriſtendom, where there is any mixture of Monarchy, and made themſelves a third eſtate; that is, have by their temporalities (which are almoſt a third of all the Lands in Europe given them by the blind zeal, or rather folly, of the Northern people; who over-ran this part of the world) ſtept into the throne, and what they cannot perform by theſe ſecular helps, and by the dependency their vaſſals have upon them, they fail not to claim and to uſurp by the power they pretend to have from God and his Vicegerent at Rome. They exempt themſelves, their Lands and goods, from all ſecular juriſdiction; that is, from all Courts of Juſtice and Magiſtracy, and will be Judges in their own Cauſes, as in matters of tythe, &c. and not content with this, will appoint Courts of their own to decide ſovereignly in teſtamentary matters, and many other cauſes, and take upon them to be ſole Puniſhers of many great Crimes, as Witchcraft, Sorcery, Adultery, and all uncleanneſs; to ſay nothing of the forementioned judicatory of the Inquiſition: in theſe laſt caſes they turn the offenders over to be puniſhed (when they have given Sentence) by the ſecular arm, ſo they call the Magiſtrate, who is blindly to execute their decrees under pain of Hell fire; as if Chriſtian Princes and Governors were appointed only by God to be their Bravoes or Hangmen. They give Protection and Sanctuary to all execrable Offenders, even to Murderers themſelves (whom God commanded to be indiſpenſably puniſhed with death) if they come within their Churches, Cloyſters, or any other place, which they will pleaſe to call Holy ground; and if the ordinary juſtice, nay, the Sovereign power, do proceed againſt ſuch offender, they thunder out their Excommunication; that is, cut off from the body of Chriſt, not the Prince only, but the whole Nation and People, ſhutting the Church doors, and commanding divine offices to ceaſe, and ſometimes even authorizing the people to riſe up in Arms, and contrain their Governors to a ſubmiſſion, as happened to this poor City in the time of our Anceſtors, when for but forbidding the ſervant of a poor Carmelite Friar (who had vowed poverty, and ſhould have kept none) to go armed, and puniſhing his diſobedience with impriſonment, our whole Senate with their Gonfalonier were conſtrained to go to Avignon for abſolution, and in caſe of refuſal, had been maſſacred by the people. It would almoſt aſtoniſh a wiſe men to imagine how theſe folks ſhould acquire an Empire ſo deſtructive to the Chriſtian Religion, and ſo pernicious to the intereſts of men, but it will not ſeem ſo miraculous to them who ſhall ſeriouſly conſider, that the Clergy hath been for more than this thouſand years upon the catch, and a formed united corporation againſt the purity of Religion, and the intereſt of Mankind, and have not only wreſted the Holy Scriptures to their own advantage (which they have kept from the laity in unknown languages, and by prohibiting the reading thereof) but made uſe likewiſe firſt of the blind devotion and ignorance of the Goths, Vandals, Huns, &c. and ſince of the ambition and avarice of Chriſtian Princes, ſtirring them up one againſt another, and ſending them upon fooliſh errands to the Holy Land, to loſe their Lives, and to leave their Dominions, in the mean time, expoſed to themſelves and their Complices. They have beſides kept Learning and Knowledge among themſelves, ſtifling the light of the Goſpel, crying down Moral virtues as ſplendid ſins, defacing human policy, deſtroying the purity of the Chriſtian faith and profeſſion, and all that was virtuous, prudent, regular and orderly upon earth; ſo that whoever would do good, and good men ſervice, get himſelf immortal honour in this life, and eternal glory in the next, would reſtore the good policy (I had almoſt ſaid, with my Author Livy, the ſanctity too) of the Heathens, with all their valour, and other glorious endowments; I ſay, whoever would do this, muſt make himſelf powerful enough to extirpate this curſed and apoſtate race out of the world; and that you may ſee this is lawful as well as neceſſary, I ſhall ſay but one word of their calling and original, and then leave this ſubject. The word Clergy is a term wholly unknown to the Scriptures, otherwiſe than in this ſenſe; a peculiar People or God's lot, uſed often for the whole Jewiſh Nation, who are likewiſe called a Kingdom of Prieſts in ſome places. In the New Teſtament, the word Cleros is taken for the true Believers, who are alſo called the Elect, and often the Church, which is the Aſſembly of the faithful met together, as is eaſily ſeen by reading the beginning of moſt of St. Paul's Epiſtles, where writing to the Church or

Churches, he uſually explains himſelf, "To all the Saints in Chriſt; ſometimes, To all who have obtained like faith with us; ſometimes, To all who in all places call upon the Name of the Lord Jeſus, &c." by which it appears, that neither the word Church or Clergy was in thoſe days ever appropriated to the Paſtors or Elders of the flock; but did ſignify indifferently all the people aſſembled together; which is likewiſe the literal conſtruction of the word Eccleſia, which is an aſſembly or meeting. In theſe Congregations or Churches was performed their Ordination, which properly ſignifies no more than a decree of ſuch Aſſembly; but is particularly uſed for an Election of any into the Miniſtry. The manner was this, ſometimes the Apoſtles themſelves in their Perigrinations, and ſometimes any other eminent Member of the Church, did propoſe to the Society (upon vacancy, or other neceſſity of a Paſtor, Elder, or Deacon) ſome good Holy man to be Elected, which perſon, if he had parts or gifts, ſuch as the Church could edify by, was choſen by the lifting up of hands, that is, by ſuffrage, and oftentimes hands were laid upon him, and Prayer made for him. Theſe men, ſo ſet apart, did not pretend to any conſecration, or ſacredneſs, more than they had before, much leſs to become a diſtinct thing from the reſt of mankind, as if they had been metamorphoſed, but did attend to perform the ſeveral functions of their calling, as propheſying; that is, Preaching the Goſpel, viſiting the ſick, &c. and never intermitted the ordinary buſineſs of their Trade or Profeſſion, unleſs their Church or Congregation was very numerous, in which caſe they were maintained by alms or contribution, which was laid aſide by every member, and collected the firſt day of the week by the Deacons. This was ſaid to be given to the Church, and was employed by ſuffrage of the whole Collective Body to the poor, and to other incidencies; ſo far was it from Sacrilege in thoſe days to employ Church goods to Lay uſes. From theſe words, Church, Clergy, Ordination, Paſtor, (which laſt hath been tranſlated of late years Biſhop) you ſee what concluſions theſe men have deduced, and how immenſe a ſtructure they have raiſed upon ſo little foundation, and how eaſily it will fall to the ground, when God ſhall inſpire Chriſtian Princes and States to redeem his truths, and his poor enſlaved Members out of their Clutches, to bring back again into the world the true original Chriſtian faith, with the Apoſtolical Churches, Paſtors, and Ordination, ſo conſiſtent with moral virtue and integrity, ſo helpful and conducing to the beſt and moſt prudent Policy, ſo fitted for obedience to Magiſtracy and Government, all which the world hath for many years been deprived of, by the execrable and innate ill quality which is inſeparable from Prieſtcraft, and the conjuration or ſpell of their new invented ordination; by which they cry with the Poet,

Jam furor humanum noſtro de pectore ſenſum
Expulit & totum ſpirant præcordia Phœbum;

which makes them ſo Sacred and Holy, that they have nothing of integrity, or indeed of humanity, left in them. I hope I ſhall not be thought impious any longer upon this point; I mean, for vindicating Chriſtian Religion from the aſſaults of theſe men, who having the confidence to believe, or at leaſt profeſs themſelves the only inſtruments which God hath choſen, or can chooſe, to teach and reform the world (though they have neither Moral virtues, nor Natural parts equal to other men for the moſt part) have by this pretence prevailed ſo far upon the common ſort of people, and upon ſome too of a better quality, that they are perſuaded their ſalvation or eternal damnation depends upon believing or not believing what they ſay. I would not be underſtood to diſſuade any from honouring the true Apoſtolical Teachers, when they ſhall be reſtabliſhed amongſt us; or from allowing them (even of right, and not of alms or courteſy) ſuch emoluments as may enable them chearfully to perform the duties of their charge, to provide for their Children, and even to uſe hoſpitality as they are commanded by St. Paul. But this I will propheſy before I conclude, that if Princes ſhall perform this buſineſs by halves, and leave any root of this Clergy or Prieſtcraft, as it now is, in the ground; or if that famous reformer fled ſome years ſince out of Picardy to Geneva, who is of ſo great renown for learning and parts, and who promiſes us ſo perfect a reformation, ſhall not in his model wholly extirpate this ſort of men, then I ſay I muſt foretel, that as well the Magiſtrate as this Workman, will find themſelves deceived in their expectation, and that the leaſt fibra of this plant will over-run again the whole Vineyard of the Lord, and turn to a diffuſive Papacy in every Dioceſe, perhaps in every Pariſh: So that God in his mercy inſpire them to cut out the core of the ulcer, and the bag of this impoſtume, that it may never ranckle or feſter any more, nor break out hereafter, to diffuſe new corruption and and putrefaction through the body of Chriſt, which is his Holy Church, nor to vitiate and infect the good order and true policy of Government.

I come now to the laſt branch of my charge, which is, that I teach Princes villainy, and how to enſlave and oppreſs their Subjects, in which accuſation I am dealt with as poor Agnollo Canini was, who, as they report, being a very learned Practiſer of the Laws, and left the only man of this profeſſion (one Autumn) in our City, the reſt of the Advocates being fled into the Country for fear of a contagious Diſeaſe which then reigned, was commanded by our Judges to aſſiſt with his Counſel both parties, and to draw Pleas as well for the Defendant as the Plaintiff, elſe the Court of Juſtice muſt have been ſhut up. In the ſame manner my accuſers handle me, and make me firſt exhort and teach Subjects to throw off their Princes, and then to inſtruct Monarchs how to enſlave and oppreſs them; but I did not expect ſuch ingratitude from mine own Citizens, or to be ſerved as Moſes was, when he was upbraided for killing the Egyptian, by one of his own people, for whoſe ſake he had done it; whereas he believed they would have underſtood by that action, that he was the perſon whom God intended to make uſe of in delivering them from the horrid ſlavery they were then under. If any man will read over my Book of the Prince with impartiality and ordinary charity, he will eaſily perceive, that it is not my intention therein to recommend that Government, or thoſe men there deſcribed to the world; much leſs to teach them to trample upon good men, and all that is ſacred and venerable upon earth, Laws, Religion, Honeſty, and what not; if I have been a little too punctual in deſigning theſe Monſters, and drawn them to the life in all their lineaments and colours, I hope mankind will know them, the better to avoid them, my Treatiſe being both a Satire againſt them, and a true Character of them; I ſpeak nothing of great and honourable Princes, as the Kings of France, England, and others, who have the States and Orders of their Kingdoms with excellent Laws and Conſtitutions to found and maintain their Government, and who reign over the hearts as well as the perſons of their ſubjects; I treat only of thoſe vermin bred out of the corruption of our own ſmall Commonwealths and Cities, or engendered by the ill blaſts that come from Rome, Olivaretto da Fermo, Borgia, the Baglioni, the Bentivoglii, and a hundred others; who having had neither right nor honourable means to bring them to their power, uſe it with more violence, rapine, and cruelty upon the poor people, than thoſe other renowned Princes ſhew to the Boars, the Wolves, the Foxes, and other ſavage beaſts which are the objects of their chaſe and hunting. Whoſoever in his Empire over men is tied to no other rules than thoſe of his own will and luſt, muſt either be a Saint to moderate his paſſions, or elſe a very Devil incarnate; or if he be neither of theſe, both his life and reign are like to be very ſhort; for whoſoever takes upon him ſo execrable an employment as to rule men againſt the Laws of nature and of reaſon, muſt turn all topſy-turvy, and never ſtick at any thing, for if once he halt, he will fall and never riſe again. I hope after this I need ſay little to juſtify myſelf from the calumny of adviſing theſe Monſters to break their faith, ſince to keep it is to loſe their Empire, faithfulneſs and ſincerity being their mortal enemies. Uguccеone della Faggivola to one who upbraided him, that he never employed honeſt men, anſwered, "Honeſt men will cut my throat, let the King uſe honeſt men," meaning the King of Naples, who was eſtabliſhed in his Throne, and had right to it. But that I may have occaſion to juſtify myſelf againſt a little more than I am accuſed of, I will confeſs, that in a work where I deſired to be a little more ſerious than I was in this Book of the Prince, I did affirm, that in what way ſoever men defended their Country, whether by breaking or keeping their faith, it was ever well defended, not meaning in a ſtrict moral ſenſe, or point of honour, but explaining myſelf that de facto the infamy of the breach of word would quickly be forgotten and pardoned by the world, which is very true: nay, what if I had ſaid that good ſucceſs in any enterprize (a far leſs conſideration than Piety to our Country) would have cancelled the blame of ſuch perfidy as Cæſar (whom I compare to Cataline) uſed towards his Fellow-citizens, not only not deteſted by poſterity, but even crowned with renown and immortal fame;

inſo-

inſomuch as Princes to this day (as I have obſerved elſewhere) think it an honour to be compared to him, and the higheſt pitch of veneration their flatterers can arrive at, is to call them by the name of one who violated his faith, and enſlaved his Country. I hope that in ſhewing as well theſe Tyrants as the poor people who are forced to live under them, their danger, that is, by laying before the former, the helliſh and precipitous courſes they muſt uſe to maintain their power, by repreſenting to the latter what they muſt ſuffer, I may be inſtrumental, firſt, to deter private Citizens from attempting upon the liberties of their Country; or if they have done it, to make them lay down their ill gotten authority; and then to warn the reſt of the Nobility and people from theſe factions and malignancies in their ſeveral Commonwealths and Governments, which might give hope and opportunity to thoſe who are ambitious amongſt them, to aſpire to an Empire over them. However it prove, I hope I am no more to be blamed for my attempt, than that excellent Phyſician of our Nation is, who hath lately taken ſo much pains to compoſe an excellent Treatiſe, of that foul Diſeaſe which was, not long ſince, brought from the new world into theſe parts; wherein though he be forced to uſe ſuch expreſſions as are almoſt able to nauſeate his Readers, and talk of ſuch Ulcers, Boils, Nodes, Blotches, Cankers, &c. that are ſcarce fit to be repeated, eſpecially when he handles the cauſes of thoſe effects, yet he did not intend to teach or exhort men to get this Diſeaſe; much leſs did he bring this lamentable infirmity into the world, but deſcribes it faithfully as it is, to the end men may be bettered, and avoid the being infected with it, and may diſcern and cure it, whenever their incontinence and folly ſhall procure it them. I ſhall ſay no more in this matter; but to conclude all make a proteſtation, that as well in this Book, as in all my other Writings, my only ſcope and deſign is to promote the intereſt and welfare of mankind, and the peace and quiet of the world, both which, I am ſo vain as to believe, would be better obtained and provided for, if the principles I lay down were followed and obſerved by Princes and People, than they are like to be by thoſe Maxims which are in this Age moſt in vogue. For myſelf, I ſhall only ſay (and call you all to witneſs for the truth of it) that as by my Birth I am a Gentleman, and of a Family which hath had many Gonfaloniers of Juſtice in it; ſo I have been uſed in many employments of great truſt, both in our City and abroad, and at this hour I am not in my Eſtate one penny the better for them all, nor ſhould I have been, although I had never ſuffered any loſſes by the ſeizure of my Eſtate in the year 1531. For my carriage, it hath ever been void of faction and contention; I never had any prejudice againſt the Houſe of Medici, but honoured the perſons of all thoſe of that Family whom I knew, and the memory of ſuch of them as lived before me, whom I acknowledge to have been excellent Patriots and Pillars of our City and Commonwealth. During the turbulent times of Piero, and after his expulſion out of Florence, though my employments were but Miniſterial, my advice was aſked in many grave matters, which I ever delivered with impartiality and indifference, not eſpouſing the heady opinions of any, much leſs their paſſions and animoſities; I never ſided with any Party further than that the Duty of my charge obliged me to ſerve the prevailing Party, when poſſeſſed of the Government of our City; this I ſpeak for thoſe changes which happened between the flight of the ſaid Piero de Medici, and the horrid Paricide committed by Clement VII. upon his indulgent Mother, joining with his greateſt enemies, and uniting himſelf with thoſe who had uſed the moſt tranſcendent inſolence to his own perſon, and the higheſt violence and fury the Sun ever ſaw to his poor Courtiers and Subjects, that ſo accompanied he might ſheath his Sword in the bowels of his own deſolate Country. At that time, and during that whole Siege, I muſt confeſs I did break the confines of my Neutrality, and not only acted as I was commanded barely, but rouzed myſelf, and ſtirred up others, haranguing (in the Streets and places of the City) the People to defend with the laſt drop of blood, the Walls of their Country, and the Liberty of their Government; taking very hazardous Journies to Feruccio, and then into the Mugello and other parts, to bring in Succours and Proviſions to our languiſhing City; and acting as a Soldier (which was a new profeſſion to me) at the age of above ſixty, when others are diſpenſed from it. For all which, I had ſo entire a ſatisfaction in my mind and conſcience, that I am perſuaded this cordial made me able to ſupport the ſufferings which befel me after our Cataſtrophe, and to rejoice in them ſo far, that all the malice and cruelty of our enemies could never draw one word from me unſuitable to the honour I thought I merited, and did in ſome ſort enjoy, for being inſtrumental to defend (as long as it was poſſible) our Altars and our Hearths. But all that I have undergone, hath been abundantly recompenced to me by the favour and courteſy of the moſt excellent Signior Coſimo, who hath been pleaſed to offer me all the preferments the greateſt ambition could aſpire to, which I did not refuſe out of any ſcruple to ſerve ſo incomparable a Prince, whoſe early years manifeſt ſo much Courage, Humanity, and Prudence, and ſo Fatherly a care of the public good, but becauſe I was very deſirous not to accept of a charge which I was not able to perform, my years and infirmities having now brought me to a condition in which I am fitter to live in a Cloyſter than a Palace, and made me good for nothing but to talk of paſt times, the common vice of old Age: So that I did not think it juſt or grateful to reward this excellent perſon ſo ill for his kindneſs, as to give him a uſeleſs Servant, and to fill up the place of a far better. This is all I think fit to ſay of this matter, I chuſe to addreſs it to you, Zenobio, for the conſtant friendſhip I have ever entertained with you, and formerly with your deceaſed Father, the companion of my Studies, and ornament of our City. And ſo I bid you farewell.

The firſt of April, 1537.

To this Vindication of Machiavel, it has been thought neceſſary to ſubjoin the following ſatiſfactory account of its Writer (which we have received ſince the Impreſſion) extracted from a letter written by the right Reverend and moſt learned Biſhop of Glouceſter, and communicated by a Gentleman equally eminent for elegance and humanity.

THE anecdote you inquire after I preſume is this, and is at your Friend's ſervice.

There is at the end of the Engliſh tranſlation of Machiavel's works, printed in Folio, 1680, a tranſlation of a pretended Letter of Machiavel, to Zenobius Buondelmontius, in vindication of himſelf and his Writings. I believe it has been generally underſtood to be a feigned thing, and has by ſome been given to Nevil, he who wrote, if I be not miſtaken, the Plato Redivivus. But, many years ago a number of the famous Marquis of Wharton's papers [the Father of the Duke] were put into my hands. Amongſt theſe was the preſs-copy (as appeared by the Printer's marks, where every page of the printed Letter begun and ended) of this remarkable Letter, in the Marquis's hand-writing, as I took it to be, compared with other papers of his. The perſon who intruſted me with theſe papers, and who, I underſtood, had given them to me, called them back out of my hands.—This anecdote I communicated to the late Speaker: and at his deſire wrote down the ſubſtance of what I here tell you, in his Book of the above Edition.

I am, dear Sir,

With the trueſt regard and affection,

Your moſt faithful, and

Aſſured Friend and humble Servant,

Prior Park,
May 17, 1762.

W. GLOUCESTER.

# INDEX.

N. B. The numerical letters refer to the volumes, the figures to the pages.

A.

*ABBATI Neri*, his villainous behaviour in a time of public diſtreſs, i. 113.

*Acciaivoli*, *Donato*, his character, i. 220—he uſes all his intereſt in order to procure the recal of the exiles, 221—is baniſhed himſelf, ibid.

*Acciaivoli*, *Agnolo*, has a particular quarrel with the family of the Medici on a lady's account, ii. 25—flies to Naples, 38—writes a letter to Pietro de Medici from Naples to ſee how he ſtands affected, 39—finding he muſt expect no favour at Florence, he removes to Rome, 40—almoſt accompliſhes the ruin of Pietro's credit there, ibid.—his deſigns are defeated by him, ibid.—being deſired by Pietro to meet him at Caſaggiolo, he has a long conference with him there, ibid.

*Achmet*, a baſhaw in the ſervice of Mahomet, makes an unexpected aſſault at Otranto, ii. 122—takes and plunders it, ibid.—puts all the inhabitants to the ſword, 123—fortifies both the town and the harbour as ſtrongly as he can, ibid.—ſcours the whole country round, and commits terrible depredations, ibid.

*Adda* river, the Venetians defeated by the French near it, iv. 143.

*Adiman*, *Antonio*, the head of a faction at Florence, i. 147—communicates the deſigns of his party to ſome of his friends at Siena, in hopes of their aſſiſtance, ibid.—acquaints them with the names of the principal perſons engaged in the conſpiracy, ibid.—aſſures them that the whole city is diſpoſed to ſhake off their yoke, ibid.—is ſent for by the Duke of Athens, ibid.—relying upon the number and ſupport of his accomplices, he boldly makes his appearance, ibid.—is ſent to priſon, 148—is knighted by the duke, 150.

*Æneas*, builds new cities in the country of which he takes poſſeſſion, iii. 3.

*Agapetus*, pope, ſolicits Otho the Saxon to deliver his country from the tyranny of the Berengaris, i. 29—is re-eſtabliſhed in his former dignity, ibid.

*Ageſilaus*, the Spartan, having taken ſome of the Perſians, cauſes them to be ſtripped naked, and ſhewn to his ſoldiers, that they may, ſeeing the delicacy of their bodies, deſpiſe them, iv. 146.

*Agis*, king of Sparta, is killed before he can accompliſh his deſign as a legiſlator, iv. 42.

*Agrarian Law*, the tumults and diſorders occaſioned at Rome by it, iii. 126.

*Aguto*, *John*, an Engliſh commander of very great reputation, who had been many years in the ſervice of the pope, and other Italian princes, is taken by the Florentines into their pay, i. 206.

*Alans*, the, make themſelves maſters of Spain, i. 6.

*Alaric*, choſen king by the Viſigoths, i. 5—invades the empire at the head of them, ibid.—ſacks Rome, and over-runs all Italy, ibid.

*Alarms*, falſe ones in the heat of an action often attended with important conſequences, iv. 134.

*Alberic*, duke of Tuſcany, choſen by the Romans for their general, i. 28—preſerves their city by his valour from the fury of the Sarazens, ibid.

*Alberti*, family of, recalled from exile, i. 302.

*Alberti*, *Benedetto*, his character, i. 209—he detaches himſelf from the plebeians, in conſequence of his patriotic principles, ibid.—excites much envy among his fellow-citizens by the ſplendor and magnificence of himſelf and his family, 213—is ſent into baniſhment, 214—his ſpeech to his fellow-citizens before his departure, ibid.

*Albizi*, *Pietro degli*, a ſingular ſtory of him, i. 204.

*Albizi*, *Rinaldo degli*, entertains ſome hopes of becoming the ſole governor of the republic of Florence, by the merit of of his own ſervices, and the reputation of his father, i. 238—makes a long ſpeech to the ſigniory, ibid.—raiſes the ſpirits of the citizens by his exhortations, 239—adviſes a continuance of the war, 241—his ſpeech is much plauded, and his advice approved by every body, 242—he is deputed to wait on Giovanni de Medici, to try if he can make any impreſſions upon him, ibid—uſes all the

the arguments he can think of to perſuade him to join the patriotic party, ibid.—perceiving him continue inflexible, he reſolves to turn Martino, one of the chancellors, out of his office, 245—appointed to conduct the expedition againſt the rebellious Volterrans, 255—promotes a war with Lucca, 257—is appointed one of the commiſſioners to ſuperintend the military operations againſt the Lucchese, 262—is accuſed of carrying on the war in a manner tending entirely to his own private advantage, 266—takes poſt, full of rage and indignation againſt the magiſtrates, and, without waiting for their leave, returns to Florence, ibid.—preſents himſelf before the Council of Ten, ibid.—his ſpeech to them, ibid.—they endeavour to appeaſe his reſentment as much as they can, but give the farther care of the Luccheſe expedition to another perſon, 267—he becomes head of the faction againſt Coſimo de Medici, 278—by endeavouring to ſupplant his adverſaries, he keeps the whole city in alarms, 279—garbles the magiſtracy, ibid.—impriſons Coſimo, 281—his addreſs to his friends, 283—his advice is rejected, 284—he riſes, with many others, to depoſe the ſigniory, 286—lays down his arms at the mediation of pope Eugenius IV. 288—is baniſhed by the ſigniory, 290—perſuades duke Philip to make war upon the Florentines, 308—having loſt all hopes of this world, he goes a pilgrimage to the holy ſepulchre, to prepare himſelf for a better, 361—dies ſoon after his return from thence, ſuddenly at dinner, whilſt he is celebrating the marriage of one of his daughters, ibid.

*Alboin*, king of the Lombards, invited by the diſgraced Narſetes to invade Italy, i. 17—leaves Pannonia to the Huns, 18—marches into Italy, ibid.—makes himſelf maſter of ſeveral parts of it, ibid.—makes a magnificent banquet at Verona, ibid.—gets drunk at it, and, filling the ſkull of Cunomund with wine, cauſes it to be preſented to Roſamond his queen, ibid.—his brutal ſpeech in her hearing with regard to her father, ibid.

*Alcibiades*, his orders when the Spartans laid ſiege to Athens, iv. 224.

*Alexander* III. pope, complains to the emperor Frederick Barbaroſſa of the uſurpation of the cardinal of St. Clement, i. 38—is cited to appear perſonally before him, with the anti-pope, 39—diſſatisfied with this citation, and perceiving the emperor diſpoſed to favour his adverſary, he immediately excommunicates him, and flies for

refuge

refuge to Philip king of France, ibid.—is encouraged to return home to Rome, ibid.—retires to Puglia on the approach of Frederick, 40—receives at Tuſculum ambaſſadors from Henry II. king of England, who make their appearance before him in order to exculpate their maſter from the murder of Thomas à Becket, ibid.—ſends two cardinals to England to enquire into the truth of the matter, ibid.—reduces Henry to the neceſſity of making ignominious ſubmiſſions, 40—has not power enough, however, though formidable to foreign princes, to render himſelf obeyed at home, 41—cannot prevail on the Romans to let him reſide in their city, ibid.—receives ſubmiſſions from Frederick at Venice, ibid.—is reconciled to him, ibid.—obliges him to give up all the authority he has in Rome, ibid.—inſiſts upon his including William king of Sicily and Puglia in the agreement, 42.

*Alexander* VI. pope, reſtores the church to its former ſplendor and authority, i. 61.

*Alexander of Epirus*, a ſtratagem of his practiſed againſt the Illyrians, executed agreeably to his wiſhes, iv. 202.

*Alexander the Great*, adviſed by Dinocrates the architect to build a city upon Mount Athos, iii. 5—aſks him how the inhabitants are to be furniſhed with proviſions there, ibid.—laughs at his reply, ibid.—leaves the mountain where it was, ibid.—builds Alexandria, ibid.—the method which he took to ſecure Thrace when he was upon his march into Aſia, iv. 214.

*Alidoſſi, Taddeo*, ſtripped of the city of Imola by the duke of Milan, ii. 48.

*Alliance*, whether that made with a prince or commonwealth is moſt to be confided in, iii. 194.

*Allum*, a mine of it diſcovered near the city of Volterra, ii. 61.

*Almachild*, a young lord, drawn by a ſtraragem to live with Roſamond the wife of Alboin, inſtead of one of her women, with whom he has an amour, i. 18—on the diſcovery of his miſtake he is ſufficiently ſtimulated by her to murder his maſter, 19—flies with her to Longinus, ibid.—receives a cup of poiſon from Roſamond, ibid.—diſcovers what ſhe had given him when he had drank about half of it, ibid.—forces her to drink the reſt, ibid.—dies with her in a few hours afterwards, ibid.

*Alphonſo*, king of Arragon, takes meaſures to make himſelf ſovereign of Sicily, i. 303—makes a ſudden deſcent upon the coaſt of Naples, ibid.—is received there by the duke of Seſſa, and takes the forces of other princes into his pay, ibid.—orders his fleet to make an attack upon Gaieta, ibid.—hearing that the Genoeſe are making an armament againſt him, he thinks proper to reinforce his own navy with a reſolution to frighten them, 304—he is defeated, taken, and ſent priſoner to the duke of Milan, ibid.—his interview with Philip, ibid.—invades the Florentines, 394—retreats out of Tuſcany after having loſt many of his men, 395—makes a confederacy with the Venetians, 417—accedes to the peace betwixt the duke of Milan, the Venetians, the Florentines, and other ſtates, 434—encourages Giacopo Piccinino to create new diſturbances, ibid.—invades the Genoeſe, 439—dies, 440.

*Alto Paſcio*, a conſiderable victory gained over Ramondo da Cordona, the Florentine general, near that place, by Caſtruccio Caſtracaris of Lucca, i. 126.

*Amalaſonta*, queen of the Oſtro-Goths, ſucceeds to the government of Italy, by the death of her ſon Athalric, i. 14—is betrayed, and put to death, by Therdate, a miniſter whom ſhe had employed to aſſiſt her, ibid.

*Ambuſcades*, how to diſcover them upon a march, iv. 162.

*Ammoniti*, citizen of Florence incapacitated to fill the magiſtracy, ſo called, i. 167.

*Andaric*, king of the Zepidi, is reduced to a ſort of ſubjection by Attila, king of the Huns, i. 7.

*Andria*, count *di*, ſent by Robert king of Naples to command the Florentines on their applying to him for another general, i. 120—his bad conduct, added to the impatient temper of the Florentines, occaſions the city to divide again, ibid.—he is driven out of it, ibid.

*Angelo, Giovanni Maria*, ſon of Giovanni Galeazzo, killed by the people of Milan, i. 56.

*Anghiari*, remarkable battle of, i. 360.

*Anghiari*, a caſtle at the foot of the mountains which part the vale of Tevere from that of Chiano, about four miles from the bourg of St. Sepulchro, i. 357.

*Anghiari, Baldaccio d'*, general of the Florentine foot, an able and experienced commander, is inhumanly aſſaſſinated by Bartolomeo Orlandini, i. 380.

*Angli*, the, a German nation, called in by the Britons to aſſiſt them, i. 6—undertake to defend them, ibid.—behave, for ſome time, like faithful allies, ibid—drive them afterwards out of the iſland, take poſſeſſion of it themſelves, and give it the name of England, ibid.

*Annalena*, the widow of Baldaccio d' Anghiari, being deprived both of her huſband and her child, reſolves to have no farther commerce with the world, i. 380—having converted her houſe into a ſort of convent, ſhe ſhuts herſelf up in it with ſeveral other ladies of noble families, and there ſpends the reſt of her days in acts of piety and devotion, immortalizing her memory by endowing and calling the convent after her own name, ibid.

*Anthony, Mark*, a ſtratagem of his, while he is retreating out of Parthia, ſucceſsful, iv. 169—his army againſt the Parthians reduced to the utmoſt diſtreſs in conſequence of the activity of their horſe, iv. 63.

*Antiochus*, rendered ſuſpicious of Hannibal who had taken refuge with him, by the artful behaviour of the Roman ambaſſadors, iv. 198.

*Anziani*, twelve citizens of Florence choſen annually with that title, i. 87.

*Apoſtolic Notary*, his office deſcribed, i. 344.

*Aquila*, city of, rebels againſt the king of Naples, ii. 148—the occaſion of the rebellion explained, ibid.

*Aquileia*, a city in Italy, inveſted by Attila, king of the Huns, i. 7—taken by him, and demoliſhed, ibid.

*Arcadius*, ſon of Theodoſius, heir to his father's crown, but not to his valour, or to his good fortune, i. 4.

*Arcolano*, a citizen of Volterra, forms a deſign to depoſe Giuſto, another citizen, and to deliver up the city into the hands of the Florentines, i. 256—goes with his party to the palace where Giuſto reſides, ibid.—draws him artfully out of his apartment into an inner room, ibid.—murders him, and throws his body out of the window, ibid.

*Argiropolo*, a Grecian by birth, and the greateſt ſcholar of the age, firſt brought to Florence to inſtruct the youth there in the Greek tongue, and other uſeful erudition, by Coſimo de Medici, ii. 15.

*Arioviſtus*, defeated in Gaul by Julius Cæſar, in conſequence of his attachment to religious cuſtoms, iv. 141.

*Ariſtolphus*, king of the Lombards, ſeizes upon Ravenna, contrary to expreſs agreement, and makes war upon the pope Gregory III. i. 23—is obliged, at his interceſſion, to accept of the terms granted him by the French, 24—promiſes to reſtore all the towns he had taken from the church, ibid.—refuſes to perform his engagement, on the return of Pepin's army to France, ibid.—forces the pope, by that refuſal, to make a ſecond application to Pepin, ibid.—dies, 25.

*Arming*, the ancient and modern way of, compared, iv. 56.

*Armour*, deſcription of that uſed by the ancients, iv. 53—the armour of the Greeks not ſo heavy as that of the Romans, ibid.

*Army*, methods propoſed for the raiſing a new one, iv. 41—the uſe of part of the Roman, and part of the Grecian arms and armour recommended, 100—a method of drawing up an army propoſed for imitation, 102—a deſcription of a battle, 107—the general exerciſe of an army pointed out, 119—precautions and artifices to be attended to in drawing up an army for battle, in the action, and after it is over, 128—how an army ought to be drawn up in order to march through an enemy's country, 150—how to reduce an army into order of battle immediately, and to form itſelf in ſuch a manner that it may be able to defend itſelf on any ſide in caſe of a ſudden attack, 154—concerning orders to be given by word of mouth, by beat of drum, or by ſound of trumpet, 157—of pioneers and proviſions neceſſary for an army, 158—no women or gaming allowed in the armies of the Ancients, 189—their method of decamping, ibid.—healthful ſituations choſen by them where they could neither be ſurrounded by the enemy, nor cut off from proviſions, 190—what number of men are ſufficient to fight an enemy, 193—what means ſome generals have uſed to get clear of the enemy, 197—how to make a prince become ſuſpicious of his counſellors and confidants, and to divide his forces, 198—how to ſuppreſs mutiny and diſcord in an army, 199—care to be taken not to drive an enemy to deſpair, 203—ſeveral artifices allowable to decoy and over-reach an enemy, ibid—how to gain the affections of the people, 204—the carrying on of a war in winter condemned, 306.

*Arozzo*, the commotions there produce a reformation in the ſtate, iii. 7.

*Artillery*, what account is to be made of it at preſent, iii. 271

*Aruns*, to revenge himſelf on Lucumo for having debauched his ſiſter at Cluſium, one of the principal cities of Etruria, has recourſe to the Gauls for aſſiſtance, iii. 34—encourages them to lay ſiege to Cluſium, ibid.

*Aſdrubal*, the Carthaginian general, defeated by the ſuperior generalſhip of Scipio, iv. 130—by what means he got clear of Claudius Nero when he had ſurrounded him in Spain, iv. 197.

*Aſtorre*, ſon of Galeatto, lord of Faenza, taken by the Florentines under their protection, on the murder of his father, ii. 156.

*Ataulph*, ſucceeds Alaric, i. 5—marries Placidia, ſiſter to the emperors, ibid.—promiſes them, in conſequence of that alliance, to march with an army to the relief of Gaul and Spain, then much harraſſed by the incurſions of the Vandals, Burgundians, Alans, and Franks, ibid.

*Athalric*, grandſon of Theodoric, dies ſoon after his inheritance of the kingdom, i. 14.

*Athens*, city of, founded under the authority of Theſeus, and by people who had before been ſcattered and diſperſed at a diſtance from each other, iii. 2.

*Attenduli, Micheletto*, made general of the Florentine league, i. 373.

*Attila*, king of the Huns, having rid himſelf of all partnerſhip in the government, by the murder of his brother Bleda, becomes very powerful, i. 7—reduces Andaric, king of the Zepidi, and Velamir, king of the Oſtro-Goths, to a ſort of ſubmiſſion to him, ibid.—inveſts Aquileia, ibid.—continues before it two years without being moleſted, ibid.—lays waſte the country during the ſiege, and diſperſes the inhabitants, ibid.—the diſperſion of them gives riſe to the city of Venice, ibid.—after having taken and demoliſhed Aquileia, he advances to Rome, ibid.—ſpares it out of reverence to the pope, ibid.—withdraws, at his interceſſion, out of Italy into Auſtria, ibid. —dies there, ibid.

*Attilius*, the Roman conſul, a vigorous proceeding of his to ſtop the flight of ſome of his troops, iv. 136.

*Auguſtulus*, ſon of Oreſtes, the empire of Rome, by intrigue and underhand practices, falls into their hands, i. 10—the former makes his eſcape from the battle of Pavia, in which the latter is killed, ibid.

*Auguſtus*, the emperor, more careful to eſtabliſh and increaſe his power, than to promote the public good, iv. 27—diſarms the Roman people, and keeps the ſame armies continually on foot upon the confines of the empire, ibid.—not thinking thoſe ſufficient to keep the ſenate and people in due awe, he raiſes other forces called *Pretorian Bands*, 28.

*Auxiliaries*, reflections on the employment of them, ii. 301—307.

*Avignon*, part of the queen of Naples's patrimony, given by her to the church, i. 64.

*Avitus*, choſen by the Romans on the death of Maximus for their emperor, i. 10.

B.

*Balia*, the, a temporary council at Florence ſo called, i. 181.

*Bancius*, *Lucius*, of Nola, inclined to favour Hannibal, becomes the firm friend of Marcellus, in conſequence of that general's noble behaviour to him, iv. 224.

*Barbadori Niccolo*, wiſhing to ſee the ruin of Coſimo de Medici, leaves no method untried to prevail upon Uzzano to join with Rinaldo degli Albizi to drive him out of the city, i. 274.

*Barbaroſſa*, *Frederick*, an excellent ſoldier, but of a haughty diſpoſition, i. 38—he cannot bear to ſubmit to the pope, ibid.—comes to Rome to be crowned, ibid.—returns peaceably into Germany, ibid.—comes back again ſpeedily to reduce ſome diſobedient towns in Lombardy, ibid.—receives a complaint from Pope Alexander III. againſt an uſurping cardinal, ibid.—cites them both to appear perſonally before him, 39—is excommunicated by Alexander, ibid.—proſecutes the war in Lombardy, ibid.—takes Milan and diſmantles it, ibid.—occaſions a confederacy againſt him, ibid.—ſets up Guido of Cremona againſt the pope, ſuccours the Tuſculans, and defeats the Romans, ibid.—marches with his army to beſiege Rome, 40—driven away by the plague, he raiſes the ſiege, and returns to Germany, ibid.—returns to Italy, 41—is threatened with the deſertion of all his clergy and barons, if he does not reconcile himſelf to the church, ibid.—is forced to make ſubmiſſions to the pope at Venice, ibid.—is reconciled to him, but obliged to give up all his authority at Rome, and to let William, king of Sicily and Puglia, be included in the agreement, 42—embarks in the expedition to Aſia, ibid.—contracts a diſorder by bathing in the Cydnus, a river in Cilicia, and dies, ib.

*Bardi*, *Aleſſandra de'*, married to Raphael, the ſon of Agnolo Acciaivoli, ii. 25—is ill treated both by her huſband and his father, either from ſome miſbehaviour of her own, or their moroſeneſs and ill nature, ibid.—is taken by force by one of her relations, pitying her condition, out of Agnolo's houſe, 26—her fortune adjudged to be returned by Coſimo de Medici, ibid.

*Battalion*, the three principal ways of drawing up one in order

order of battle deſcribed, iv. 76—how to make a whole battalion face about at a time, 81—how to draw up one in ſuch order as to face the enemy on any ſide, 81—how to draw up one with two horns, and another in a hollow ſquare, 83—of the baggage and carriages belonging to one, 84.

*Battiſta*, the head of the Canneſchi Family, murdered by the populace, i. 384.

*Battle*, the confidence of ſoldiers in themſelves and in their general, of great ſervice to them in one, iii. 453.

*Belgrade*, a fortreſs in Hungary, beſieged by the Turks, i. 436.

*Beliſarius*, after having driven the Vandals out of Africa, and reduced it to its former obedience to the empire, is appointed by Juſtinian, the emperor, his commander againſt Theodate, i. 14—makes himſelf maſter of Sicily, ibid.—tranſports himſelf to Italy, ibid.—recovers Naples and Rome, ibid.—beſieges Ravenna, and takes Vitiges priſoner in it, 15—is recalled by Juſtinian, ibid.—is ſent back again into Italy, ibid.—having but an inconſiderable force he rather loſes the reputation he had before acquired than makes any addition to it, ibid.—has the mortification to ſee Rome beſieged and taken, as it were, before his face by Totila, king of the Goths, ibid.—ſeeing Rome abandoned he reſolves to attempt ſomething to re-eſtabliſh his reputation, ibid.—taking poſſeſſion of the city in its ruinous ſtate, he rebuilds the walls with the utmoſt expedition, and invites the inhabitants to return to it, ibid.—is recalled a ſecond time by Juſtinian, ibid.—quits Italy, and leaves it to the mercy of Totila, ibid.

*Bella, Giana della*, a Florentine patriot, of a noble family, encourages a reformation of the city, i. 99—becomes odious to the nobility, ibid.—is requeſted by the enraged people to cauſe the execution of thoſe laws which he had himſelf framed, 100—adviſes them to carry their complaints to the ſigniory, and to demand juſtice of them, ibid.—fearing the malevolence of the populace, and the fickleneſs of the magiſtrates, he reſolves to ſecure himſelf againſt the jealouſy of his enemies, and his country from the rage of his friends, by giving way to envy, and going into a voluntary exile, ibid.

*Belphegor*, an arch-devil, ſent into the world by Pluto, and obliged to marry, iv. 245—ſets out for it with a train of devils in the diſguiſe of ſervants, 246—ſoon after his arrival upon earth he makes a magnificent entry into Florence, ibid.—aſſumes the name of Don Roderigo of Caſtile, ibid.—takes a very fine houſe in the ſuburbs of All Saints, ibid.—ſpreads a falſe account of himſelf to conceal his real quality, ibid.—convinces the Florentines, by his ſplendour, that he is exceeding rich, ibid.—is courted by ſeveral of the nobility, ibid.—makes choice of a beautiful young lady, ibid.—marries her, ibid.—celebrates his marriage in the moſt ſuperb and oſtentatious manner, ibid.—enters into all the pleaſures and follies of the age ſoon after his wedding, 247—ſpends vaſt ſums of money to make himſelf popular, ibid.—grows ſo paſſionately fond of his wife, that he is almoſt diſtracted whenever ſhe happens to be indiſpoſed, or diſpleaſed at any thing, ib.—thinks ſhe excells Lucifer himſelf in pride and inſolence, ibid.—becomes weary of his life, ibid.—reſolves to bear all his grievances with patience, and to keep his wife in temper, if poſſible, ibid.—ſpends immenſe ſums to gratify her vanity with the richeſt cloaths, ibid.—indulges her in every new faſhion, ibid.—gives handſome marriage-portions to all her ſiſters, ibid.—ſends her brothers to different places in different employments, ibid.—bears all the expences in which ſhe involves him during the time of the carnival, with patience, to keep peace at home, 248—vainly endeavours to live quietly, ibid.—is brought into many diſtreſſes and inconveniencies, in conſequence of her extravagance and inſolent behaviour, ibid.—is almoſt at his wits end, being deſerted, not only by his hired ſervants, but even by the devils themſelves whom he had brought with him into this world in the ſhape of men, ibid.—chuſes rather to return to hell, and endure any ſort of torment there, than to live upon earth under the hatches of a vixen, ibid.—begins to find himſelf in a way of having freſh ſupplies, ibid.—borrows money of merchants and brokers, and gives them notes and bonds for it, ibid.—meets with ſevere diſappointments, ibid.—is narrowly watched by his creditors, 249 reſolves to run away at all events, ibid.—mounts his horſe early one morning, and flies out of the city, ibid.—is purſued by bailiffs and by his creditors, ibid.—leaves the high road, and traverſes the country to ſeek his fortune, ibid.—finds himſelf entangled among ditches and encloſures, ibid.—is forced to quit his horſe and take to his heels, ibid.—arrives at the houſe of a farmer, ibid.—recommends himſelf to his protection, ibid.—promiſes to make him a rich man, if he will conceal him from his creditors, ibid.—on being removed from the place of his concealment he acquaints the farmer with his name, ſituation in this world, &c. 250—is outwitted by him, and makes haſte to the infernal regions to eſcape from his wife, 255.

*Benchi, Florentine*, a gentleman of the family of the Buondelmonſi, qualified to be one of the ſigniory, by having been admitted into the rank of commoners, for his merit in the wars againſt the Piſans, i. 168—is excluded when he expects that honour, by a new law againſt the admiſſion of any perſon of noble extraction, though become a commoner, into a ſhare of the magiſtracy, ibid.—provoked at this excluding-law, he joins with Pietro degli Albizi, ibid.

*Benedict* the Twelfth, being apprehenſive that Lewis the emperor will become abſolute maſter of Italy, reſolves to make all ſuch his friends there as have uſurped any territories formerly ſubject to him, i. 60—publiſhes a decree to confirm all the uſurped titles and eſtates in Lombardy to thoſe who were then in poſſeſſion of them, 61.

*Benevento*, ſeized upon by Alphonſo, king of Naples, i. 376—its ſituation deſcribed, ibid.

*Bentivoglio, Annibal*, the head of that family, killed by Battiſta Canneſchi and his accomplices, i. 383.

*Berengarius*, duke of Friuli, made king of Italy by the Romans, i. 28—defeats the Huns in an engagement, and drives them back again into Pannonia, ibid.

*Bertaccio*, his cruel behaviour to a young gentleman on his coming to make an apology for having wounded his ſon, i. 104.

*Bianca*, Madam, married to count Sforza, with the city of Cremona for her dower, i. 373.

*Biſhops*, Roman, begin to aſſume a greater degree of authority than they had ever done before, i. 20.

*Bleda*, brother to Attila, king of the Huns, murdered by him, i. 7.

*Boccaccio, Giovanni*, the great plague at Florence, of which above ninety-ſix thouſand people died, deſcribed by him in the moſt affecting manner, at the beginning of his Decamerone, i. 160.

*Bologna*, city of, why called the Fat, i. 377.

*Boniface*, governor of Africa, in the name of the emperor, invites the Viſigoths to come and ſettle there, i. 5—being

ing in rebellion himſelf, he is afraid of being called to account, and puniſhed, 6.

*Boniface* VIII. pope, ſeized by Sciarra, and made priſoner at Anagni, i. 51—ſet at liberty again by the people of the town, ibid.—enraged at his diſgrace, he dies, ſoon afterwards, diſtracted, ibid.—the firſt jubilee inſtituted by this pope in the year 1300, ibid.

*Borgia, Cæſar*, beſieges the counteſs Catherine at Forli, at the head of a French army, iv. 212—makes himſelf maſter of the dutchy of Urbino in one day, by an uncommon piece of generalſhip, 221.

*Borgo di San Sepulchro*, the caſtle of, ſold to the Florentines by the pope for the ſum of twenty-five thouſand ducats, i. 312.

*Borſo*, marquis of Ferrara, receives Diotiſalvi Neroni, ii. 45.

*Britons*, the, apprehenſive of the people who had conquered Gaul, and ſeeing Theodoſius unable to protect them, call in the Angli, a German nation, to their aſſiſtance, i. 6—being expelled their country, and become deſperate by neceſſity, they reſolve to invade ſome other, i. 7—paſs the ſea, and poſſeſs themſelves of that part which lies upon the coaſt of France, calling it Bretagne, or Britany, ibid.

*Brunelleſchi, Philip*, a celebrated painter and artichect of Florence, having reconnoitred the courſe of the river Serchio, and the ſituation of Lucca, informs the Council of Ten that he will undertake to lay the city under water, i. 268—convinces them ſo far of the practicability of his deſign, that they give him a commiſſion to put it in execution, ibid.—his project, by occaſioning great diſorders among the Florentine troops, ſaves the city, ibid.

*Brutus, Lucius Junius*, the putting ſuch men as his ſons to death defended, iii. 341.

*Buondelmonte, Meſſer*, murdered at Florence, at the foot of the old bridge, cloſe by a ſtatue of Mars, i. 84.

*Burgundians*, the, over run Gaul, i. 6—give names to the places of which they poſſeſs themſelves, ibid.

C.

*Cæſar, Julius*, the imitation of his conduct after a victory recommended, iv. 137—his artful manner of acting, in order to paſs a river in Gaul in the face of the enemy on the oppoſite ſide, deſcribed, 167.

*Caſaggiolo*, a long conference there between Agnolo Acciaivoli and Pietro de Medici, ii. 49.

*Calabria, Charles*, duke of, by approaching with his army makes the Florentines run away with ſuch celerity, that they leave all their baggage, ammunition, artillery, and carriages in the hands of the enemy, ii. 113—being in no haſte to withdraw his forces out of the territories of Siena, he pretends that he is detained by ſome diſcords among the inhabitants of that place, 121—lays heavy fines upon ſome of them, ibid.—impriſons others, ibid.—ſends many into baniſhment, ibid—puts ſeveral to death, ibid.—is ſuſpected of a deſign to make himſelf maſter of that city, ibid.—ravages the pope's dominions, and advances towards Rome, 129—his army is defeated by the pope's, 150.

*Calixtus* III. pope, endeavours to raiſe a cruſade againſt the Turks, i. 435—dies, 441.

*Calumnies*, as pernicious to a commonwealth, as legal accuſations are ſerviceable to it, iii. 34.

*Calvinus Domitius*, takes a town by making the inhabitants believe that he is only exerciſing thoſe troops around it, with which he intended to aſſault it, iv. 221.

*Camels*, made uſe of with ſucceſs by Crœſus againſt the enemy's horſe, iv. 134.

*Camillus*, the cauſe of his baniſhment from Rome, iii. 427.

*Campaldino*, a conſiderable victory gained over the people of Arezzo there by the Florentines, at war with them for having expelled the Guelphs their city, i. 97.

*Campus Martius*, the Roman youth exerciſed there, becauſe the Tyber ran cloſe by it, iv. 69.

*Cancellieri*, a great quarrel in that family, the riſe, progreſs, and conſequences of it particularly deſcribed, i. 104—110.

*Candia*, ceded to the Venetians by the French, i. 60.

*Cane, Fantino*, makes himſelf maſter of ſeveral towns in Italy, and amaſſes great riches, i. 71—dying without children he leaves his wife Beatrice heir to his poſſeſſions, ibid.—enjoins his friends to uſe their utmoſt endeavours to get her married to Philip Viſconti, ibid.

*Cannæ*, battle of, fatal to the Romans, iii. 49—the manner in which thoſe who determine to quit Italy are obliged to remain in it, ibid.

*Canneſchi*, family of, at Bologna, raiſe an inſurrection in favour of the duke of Milan, i. 383—kill Annibal Bentivoglio, the head of that family, ibid.—are quelled, and driven out of the city, ibid.

*Gannete, Battiſta*, in order to keep forcible poſſeſſion of Bologna, applies for aid to duke Philip, i. 299.

*Cannon*, the uſe of it produced in the war between the Genoeſe and the Venetians about the iſland of Tenedos, i. 65.

*Cappani, Neri*, his ſpeech to the Venetian ſenate, i. 333—his anſwer to count Poppi's addreſs, 364.

*Caravaggio*, beſieged by count Sforza, i. 401—the caſtle of it reduced to the greateſt extremity, ibid.—a memorable engagement there between the Florentines and the Venetians, in which the latter are totally defeated, ib.

*Cardinals*, the origin of them, i. 27.

*Cardona, Ramondo da*, appointed by the Florentines their commander in chief, i. 125—is very importunate with them to give him the ſame command over the city which he had over the army, 126—pretends that he cannot, without ſuch an addition to his power, require or exert the neceſſary obedience due to a general, ibid.—finding the Florentines unwilling to comply with his demands, he trifles away his time in doing nothing, ibid.—gives Caſtruccio a conſiderable advantage over him by his indolence, ibid.—behaves in ſo unſoldier-like a manner, that he cannot even make his eſcape from the enemy, ibid.—is overtaken in his retreat by Caſtruccio, and attacked by him near Alto Paſcio, ibid.—is totally defeated, and loſes his life, ibid.

*Carmignuola, Franciſco*, appointed captain-general of the league between the Venetians and the Florentines, i. 249—takes many towns from duke Philip, and makes himſelf maſter of Breſcia, a city deemed, according to the method of waging war in thoſe times, impregnable, ibid.

*Carmignuola*, count, commander in chief of the duke of Milan's forces, is defeated by the Swiſs with great loſs, iv. 58—gains a victory over them, by ordering his gens d'armes to diſmount, and fight on foot, ibid.—his ſucceſs accounted for, 59.

*Caſala, Giovanni de*, governor of Forli, unable to defend it againſt the vigorous attacks of Cæſar Borgia, iv. 212.

*Caſtato*, a new tax at Florence ſo called, i. 249—great diſcontents occaſioned by it, ibid.

*Caſtello*, taken from the pope by the Florentines, ii. 131.

*Caſtiglionchio, Lapo da*, one of the captains of the Guelph faction at Florence, urges the choice of Sylveſtro de Medici for a gonfalonier, i. 177—is oppoſed by Pietro degli Albizi, ibid.—comes very unwillingly over to his propoſal, 178—gives his reaſons for being of a different opinion, ibid.—his houſe is plundered and burnt, ibid.—ſeeing the ſigniory at the head of the attack upon the Guelphs, and the people all in arms, and having no other remedy but either to abſcond or fly, he takes ſanctuary in the church of Santa Croce, ibid.—from thence he flies to Coſentino, in the habit of a monk, 182—is often heard to condemn Pietro degli Albizi for having put off their deſign till St. John's day, and himſelf for having concurred in it, ibid.—is proclaimed a rebel, ib.

*Caſtiglione della Piſcaia, Picconino*, having been routed, is forced to fly in great diſorder to that place, i. 435.

*Caſtracani Caſtruccio*, ſucceeds Uguccione della Faggiuola, in the government of Lucca and Piſa, 121—becomes the head of the Ghibeline faction in Tuſcany, 122—ſets down before Prato, ibid.—retreats to Lucca, ibid.—grows ſo formidable by having ſeized upon Piſtoia, that the Florentines begin to ſtand in awe of him, 125—omits no opportunity to take the advantage which the Florentine general gives him, ibid.—attacks him near Alto Paſcio, and gains a complete victory over him, ibid.—makes inexpreſſible havock after it, ibid.—is checked in his military career by Charles, duke of Calabria, 127—enables Louis of Bavaria, by his aſſiſtance, to make himſelf maſter of Piſa, 128—ſeizes Piſa, ibid.—marches to Piſtoia to recover it from the Florentines, ibid.—lays ſiege to it, ibid.—forces it to ſurrender, ibid.—and to receive him for their lord, ibid.—acquires grea treputation, ibid.—falls ſick and dies in the midſt of his victories, ibid.—his life, ii 441—477.

*Cataractæ*, portculliſes ſo called by the ancients, iv. 214.

*Catharine*, natural daughter to the duke of Milan, given in marriage to count Girolamo, with the city of Imola for her dower, ii. 48.

*Catharine*, the counteſs, beſieged at Forli by Cæſar Borgia, iv. 212.

*Cavalry*, ſome thoughts concerning the choice of them, iv. 50—the Roman way of chuſing them preferred, 51—the modern way of arming them more ſecure than that of the ancients, 61—why they are, in general, inferior to the infantry, 62.

*Celeſtine* V. pope, reſigns the pontificate to Boniface VIII. i. 50.

*Charlemagne*, or *Charles the Great*, king of France, applied to by pope Theodore the Firſt, for help againſt Deſiderius, i. 25—paſſes the Alps, and ſhuts up Deſiderius with his ſons in Pavia, ibid.—takes them priſoners, and ſends them to France, ibid.—pays a viſit to the pope at Rome, ibid.—makes a very flattering declaration to him, ibid.—is unanimouſly made, in return for it, emperor, ibid.—new models Italy in the pontificate of Leo III. 26—makes his ſon Pepin king of Italy, ibid.

*Charles of Anjou*, called into Italy by the pope, i. 91—defeats Manfred, deprives him of his kingdom, and kills him, ibid.

*Charles*, duke of Burgundy, promiſes to aſſiſt pope Pius againſt the Turks in *perſon*, ii. 22—is appointed one of the generals, ibid.

*Charles* VII. king of France, receives an offer of the ſtate of Genoa, from Pietro Fregoſo, the doge, i. 439—readily accepts of it, and ſends king Regnier's ſon, John of Anjou, to take poſſeſſion of that city, ibid.—gains many a victory by pretending to be adviſed in every thing by a virgin ſent from heaven, commonly called, *the Virgin of France*, iv. 146.

*Charles*, ſon to Robert king of Naples, and duke of Calabria, has the government of Florence offered him, on his undertaking to defend it, i. 127—ſends Gualtier duke of Athens to the Florentines as his lieutenant, ibid.—comes in perſon to Florence, and makes his entry, ibid.—gives ſome check to Caſtruccio by his arrival, ibid.—prevents him from roving about the country, and plundering it without controul, as he had done before, ibid.—exacts four hundred thouſand florins from the citizens in one year, in violation of the agreement made with him, ibid.—thinking the kingdom of Naples in no ſmall danger, on the military progreſs of Lewis of Bavaria towards Rome, he returns thither, with all the forces he had brought with him, leaving Philip Saginetto his lieutenant at Florence, 128—dies, ibid.

*Ciarpellone*, his defection gives count Sforza no ſmall uneaſineſs, i. 373.

*Cignano*, a caſtle about twelve miles from Breſcia, beſieged by Niccolo Piccinino, i. 373.

*Cimbri*, the, ſubdued by Marius, a Roman citizen, i. 3.

*Cimon*, the Athenian, ſets fire to a temple, one night, which

which ſtood without the gates of a town he deſigned to ſurpriſe, iv. 211.

*Cincinnatus*, reflections on his poverty, iii. 340.

*Cirignuola*, in the kingdom of Naples, the French beaten there, iv. 129.

*Cities*, concerning the origin of them in general, iii. 1—5.

*Citizen*, the remarkable ſpeech of one of Florence, i. 168.

*Citizen*, the power of one conferred by the free ſuffrages of the people, pernicious to liberty, iii. 119—citizens who have filled the higheſt poſts in the ſtate ought not to be above ſerving in thoſe of a lower degree, 125.

*Clarice*, a daughter of the family of the Urſini, married to Lorenzo, ſon of Pietro de Medici, ii. 46.

*Claſſes*, thoſe formed by Servius Tullius, a ſort of trained bands, iv. 40.

*Clearchus*, the tyrant of Heraclea, baniſhed from thence, iii. 69—is brought again into the government by the nobility, ibid.—finds himſelf wholly in their hands, ibid.—is unable either to ſatiate or reſtrain them, ibid.—reſolves to get rid of them, and to make the people his friends, 70.

*Clement* VI. pope, reſolves that the jubilee, ordained by Boniface the Eighth, inſtead of being held every hundredth year, ſhould be celebrated every fiftieth, i. 63—paſſes a decree for that purpoſe, ibid.

*Cleomenes*, the Spartan king, reſtores the laws of Lycurgus to their former vigour and authority, by his own vigorous and arbitrary conduct, iii. 43.

*Clefi*, choſen by the Lombards their king, i. 19—he rebuilds Imola, a town that had been demoliſhed by Narſetes, ibid.—reduces Rimini, and almoſt all the country between that place and Rome, ibid.—dies in the midſt of his victories, ibid.

*Clothiers*, one of that company in Florence, makes an inflammatory ſpeech to his aſſociates, i. 188.

*Cocchi, Donato*, reſolves to ſet up a balia without the concurrence of Coſimo de Medici, ii. 7—meets with a violent oppoſition, ibid.—is treated with ſo much ſcorn and deriſion that he becomes ſtark mad, ibid.

*Coglione, Bartolomeo*, appointed commander in chief of the Venetian forces againſt the Florentines, ii. 42—aſſembles an army with as much expedition as poſſible, ibid.—is joined by Hercules D'Eſte with ſome troops ſent by Borſo duke of Ferrara, 43—makes an attempt upon the Bourg of Doadola, ibid.—burns it, and commits ravages

vages in the adjacent country, ibid.—retires towards Ravenna, 44.

*Colà*, a Mantuan by birth, forms a conſpiracy againſt the duke of Milan, ii. 70.

*Colonies*, the utility of them, i. 79.

*Colonni*, quarrels between that family and the Urſini at Rome, ii. 137.

*Commander* in chief, more harm than good done by more than one in an army, iii. 405.

*Commiſſions*, free and diſcretionary ones given by the Romans to the commanders of their armies upon any expedition, iii. 334.

*Compulſion*, men rendered mutinous and diſcontented by it, iv. 37.

*Conradine*, lawful king of Naples and Sicily, by his father's will, raiſes a good body of forces in Germany for the recovery of his right, i. 47—marches into Italy againſt Charles of Anjou the uſurper, ibid.—is engaged by him, defeated, and taken, ibid.—killed afterwards while he is trying to make his eſcape diſguiſed, ibid.

*Conſpiracies*, reflections on them, iii. 352.

*Conſtantinople*, the empire of it falls into the hands of Zeno, i. 10.

*Conſuls*, the method taken by the Romans, as ſoon as they entered into their office, to raiſe the forces that were wanted for the ſervice of that year, iv. 43.

*Coriolanus*, ſaved from the fury of the populace by the tribunes, iii. 31.

*Corneto*, *Giovanni Vitelleſchi da*, patriarch of Alexandria, appointed commander in chief of the pope's forces, i. 344—is entruſted with the ſole management of all his affairs and undertakings in Tuſcany, ibid.—ſuſpected of betraying the pope, 345—is impriſoned in the caſtle of St. Angelo, 346—dies there, ibid.

*Corzano*, caſtle of, ſaved by Antonio Gualandi, native of Piſa, when it was on the point of being treacherouſly given to Puccio by Gambacorta, i. 428.

*Crœſus*, makes uſe of camels with ſucceſs againſt the enemy's horſe, iv. 134.

*Craſſus*, *Marcus*, his ſignificant queſtion to one of his officers, iv. 196.

*Crema*, the capital of a little country, called Cremaſco, upon the river Serio, which joins the Adda upon the borders of the Milaneſe, taken by the Venetians, i. 410.

*Cruſade*, an account of the expedition ſo called, i. 36.

*Cuſtoms*, ancient, and inſtitutions, the ſhadow of them at leaſt to be retained by thoſe who would reform a government into a free ſtate, iii. 92.

*Cyprus*, iſland of, a diſpute concerning it between the king of Naples and the Venetians, ii. 66.

*Cyrus*, deceived by the pretended flight of Thomyſis, iv. 203.

D.

*D'Agobbio*, *Jacomo Gabrieli*, inveſted by the Florentines with abſolute power over the citizens, i. 131—behaves with a moſt ſhameleſs inſolence and partiality, ibid.—provokes a conſpiracy againſt him, ibid.—thinking his life in danger, he is ſo frighted that he runs, trembling, to ſecure himſelf in the midſt of armed men, 133.

*Darius*, how it came to paſs that his kingdom, uſurped by Alexander, did not rebel againſt Alexander's ſucceſſors, ii. 211.

*D'Aubigny*, Monſ. ſent to oppoſe the march of a body of Spaniſh infantry, tranſported from Sicily into the kingdom of Naples, with ſome gens d'armes, and about four thouſand Swiſs foot, iv. 60—the Swiſs preſs ſo hard upon the enemy with their pikes, that they ſoon open their ranks, ibid.—are afterwards ſlaughtered by the Spaniards, and completely defeated, ibid.

*Deceit*, in time of war, allowable in our dealings with our enemies, iii, 475—all means to be uſed, honourable and diſhonourable, for the ſafety of our country, 476.

*Decemvirate*, reaſons why the creation of it was prejudicial to the liberties of Rome, iii. 123.

*Decemviri*, the creation of them conſidered, iii. 137.

*Decius*, colleague of Fabius, is defeated and ſlain by taking a courſe oppoſite to him, iv. 141.

*Deſiderius*, a Lombard, duke of Tuſcany, takes up arms on the death of Ariſtolphus, to ſecure the ſucceſſion of the kingdom to himſelf, i. 25—ſolicits the aſſiſtance of the pope, ibid.—promiſes him his friendſhip in return, ibid.—gains the pope's aſſiſtance, and is not oppoſed by any other competitor, ibid.—obſerves his promiſe for a while with the utmoſt punctuality, and reſigns the territories to Gregory which had been ceded to him by the agreement made with Pepin, ibid.—beſieges pope Theodore the Firſt in Rome, ibid.—is ſhut up, with his ſons, in Pavia, by Charlemagne, ibid.—they are taken priſoners, and ſent to France, ibid.

*Dictator*, his authority always of ſervice to the Roman commonwealth, iii. 119.

*Didius*, *Titus*, a ſtratagem of his ſucceſsful, iv. 198.

*Dimius*, *Titus*, a remarkable artifice of his to conceal the loſs he had ſuſtained in battle, iv. 138.

*Dinocrates*, the architect, adviſes Alexander the Great to build a city upon mount Athos in order to perpetuate his name, iii. 5—is aſked by him how the inhabitants are to be furniſhed with proviſions, ibid.—his reply makes Alexander laugh, ibid.

*Dionyſius*, offers the people of Rhegium terms of accommodation, and during the treaty prevails on them to ſupply him with a large quantity of proviſions, iv. 220—having thus leſſened their ſtock, and increaſed his own, he blocks up the town immediately and ſoon afterwards takes it, ibid.

*Diſcipline*, military, the difference between that of the ancients, and that of the moderns, iii. 267.

*Dogdola*, the bourg of, aſſaulted by Bartolomeo Coglione, ii. 43—burnt by him,

*Dominion*, of ſuch who have arrived at it by wicked and unjuſtifiable means, ii. 255.

*Donati*, *Corſo*, diſſatisfied at his being excluded from the ſhare in the government of Florence, to which he thinks himſelf entitled, and exaſperated at the neglect with which he is treated, meditates revenge, i. 3—to varniſh over his deſign, he accuſes ſeveral citizens of having embezzled the public money, and of having applied it to their own private uſes, ibid.—is the only perſon, of any diſtinction, who does not take up arms when the city is viſited in a lamentable manner by fire and ſword, 113—is called in as an arbitrator, ibid.—is cited to appear before the pope, 114—readily obeys the ſummons, ibid.—returns to Florence, 115—occaſions freſh troubles by his reſtleſs ambition, ibid.—oppoſes the nobility in all their ſchemes, in order to make himſelf popular, ibid.—turns all his authority to ſupport the people in their various reſolutions, ibid.—is reſolved to ſtand by them when they have any particular point to carry, ibid.—ſtrengthens all the ſuſpicions with regard to his ambitious proſpects by marrying a daughter of the head of the Bianchi and the Ghibelines, 116—an accuſation is preferred againſt him, ibid.—he is cited to make his appearance before the captain of the people, ibid.—he refuſes to obey the ſummons, ibid.—he is declared a contumacious rebel,

rebel, ibid—begins to fortify his houſe, 117—ſeeing himſelf ſurrounded on a ſudden by his enemies, and deſpairing of ſuccour from his father-in-law, he reſolves to effectuate his eſcape, ibid.—breaks through them, and flies out of the Porta della Cruce, ibid.—is taken priſoner at Ravezzano, ibid.—throws himſelf from his horſe to the ground, in his way to Florence, and is ſlain by one of the guards, ibid.

*Drama*, a curious hiſtorical one, repreſenting the coming of the three Magi from the Eaſt, exhibited with prodigious magnificence and applauſe at Florence, ii. 28.

*Drums*, the uſefulneſs of them in an army, iv. 87.

*Druſiana*, a natural daughter of Sforza, duke of Milan, married to Giacopo Piccinino, ii. 20.

*Durazzo Carlo*, raiſes a powerful army to invade the kingdom of Naples, i. 206—alarms the Florentines by his military proceedings, ibid.—receives a preſent from them of forty thouſand ducats not to moleſt them, 207—marches on to invade the territories of queen Giovanna, ibid.—makes himſelf maſter of the kingdom of Naples, and ſends her priſoner to Hungary, ibid.—alarms the governors ſtill more by his ſucceſs, ibid.—demands the aſſiſtance of the Florentines againſt Lewis of Anjou, 212—takes poſſeſſion of the kingdom of Hungary, and dies there ſoon after he is crowned, 213.

E.

*Eaſtern Empire*, the, ruined in the time of the emperor Heraclius, i. 22.

*Egidius* cardinal, ſent to Italy by pope Innocent II. i. 65—recovers Bologna, ibid.—forces the Romans to admit a foreign ſenator every year of the pope's appointment, ibid. makes an honourable accommodation with the Viſconti, ibid.

*Electors*, } their firſt inſtitution, i. 30.
*Electorate*, }

*Elephants*, made uſe of with ſucceſs by Pyrrhus againſt the Roman horſe, iv. 135.

*Elizabeth*, daughter to Alphonſo, ſon and heir to the king of Naples, married to Giovanni Galeazzo, the eldeſt ſon of the duke of Milan, ii. 48.

*Encampments*, the ſituations choſen for them by the Greeks and Romans pointed out, iv. 173—the form of an encampment, 174—concerning the centinels and guards that are proper for a camp, 185—the neceſſity of knowing

ing who goes out of a camp, and who comes into it, 186—how to encamp more or leſs than four regiments or legions, 192.

*England*, the name given to Britain by the Angli, a German nation, invited over by the inhabitants to aſſiſt them againſt their invaders, i. 6.

*Envy*, the ſmalleſt ſparks of it to be extinguiſhed by the citizen who would do any good in a republick by dint of his own authority, iii. 443.

*Eſtabliſhments*, religious and civil, incapable of a long duration without being frequently reduced to their firſt principles, iii. 340.

*Eſte*, the houſe of, becomes lords of Ferrara, i. 44.

*Eudoxa*, widow of the emperor Valentinian, is forced by Maximus to marry him, i. 9—being of royal extraction, and diſdaining the embraces of a private citizen, ſhe, in revenge, ſecretly encourages Genſeric, king of the Vandals, to invade Italy, ibid.

*Eugenius* IV. pope, being driven out of Rome, flies to Florence, i. 298—makes an ignominious peace with count Sforza, ibid.—ſolicits the aſſiſtance of the Venetians and Florentines, 299—regains all the territories which Fortebraccio had taken from him, 301—forces the duke of Milan to ſue for a peace, ibid.—leaves Florence, and goes to Bologna, 311—endeavours to bring about an accommodation betwixt the league and the duke, ibid.—takes great pains in the matter, but to no purpoſe, ibid.—a quarrel between him and count Poppi accommodated by the Florentines, 323—deluded by the artful repreſentations of Piccinino, he ſends him five thouſand ducats, and promiſes to provide largely for him and his children, 327—he is warned by ſeveral perſons to beware of Piccinino, but gives no credit to them, ibid.—loſes, in conſequence of his credulity, all his towns in Romagna, 328.

*Euric*, ſon of Attila, i. 8.

*Exiles*, the Florentine ones, enemies to Pietro de Medici, apply to the doge and ſenate of Venice, and affect them ſo much by their addreſſes to them, as to make them declare war againſt Florence, ii. 42.

*Exiles*, the danger of placing confidence in them, iii. 328.

*Ezelino*, commander of the Ghibelines, gets poſſeſſion of all that part of Lombardy which lies on the other ſide of the Po, i. 46—cauſes twelve thouſand of the Paduans to to be put to death, ibid.—dies himſelf before the concluſion of the war, ibid.

F.

*Fabius*, the Roman general, celebrated for his delay, by what mode of proceeding he routed the Samnites and the Gauls, iv. 141—the method which he took to divide the enemy's ſtrength, 198.

*Faenza*, the protection of that city undertaken by the Florentines, and of young Aſtorre, the ſon of Galeatto, the lord of it, murdered by the connivance of his wife, ii. 156.

*Faggiuola*, *Uguccione della*, head of the Bianchi and Ghibelines, marries his daughter to Corſo Donati, i. 116—advances as far as Remoli to aſſiſt his ſon-in-law, 118—being informed of having fallen into the hands of the people, he thinks it moſt prudent, on many accounts, to turn back again, ibid.—makes himſelf maſter of Piſa, and afterwards of Lucca, 119—neglects no opportunities to increaſe the power he has already acquired, ibid.—gains poſſeſſion, partly by force, and partly by artifice, of ſeveral caſtles in the vales of Arno and Nievole, ibid.—proceeds to lay ſiege to other cities, ibid.—totally defeats the Florentines after a bloody engagement, ibid.—is prevented from the full enjoyment of his victory by the loſs of one of his ſons in the field of battle, ibid.—is driven out of Lucca and Piſa, 121.

*Fedini, Niccolo*, makes an important diſcovery to Pietro de Medici, ii. 31.

*Ferdinand*, the illegitimate ſon of king Alphonſo, marches into Tuſcany, i. 423—makes an attempt upon Foiano in the vale of Chiana, ibid.—ſucceeds his father Alphonſo, as king of Naples, 440—routed by John of Anjou, 445—reinforced by the pope, and the duke of Milan, he takes the field again, defeats John, and drives him out of the kingdom, 446—becomes again king of Naples, ii. 18—takes all proper methods to eſtabliſh himſelf in his government, ibid.—invites Piccinino into his ſervice, 20—makes him commander in chief of all his forces, ibid.—gives him an invitation to dine with him, ibid.—orders him to be impriſoned, and afterwards to be put to death, ibid.—enters into a new confederacy with Pietro de Medici's enemies, 43—ſends Alphonſo, his eldeſt ſon, to their aſſiſtance, ibid.—makes a peace with

with Lorenzo de Medici, 120—enters into a confederacy with the Florentines, the duke of Milan, and the Bologneſe, 127—to diſcover the pope's intentions, he ſends the duke of Calabria, with an army under his command, to quarter upon the Tronto, 128—determines to fall upon him, 129—his forces make terrible havock in the pope's territories, ibid.—ſeeing himſelf threatened with a ſtorm on all ſides, he has recourſe to the Florentines, and to the duke of Milan for aſſiſtance, 149—aſſembles two armies, ibid.—is every where victorious, ibid.—concludes a peace with the pope, ibid.

*Ferrara*, beſieged by the Venetians, ii. 133.

*Feſole*, the citizens belonging to it, mark out a plot of ground upon the plain that lies betwixt the ſkirts of the hill on which it ſtands, and the Arno, for the conveniency of merchants, that their goods may be conveyed thither with leſs difficulty, and their markets better frequented, i. 80.

*Flatterrers*, to be avoided by princes, ii. 401.

*Flax*, in what manner uſed by the Spaniards in their battles with Hamilcar, iv. 135.

*Florence*, city of, its origin, i. 80—the derivation of its name, 81—the cauſe of its firſt diviſion deſcribed, 83—the riſe of the Guelph and Ghibeline factions, 85—their re-union, and the form of government eſtabliſhed in conſequence of it, 87—the inſtitution of the anziani, the captain of the people, and the podeſta, ibid.—their forces and generoſity in time of war, ibid.—a reform of the ſtate, 92—freſh commotions, 93—the government new modelled by the Guelphs, 24—the twelve buonhuomini, and the credenza appointed, 94—the city excommunicated by Gregory X. 95—the government reformed by the citizens, 96—the inſtitution of three priori, to govern for three months, and to be choſen out of the citizens, 97—the ſigniory, ibid.—diſcords betwixt the nobility and the people, 98—the nobility exhorted to peace, 101—the ſame admonitions given to the people, 102—another reform, 103—a great quarrel in the family of the Cancellieri, the occaſion and conſequence of it, 104, 105—they divide into two factions, diſtinguiſhed by the names of Whites and Blacks, 104—their chiefs and partizans, 105—Charles of Valois made governor of Florence, 108—new troubles occaſioned by Corſo Donati, 110, 112—fomented by the Medici and Giungi, 112—a great fire deſtroys above thirteen hundred houſes, 113—

Corſo Donati condemned as a rebel, 117—his death, 118—freſh diviſions, 118—120—the tyranny and cruelty of Lando D'Agobbio, 120—the ſucceſs of Caſtruccio Caſtracani, 122—a council of the ſigniory to laſt forty months, 125—election of the magiſtrates by imborſation, ibid.—Ramondo da Cordona, general of the Florentine army, ibid.—his bad conduct, defeat, and death, 126—the duke of Athens deputed governor of Florence, 127—the duke of Calabria's entry into Florence, ibid.—the death of Caſtruccio, and of the duke of Calabria, 128—a new model of government, ibid.—the Florentines quiet at home, 129—new diſturbances, 131—a captain of the guards appointed, ibid—an engagement between the factions in Florence prevented, by the mediation of the Maffeo da Maradi, the podeſta, 134—Lucca ſold to the Florentines, 135—taken from them by the Piſans, 136—the duke of Athens made governor of Florence, ibid.—the ſpeech of one of the ſigniory to him, 139—his anſwer, 141—he is made ſovereign of the people, 142—his violent manner of proceeding, 143—Matteo de Morozzi diſcovers a plot to him, 145—three conſpiracies on foot againſt him at the ſame time, 146—an inſurrection in Florence, 148—the duke is expelled, 152—his character, ibid —another reform, 153—the nobility turned out of their offices, 153—156—the bold attempt of Andrea Strozzi, 156—the nobles endeavour to recover their authority, 157—the people take arms, and entirely ſuppreſs them, 157—160—animoſities betwixt the nobility and the people, the chief cauſe of diſturbances in a city, 162—the emulation between the middle ſort of the people and the plebeians, 165—ſeveral are admoniſhed, and rendered incapable of the magiſtracy, 167—the ſpeech of a citizen to the ſigniory, ibid.—a reformation in Florence, 174—eight citizens appointed to act as ſecretaries at war, 175—a conſpiracy of the Guelphs defeated, 177—the ſpeech of Sylveſtro de Medici, 179—the bàlia, a temporary council inſtituted, 181—another reformation, 182—the ſpeech of Luigi Guicciardini to the magiſtrates and ſyndics of the arts, when he was gonfaloniere di giuſtizia, 184—new diſturbances ariſe from the diſcontents of the plebeians, 188—the plebeians riſe in arms, 192—their demands, 194—Michael de Lando, a woolcomber, puts himſelf at the head of them, and ſeizes the government, 197—his character, ibid.—he quells the plebeians, 202—the popular and plebeian factions,

factions, 203—apprehenſions of a conſpiracy, ibid.—many executions in Florence, 204—remarkable ſtory of Pietro degli Albizi, ibid.—another model of government, 211—the plebeians deprived of all ſhare in it, ibid.—Michael de Lando is baniſhed, ibid.—the Florentines afraid of Carli Durazzo, 212—Benedetto Alberti is baniſhed, 214—the ſpeech of Veri de Medici to the ſigniory, 219—Donato Acciaivuoli is baniſhed, 221—a conſpiracy defeated, 224—a plot diſcovered, ibid.—ſeveral families proclaimed rebels and baniſhed, 225—the family of the Medici recover their authority, 231—Philip Viſconti, duke of Milan, enters into a treaty with the Florentines, 233—breaks it, ibid.—defeats the Florentine army, 237—Rinaldo degli Albizi endeavours to quiet the clamours of the people, 240—Uzzano's opinion, 242—they try to bring over Giovanni de Medici, ibid.—his anſwer to Rinaldo, ibid.—the factions of Uzzano and Medici, 245—the remarkable courage and fidelity of Biagio del Melano, 246—the perfidy and cowardice of Zanobi del Pino, 247—Niccolo Piccinino the Florentine general, goes over to the duke of Milan, 248—the Venetians enter into a league with the Florentines, ibid.—a new taxation called cataſto, 249—the conſequences of it, 250—the advice of Giovanni de Medici to his two ſons at his death, 253—his character, 254—Volterra rebels againſt the Florentines, ibid.—ſoon reduced to obedience, 256—Rinaldo promotes a war with Lucca, 257—Uzzano oppoſes it, ibid.—the cruelty of a Florentine commiſſary, 263—he is caſhiered for it, 216—Rinaldo, the other commiſſary, accuſed of miſconduct, ibid.—his ſpeech to the Council of Ten, ibid.—the project of a celebrated painter and architect, 268—the Florentines defeated by Piccinino, 271—a peace between them and the Lucchese, 272—Uzzano is perſuaded by Niccolo Barbadori in trying to drive Coſimo de Medici out of the city, 274—his anſwer, ibid.—his death, 278—Rinaldo becomes head of that faction, 279—he garbles the magiſtracy, and impriſons Coſimo, 280—Malavolti's glorious behaviour to him in priſon, 281—Coſimo is baniſhed, 282—Rinaldo's advice to his party is neglected, 284—with many others he riſes in arms to depoſe the ſigniory, 285—lays them down again, at the mediation of pope Eugenius IV. 290—the ſigniory baniſh Rinaldo, and recal Coſimo, 290, 291—a new form of government, 301—their ſevere proceedings, ibid—the Florentines alarmed by the duke of Milan, 311—a controverſy betwixt the Greek and Roman churches determined at Florence by the ſubmiſſion of the former, 325—a diſcourſe upon the proper ways and means of reforming the government of it, iv. 265, 284.

*Fluentia*, ſuppoſed by ſome to be the original name of the city of Florence, from its being ſituated near the ſtream of the river Arno, i. 81

*Foiano*, in the vale of Chiano, a ſmall fortreſs, neither ſtrong nor well garriſoned, i. 423—the number of men ſent thither by the ſigniory of Florence not exceeding two hundred, but reckoned as good and faithful ſoldiers as any in thoſe times, ibid.—it ſurrenders to Ferdinand, the illegitimate ſon of Alphonſo, king of Naples, after having ſuſtained a ſiege of ſix-and-thirty days, ibid.

*Forces*, auxiliary or mercenary ones not to be employed by a prince or a republic without danger, iii. 289.

*Forli*, counteſs Catherine beſieged there by Cæſar Borgia, iv. 212.

*Fortebraccio, Niccolo*, ſent for by the commiſſaries of Florence to employ his troops in the reduction of Volterra, i. 257—marches with a ſmall army, and ſurpriſes two caſtles belonging to the Luccheſe, ibid.—becomes the head of a party againſt the church, 297—falls upon pope Eugenius, 298—bends his forces againſt Rome, ibid.—ſeizes upon ſeven towns, 300—retires to Aſciſi, ibid.—is there beſieged by count Sforza, ibid.—makes a brave defence for a long time, ibid.—boldly attacks Lione, count Sforza's brother, takes him priſoner, and diſperſes his army, ibid.—purſues his victory with rapidity, ibid.—takes and plunders ſeveral towns in la Marca, ibid.—is routed in an engagement with Sforza, and taken priſoner, ibid.—dies ſoon afterwards of the wounds he receives in battle, ibid.

*Fortreſſes*, more harm than good generally done by them in a ſtate, iii. 303—in what manner they are to be built and fortified, iv. 209.

*Fortune*, how far it may be ſaid that ſhe prevails in human affairs, and in what manner ſhe is to be oppoſed, ii. 411—people blinded by her when ſhe would not have them defeat her deſigns, iii. 321.

*Foundation*, the advantages of a good one to a weak prince in ſucceſſion to an able one, iii. 80—no ſtate to be ſupported by one weak prince ſucceeding another, 81.

*France*, a ſketch of its conſtitution and affairs, ii. 493—512

*Franciſco, Giovanni*, the ſon of Palla Strozzi, is applied to by the Florentine exiles on account of his riches, ii. 41.—lends a favourable ear to their military remonſtrances, ibid.

*Frederick* III. emperor of Germany, makes his entry into Florence, i. 421—proceeds to Rome to receive his crown from the hands of the pope, 42.

*Frederick*, lord of Urbino, in the ſervice of the Florentines, courted by pope Sixtus, and by king Ferdinand, ibid.—invited by them to Rome and Naples, ii. 67—to the great mortification of the Florentines he deſerts them, and is appointed commander in chief of the confederated forces againſt them, ibid.

*Fregoſo, Ludovico*, makes himſelf maſter of Serezana, and impriſons every body there who adheres to the Florentines, ii. 118.

*Fregoſo, Paolo*, archbiſhop of Genoa, makes himſelf lord of the city of Genoa, i. 138.

*French*, why they have been, and ſtill are, accounted more than men at the firſt charge, and afterwards leſs than women, iii. 463.

*Fulvius*, the Roman conſul, an ambuſcade concerted by him attended with ſucceſs, iv. 201.

*Furli*, an inſurrection there, ii. 153.

G.

*Gaieta*, Alphonſo, king of Arragon, orders his fleet to make an attack upon it, i. 303.

*Galeaſſes*, Florentine ones deſcribed, i. 396.

*Galeatto*, lord of Faenza, murdered by the connivance of his wife, ii. 156.

*Galeazzo*, duke of Milan, ſends ambaſſadors to Florence to confirm the treaty of alliance that had been concluded between his father and that republic, ii. 28.—enters into a confederacy with Pietro de Medici's enemies, 43—comes in perſon to their aſſiſtance, ibid.—receives remonſtrances from the Florentine commiſſaries, ibid.—is ſo far influenced by them that he returns home immedidiately, 44—gives his natural daughter Catharine in marriage to count Girolamo, with the city of Imola for her dower, 48—is aſſaſſinated in the church of St. Stephen, 76—an account of the conſpirators, their motives, their apprehenſions, and their death, 70—78.

*Galeazzo, Giovanni*, commonly called count di Virtù, treacherouſly murders his uncle Barnabo, i. 56—makes him-

himſelf ſole prince, ibid.—is the firſt who takes upon himſelf the duke of Milan, ibid.

*Gambacorta*, *Girardo*, lord of the vale of Bagno, is tampered with by Alphonſo, king of Naples, i. 428—is offered another ſtate in the kingdom of Naples, if he will deliver up that territory to him, ibid.—receives an ambaſſador from Florence to remind him of the favours which he and his family had received from that republic, and to exhort him to remain faithful to it, ibid.—ſeeming to be much ſurpriſed at the imputation, he aſſures him, with the moſt ſolemn oaths and aſſeverations, that ſo wicked a thought had never entered into his head, ibid.—proffers not only to go back with him to Florence, but to reſide there as a ſecurity for his fidelity, ibid.—pretends to be in an ill ſtate of health, ibid.—delivers up his ſon to the ambaſſador as an hoſtage, ibid.—convinces him, by his open behaviour, that he had been calumniated, ibid.—proſecutes his agreement with the king with more earneſtneſs, ibid.—is made a priſoner by one of his attendants when he is on the point of delivering up the laſt fortreſs into the king's hands, 429—with difficulty eſcapes from his confinement, ibid.—wanders about the world like a vagabond, leaving his wife and family, and all his poſſeſſions, in the hands of the enemy, ibid.

*Garigliano*, the French defeated near it, iv. 206.

*General*, the duty of a wiſe one to lay his own army under a neceſſity of fighting, but never to reduce an enemy to ſuch circumſtances, iii. 394—the queſtion whether a good general and a bad army, or a bad army and a good general, are moſt to be depended upon, diſcuſſed, 399—the abilities of a general ſhewn by nothing ſo much as the power of penetrating into the deſigns of the enemy, 411—the qualifications neceſſary in a general to make his troops confide in him, 469—the neceſſity of his being well acquainted with the country which is the ſeat of war, 471—the report of a general's being killed frequently ſucceſsful, iv. 134—a general ought to be well acquainted with the country thro' which he is to paſs, 164—it is particularly incumbent on him to keep his deſigns ſecret, ibid.—means to be taken for that purpoſe, 165—ſome other precautions neceſſary upon a march, 167—how a general is to avoid an engagement, if the enemy preſſes him hard when he is going to paſs a river, ibid.—in what manner rivers may be paſſed with ſafety, 168—

how ſome generals have eſcaped when they have been ſhut up in a paſs, or ſurrounded by the enemy, 169—the ſtriking out of new inventions required in a general, 233.

*Generoſity*, a ſingular inſtance of its effect, iv. 416.

*Genoa*, rebels againſt the duke of Milan, ii. 106—the ducheſs dowager gives up the citadel to Battiſtino Fregoſo, 107.

*Genoeſe*, fit out a powerful ſquadron for the relief of the Neapolitans, i. 304.

*Genſeric*, king of the Vandals, makes a deſcent at the head of them upon the coaſts of Africa, i. 6.

*Germany*, a ſketch of its conſtitution and affairs, ii. 513—519.

*Gianni, Aſtorre*, the Florentine commiſſary, is intreated by the Seravezzans to receive them under his protection as faithful ſubjects to the ſtate of Florence, i. 263—ſeems to accept of their ſubmiſſion with pleaſure, ibid.—orders his forces to ſeize upon all the paſſes and ſtrong places in the vale of Seravezza, ibid.—aſſembles them all in their principal church, ibid.—keeps them priſoners there, ibid.—cauſes his ſoldiers to plunder and ravage the whole country with unheard of avarice and barbarity, ibid.—in conſequence of the ſpirited remonſtrances of the Severazzans againſt his barbarity and avarice, he is not only recalled immediately, but caſhiered, and rendered for ever incapable of being employed again in the ſervice of the republic, 266.

*Gildo*, appointed by Theodoſius to preſide over the ſouth part of the Roman empire, i. 5—reſolves, after his death, to drop the title of governor, and to aſſume the ſovereign dominion over his province, ibid.

*Giordano*, count, commander of the auxiliaries, ſent by Manfred to the Ghibelines, advances with them, after his victory over the Guelphs, to Florence, i. 89—forces the city to acknowledge Manfred for its ſovereign, ibid.—depoſes the magiſtrates, and entirely abrogates or alters all laws and cuſtoms that might look like remains of their former liberty, ibid.—obliged to return to Naples upon affairs of great conſequence, he leaves count Guido Novello, a Florentine, as deputy for the king there, ibid.

*Giovanna* I. queen of Naples, calls in Alphonſo, king of Arragon, to her aſſiſtance, i. 72—adopts him, ibid.—makes Braccio de Montone her general, ibid.

*Giovanna* II. queen of Naples, dies, i. 303—declares by her laſt will Regnier duke of Anjou her ſucceſſor, ibid.

*Giungi, Paolo,* lord of Lucca, to regain the friendſhip of the Florentines, refuſes to give aid to the Volterrans, i. 255—ſends an embaſſy to the ſigniory of Florence to complain of the depredations made by Fortebraccio, and to intreat them not to join their enemy in making war upon a neighbouring ſtate, which had always lived in ſtrict amity with them, 258—ſeeing himſelf cloſely beſieged, he ſends to ſolicit relief from the duke of Milan, 269—waked in the dead of night by the noiſe made by armed men, he is frightened, 270—offers them the keys of the city, ibid.—ſaves his life by his ſubmiſſive behaviour, ibid.—is carried, with his ſon, to the duke of Milan, ibid.—they both die not long afterwards in priſon, 271.

*Giuſto,* a plebeian of Volterra, irritated againſt the Florentines, determines to wreſt the town out of their hands, and to take the government of it upon himſelf, i. 254—makes himſelf maſter of the town, 255—ſeizes the governor, and takes the reins into his own hands, ibid.—expecting to be moleſted in his new ſovereignty, he ſends to deſire the aid of the Luccheſe and Sieneſe, 255—his requeſt is denied, ibid.—he makes ſpirited preparations for the defence of the town, ibid.—is ſurpriſed in his apartment by a party of conſpirators againſt him, 256—is attacked by them all with their drawn ſwords, ibid.—draws his own, and deſperately wounds two of his adverſaries before he falls, ibid.—is killed, and thrown out of the window, ibid.

*Glouceſter,* biſhop of, (Dr. Warburton) a letter of his to invalidate the authenticity of a letter ſaid to have been written by Machiavel to Zanobius Buondelmentius, in vindication of his own writings, iv. 361.

*Godfrey,* the moſt conſiderable and powerful of all the princes of Italy, i. 30.

*Goths,* ſeeing the daily havoc made among them by Beliſarius, they lay hands on their king Theodate, and put him to death, i. 15—ſet up Vitiges in his ſtead, ibid.—recover their ſpirits on the recal of Beliſarius, and make choice of Ildovadus, governor of Verona, to rule over them, 15—retire, after the death of Totila, into Pavia, and make Teia king over them, 16—the name of them extinguiſhed in Italy by the victory of Narſetes near Nocera, ibid.

*Government*, the different ſorts of it conſidered, ii. 7.

*Gracchus*, *Tiberius*, deceives the Spaniards, iv. 202.

*Gregory* III. pope, ſeeing the emperor of Conſtantinople debilitated by repeated loſſes, deſpairs of any ſucceſs from that quarter, i. 23—not daring to confide in the Lombards, he has recourſe to Pepin, king of France, ibid.—receives a favourable anſwer to his ſolicitations, and is invited by him into France, 24—meets with an honourable reception from Pepin on his arrival, ibid.—returns with an army to Italy, ibid.—lays ſiege to Pavia, ibid.—reduces the Lombards to diſtreſs, and obliges Ariſtolphus to accept of the terms granted him by the French, ibid.—a memorable ſaying of his, ibid.—he makes a ſecond application to Pepin, on Ariſtolphus's refuſing to perform his engagements, ibid.—is applied to by Deſiderius, duke of Tuſcany, for aſſiſtance, 25—grants his requeſt, ibid.—receives thoſe territories from him which had been ceded to him by the agreement made with Pepin, ibid.

*Gregory* V. driven out of Rome, i. 29—is re-inſtated by Otho III. ibid.—takes the power of creating emperors from the Romans, and veſts it in ſix princes of Germany, afterwards ſtyled Electors, and their ſtates Electorates, 30.

*Gregory* X. pope, arrives at Florence, i. 95—thinking it his duty to uſe his endeavours to re-unite the city, and compoſe all differences, he prevails on the Florentines to receive commiſſioners from the Ghibelines, ibid.—enraged at their refuſing to come back again, he excommunicates the city, ibid.

*Gregory* XI. pope, reſides at Avignon, and governs Italy by legates, i. 175.

*Gregory* XII. returns to Rome, after having reſided in France ſeventy-one years, i. 165.

*Gualando*, *Antonio*, by his bravery ſaves the vale of Bagno from being delivered up to Alphonſo, by the perfidy of Gambacorta, i. 429.

*Gualtier*, duke of Athens, ſent by Charles, duke of Calabria, to Florence as his lieutenant, to take poſſeſſion of the government, i. 127—new models the magiſtracy as he thinks proper, ibid.—gains the affections of every body by the (apparent) modeſty and moderation of his behaviour, ibid.—arrives at Florence with ſupplies from the king of Naples at an unlucky time, 136—made conſervator of the peace, and then commander in chief, ibid.—is inflamed

flamed with a ſtill greater thirſt of power, 137—endeavours to ingratiate himſelf with the lower ſort of people, ibid.—alarms the middle ſort of citizens by the ſeverity of his conduct, ibid.—ſtrikes additional awe, and acquires additional reputation, 138—makes a bold puſh to have the ſupreme power of the city veſted in him, ibid.—iſſues a proclamation, by which all the people are ordered to appear before him, ibid.—the remarkable addreſs of a citizen deputed to him, 139—his anſwer to it, 141—he gets poſſeſſion of the government, 143—behaves in a very tyrannical manner, ibid.—is jealous of the nobility, 144—makes his court to the people, ibid.—commits many outrages, 144, 145—ſtirs up three conſpiracies againſt him by his deſpotiſm, 146—alarmed at the ſpirited proceedings of his revengeful enemies, he buſies himſelf in fortifying his palace, 149—is, to his extreme mortification, blocked up in it, 151—is ſuffered to withdraw with his effects unmoleſted, out of Florence, on his agreeing to renounce all claim to any authority over the city, and to ratify his agreement at a ſpecified place out of the Florentine dominions, ib.—takes his leave of Florence, ibid.—confirms his renunciation, but with great reluctance, ibid.—his character, ibid.

*Guicciardini*, *Luigi*, his ſpeech to the magiſtrates and ſyndics of the arts at Florence, when he was Gonfaloniere di Giuſtizia, i. 184.

H.

*Hannibal*, the glory which he acquired in Italy equal to that acquired by Scipio in Spain, but by different methods, accounted for, iii. 417—his manner of throwing Fabius Maximus, by whom he was ſurrounded, into ſuch a perplexity, as to render him unable to prevent his retreat, iv. 197—gets poſſeſſion of a place belonging to the Romans by an uncommon ſtratagem, iv. 223.

*Hawkwood*, ſir *John*, diſcharged by the Florentines from their ſervice, i. 212.

*Head*, a multitude without one, of very little conſequence, iii. 147.

*Henry* III. the emperor, not bearing to ſee the popes ſo powerful, commands Alexander to reſign the papacy, and the cardinals to repair to Germany to make a freſh election, i. 31—has the honour of being the firſt prince made ſenſible of the weight of ſpiritual weapons, ibid.—

his dethronement gives birth to the famous factions of of Guelfs and Ghibelines, 32—he is forced, by his own ſubjects, in a ſtate of excommunication, to go to Italy, 33—makes his peace with the pope by aſking pardon upon his bare knees, ibid.—quarrels again with the pope, and is again excommunicated, ibid.—exaſperated at ſuch tyrannical treatment, he ſends his ſon Henry with an army to Rome, ibid.

*Henry*, ſon to the above, beſieges the pope in his caſtle, i. 33—receives intelligence that Robert Guiſcard is marching out of Puglia to the pontiff's relief, ibid.—waits not for his arrival, but returns to Germany, ibid.

*Henry* IV. emperor, comes to Rome in the pontificate of Paſcal the Second, i. 37—pretends great reſpect for him, ibid.—ſhuts up both him and all his clergy in priſon, ibid.—cannot be prevailed on to releaſe them till he has a licenſe to diſpoſe of all the churches in Germany as he pleaſes, ibid.

*Henry* II. king of England, ſends ambaſſadors to pope Alexander III. to exculpate him from the murder of Thomas à Becket, i. 40.

*Herdonius, Appius*, having put himſelf at the head of a multitude of ſlaves and exiles, amounting to no leſs than four thouſand, ſeizes the Capitol in the night, to the great conſternation of the whole city, iii. 60.

*Honorius*, ſon of Theodoſius, heir to his father's crown, but not to his valour or his good fortune, i. 4.

*Horatii*, the inferences to be drawn from the combat between them and the Curiatii, iii. 86.

*Horſes*, the method of raiſing plenty of them in any country, for the ſervice of the army, iv. 232.

*Hoſtilius, Tullus*, a ſtratagem of him, iv. 135.

*Houſſaye, Amelot de la*, his dedication of his French tranſlation of Machiavel's Prince to the grand duke of Tuſcany, ii. 169—his preface to his tranſlation, 172.

*Huns*, the, ſeize upon Pannonia, a province on this ſide of the Danube, and give it the name of Hungary, i. 7.

I.

*Ildovadus*, governor of Verona, choſen by the Goths to rule over them, i. 15—is killed ſoon afterwards, ibid.

*Imborſation*, a mode of electing magiſtrates at Florence, i. 125.

*Imola*, rebuilt by Cleſi, king of the Lombards, after having been

been demoliſhed by Narſetes, i. 19—taken by ſurprize by Agnolo della Pergola, i. 236.

*Inexperience*, the mother of cowardice, iv. 36.

*Infantry*, no ſort of it ſo dangerous as that which is compoſed of people who make war their only calling, iv. 27—how they ought to be armed, 60.

*Injuries*, private ones to be forgotten by a good citizen when the public good requires it, ii. 486.

*Innocent* II. pope, the hoſpital de Santo Spirito at Rome built by him, i. 43.

*Innocent* VI. pope, retrieves the reputation of the church by his virtue and good conduct, i. 65.

*Innocent* VIII. pope, undertakes the protection of the city of Aquila, ii. 148—is oppoſed every where with ſucceſs by king Ferdinand, 149—concludes a peace with him, ibid.—is reconciled to the Florentines, 150—marries his baſtard ſon Franciſco to one of Lorenzo de Medici's daughters, ibid.—perſuades the Genoeſe to give up Serezano to the Florentines, 151.

*Inventions*, the effects of new ones ſometimes in battle, iii. 401.

*John of Anjou*, ſent to Florence by his father, i. 431.

*Iphicrates*, the Athenian, kills a centinel whom he finds aſleep upon his poſt, iv. 224—his ſaying upon the occaſion, ibid.

*Jugurtha*, puts all his counſellors to death, iv. 198.

*Julius*, pope, takes the town of Mirandola without difficulty by the freezing of the ditches around it, iv. 211.

*Juſtice*, military, reflections on it, iv. 187—the methods taken by the ancients for puniſhing offenders, ib.

*Juſtinian*, the emperor, is encouraged, by the diſguſting behaviour of Theodate to the Oſtrogoths, to attempt the diſpoſſeſſing him of Italy, i. 14—appoints Beliſarius his commander in chief, ibid.—recalls him from Italy, 15—ſends him again to it, ibid.—is obliged, being invaded by the Parthians, to recall him a ſecond time, ibid.—is prevented from ſending freſh ſuccours into Italy by a new alarm from the Sclavi, 16—having repelled them, he ſends another army into Italy, under the conduct of Narſes, or Narſetes, ibid.—dies when Italy had ſcarce freed itſelf from the Gothic yoke, ibid.

*Juſtinus*, ſucceeds his father Juſtinian, i. 16—recalls Narſetes out of Italy at the inſtigation of his wife Sophia, ib. ſends Longinus thither to ſuperſede him, ibid.

K.

*Knights Templars*, the foundation of that order, i. 37.

L.

*Ladiſlaus*, king of Naples, finding himſelf unable to cope with the forces of the Florentines, is obliged to make a ceſſion of Cortona to them, a city which had been for ſome time in his hands, i. 226—gathering freſh ſtrength afterwards, he renews the war with much more vigour, ib.

*Lamberti*, *Moſchi*, a ſignificant ſaying of his, i. 85.

*Lampognano*, filled with reſentment againſt Galeazzo, the cruel and laſcivious duke of Milan, for having refuſed to give him poſſeſſion of Miramondo, an abbey of which he had obtained a grant from the pope, for one of his kinſmen, ii. 72—meditates the tyrant's death, 73—is inſtrumental to it in the church of St. Stephen's, 176—endeavouring to make his eſcape out of it, he is overtaken and ſlain by a Moor, one of the duke's footmen, ibid.

*Lando*, *Michael*, a wool-comber, puts himſelf at the head of the plebeians, and ſeizes upon the government, i. 97—his character, ibid.—he quells the plebeians, 201—is baniſhed, 221.

*Language*, contemptuous and reproachful of more diſſervice than utility to man, iii. 313.

*Law*, the making a new one which looks backwards too far, in oppoſition to old cuſtoms, extremely diſguſtful, iii. 126—the breaking a new law a bad precedent, 149.

*Leagues*, none made between princes and republics truly magnanimous and powerful, by dint of money, iii. 224.

*Legions*, the excellence of the Roman ones, iv. 27—filled with new men at the end of every fifteen years, ibid.—the manner in which the Roman legion was divided, 98.

*Leptenes*, the Syracuſan, his ſtratagem againſt the Carthaginians as ſucceſsful as he wiſhed it to be, iv. 202.

*Levies*, the method obſerved by the Romans in making them, iv. 43.

*Lewis of Bavaria*, emperor, marches into Italy with an army, i. 127—comes into Lombardy, ibid.—advancing into Tuſcany, he, with the aſſiſtance of Caſtruccio, makes himſelf maſter of Piſa, 128—on his arrival at Rome, he ſets up an anti-pope, ibid.—does many things to the prejudice of the church, and attempts others which he is not able to effect, ibid.—leaves Rome with no little diſhonour,

diſhonour, 129—goes to Piſa, and by his diſſatisfactory conduct makes eight hundred German horſe mutiny, ibid.—obſerving how liberally pope Benedict diſpoſes of the ſtates belonging to the empire, reſolves not to be behind hand with him in ſuch ſort of generoſity, i. 61—gives away all the ſtates which had been uſurped from the church, to be held of the empire by the preſent poſſeſſors, ibid.—reduces the church by theſe donations to a very low condition, ibid.—by announcing his intention of coming into Italy, he occaſions great commotions in Lombardy, ibid.

*Lewis of Anjou*, comes to Italy to drive Carlo Durazzo out of the kingdom of Naples, and to reinſtate queen Giovanna, i. 222—throws the Florentines into no ſmall perplexity by his approaches, ibid.

*Liberty*, whether it is ſafer to truſt the guardianſhip of it in the hands of the nobility, or of the commonalty, iii. 18—the neceſſity of having a criminal freely accuſed, with impunity to the accuſer, for the preſervation of liberty, 30—liberty not eaſily maintained by a people by any accident become entirely free, after having been accuſtomed to live under the dominion of a prince, 66—liberty recovered by a corrupt people, never preſerved by them, 71—how liberty may be ſupported in a corrupt ſtate, where it has once been eſtabliſhed, and in what manner it may be introduced, if it was not eſtabliſhed before, 74.

*Lione*, brother to count Sforza, attacked by Fortebraccio, i. 300—taken priſoner, ibid.—his army diſperſed, ibid.

*Lodi*, ſubmits to the Venetians, upon the death of the duke of Milan, i. 394.

*Lombards*, the laſt of the northern nations who invade Italy, i. 10—aſſembling at Pavia, the ſeat of their government, they chuſe Cleſi for their king, 19—weary of a monarchical government, in conſequence of his rigour and cruelty, they determine, on his death, to have no more kings, 20—appoint thirty dukes to rule over them, ib.—by this change in their conſtitution they render themſelves unable to ſubdue Italy entirely, ibid.—unable to extend their conqueſts farther than Benevento, ibid.—they come to an accommodation with the Romans and Longinus, ibid.—gathering freſh ſtrength, they commence hoſtilities againſt the pope and the Romans, 27.

*Longinus*, ſent into Italy by the emperor Juſtinian to ſuperſede

ſede Narſetes, i. 16—keeps his reſidence at Ravenna, but introduces a new form of government into Italy, 17—not only facilitates, but haſtens its ruin by his new introductions, ibid.—receives Almachild and Roſamond, after the murder of Alboin, with much honour at Ravenna, 19—availing himſelf of the inability of Tiberius to ſend any relief into Italy, he thinks he has a fair opportunity to make himſelf king of the Lombards, and of all Italy, by the help of Roſamond and her treaſure, ibid.—communicates his deſign to her, ibid.—perſuades her to diſpatch Almachild, and to take him afterwards for her huſband, ibid.—finds his propoſal accepted by her, ibid.—loſes all the hopes he had conceived by the deaths of Almachild and Roſamond, ibid.—comes to an accommodation with the Lombards, 20.

*Lorenzo, Niccolo di,* chancellor of the Capitol at Rome, turns the ſenators out of the city, i. 62—aſſuming the title of tribune, he makes himſelf head of that commonwealth, ibid.—reduces it to its ancient form of government, with much reputation and appearance of juſtice, ibid.—is ſoon obliged, notwithſtanding the reputation he had acquired, to reſign his new office, ibid.—finding himſelf unequal to the weight he had undertaken, he privately retires, and ſhelters himſelf under the wings of Charles king of Bohemia, ibid.—is ſent by him priſoner to Rome, ibid.—is ſet at liberty by the pope, and reinſtated in his former office, 63—reſumes the government of the city, and cauſes a perſon who had poſſeſſed himſelf of the tribuneſhip to be put to death, ibid.—undergoes the ſame fate himſelf, ibid.

*Lucca,* city of, ſaved from the diſorder occaſioned among the Florentine troops by the project of a celebrated painter to lay it under water, i. 268—the tyrant there depoſed, 270—the ſpeech of a citizen there to animate the inhabitants to defend themſelves againſt the Florentines, 314.

*Luctatius, Quintus,* his ſtratagem to paſs a river without being obliged to fight the enemy in his rear, iv. 166.

*Lucullus,* prevents a body of Macedonian horſe from deſerting him by a judicious manœuvre, iv. 203.

*Lucumo,* having debauched the ſiſter of Aruns at Cluſium, the latter encourages the Gauls to beſiege that city, iii. 34.

M.

*Machiavel, Nicholas,* his letter to Zanobius Buondelmontius in vindication of his own writings, iv. 335—361.

*Machiavelli, Girolamo*, ſent into exile, ii. 8—not obſerving the bounds that were preſcribed to him, he is declared a rebel, ibid.—travelling through Italy to excite other ſtates to make war upon his own country, he is betrayed, apprehended, ſent to Florence, impriſoned, and put to death, ibid.

*Maffeo Viſconti*, firſt duke of Milan, i. 56.

*Malateſta, Giſmondo*, having married the daughter of count Sforza, he expects to obtain the government of Piſa from him, i. 317—reſents his giving it to his own brother, ibid.—is ſtill more exaſperated, ibid.—goes over to the duke of Milan, ibid.—earneſtly ſolicits the pope and the king of Naples to make war upon his father in-law, ib.—receives powerful ſuccours, ibid.—appointed one of the Florentine generals, 395.

*Malavolti, Frederigo*, his generous behaviour to Coſimo de Medici while he was his priſoner, i. 281.

*Manfred*, king of Sicily, deprived of his kingdom and life, by Charles duke of Anjou, i. 91.

*Manlius Capitolinus*, unable to bear the extraordinary honours conferred upon Furius Camillus, and perceiving he can make no impreſſion upon the ſenate, applies to the people, iii. 34—ſpreads various aſperſions and inſinuations among them to the prejudice of Camillus, ibid.—particularly concerning the diſtribution of the ranſom-money collected for the Gauls, 35—ſtirs up the people to raiſe tumults in the city, ibid.—gives great offence to the ſenators by his ſeditious proceedings, ibid.—is cited to appear before a dictator, ibid.—is deſired to declare in whoſe hands the ranſom-money is lodged, ibid.—returns an evaſive anſwer, ibid.—is ſent directly to priſon, ibid.

*Mantua*, marquis of, joined by Niccolo Piccinino at Peſchiera, i. 338—advances with him to the walls of Verona, in the dead of night, ibid.—makes a ſudden ſcalade upon the new citadel, ibid.—carries it before the enemy knows any thing of the matter, ibid.—deſcends from thence with his men into the town, ibid.—breaks open St. Anthony's gate, and lets in all his cavalry through it, ibid.—intreated by ſome of the principal inhabitants to receive the city into his hands, rather than ſuffer it to be rifled and ſacked, 341—receives them favourably, ibid.—endeavours to reſtrain the licentiouſneſs of his ſoldiers as much as poſſible, and to prevent the city from being plundered, ibid.—takes every method, at the ſame time, to get the reſt of the ſtrong places into his hands, ibid.—ſeparates thoſe which he cannot make himſelf maſter of from the town, ibid.—ſurrounds them with foſſes and other works, to hinder the enemy from throwing ſuccours into them, and thoſe already there from annoying the towns, ibid.

*Maradi, Maffeo da*, prevents an engagement between the factions in Florence by his mediation, i. 134.

*Marcellus*, converts Lucius Bancius of Nola, diſpoſed to favour Hannibal, into a friend by his generous behaviour to him, iv. 224.

*Marcius, Lucius*, taking advantage of the remiſſneſs of the Carthaginians, after having ſlain the two Scipios in battle, attacks them, and routs them, iv. 138.

*Marius*, a Roman citizen, ſubdues the Cimbri, i. 4.

*Marius*, his mode of trying the fidelity of the Gauls in the war againſt the Cimbrians, iv. 196.

*Marignuoli, Guerriante*, one of the ſigniors, at Florence, more frightened than the reſt, by the intrepid proceedings of an enraged multitude, runs down ſtairs under a pretence of ſhutting the gates, and ſneaks away to his own houſe, i. 195—is diſcovered by the mob, but is not perſonally inſulted by them, 196.

*Marradi*, a fort ſituated at the foot of thoſe mountains which ſeparate Tuſcany from Romagna, but on that ſide of them which lies next to the latter, and at the entrance of the vale of Lamona, ibid.—its advantageous ſituation deſcribed, ibid.

*Martinella*, a bell ſo called by the Florentines, tolled for a month together, in time of war, before they took the field, i. 81.

*Martinengho*, a caſtle ſo ſituated that whoever is maſter of it may eaſily throw ſuccours into Bergamo, i. 373—count Sforza, apprehenſive of the latter's falling into the enemy's hand, ſits down before the former, ibid.

*Martino*, one of the chancellors at Florence, turned out of his office, i. 245.

*Matteo, Giovanni*, a farmer to whom Belphegor flies for protection, from his creditors, and by whom he is afterwards outwitted, iv. 249.

*Matthias*, king of Hungary, promiſes to aſſiſt pope Pius in perſon againſt the Turks, ii. 22.—is appointed one of the generals, ibid.

*Maximus*, a citizen of Rome, ſeizes upon it, after the death

death of Valentinian, i. 9—forces his widow to marry him, ibid.

*Medici, Sylveſtro de*, his ſpeech, i. 179.

*Medici, Veri de*, his ſpeech to the ſigniory of Florence, i. 228.

*Medici, Giovanni de*, publicly expreſſes his diſapprobation of the cataſto, i. 249—allays the diſcontents occaſioned by it, in ſome meaſure, by an addreſs to the people, 251—falls ſick, 253—calls his two ſons to his bed-ſide, and takes leave of them with a manly and affecting ſpeech, ibid.—dies ſoon afterwards, ibid.—his character, 254.

*Medici, Coſimo de*, his character, i. 273—impriſoned by Rinaldo degli Albizi, 281—meets with very generous treatment from Frederigo Malavolti, under whoſe care he is placed, ibid.—is baniſhed to Padua, 282—recalled, 290—is more jealous of the reputation of Neri Cappone, than of that of any other perſon, 378—privately applied to by count Sforza on his being deſerted by the Venetians, 412—gives him large ſums out of his own purſe, and encourages him to purſue the projected enterprize, ibid.—uſes all his endeavours, at the ſame time, that ſuccours may be ſent him by the public, ibid.—juſtifies the ſending aſſiſtance to count Sforza, 413—returns the anſwer of the ſigniory to the remonſtrances made by the Neapolitan and Venetian ambaſſadors, 418—his friends grow more jealous of him, and endeavour to leſſen his power, ii. 5—he ſuffers them to proceed to an imborſation, 6—makes them ſenſible of their impolitic behaviour, ibid.—renews the cataſto, ibid.—is waited upon by the grandees, ibid.—their ſolicitations from him, 7—grows too old to attend to public affairs, with his uſual aſſiduity, 8—ſickens and dies, 10—his character, 10—17.

*Medici, Pietro de*, ſon of Coſimo, attaches himſelf to Diotiſalvi Neroni, ii. 23—ſends for him, and acquaints him with his father's dying directions on his account, 24—ſolicits his aſſiſtance with regard to the management of his own private concerns, and the government of the city, ibid.—puts all his father's writings and accompts into his hands, ibid.—is duped by the counſel of Diotiſalvi, 25—is loaded with all ſorts of reproaches and ignominious names for his avarice and ingratitude, ibid.—is defeated by Diotiſalvi, ibid.—the clamour raiſed againſt him increaſed by the failure of ſeveral merchants, ii. 26—is unable to reſiſt

ſiſt the torrent of faction, 29—receives a correct liſt of thoſe who had ſubſcribed to the proceedings againſt him, 31—is aſtoniſhed at the number and quality of his enemies, ibid.—reſolves to engage ſuch as have ſtill, in his opinion, favoured his family, to ſign an inſtrument to ſupport him, ibid.—finds that the very perſons who had ſigned a combination againſt him, now do the ſame in his favour, ibid.—his party ſtrengthened, 32—he receives intelligence of the machinations of his enemies, 33—reſolves to be beforehand with them by taking up arms firſt, ibid—pretends to have received a letter from the lord of Bologna, ibid.—returns to the city, attended by a great multitude of armed men, 34—receives a deputation of the citizens at his own houſe, 35—his reply to their ſpeech, 36—he addreſſes himſelf more particularly to Diotiſalvi Nerone, and his brothers, 37—prevents their being pulled to pieces, ibid.—reſolves not to attempt any alterations while Bernardo Lotti remains in the office of gonfalonier of juſtice, ibid.—receives a letter from Agnolo Acciaivoli, 39—his anſwer to it, 40—defeats his enemies, ibid.—celebrates the nuptials of his ſon Lorenzo with the utmoſt ſplendor and magnificence, 46—makes a ſpeech full of exhortation and threats to his aſſociates in the government, 48—ſends privately to deſire Agnolo Acciaivoli to come to him at Cafaggiolo, 49—has a long conference with him on the ſtate of the commonwealth, ibid.—is prevented by death from the execution of his patriotic deſign, ibid.

*Medici*, *Lorenzo de'*, ſon of the foregoing, carries away, with eaſe, the prize from all his competitors at a tournament at Florence, ii. 28—his nuptials are celebrated with the utmoſt ſplendor and magnificence, 46—is ſent for, with his brother Giulano, by Thomaſo Soderini to be preſent at the meeting of the heads of the chief families in Florence at the convent of St. Anthony, 50—his addreſs to his countrymen, in conſequence of Soderini's ſpeech in favour of himſelf, and of his brother, 51—they are looked upon as the heads of the republic, ibid.—put themſelves under the guidance and direction of Soderini, ibid.—Lorenzo diſtinguiſhes himſelf by oppoſing the ſentiments of Soderini with regard to the Volterrans, 63—acquires much reputation from the ſucceſsful proceedings againſt them, 65—eſcapes out of the hands of thoſe who had aſſaſſinated his brother, 92—his ſpeech to the citizens of Florence, 99—is fixed upon to go to Naples in in order to conclude a peace with king Ferdinand, 117—is received at Naples with much honour, 119—makes a peace with the king, and returns to Florence with an increaſe of reputation, 120—being afflicted not only with the gout, but with pains in his ſtomach, he is obliged to go to the baths for the recovery of his health, 148—his death and character, 157—164.

*Medici*, *Giulano de*, brother of the foregoing, aſſaſſinated, ii. 92.

*Melano*, *Biagio de*, his remarkable courage and fidelity, i. 246.

*Memnon*, the Rhodian, gets one of his own men to paſs over to the enemy as a deſerter, and by that ſtratagem gains a complete victory over them, iv. 203.

*Mercato*, *Gaſpar da Vico*, a Milaneſe plebeian, choſen by his diſtreſſed fellow-citizens to be their leader, i. 415—makes ſo furious an aſſault with them upon the place where the magiſtrates are ſitting, that all thoſe who cannot make their eſcape by flight, are killed on the ſpot, ibid.—having made themſelves maſters of the city, they begin to conſult what are the moſt proper means to be taken, in order to deliver them out of their preſent miſery, and to reſtore their former tranquillity, ibid.—it is unanimouſly agreed amongſt them to put themſelves under the protection of ſome prince able to defend them, ibid.—they cannot agree about the perſon, 426—Mercato ventures to propoſe count Sforza, ibid.—excuſes the count's conduct, and throws the blame upon the Venetians and other ſtates in Italy, ibid.—his harangue is liſtened to with wonderful attention by the populace, ibid.—he is diſpatched by them to invite the count to the city, ibid.

*Mercenaries*, reflections on the employment of them, ii. 291.

*Metellus*, tampers with the ambaſſadors ſent to him by Jugurtha, iv. 198.

*Milaneſe*, reduced to ſuch extremity of wretchedneſs that many of the poor people in the city drop down dead in the ſtreets every day for want of bread, i. 415.

*Militia*, the inconveniences of a ſettled one pointed out, iv. 34—the conveniences of one enumerated, 45.

*Mines*, military ones conſidered, iv. 226.

*Minucius*, *Lucius*, the Roman conſul, being ſhut up, the Numidians in the mountains of Liguria, procure a ſafe removal from his confinement by his addreſs, iv. 168.

*Mirandola*, taken by pope Julius, without any difficulty, by the freezing of the ditches around it, iv. 211.

*Mithridates*, a ſpirited ſpeech of his in the field of battle, iv. 136.

*Money*, not the ſinews of war, as it is commonly thought to be, iii. 247.

*Monte Pulciano*, a packet from the cardinal of Florence to Niccolo Piccinino, ſent to him, without the knowledge of the pope, intercepted there, i. 345.

*Monteſecco, Giovanni Battiſta da*, commander in chief of the pope's forces, eſteemed a ſoldier of great experience and abilities, applied to by count Girolamo and the archbiſhop of Piſa, ii. 86—raiſes many doubts and objections, ibid.—is not ſatisfied with the attempts made to remove them, ibid.

*Montone Carlo de*, is employed as a commander of the Venetians as ſoon as he is able to bear arms, out of gratitude to the memory of his father, and the hopes they had conceived of the young man himſelf, ii. 68—at the expiration of the term of his commiſſion, he chuſes not to engage again in the ſervice of that republic, ibid.—is in hopes of recovering his paternal eſtate, in the country of Perugia, ibid.—marches with ſome forces into Tuſcany, ibid.—invades the Sianeſe, ibid.—over-runs all their territory, ibid.—receives a letter from the Florentines, 69—makes ſtrong remonſtrances againſt them, ibid.—leaves Tuſcany, and returns to the ſervice of the Venetians, ibid.

*Morozzi, Matteo de*, to gain the favour of the duke of Athens, or to exculpate himſelf, diſcovers a plot againſt him, i. 145.

*Moſes*, finds cities ready built in the country of which he gets poſſeſſion, iii. 3.

*Muſic*, military, the utility of it, iv. 88.

*Muſkets*, the ſophi of Perſia and the ſultan of Syria routed in an engagement with the grand ſignior merely by the uſe of them, iv. 135.

N.

*Naples*, kingdom of, its firſt foundation, i. 33.

*Nardi, Bernardo*, unable to bear the poverty and hardſhip of exile, reſolves to take ſome method to kindle a new war, ii. 52—flatters himſelf that he ſhall raiſe a flame too fierce for the Florentines to extinguiſh, ibid.—communicates his deſign to Diotiſalvi Neroni, ibid.—is elated with his advice and his aſſurances, ibid.—introduces himſelf privately into the town of Prato, and opens the affair to ſome of his acquaintance, ibid.—finds many of the citizens and the Polandri alſo ready to join him, 53—ſends to inform Diotiſalvi of the time when they propoſe to execute their deſign, and of the manner of execution, ibid.—comes to one of the gates of the town a little before day-light one morning, with the Palandri, and about an hundred armed men, ibid.—is admitted, in conſequence of the addreſs of his friends, into the town with his troops, ibid.—makes himſelf maſter of the palace, and puts the governor, with all his family, under a guard, ibid.—being informed that the magiſtracy are in conſultation, he goes directly to them, and acquaints them with the motives of his undertaking, 54—makes no impreſſion upon them by his aſſurances and inſtigations, ibid.—is exhorted by them to ſet their governor at liberty, and to order his accomplices out of the town as ſoon as he can, ibid.—not diſcouraged at this repulſe, he reſolves to uſe force, ibid.—determines to put Petrucci to death, ibid.—cauſes him to be dragged from his priſon, and orders him to be hanged out of one of the windows of the palace, to ſtrike horror, ibid.—is addreſſed by Petrucci while he is buſied in giving directions for his execution, ibid.—thinks proper to follow his advice, ibid.—brings him into a balcony looking into the ſtreet, ibid.—makes him harangue the people, ibid.—ſends him back to priſon, ib.—is attacked by Ginori, while he is running about the ſtreet, intreating ſome, and threatening others, ibid.—is wounded and taken, 56—is conducted to Florence, ibid.—his ſpirited reply to the magiſtrates, ibid.

*Narſetes*, ſent into Italy at the head of an army by Juſtinian, i. 16—defeats Totila on his arrival, and kills him, ibid.—takes Rome again after his defeat of Totila, ibid.—marches againſt Teia, ibid.—engages him, routs him, and kills him near Nocera, ibid.—recalled from Italy by Juſtinus, ibid.—ſuperſeded by Longinus, ibid.—is extremely diſguſted at the emperor for depriving him of the government of Italy, 17—outrageouſly provoked at ſome of the empreſs Sophia's contemptuous expreſſions, he invites Alboin, who then reigned over the Lombards in Pannonia, to come and invade Italy, ibid.

*Negotiation*, thoughts on the different ſorts of it, ii. 430.

*Nephews*, of popes, to be conſidered as their ſons from the pontificate of Nicholas III. i. 48.

*Neroni*, *Diotiſalvi*, is ſent for by Pietro de Medici, who acquaints him with his father's directions on his death-bed relating to him, and puts all his papers into his hands, ii. 24—promiſes to ſerve him faithfully, and, to the utmoſt of his power, upon all occaſions, ibid.—finds Coſimo's affairs, upon the examination of his books, in great confuſion, ibid.—deceives Pietro with falſe repreſentations, 25—turns his back upon him, and enters into a combination to deprive him of all power and authority in the ſtate, ibid.—hopes, by getting rid of him, to have the chief power devolve upon himſelf, ibid.—viſits him often, and behaves with the greateſt duplicity, 33—his machinations diſcovered, 34—his activity upon the occaſion, ibid.—he flies to Venice, 38—uſes all poſſible means to embroil his country with the Venetian ſtate, 40—goes to Ferrara, 45—is received by Borſo, the marquis of that ſtate, ibid.

*Nero*, *Claudius*, ſurrounds Aſdrubal in Spain, iv. 197—is out-generalled by him, ibid.

*New States*, one perſon only ſhould be concerned in the founding of one, or in making a thorough reform in an old one, iii. 39.

*Nicholas* II. deprives the Romans of their right of appointing the popes when elected, and reduces the election to the ſuffrages of cardinals only, i. 31.

*Nicholas* III. of the family of Urſini, the firſt pope who openly avowed his ambition, and ſhewed that under a pretence of advancing the intereſts of the church, he only deſigned to aggrandize his own family, i. 48.

*Nocera*, near that place Teia, king of the Goths, is defeated and killed by Narſetes, i. 16.

*Novello*, *Guido*, lord of Caſentino, appointed deputy for the king of Naples at Florence, by Giordano, i. 89—reſolves to try to recover the affections of the people, whom he had exaſperated by his oppreſſive manner of proceeding, 91—thinking himſelf obliged to make ſome proviſion for his ſoldiers, he lays a new tax upon the citizens upon that purpoſe, 92—meets with ſo much oppoſition that he dares not uſe any compulſive means to collect it, ibid.—is worſted in an engagement with the people, whom he had provoked to take arms, 93—daunted at his repulſe, and apprehenſive of being murdered in the night, he determines to ſave himſelf by flight, ibid.—

retires in haſte to Prato, ibid.—is ſenſible of his error, on the recovery of his ſpirits, ibid.—deſirous of retrieving his reputation, he marches back early in the morning to Florence, ibid.—is diſappointed in his deſign, ibid.—is forced to draw off again once more with infinite diſgrace and chagrin, ibid.

O.

*Oddo*, count, entering the vale with of Lamona with Niccolo Piccinino, is ſlain there, i. 247.

*Odoacer*, choſen by the Eruli and the Turingi to command them, i. 10—enters Italy at the head of them, ibid.—defeats and kills Oreſtes in a battle near Pavia, ibid.—changes, after his victory, the title both of the governors and the government, ibid.—aboliſhes the name of emperor and empire, ibid.—cauſes himſelf to be ſtyled king of Rome, ibid.—is the firſt chieftain of thoſe nations which over-run the world, who reſolves to fix in Italy, ibid.

*Oligati, Girolamo*, enters into a conſpiracy againſt Galeazzo, duke of Milan, ii. 70—is inſtrumental to his death in the church of St. Stephen's, 76—gets out of the church, diſengages himſelf from the crowd, and runs directly, not knowing whither elſe to fly, to his own houſe, 77—is refuſed admittance by his father and brothers, ibid.—is recommended by his mother, moved with compaſſion at his diſtreſs, to the care of a prieſt, ibid.—is taken home with him in another dreſs, ibid.—ſtays at his lodgings two days in hopes that ſome change may happen in his favour, ibid.—finding himſelf diſappointed in that expectation, he begins to be afraid of being taken if he continues there any longer, ibid.—endeavours to make his eſcape in diſguiſe, ibid.—being diſcovered and apprehended, he is brought before the magiſtrates, ibid.—gives a full and circumſtantial detail of the conſpiracy, ibid.—is beheaded, ibid.

*Omens*, in what manner the ancients interprered bad ones, and other ſiniſter events, iv. 200.

*Oratory*, the ſtudy of it proper for a general, iv. 145—the neceſſity of his haranguing his men ſometimes in order to mould them to his particular purpoſe, ibid.

*Ordinamenti, li*, laws at Florence ſo called, i. 99.

*Orlandini, Bartolomeo*, has the charge of a fort at Marradi, i. 351—ſhamefully abandons it, ibid.—cruelly aſſaſſi-

nates

nates Baldaccio d'Anghiari, an able and experienced commander in the ſervice of the Florentines, 380.

*Oſporco*, a Roman, ſucceeding to the papacy, is aſhamed of his ugly name, and aſſumes that of Sergius, i. 27.

*Oſtrogoths*, eſtabliſh themſelves in Pannonia, i. 8—poſſeſs themſelves of Moenia and Pannonia, now called Bornia and Servia, ibid.

*Otho*, duke of Saxony, ſolicited by pope Agapetus to deliver his country from the tyranny of the Berengarii, i. 29—marches into Italy, ibid.—drives the Berengarii out of a kingdom which they had long poſſeſſed, ibid.—re-eſtabliſhes the pope in his former dignity, ibid.

*Otranto*, aſſaulted, taken, and plundered by the Turks, ii. 122—all the inhabitants put to the ſword, 123.

P.

*Paccius, Ovius*, a Roman prieſt, his advice, iii. 65.

*Paduans*, twelve thouſand of them cruelly put to death by the order of Ezelino, commander of the Ghibelines, i. 46.

*Pannonia*, a province on this ſide the Danube, ſeized by the Huns, and called by them Hungary, i. 7.

*Papirius*, orders the pullarii to take an omen, iv. 62—animated by the favourable, though falſe information of the chief of them, he draws up his troops in order of battle, ibid.—his reply to his nephew, on being told by him that the poultry would not eat, 63—orders his officers to place the pullarii in the front of the battle, ibid.—marches directly againſt the enemy, ibid.—his anſwer on hearing that the chief of the pullarii is killed, ibid.—he engages the enemy, and beats them, ibid.—is honoured and rewarded, ibid.

*Paſſes*, the defence of them often prejudicial, iii. 88.

*Pavia*, Deſiderius, duke of Tuſcany, ſhut up there with his ſon by Charlemagne, i. 25.

*Pazzi, Franciſco*, reſiding at Rome, determines to hazard the loſs of what he already poſſeſſes, in order to obtain what he ſtill wants, ii. 85—complains to count Girolamo, the pope's natural ſon, of the proceedings of the Medici, ibid.—goes to Florence, ibid.—finds Giacopo Pazzi more cool and reſerved than he expected, ibid.—informs his friends at Rome of his diſappointment, ibid.—animoſities between the Pazzi and the Medici, ibid.—the former meditate revenge againſt the latter, ibid.—an account of the principal perſons concerned in the conſpi-

conſpiracy, 85—89—Rinaldo de Pazzi diſſuades them from it, 89—the manner in which it was executed, 90, 91—many of the principal conſpirators apprehended and put to death, 94—the whole family of the Pazzi diſperſed, 98.

*People*, the, ſeldom erroneous in particulars, though they may ſometimes be miſtaken in general points, iii. 153—deluded by a falſe appearance of advantage, they often ſeek their own deſtruction, and are eaſily moved by magnificent hopes and promiſes, 168—an enraged multitude frequently appeaſed by the appearance of a grave man in authority, 173—the government of a ſtate where the people are not corrupted, 174—the people united, ſtrong and formidable; ſeparated, weak, and contemptible, 184—better and more conſtant in general than the prince, 185—the manners and diſpoſitions of the people to be particularly conſidered by him who is ambitious of changing the form of a government, 380.

*Pepin*, ſon of Charlemagne, made ſovereign of France, in conſideration of his father's bravery, and his own merit, i. 24—applied to by pope Gregory III. to ſuccour him againſt the Lombards, ibid.—not only readily promiſes to aſſiſt him, but ſends to invite him into France, ibid.—receives him with great honour, ibid.—ſends him back with an army into Italy, ibid.—is again applied to by Gregory, ibid.—ſends another army into Italy, ibid.—enlarges the territories of the pope, 25—dies, ibid.

*Pergola, Agnolo della*, ſent by Philip Viſconti, duke of Milan, with a formidable force to Imola, i. 236—takes the town by ſurprize, ibid.—ſits down before Zagonara, 237—puts the Florentines to rout, ibid.—takes all the towns in Romagna, in the poſſeſſion of the Florentines, two excepted, 246—is adviſed by Zanobi del Pino, governor of Galeato, to leave the mountains and fortreſſes of Romagna, and to deſcend to the plains of Tuſcany, 247—deteſting his baſeneſs and cowardice, he delivers him up to his own men, ibid.

*Peruzzi, Philip*, preſident of the chancery of reformation, depoſed, and a more obſequious perſon choſen in his room, i. 381.

*Petrarch*, the celebrated poet, ſome lines out of one of his ſonnets, i. 425.

*Petrucci, Ceſare*, governor of Prato, for the republic of Florence, ii. 53—deceived by a meſſage from one of the conſpirators againſt the town, he ſends a ſervant with the

the keys of it, ibid.—is ſeized and put under a guard, ibid.—is dragged out of the place where he was confined, and ordered to be hanged out one of the windows of the palace, 55—his ſpeech to Bernardo Nardi, ibid.

*Phalanx*, an account of the Macedonian one, iv. 99.

*Philip Viſconti*, the ſecond ſon of Giovanni Galeazzo, becoming ſole lord of Lombardy, by the death of his brother, ſets his heart upon recovering the ſtate of Genoa, which then lived free under the government of their doge Tomaſo da Campo Fregoſo, i. 232—diffident of ſucceſs, he endeavours to engage the Florentines to enter into an alliance with him, ibid.—ſends ambaſſadors to propoſe it to the citizens of Florence, ibid.—concludes an agreement with them, 233—infringes the articles of the convention, ibid.—ſends ambaſſadors to Florence to juſtify his conduct, and to feel the pulſe of the citizens, ibid.—endeavours to lull them into ſecurity, 234—raiſes diſcord and diviſions in the city, by his embaſſy, ibid.—gives the governors of the ſtate great uneaſineſs by his military proceedings, 235—particularly by his manner of acting at Furli, ibid.—ſeeing the Florentines earneſtly bent upon the recovery of a town which he had reſolved to maintain, he throws off the maſk, 236—ſends Agnolo della Pergola with a conſiderable force to Imola, to keep the lord of that place fully employed, ibid.—reduces Alberigo to great diſtreſs, 237—concludes a peace with the Florentines by the mediation of the pope, 251—breaks the condition of it, ibid.—is utterly defeated by them at Maclovio, ibid.—ſigns a peace with them, 252—ſolicited by Giungi, lord of Lucca, for relief, 269—is unwilling to ſend him any ſuccours, ibid.—lays aſide all reſerve, and orders his general, Franciſco Sforza, to demand a paſſage for his troops through the territories of Lucca, ibid.—makes a peace with the league, 297—promiſes his natural daughter in marriage to count Sforza, 298—is applied to by Battiſta Canneto for his aſſiſtance againſt the pope, 297—gives the pope and his confederates time to recover their ſpirits, ibid.—orders Piccinino to force his way through Tuſcany, 300—is requeſted by the Neapolitans to aſſiſt them againſt Alphonſo, king of Arragon, 303—recommends them to the protection of the Genoeſe, ibid.—receives from the Genoeſe, Alphonſo, as their priſoner, 304—his interview with him, ibid.—ſets him at at liberty, 305—loſes his power over the city of Genoa, by the repentance of Francis Spinola, who had betrayed it to him, 306—ſends inſtructions to him to make an incurſion towards the ſea-coaſt near Leghorn, and to harraſs the confines of Piſa as much as poſſible, 311—will liſten to no agreement with the league without the reſtoration of Genoa, ibid.—breaks his engagement with the Venetians, 313—is forced to recal Piccinino out of Tuſcany, ibid.—in conſequence of applications to him from the diſtreſſed Luccheſe, he reſolves either to ſend a conſiderable army to Tuſcany, or to make a vigorous war upon the Venetians, 318—on being informed of Sforza's refuſal to paſs the Po out of reſpect to him, he begins to entertain ſome hopes of being able to preſerve his mediation, 320—deſires him to uſe his endeavours to make a peace between the Luccheſe and the Florentines, and to get him included in it, if poſſible, ibid.—buoys him up with the hopes of his daughter in marriage, 321—enters into a treaty with count Sforza, 322—reſolves to take Romagna from the pope, 326—takes great pains to clear himſelf to the pope, to the Florentines, and to count Sforza, 328—continues to flatter the count, in a farcical manner, with regard to the promiſed marriage, 329—to keep him quiet, and to prevent all ſuſpicion, he ſends him the ſum of twenty thouſand florins, his daughter's dower by the marriage-articles, ibid.—is encouraged by Piccinino to invade Tuſcany, 343—determines upon that invaſion, ibid.—propoſes a peace to count Sforza, 371—the count's anſwer to him, ibid.—receives an inſolent meſſage from Piccinino, 374—is very much exaſperated by his behaviour, ibid.—gives his natural daughter in marriage to count Sforza, 375—a peace concluded in conſequence of it, ibid.

*Philip*, king of Macedon, his ſevere orders to prevent the deſertion of his troops, in an engagement with the Scythians, productive of victory over them, iv. 136.

*Phormio*, the Athenian, takes the city of Calcedon, by pretending to raiſe the ſiege, iv. 223.

*Piccinino, Niccolo*, enters the vale of Lamona with count Oddo, to try if he can prevail upon the lord of Faenza to join the Florentines, i. 247—is taken priſoner, and ſent to Faenza, ibid.—negociates ſo effectually with the lord of Faenza and his mother, that they conſent to enter into an alliance with the republic of Florence, 248—is is ſet at liberty, ibid.—does not think fit to purſue the meaſures which he recommended to others, ibid.—ſuddenly leaves Arezzo, when he has received his arrears from the Florentines, and goes to duke Philip in Lombardy, ibid.—is taken into his ſervice, ibid.—is ſent by him to the ſuccour of the Luccheſe, 271—gives the Florentines a conſiderable overthrow, ibid.—becomes one of the chiefs of a party againſt the church, 298—defeats the Venetians and Florentines in an engagement not far from Imola, 299—ordered by Philip to force his way through Romagna into Tuſcany, 300—ordered by him to advance towards Genoa, 311—drives ſome of the Genoeſe up into the mountains, ibid.—takes the vale of Ponzeveri from them, ibid.—forces them into that town, ibid.—is obliged to draw off again with his forces, ibid.—makes an aſſault upon Serazana, and takes it, ibid.—to alarm the Florentines ſtill more, he proceeds towards Lucca, ibid.—by his arrival at Lucca he makes the Florentines apprehenſive of new diſturbances from that quarter, 312—ſends to demand a paſſage through that country into the kingdom of Naples, ibid.—on being refuſed, he threatens to force one, ibid.—failing in his attack upon the town of Piſano, he lays waſte all the adjacent country, ibid.—takes St. Giovanni alla Vena, ibid.—plunders it, and burns it to the ground, ibid.—the ſucceſs of this enterprize determines him to attempt ſomething farther, ibid.—attacks two places and takes them both, ibid.—ſets down, with all his forces, before Barga, ibid.—is routed almoſt under the walls of that town, and forced to raiſe the ſiege, 313—is recalled out of Tuſcany by Philip, ibid.—pretending to be highly diſguſted at the alliance into which Philip had entered with his profeſſed enemy, count Sforza, he retires with his forces to Camurata, 327—fortifies himſelf as if he intended to ſtay there, till he could be employed by ſome other ſtate, ibid.—deludes the pope by his plauſible repreſentations, ibid.—receives five thouſand ducats from him, and the promiſe of a large proviſion for himſelf and his children, ibid.—reſolves to make an attempt upon Ravenna, ibid.—brings it to ſurrender after a very ſhort ſiege, 328—ſeizes upon ſeveral other places, ibid.—adds inſolence to perfidy, ibid.—leaves the defence of Romagna to his ſon Franciſco, and marches, himſelf, with the greateſt part of his forces into Lombardy, ibid.—joins the duke's army, ibid.—

falling into the territories of Breſcia, he ſoon reduces all that part of the country, and then ſits down before the city itſelf, ibid.—to prevent count Sforza's attempt for the relief of Verona, he moves with his army to Soave, 236—entrenches himſelf, ibid.—raiſes ſome forts to cut off the count's paſſage over the mountains, but they are not ſufficient to ſtop it, 336—finding that the count had actually paſſed the mountains, he retires beyond the river Adige, ibid.—defeats and takes moſt of the Venetian gallies upon the lake di Garda, 337—one part of his army is routed by Sforza, 338—he himſelf eſcapes in a ſtrange manner to the other, ibid.—ſurpriſes Verona, 340—encourages Philip to invade Tuſcany, 343—gets into Romagna, 348—tampers ſo effectually with the ſons of Pandolpho Malateſta, that they deſert the Venetians, and go over to the duke, ib.—alarms Sforza by his military progreſs, ibid.—having made all neceſſary diſpoſitions in Romagna, he intends to proceed on his march to Tuſcany over the mountains of St. Benedetto, and through the vale of Montone, 351—finds thoſe defiles ſufficiently guarded to fruſtrate his deſigns, ibid.—hopeleſs of ſucceeding at the paſs of St. Benedetto, he determines to try what may be done at Marradi, ibid.—is ſurpriſed to ſee ſo important a paſs meanly abandoned, ibid.—is overjoyed to get poſſeſſion of it, ibid.—immediately marches down to the vale of Mugello, ibid.—ſeizes upon ſeveral caſtles, ibid.—takes up his quarters at Peluciano, ibid.—makes incurſions into the neighbouring territories, as far as the mountains of Fieſole, ibid.—paſſes the Arno, ibid.—plunders and ravages all the country, till he comes within three miles of Florence, ibid.—is joined by count Poppi revolting from the Florentines, 353—is adviſed by him to march towards Caſentino, ibid.—follows his advice, ibid.—lays ſiege to the caſtle of St. Niccolo, ibid.—takes it after a ſiege of two-and-thirty days, 354—purſuing his ſucceſs, he takes Raſſina and Chiuſi, 355—is perſuaded by Poppi to fix his quarters in that neighbourhood, ibid.—his anſwer to him, ibid.—proceeds to the bourg of St. Sepulchro, ibid.—begins to treat at a diſtance with the people of Caſtello, to ſee if he can corrupt them, ibid.—finds them inflexible, ibid.—goes to Perugia, ibid.—is honourably received there, ibid.—is looked upon with ſuſpicious eyes by the citizens, ibid.—makes ſeveral propoſals, 356—on their being rejected, ed, he returns to his army with a preſent made to him, ibid.—forms a deſign of taking Cortona from the Florentines by a conſpiracy, ibid.—is diſappointed by the diſcovery of it, ibid.—finding himſelf obliged to leave Tuſcany, he reſolves to make his utmoſt efforts at the laſt, and to give the Florentines battle, 357—hopes to take them unprepared, ibid.—is animated by the perſuaſions of Rinaldo degli Albizi and count Poppi, ibid.—moves with his forces, 358—is defeated by the Florentines at the battle of Anghiari, 360—marches away with the remainder of his forces, 361—reduces Sforza to great diſtreſs, 374—behaves with inſolence to the duke, ibid.—is diſappointed of a certain victory by the duke of Milan, 382—dies of grief, ibid.

*Piccinino, Giacopo,* raiſes diſturbances, privately encouraged by Alphonſo, i. 434—quits the ſervice of Ferdinand, and goes over to the French, 445—alarmed at the proceedings againſt him, endeavours, by the medition of his friends, to make his peace with the duke Sforza, ii. 19—reſolves to accept of the honourable terms offered to him by the duke, ibid.—waits upon him at Milan, ibid.—receives conſiderable honours upon his entrance into that city, 20—by thoſe honours his ruin is haſtened, as the duke's jealouſy is increaſed by them, ibid.—his marriage with the duke's daughter conſummated, ibid.—he is invited by Ferninand into his ſervice, and made commander in chief of his forces, ibid.—ſets out for Naples with his lady, ibid.—is entertained there for many days, with all ſorts of feſtivities and rejoicings, ibid.—is impriſoned, and afterwards put to death, ibid.

*Piccinino, Franciſco,* ſon of the above, diſtinguiſhes himſelf by his valour at the battle of Anghiari, i. 359.

*Piccinino,* the patriarch of Aquileia, and pope's legate, beginning to grow ſuſpicious that the Florentines are unwilling to have the town of St. Sepulchro revert to the church, is ſo enraged that high words paſs between him and the commiſſaries, i. 362—a treaty is concluded at laſt to his ſatisfaction, ibid.—he determines that count Sforza's troops ſhall advance towards Perugia, in order to relieve la Marca, or Rome, to whichſoever of the two he bends his courſe, ibid.—that Bernardo de Medici ſhall go along with them, ibid.—that Neri Capponi ſhall go with the Florentine forces to reduce Caſentino, ib.

*Pieto*, cardinal of St. Sixtus, dies at Rome, not without ſuſpicion of having been poiſoned by the Venetians, ii. 65.

*Pietra*, *Santa*, beſieged by the Florentines, ii. 145—taken by them, 147.

*Pike*, the invention of it, iv. 53.

*Pino*, *Zanobi del*, governor of Galeata, ſhamefully gives up that place without making any defence, i. 247—adviſes Agnolo della Pergola to leave the mountains and fortreſſes of Romagna, and to deſcend into the plains of Tuſcany, ibid.—is delivered up by him for his baſeneſs and cowardice to his own men, ibid.—is ſhut up by them in a dungeon, with nothing but a pack of cards to eat, ibid.—dies in a few days of hunger, ibid.

*Pioneers*, the uſefulneſs of them, iv. 158.

*Piſa*, its greatneſs riſes from the depopulation of Genoa, and by the reſort of multitudes driven out of their own country, i. 29.

*Pitti*, *Luca*, a bold and reſolute man, being inveſted with the office of gonfalonier of juſtice, is very importunate with the people to appoint a balia, ii. 7—being diſappointed, he treats thoſe who are members of the council with great inſolence, ibid.—threatens them, and ſoon afterwards puts his threats in execution, ibid.—fills the palace with armed men, 8—calls the people together in the piazza, and compells them, by force of arms, to do what they even would not hear of before, ibid.—is knighted for the good ſervices done to the ſtate by him, ibid.—increaſes his popularity, ibid.—receives rich preſents, 9—builds two magnificent palaces, ibid.—has recourſe to very extraordinary means for the finiſhing of them, ibid.—receives a viſit from Diotiſalvi to encourage him, and to keep him ſteady to his friends, 34—changes his mind, and is drawn over to Pietro de Medici's ſide, ibid.—a ſtriking view of his ſituation in his adverſity, 38.

*Pius* II. pope, in the room of Calixtus, i. 441—excites the Chriſtian princes againſt the Turks, ii. 21—takes ſuch meaſures as his predeceſſors had done before, ibid.—all the princes of Europe engage to furniſh him with ſupplies, either of money or men, ibid.—he leaves Rome, and goes to Ancona, 22—is conſiderably diſappointed, ibid.—falls ſick and dies, ibid.

*Placentia*, ſubmits to the Venetians, upon the death of the duke of Milan, i. 394.

*Placidia*, ſiſter to the emperors, is married to Ataulph, king of the Viſigoths, i. 5.

*Plebeian*, the inflammatory ſpeech of a Florentine one, i. 88.

*Polenta*, *Oſtacio de*, ungratefully treated by the Venetians, i. 372.

*Pompey*, his behaviour to the Catinenſes, in conſequence of his ſuſpecting their fidelity to him, iv. 203.

*Pomponius*, *Marcus*, tribune of the people, lodges an accuſation againſt Lucius Manlius, iii. 49—is compelled by him to take an oath to withdraw the accuſation, ibid.—takes it, and ſtrictly obſerves it, ibid.

*Popes*, three of them at one time, i. 69.

*Poppi*, count *de*, refuſes to deliver up the bourg and citadel of St. Sepulchro to the pope, i. 323—finding himſelf unable to maintain them, he makes an offer of them to the Florentines, ibid.—the quarrel between him and the pope accommodated by them, 324—he revolts from the Florentines, 353—joins Piccinino, ibid.—adviſes him to march towards Caſentino, ibid.—perſuades him to fix his quarters in the neighbourhood of Raſſina and Chiuſi, 355—beſieged and taken, 363—his addreſs to the Florentine commiſſaries, ibid.—is ſtripped of his dominions for his perfidy, 364.

*Poppi*, town of, aſſaulted by Neri Cappari, 363—capitulates, ibid.

*Porcari*, *Stephen*, a Roman citizen, enters into a conſpiracy to deliver his country out of the hands of the pope and the prelates, i. 425.

*Prato*, the commotions there throw the ſtate into great confuſion, iii. 7.

*Prætorian Bands*, why raiſed by the Roman emperors, and how employed, iv. 28—become formidable to the emperors themſelves, ibid.

*Prince*, the, dedication of that work to the moſt magnificent Lorenzo de Medici, ii. 167.

*Prince*, the duty of one in relation to military affairs, ii. 311—315—of ſuch things as advance or diminiſh the reputation of a prince, 320—of royal liberality, and royal parſimony, 325—328—how far princes are obliged to obſerve their engagements, 339—343—the neceſſity of a prince's taking care not to make himſelf hated or deſpiſed, 349—363—the manner in which a prince ought to act, in order to gain reputation, 383—how it came to paſs that many of the Italian princes loſt their dominions, 406.

*Principalities*, the different kinds of them, and the means by which they are obtained, ii. 187—of hereditary principalities, 189—of mixed principalities, 194—how ſuch ſtates or principalities ought to be governed as lived under their own laws before they were reduced, 228—of new principalities that have been acquired either by the forces and aſſiſtance of others, or by good fortune, 239—of civil principality, 265—in what manner the ſtrength of all principalities is to be compared, 273—of eccleſiaſtical principalities, 281.

*Priori*, magiſtrates of Florence ſo called, i. 97.

*Promiſes*, extorted ones not binding, iii. 477.

*Proviſions*, in an army, directions concerning them, iv. 191.

*Pruſſia*, king of, his preface to his Examen, or critical eſſay upon Machiavel's Prince, ii. 178.

*Puccio*, brother, a knight of the order of St. John at Jeruſalem, [now called knights of Malta] ſent by Alphonſo, king of Naples, with a body of forces into the vale of Bagno to receive the towns and caſtles in the poſſeſſion of Girardo Gambacorza, i. 428—makes himſelf maſter of all that territory, the caſtle of Corzano excepted, ibid.

*Pulcher*, *Appius*, being deſirous to engage the Carthaginian army in Sicily, orders the pullarii to take an omen, iii. 63—on being informed that the poultry would not eat, he throws them into the ſea, ibid.—his ſaying upon the occaſion, ibid.—coming to an engagement with the enemy he loſes the day, ibid.—is ſent for to Rome and diſgraced, ibid.

*Puniſhment*, thoſe who injure either a whole people, or any particular perſon, always to be conſidered as deſerving of it, iii. 319.

*Pyrrhus*, a memorable ſaying of his, iv. 193.

Q.

*Quintius*, *Titus*, orders the plebeians under his command, in conſequence of the death of Publius Valerius, to march with him immediately againſt the Volſci, leſt they ſhould, by having time to take breath, revive their clamours for the Terentillan law, iii. 60—inſiſts upon their being obliged to follow him, 61—is oppoſed by the tribunes, ibid.—obeyed by the people, ibid.

R.

*Ravenna*, choſen by the emperor Valentinian for his reſidence inſtead of Rome, i. 8.

*Regiments*, of how many men they ſhould be compoſed, iv. 71—how they ſhould be diſciplined and exerciſed in battalions and companies, ibid.—the number of horſe neceſſary in a regiment, 94—how many carriages ought to be allowed for their baggage, ibid.

*Regnier of Anjou*, invited by the Florentines and the duke of Milan into Italy, i. 430—he comes with ſupplies, but ſoon leaves them, and returns to France, 430, 431—ſends his ſon John of Anjou to Florence, 431.

*Regulus, Marcus*, after having been victorious over the Carthaginians, is defeated by them, iv. 129—to what his defeat was owing, ibid.

*Religion*, the importance of a veneration and due regard to it, for the preſervation of a ſtate, iii. 53.

*Republics*, as well-governed ones muſt neceſſarily have virtuous men to conduct them, their conqueſts and acquiſitions will be proprotionable to their virtue, iii. 83—thoſe republics highly to be blamed which have not troops of their own, 84—well-governed ones appoint proper rewards and puniſhments, according to the merits or demerits of their citizens, and never balance one againſt the other, 90—weak ones always irreſolute, and taking wrong meaſures, 131—if they are ever reſolute, they are more ſo from neceſſity than choice, ibid.—the courſe of affairs in a republic never to be ſtopped by a ſingle magiſtrate or a council, 163—the ruin of ill governed republics, rather than their exaltation, promoted by the acquiſitions which they make, 284—a ſtrict eye upon the conduct of their ſubjects required from the governors of a republic, 438—the frequent exaction of new laws neceſſary for the preſervation of its liberty, 488.

*Reputation*, the ſame degree of it obtained by two eminent Romans, by ſeverity and gentleneſs, iii. 420.

*Revolutions*, the various ones in ſtates, brought about with and without bloodſhed, accounted for, iii. 379.

*Rhodes*, iſle of, ſucceſsfully invaded by the Turks, ii. 122.

*Rido, Antonio*, a Paduan, governor of the caſtle of St. Angelo at Rome, ordered by the pope to ſecure the cardinal of Florence, in conſequence of an intercepted pacquet from him to Piccinino, i. 345—readily undertakes to execute his orders, ibid.—ſoon meets with a convenient opportunity to give proofs of his obedience, ibid.—receives a meſſage from the cardinal, by which he is deſired to meet him in the morning at a certain hour upon the bridge, 346—goes to the bridge at the hour appointed, ibid.—leads in the cardinal, in the courſe of their converſation, to the other end of it, ibid.—makes a ſignal to have it drawn up, and conſequently makes the cardinal his priſoner in the caſtle of St. Angelo, ibid.—his conſolatory ſpeech to him, ibid.—the cardinal's anſwer to it, ibid.

*Rigour*, the queſtion whether that or clemency has a greater effect upon the multitude conſidered, iii. 414.

*Rimini*, *Roberto da*, appointed by the pope his commander in chief, ii. 129.

*Rimini*, the town of, reduced by Cleſi, king of the Lombards, i. 19.

*Robert*, king of Naples, ſends count di Andria, to be commander of the Florentines, on their applying to him for another general, i. 120.

*Roman* empire, the manner in which it is cantoned out, i. 10, 11—its deſtruction by inundations of Barbarians from the northern parts which lie beyond the Rhine and the Danube, attributed to the reſidence of the emperors at Conſtantinople, i. 3—the weſtern parts of it being far removed from their inſpection, extremely liable to be plundered by their own ſubſtitutes, and the incurſions of foreign enemies, ibid.—the final ruin of the Roman empire not accompliſhed till after many irruptions from the northern hive, ibid.

*Romanus*, emperor of Greece, after having deprived Conſtantine of that kingdom, is ſo enraged at the rebellion of the people of Puglia and Calabria, that he ſuffers the Saracens to invade thoſe provinces, i. 28.

*Rome*, the empire of it falls to Oreſtes and his ſon Auguſtulus, i. 10—conſiderations on its origin, iii. 5—on its government, 11—to what accidents it was owing that the tribunes of the people were created, and how they contributed to make the Roman commonwealth more perfect, 13—its power and freedom increaſed by the diſſenſions between the patricians and the plebeians, 14—whether ſuch a form of government could have been eſtabliſhed at Rome, as could have prevented animoſities between the ſenate and the people, 23—on the religion of the Romans, 48—how the Romans availed themſelves of religion in reforming the ſtate, 58—in proſecuting their wars, ibid.—in compoſing their tumults, ibid—their interpretation of their auſpices conſidered, 61—the ſuperiority of the Romans to the Athenians in point of gratitude to their citizens, accounted for, 97—thoughts on the behaviour of the Romans to their generals, 111—the tumults and diſorders at Rome, occaſioned by the Agrarian law, 126—the conſulſhip and all the dignities in Rome conferred without reſpect to age, 197—whether the grandeur of the Roman empire may be attributed to the virtue or good fortune of that people, 209—with what nations the Romans were engaged in their wars, and how obſtinately thoſe nations defended their liberties againſt them, 214—the policy of Rome in making itſelf ſtrong and powerful, by deſtroying the ſtates round about it, and by incorporating ſtrangers with its own citizens, 224—the conduct obſerved by the Romans in their wars, 236—the proportion of land which the Romans gave to every inhabitant of their colonies, 238—their migrations to foreign countries conſidered, 239—the firſt prætor ſent by the Romans abroad, to Capua, 292—the taking of a middle courſe always avoided by the Romans, when they had occaſion to paſs judgment upon any of their ſubjects, 297—ſeveral methods by which the Romans made themſelves maſters of towns, pointed out, 330—the Roman legions filled with new men at the end of every fifteen years, iv. 27—why the prætorian bards were raiſed by the Roman emperors, and how they were employed, 28—they become formidable to the emperors themſelves, ibid.—the claſſes formed by Servius Tullius, a ſort of trained bands, 40—new-raiſed men called by the Romans Tirones, 43—the method taken by the Roman conſuls, as ſoon as they entered upon their office, to raiſe the forces that were wanted for the ſervice of the year, ibid.—the Roman way of chuſing cavalry recommended, 51—the order of battle obſerved by the Romans, 97—the manner in which the Roman legion was divided, 98—in what manner the Romans uſed to march through an enemy's country, 149—the ſituation choſen for an encampment by the Romans pointed out, 173—of what number the Roman army generally conſiſted, 201.

*Romulus*, his behaviour, as a legiſlator, defended, iii. 41.

*Roſamond*, wife of Alboin, receives her father's ſkull filled with wine, by order of her huſband, i. 18—ſtung to the quick by a cruel ſarcaſm from him, ſhe ſecretly vows revenge, ibid.—ſhares her bed with Almachild, a young lord, by a manœuvre with one of her women, ibid.—diſcovers herſelf to him, and ſtimulates him to kill his maſter, 19—flies with him, with all Alboin's treaſure, to Longinus at Ravenna, ibid.—is received by him with much honour at Ravenna, ibid.—liſtening to the propoſals of Longinus, ſhe prepares a cup of poiſon for Almachild, ibid.—gives it him with her own hands, ibid. is forced, by him, after having taken half it, to drink the reſt, ibid.—dies, with him, a few hours afterwards, ibid.

*Rubbetius, Publius*, makes ſuch an impreſſion upon the plebeians by his ſpirited repreſentations that they run to arms, and recover the Capitol which had been ſeized by Appius Herdonius, iii. 60.

*Ruffinus*, appointed by the emperor Theodoſius to preſide over the eaſtern part of the Roman empire, i. 5—reſolves, after his death, to drop the title of governor, and to aſſume the ſovereign dominion over that province himſelf, ibid.—is ſoon ſuppreſſed, ibid.

*Ruffoli, Ubaldo*, the firſt who fills the office of gonfaloniere di giuſtizia, or ſtandard-bearer of juſtice, i. 98—he demoliſhes the houſes of the Galleti, becauſe one of that family had killed a fellow-citizen in France, ibid.

S.

*Saginetto, Philippo*, left at Florence as his lieutenant by Charles, ſon to Robert, king of Naples, and duke of Calabria, i. 128.

*Salviati, Francis*, appointed archbiſhop of Piſa by the pope upon the death of Philip de Medicis, ii. 83—being full of reſentment againſt the Medici for having made an oppoſition to his promotion, readily embarks with their enemies in their deſigns againſt them, 85—is hanged, in conſequence of his activity, as one of the conſpirators, 94.

*Samnites*, the, look upon an application to religion as the only remedy in a deſperate ſtate, iii. 64.

*San Severino, Alberto da*, an officer of great reputation, ordered by the ſigniory at Florence to march towards Prato, with what forces he can get together, and to advance as near it as he can, that he may ſend them a certain account how matters ſtand there, and afterwards proceed as occaſion requires, and he thinks moſt

proper,

proper, ii. 56—hardly is he got to Caſtello di Campi, when he meets a meſſenger from Petrucci, who informs him that Bernardo Nardi is taken, that his accomplices are either killed or diſperſed, and that every thing is quiet at Prato, ibid.—returns with his men to Florence upon this information, ibid.

*Sante*, a baſtard ſon of Hercules Bentivoglio, being made governor of Bologna, and of Annibal's children, governs with great prudence, and dies a natural death, i. 386.

*Santo Spirito*, the church of, takes fire by accident, and is burnt to the ground, ii. 60.

*Saracens*, the, permitted by Romanus, emperor of Greece, to invade the provinces of Puglia and Calabria, i. 28—having ſubdued them, they endeavour to make themſelves maſters of Rome, ibid.—being obliged to raiſe the ſiege, they build an important fortreſs, ibid.

*Scali, Giorgio*, his affecting behaviour immediately before his execution, i. 209.

*Sciarra*, the head of the Colonni family, flying from the fury of pope Boniface VIII. in diſguiſe, is taken by the Catalan corſairs, and forced to row in their gallies, like a common ſlave, i. 51—being known at Marſeilles, he is ranſomed, and ſent away to Philip, king of France, ib.—is ſent privately by him into Italy, ibid.—arrives at Anagni, ibid.—gathers his friends together in the night, ſeizes upon his holineſs's perſon, and makes him priſoner, ibid.

*Scipio*, obliges, with his drawn ſword, all thoſe Romans who are on the point of tranſporting themſelves into Sicily, after the battle of Cannæ, to take an oath never to abandon their country, iii. 49—makes himſelf maſter of New Carthage by aſſault, iv. 220—of many places in Africa ſtrongly garriſoned by the Carthaginians, by feints, 222.

*Secretaries*, reflections on thoſe employed by princes, ii. 394.

*Senſo, Bartolomeo de*, one of the principal citizens of Cortona, going to mount guard by the governor's order, at one of the gates of the town, is warned by a friend not to go thither, if he has not a mind to be ſlain, i. 356—is informed by that friend of a conſpiracy, and immedidiately communicates it to the governor, ibid.

*Seravezzans*, cruelly treated by Aſtorre Gianni, apply to the Council of Ten at Florence for redreſs, i. 263—the ſpeech

ſpeech of one of them to the council, ibid.—the conſequences of it favourable to his fellow-citizens, 266.

*Serezana*, taken by the Florentines, ii. 152.

*Serezanella*, a fortreſs belonging to the Florentines, beſieged by the Genoeſe, ii. 151—relieved, 152.

*Sertorius*, a Roman commander, kills one his own men, in a battle with the Spaniards, who brings him word that one of his generals is dead, ſuppoſing that the publication of it would ſtrike a damp in his army, iv. 136.

*Seſſa*, duke of, receives Alphonſo, king of Arragon, at Naples, i. 303.

*Sforza*, the dukedom of Milan falls to that family, i. 56.

*Sforza*, *Franciſco*, count, is promiſed by Philip, duke of Milan, his daughter in marriage, i. 298—gains great reputation from that promiſe, ibid.—poſſeſſes himſelf of la Marca d'Ancona, ibid—makes a peace with pope Eugenius, by which the territory of la Marca is ceded to him, ibid.—ſent by the duke of Milan to demand a paſſage for his troops through the territories of Lucca, 269—advances with them to Lucca, ibid.—marches to Buggiano, ibid.—takes it, ibid.—burns a neighbouring fortreſs, ibid.—is bribed by the Florentines to give up Lucca to them, and to quit the country, 270—liſtens to their offers, ibid.—agrees to draw his forces from Lucca on the payment of fifty thouſand ducats, ibid.—to excuſe his proceedings to the duke, he determines to aſſiſt the Luccheſe in the depoſition of their tyrant, ibid.—takes Giungi, the tyrant of Lucca, and his ſon, with him to the duke of Milan, ibid.—appointed by the pope and his confederates their general, in order to drive Fortebraccio out of the territories of the church, 299—beſieges him at Aſceſi, 300—receives inſtructions to oppoſe Piccinino's paſſage through Tuſcany, ibid.—raiſes the ſiege of Aſceſi, ibid.—marches with his forces to Eſena, ibid.—chagrined at the ſucceſs of Fortebraccio, ibid.—leaves part of his army to hold Piccinino at bay, ibid.—advances with the reſt againſt Fortebraccio, ibid.—brings him to an engagement, ibid.—defeats him, ib.—takes him priſoner, ibid.—joining Neri di Gino, he takes poſt at Santa Garda, 312—advancing towards Piccinino, he engages and routs his army almoſt under the walls of Barga, 313—forces him to raiſe the ſiege, ibid.—puts his army in motion again, ibid.—being deſirous of recovering what the Florentines had loſt, before he invades

invades others, he firſt retakes all the towns which Piccinino had made himſelf maſter of, ibid.—directs his march towards the territories of the Luccheſe, ibid.—lays ſiege to Camajore, ibid.—the inhabitants, terrified at his ſudden arrival, ſurrender to him, ibid.—he reduces Maſſa and Serezana with equal facility, ibid.—carries his arms into the confines of Lucca, ibid.—commits great ravages, ſparing nothing that his ſoldiers can lay their hands on, 314—is made governor of the league, 319—will not be obliged to paſs the Po, ibid.—is prevailed upon to promiſe the Florentines that he will paſs that river, ibid.—is ſent into Lombardy, ibid.—having taken Uzzano, and thrown up ſome works round Lucca to keep it ſtill blocked up, he recommends the ſuperintendance of the war to commiſſaries, ibid.—paſſes the Appenines, and advances to Reggio, 320—is ordered by the Venetians, ſuſpecting his ſincerity, to paſs the Po immediately, and to join their forces, ibid.—he refuſes to obey their orders, ib.—returns to Tuſcany, ib.—encamps in the territories of Piſa, ibid.—is again flattered with the promiſe of his daughter in marriage, 321—uſes all means to prevent the Florentines from proſecuting the war, ib.—is earneſtly ſolicited by the Florentines not to abandon his confederates, 322—his impatience to be married to the duke's daughter keeps him in a very fluctuating ſtate, ibid.—he is alarmed at the deſertion of ſome of his principal officers, ibid.—enters into a treaty with the duke, ibid.—takes pains, after this agreement, to perſuade the Florentines to come to an accommodation with the Luccheſe, ibid.—is ſolicited by the Florentines, 329—is kept in ſuſpence by the deſire he has to conclude the match with the duke's daughter, ibid.—is deſired by Philip to uſe all his endeavours to make a peace between the Luccheſe and the Florentines, and to get him inincluded in it if poſſible, 330—earneſtly perſuaded by the Florentines not to deſert the Venetians, 331—enters into a confederacy, ibid.—revives the drooping ſpirits of the Venetians on his arrival in Lombardy, 336—makes the relief of Verona the firſt object of his attention, ibid.—ſeeing his paſſage obſtructed through the plains, he reſolves to march over the mountains, and to puſh on that way, to Verona, ibid.—paſſes the mountains, and arrives in the plains beyond Soave, ibid.—enters Verona without any oppoſition, ibid.—attempts to relieve Breſcia alſo, 337—ſits

down

down before Bandolino, ibid.—obliged to raiſe the ſiege, and to retire to Zeno, a fortreſs belonging to the Veroneſe, 337—defeats a part of Piccinino's army, 338—recovers Verona ſurpriſed by him, 339—his anſwer to the Venetians on their importuning him to attempt the relief of Breſcia with his forces, 343—gives them no ſatisfaction by it, 344—his difference with the Venetians about the relief of Breſcia adjuſted, 348—he is alarmed at the arrival of Piccinino in Romagna, and at the deſertion of the ſons of Pandolpho Malateſta, ibid.—is afraid of loſing his poſſeſſions in la Morca, ibid.—takes poſt and goes to Venice, 349—demands an audience of the ſenate, ibid.—his ſpeech to them, ibid.—determines to make himſelf maſter of the lake di Garda, and to drive the duke's forces entirely from it, 356—attacks the Venetians with his gallies, ibid.—defeats them, and takes the caſtles they had taken poſſeſſion of, ibid.—relieves Breſcia, ibid.—marches after the enemy, ibid.—diſlodges them from the caſtle to which they had retreated, and obliges them to retire to Cremona, ibid.—begins to be afraid of loſing ſome of his dominions, if not all, 357—orders Piccinino to quit Tuſcany immediately, ibid.—his anſwer to the duke's propoſal for a peace, 371—endeavours to recover the confidence of the Venetians by a vigorous proſecution of the war, 371—is courted by all parties, 388—is in deſperate circumſtances after the death of the duke of Milan, 391—made by the Milaneſe commander in chief of their forces, ibid.—marries the duke's natural daughter, 395—totally defeats the Venetians at Caravaggio, 402—his generous behaviour to a Venetian proveditore, whom he had taken priſoner, ibid.—concludes a peace with the Venetians, 404—deſerts the Milaneſe, ibid.—is addreſſed by their ambaſſador, ibid.—his anſwer, 408—lays ſiege to Milan, 410—makes a truce, and draws off the army, 411—returns at the expiration of the truce, and reduces the city to great diſtreſs, 414—enters Milan, and is made duke of it by the general conſent of the citizens, 416—engages in a confederacy with the Florentines, 417—undertakes the reduction of Genoa, and ſucceeds, ii. 18—ſends the king of France a ſupply of fifteen hundred horſe, under the command of his eldeſt ſon Galeazzo, ibid.—becomes duke of Milan and lord of Genoa, ibid.—takes all proper meaſures to eſtabliſh himſelf in his government, ibid.—offers Giacopo Piccinino honourable terms, 19—orders Piccinino's marriage with his daughter to be conſummated, 20—privately concerts his ruin with Ferdinand, ibid.—dies, 23—is ſucceeded by his ſon Galeazzo, ibid.

*Sforza, Ludovico,* makes himſelf guardian of the young duke of Milan, ii. 118—comes to an agreement with the Venetians, 136.

*Signiory,* of Florence, the ſpirited addreſs of one of them to Gualtier, duke of Athens, i. 139.

*Sixtus* IV. pope, the firſt who began to ſhew the world what a pope could do if he pleaſed, ii. 47—is dreaded by moſt of the princes in Italy, ibid.—reſolving to keep the territories of the church in their duty, he orders Spoletto to be ſacked, 65—becomes an enemy to the Medici on their furniſhing it with ſupplies, ibid.—being deprived of the ſervices of cardinal Pietro by his death, ſuppoſed to be by poiſon, he proceeds with more coolneſs and deliberation in his deſigns, 66—enters into a league with king Ferdinand, and invites the other princes of Italy to join in it, ibid.—takes great pains to detach Frederick, lord of Urbino, reckoned the moſt able commander in Italy, from the ſervice of the Florentines, 67—gives him an invitation to Rome, ibid.—pretends to be diſguſted at the behaviour of the Florentines, ibid.—appoints Franciſco Salviati to ſucceed Philip de Medici in the archbiſhoprick of Piſa, 83—makes war upon the Florentines, 99—will not admit the Florentine ambaſſadors to an audience, 108—is offended at not being included in the treaty betwixt the Florentines and the Neapolitans, 121—receives twelve ambaſſadors from Florence, 124—treats them with great haughtineſs, 126—is reconciled to them at laſt, ibid.—gives them his benediction, and cauſes the form of the accommodation betwixt them to be publicly read, ibid.—impoſes heavy conditions upon the Florentines, ibid.—forms a confederacy with the Venetians, the Genoeſe, and the Sieneſe, 127—his dominions are ravaged by the Neapolitan forces, under the command of the duke of Calabria, who advances towards Rome, and fills the city, on his approach, with faction and diſcord, ibid.—appoints Robert Rimini his commander in chief, ibid.—his troops defeat thoſe of the duke, 130—buries Robert Rimini with great funeral honours, 131—concludes a peace with the king of Naples, and with the Florentines, 132—dies, 138.

*Skirmiſhes*, whether they are neceſſary before battle, iii. 466.

*Soderini, Nicholas*, choſen gonfalonier of juſtice, ii. 31—is attended to the palace with a great concourſe of the principal citizens, ibid.—is crowned by them with an olive garland, ibid.—follows his brother's advice, 32—goes out of his office with little honour, ibid.

*Soldiers*, the beſt and moſt faithful ones among thoſe who fight from a principle of honour, iii. 146—the beſt method of raiſing them, iv. 34—how the ancients exerciſed theirs, 65—in what manner they ſhould be exerciſed at preſent, 68—in what manner they are to be rallied after having been thrown into diſorder, 79—different ways of animating them, 144—kept in their duty by religion, 146—to be ſometimes laid under a neceſſity of fighting bravely, 147.

*Soldiery*, the different ſorts of it, ii. 289.

*Sophia*, the wife of the emperor Juſtinus inſtigates him to recal Narſetes from Italy, i. 16—provokes Narſetes, by a contemptuous meſſage, to invite the king of the Lombards to invade it, 17.

*Spinola, Francis*, having betrayed the city of Genoa into the hands of the duke of Milan, repents of his conduct, and enables it to recover its liberty, i. 306.

*Spinoli, Gherardino*, a Genoeſe, makes a purchaſe of Lucca, with thirty thouſand florins, i. 130.

*Spoletto*, ordered to be ſacked by pope Sixtus IV. ii. 65.

*St. Dominic*, the order of, when inſtituted, i. 43.

*St. Francis*, the order of, when inſtituted, i. 43.

*St. George*, an account of that company at Genoa, ii. 141—143.

*St. Niccolo*, a caſtle upon the ſkirts of the mountains that divide the ſtate of Caſentino from the vale of Arno, 353—taken by Niccolo Piccinino after a ſiege of two-and-thirty days, 354.

*State*, dangerous evils in a ſtate more likely to be removed by a temporizing, than a violent conduct, iii. 115—a great misfortune befalling a ſtate generally prognoſticated by ſome people, or foretold by ſome perſon or other, 180—weak ſtates commonly fluctuating in their reſolutions, 264—the methods to be taken for the re-union of a divided ſtate, pointed out, 435.

*Stiliano*, caſtle of, burnt by Franciſco Sforza, the Milaneſe general, i. 269.

*Stilico*, appointed by the emperor Theodoſius to preſide over the weſtern part of the Roman empire, i. 5.—concealing ceaſing his ambition with more art than Ruffinus or Gildo did theirs, he endeavours to inſinuate himſelf into the favour and confidence of the new emperors, i. 5—deſigns, however, to perplex and embarraſs their affairs, ibid.—adviſes them to retrench the former pay of the Viſigoths, in order to ſtir the people againſt them, ibid.—incites alſo many other northern nations, ready to ſeek new ſettlements, to invade the Roman provinces, ibid.

*Strozzi*, *Andrea*, a Florentine, makes an attempt upon the liberties of the city, i. 156—with difficulty eſcapes the hands of the magiſtrates, ibid.

*Sylla*, by what means he twice eluded his enemy, iv. 197.

T.

*Teia*, choſen by the Goths their king, on the death of Totila, i. 16.

*Tempeſt*, a prodigious one in Tuſcany, i. 437.

*Tenric*, ſon of Attila, i. 8.

*Theodate*, having betrayed Amalaſontha, and put her to death, ſeizes upon the kingdom himſelf, i. 14—gives great diſguſt to the Oſtrogoths by ſuch a proceeding, ibid.

*Theodore*, the firſt pope, quarrels with Deſiderius, a Lombard, duke of Tuſcany, i. 25—is beſieged by him in Rome, ibid.—is obliged to apply for help to Charlemagne, ibid.

*Theodoric*, ſucceeding to the kingdom of the Oſtrogoths on the death of his uncle Volamir, writes a letter to Zeno, the eaſtern emperor, in order to procure larger and more convenient territories for them, i. 11—receives permiſſion from him to march againſt Odoacer, and to wreſt Italy out of his hands if he was able, ib.—in conſequence of this permiſſion he, immediately quitting Pannonia, enters Italy, ibid.—kills Odoacer and his ſon, ibid.—calls himſelf king of Rome, ibid.—takes up his reſidence at Ravenna, ibid.—his character, 11, 12—reflections on the wretched ſtate of Italy between the reigns of Arcadius, Honorius, and that of Theodoric, 12—on the revolutions originating from that miſerable ſituation, 13—the happineſs of it during the reign of Theodoric, 14.

*Theodoſius*, the laſt Roman emperor, who entirely defeats the Viſigoths, and reduces them to obedience i. 4—finds

finds them ſubmiſſive to his government, ibid.—ready to receive his pay, and to fight for him, ibid.—appoints three governors to preſide over three parts of the empire; Ruffinus over the Eaſt, Stilico over the Weſt, and Gildo over the South, 5.

*Theodoſius*, ſon of Arcadius, ſucceeds to the empire, i. 6—gives himſelf little trouble about the affairs of the Weſt, ibid.—ſeeing himſelf attacked in many different places, he begins to treat, firſt with the Vandals, and then with the Franks, ibid.

*Theſeus*, the founder of the city of Athens, iii. 2.

*Thomyris*, queen of Scythia, deceives Cyrus by a pretended flight, iv. 202.

*Tiberius*, the emperor, ſucceſſor to Juſtinus, being engaged in a war with the Parthians, cannot ſend any relief into Italy, i. 19.

*Tiberius*, the emperor, more careful to eſtabliſh and increaſe his own power, than to promote the public good, iv. 27—diſarms the Roman people, and keeps the ſame armies continually on the foot upon the confines of the empire, ibid.—not thinking thoſe ſufficient to keep the ſenate and people in due awe, raiſes other forces, called the prætorian bands, 28.

*Time*, juſtly called the father of truth, iii. 13.

*Times*, the neceſſity of a man's accommodating himſelf to them, in order to ſecure ſucceſs in great deſigns, iii. 384.

*Tirones*, new-raiſed men ſo called by the Romans, iv. 43.

*Tivoli*, the ancient Tybur of the Romans, i. 393.

*Tournament*, a grand one at Florence, ii. 28.

*Totila*, ſucceeds Ildovadus, as king of the Goths, i. 15—routs the emperor's forces, ibid.—regains Tuſcany, and ſtrips the imperial generals of almoſt every ſtate which Beliſarius recovered, ibid.—beſieges Rome, whilſt Beliſarius lies with his army at Oſtia, and takes it, 15—demoliſhes the greater part of the city, ibid.—marches into Calabria, in order to cut off the ſupplies coming out of Greece againſt him, ibid.—retakes Rome, but does not exerciſe the ſame rigour upon it that he had done before, 16—defeated and killed by Narſetes, ibid.

*Town*, the proviſions neceſſary for its defence upon the approach of an enemy, iii. 445—in what manner to be fortified, iv. 209—rules to be obſerved by by thoſe who are to defend a town threatened with a ſiege, 211—advice to thoſe who are in want of proviſions when they are beſieged, 217—and to the beſiegers, ibid.—how to draw a garriſon out of a town that is beſieged, 222—good guards to be kept at all times, and in all places, by the beſieged, 224—different methods by which they may convey private intelligence to their friends, 225—how to repair a breach, and to defend it, 226—the beſieged to divide the forces as little as poſſible, 228—the expoſure of a town to an aſſault on one ſide ſometimes neceſſary, ibid.

*Tyranny*, the introducers of it into any ſtate to be held in deteſtation, iii. 43.

U.

*Uberti*, *Farinati degli*, commander of the Neapolitan forces, defeats the Guelphs upon the banks of the river Arbia with great ſlaughter, i. 89—gives ſingular proofs of his patriotiſm, 90—openly and boldly proteſts againſt the cruel ſentence of his party upon the city of Florence, ibid.—his memorable declaration before the council at Empali, ibid.

*Urban*, the ſecond, a perſon very diſagreeable to the Romans, i. 36—not thinking himſelf ſecure in Italy, he removes into France, ibid.—lays there the plan of a very noble and generous undertaking, ibid.

*Uzzano*, *Niccolo da*, oppoſes Rinaldo de Albizi's argument in favour of a war againſt Lucca, i. 259—his anſwer to Niccolo Barbadori, on being ſolicited by him to promote the expulſion of Coſimo de Medici from the city of Florence, 274—dies ſoon afterwards, 278.

V.

*Vada*, caſtle of, taken from the Florentines by the Neapolitans, by the negligence of the governor, i. 424.

*Valentine*, duke, finds himſelf obliged to wait upon Lewis XII. king of France, (in Lombardy), in conſequence of the complaints made by the Florentines, after the revolt of Arezzo, and ſome other towns in the vale of Chiana, in order to exculpate himſelf, ii. 481—ſtopping at Imola, in his return from thence,

thence, he there lays a ſcheme to diſpoſſeſs Giovanni Bentivoglio of Bologna, and to make it the capital of the ſtates which he had lately acquired in Romagna, ibid.—ſtirs up a formidable conſpiracy, ibid.—the caſtle of St. Leo wreſted out of his hands, 482—receives from the Florentines their ſecretary Niccolo Machiavelli, with an offer of their protection and aſſiſtance againſt his new enemies, 483—is in great diſtreſs at Imola, by the mutiny and deſertion of part of his forces, ibid.—takes courage from the offers made him by the Florentines, ibid.—reſolves to ſpin out the war with the few troops which were faithful to him, and to amuſe the enemy with overtures of agreement, whilſt he endeavoured to raiſe more forces, ibid.—ſends to deſire ſuccour from the king of France, ibid.—raiſes all the recruits he poſſibly can, by giving large advance-money, and good pay to every man, eſpecially horſemen, who would enter into his ſervice, ibid.—a body of his troops make a ſtand againſt the enemy at Foſſombrone, but are ſoon routed, ibid.—the news of this defeat determines him to ſtop the progreſs of the war at any rate, by a treaty of peace, ibid.—leaves no ſort of artifice untried which may contribute to that end, ibid.—his inſinuating repreſentations, ibid.—he works ſo effectually upon the credulity of his enemies, that they agree to a ceſſation of hoſtilities, and ſend Signor Paolo Urſini to treat with him of peace, ibid.—ſtill continues his preparations for war, ibid.—raiſes forces with all poſſible diligence, ibid.—diſtributes them privately in different towns all over Romagna, 484—receives a reinforcement of five hundred French lances, ibid.—thinks it a ſafer and better way to proceed rather by circumvention than open violence, ibid.—reſolves not to break off the treaty he had begun, ibid.—proceeds with ſo much ſeeming candour and diſintereſtedneſs, that a peace is ſoon concluded, ibid.—agrees to pay the penſions as uſual, and makes a preſent of four thouſand ducats in ready money, ibid.—not only promiſes to give Giovanni Bentivoglio no farther diſturbance at Bologna, but contracts a family-alliance with him, ibid.—is promiſed by his enemies in return the reſtoration of the duchy of Urbino, and whatever elſe they had taken

from

from him, and their ſervice in any future expedition, ibid.—having concluded this treaty, he quarters all his own forces and French auxiliaries in the different towns of Romagna, 485—leaves Imola, ibid.—goes to Ceſena, ibid.—ſtays there ſeveral days to conſult with ſome deputies ſent thither by the Vitelli and Urſini, about the enterprize they ſhould next go upon, ibid.—receives a meſſage from them, by which they offered to invade Tuſcany, or to make an attempt upon Sinigaglia, ibid.—wiſhes them to have no thoughts of the firſt propoſal, but concurs with them in the other, ibid.—thinks he has a very favourable opportunity for the execution of his ſecret deſigns, ibid.—diſmiſſes his French auxiliaries, and ſends them back again into Lombardy, ibid.—leaves Ceſena, ibid.—comes to Fano, and avails himſelf of all the artifice he is maſter of to prevail upon Vitelli and Urſini to ſtay at Sinigaglia till his arrival, ibid.—gains a conſiderable point, 486—communicates his deſign to eight of his moſt intimate confidants, ibid.—gives them inſtructions for their conduct, ibid.—orders all his forces, both horſe and foot, to rendezvous upon the banks of the Metavero, and to wait there till he joined them, ibid.—arrives there himſelf at the time appointed, and draws up his army, ibid.—cauſes two hundred horſe to advance towards Sinigaglia, ibid.—commands the foot to move after them at ſome little diſtance, ibid.—brings up the reſt of the cavalry himſelf in the rear, ibid.—draws near the town of Sinigaglia, 487—receives Vitellozzo Vitelli, Paolo Urſini, and the duke of Gravina, in a very generous manner, ibid.—not perceiving Oliveretto da Fermo, he makes a private ſignal to one of his men appointed to watch him, to take care that he did not eſcape, ibid.—receives him alſo very graciouſly, ibid.—after having ordered them to be ſecured, he mounts his horſe, and iſſues commands for the diſarming and plundering of their ſoldiers, 489—prevents his own ſoldiers from pillaging the town by killing ſeveral of them with his own hand, ibid.—having reſolved to put Vitellozzo and Oliveretto to death, he orders them both to be ſtrangled, ibid.

*Valentinian*, emperor of the Weſt, reſolves, after the departure of Attila from Italy, to attempt the reſtoration of that empire to its former greatneſs and ſplendour, i. 8—chuſes Ravenna inſtead of Rome for the place of his reſidence, ibid.

*Valerius, Publius*, his behaviour to the [illegible], miſtruſting their ſincerity, iv. 294.

*Vandals*, the, hard preſſed, and reduced to extremities by the Viſigoths, after having ſeized upon that part of Spain called Breſcia, are called over by Boniface (at that time governing Africa in the name of the Emperor) to come and ſettle there, i. 6—willingly embark in this enterprize, ibid.—under the banner of Genſeric their king, they make a deſcent upon the coaſt of Africa, ibid.—make themſelves maſters of Africa, ibid.—receive pacific overtures from the emperor Theodoſius, ibid.—driven out of Africa by Beliſarius, 14.

*Velamir*, king of the Oſtrogoths, i. 7.—after the death of Attila, he takes up arms againſt his two ſons, Tenric and Euric, ibid.—kills one of them, and drives the other, with all the Huns, over the Danube into their own country, 8.

*Venice*, remarkable inſtance of an unwholeſome country's being rendered healthy by its populouſneſs, i. 80.

*Venice*, city of, founded by people who had fled into certain little iſles at the extremity of the Adriatic, where they lived together under no particular governor, but agreed to obſerve certain laws which ſeemed abſolutely neceſſary for their ſupport and eſtabliſhment, ii. 2.

*Ventimiglio*, ſent by pope Calixtus III. as his general againſt Piccinino, i. 435—comes to an engagement with him near Bolſena, ibid.—is taken priſoner, ibid.

*Vercingetorex*, general of the Gauls, retreats to a conſiderable diſtance, that he may not be obliged to fight the Roman army commanded by Julius Cæſar, iv. 143.

*Verona*, ſurpriſed in the dead of night by the marquis of Mantua and Niccolo Piccinino, i. 340—the city ſaved from pillage by the ſubmiſſion of ſome of the principal inhabitants, 341.

*Victory*, the duty of wiſe princes and well-governed republics to be contented with it, and not to graſp at more, iii. 316.

*Virtue*, military, reflections on it, iv. 89—to what the rareneſs of it may be attributed, 93.

*Viſconti*, the, founders of the dukedom of Milan, their original traced, i. 54, 55, 56.

*Viſigoths*, the firſt of the northern nations, after the conqueſt of the Cimbri by Marius, that invaded the Roman empire, i. 3—have the country extending itſelf along the banks of the Danube aſſigned them by the emperors, after ſeveral battles, for their habitation, 4—maintain a poſſeſſion of the lands allotted them for a great number of years, ibid.—invade the Roman provinces at different times, and upon various occaſions, ibid.—are often repelled by the power of the emperors, ibid.—are entirely reduced to obedience by the emperor Theodoſius, ibid.—do not after his victories chuſe any other king of their own to reign over them, ibid.—voluntarily ſubmit to his government, ibid.—receive his pay, and fight under his banners, ibid.—finding their uſual ſubſidies reduced by the emperors, in conſequence of the advice given them by Stilico, they determine to redreſs themſelves, 5—make Alaric their king, ibid.—invade the empire under his conduct, ibid.—take and ſack Rome itſelf, after many enterprizes, and over-run all the reſt of Italy, ibid.—make themſelves maſters of Spain, 6.

*Vitelli, Niccolo*, lord of the city of Caſtello, one of Lorenzo de Medici's moſt intimate friends, ii. 65—furniſhes him with ſome ſupplies, ibid.

*Vitiges*, choſen king by the Goths in the room of Theodate, i. 15—is beſieged and taken priſoner in Ravenna by Beliſarius, ibid.

*Voltaire*, M. his preface to the firſt edition of the King of Pruſſia's Examen du Prince de Machiavel, ii. 181.

*Volterra*, rebels againſt the Florentines, i. 254—ſoon reduced to obedience, 255—tumults there, and the cauſe of them, ii. 61—when detached by the Florentines, 64.

*Vortiger*, king of the Angli, drives the Britons out of their iſland, and gives it the name of England, i. 6.

W.

*War*, ſome of the ſprings of it between different powers diſcloſed, iii. 245—whether it is better, upon the expectation of a war, to invade the enemy, or to ſuſtain an invaſion, 252—the profeſſion of it not to be made his only one by an honeſt man, iv. 21—the ſubjects in a monarchy or a republic not to be ſuffered to make war their only occupation, 24—the military art to be practiſed in time of peace as an exerciſe, in time of war merely out of neceſſity, and for the acquiſition of glory, 25.

*Whitehorne, Peter*, his dedication to queen Elizabeth, iv. 4.
*William*, king of Sicily and Puglia, included in an agreement between Frederick Barbaroſſa and pope Urban II. i. 42.
*Women*, the ruin of ſome ſtates aſcribed to them, iii. 433.

X.

*Xantippus*, the Lacedæmonian, his advice to the Carthaginians fatal to the Romans, iv. 129.

Z.

*Zeno*, the government of Conſtantinople falls into his hands, i. 10—reſiding there, he rules the whole empire of the eaſt, 11.
*Zeno*, a fortreſs belonging to the Veroneſe, i. 337.
*Zepidi*, eſtabliſh themſelves in Pannonia, i. 8.

FINIS.